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Abstract
A large number of authors have observed that forensic speeches may contain material 
which would currently be regarded as inappropriate or irrelevant. For example, 
defendants may admit or ignore a charge - and claim that, because of their past public 
services or good character they should not be condemned. In addition to these pleas, one 
also finc/appeals to the court’s pity and attempts to deride the opponents character and 
citizenship, designed to arouse the emotions of the court in an attempt to win its vote. 
Since the eighteenth century, modem scholars have regularly claimed that these appeals 
and comments could influence the verdict of the court. Sometimes they have argued that 
juries did this as part of an overall framework of equity (the “equity” theory); at other 
times they argue that jury decisions were effectively random and frequently capricious. 
This latter theory is the earliest found in relation to concepts of relevance, but has 
become more powerful today under the weight of recent theories about “social 
competition” and its impacts on the practice of litigation.
There is a contrary position in modem scholarship to these “equity” and “social 
competition” theories. Meyer-Laurin has noted that speakers frequently exhort the jury 
to judge according to the law, and never exhort them to ignore the law. He and others 
claim that juries effectively kept legal considerations uppermost when deciding cases. 
There has been a long history of debate between proponents of the three theories, but the 
issue has never been effectively resolved. Scholars have been able to marshal evidence, 
at times from the same forensic speeches, to prove all three theories simultaneously. It is 
obvious that all three cannot be correct, but what is less obvious is that all three are 
probably wrong. The explanation lies in a reassessment of the forensic speeches, and the 
evidence they provide for the concept of relevance in Athenian courts.
This thesis offers definitions of relevance, an assessment of the extent of legal and 
nonlegal arguments in forensic speeches, and also discusses key features of the concept 
of relevance such as the use of witnesses, appeals for pity, the Heliastic oath and appeals 
based on character or equity. The thesis argues that the “equity” theory is untenable, and 
the “social competition” theory does not match the evidence of forensic oratory. Meyer- 
Laurin’s “positivistic” theory is the most valid, but drastically underestimates the 
occurrence of nonlegal pleading. This thesis shows, by analysing Athenian concepts of 
relevance, that juries generally would be expected to place legal considerations first, but 
nonlegal arguments were frequent and could be regularly used to supplement a legal 
case. They were only rarely used as the main prop of a case, and in those cases in 
circumstances when the speakers did not have solid legal foundations for their cases. 
Overall, relevance was a flexible concept which could vary in any speech, but 
nonetheless was confined within the parameters of a general respect for law and 
evidence.
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Chapter One Introduction, Methodology and Sources
de quibus vos aliis testes esse debetis, de eis ipsi alios testis audietis? at quos 
testis? primum dicam, id quod est commune, Graecos...verum tarnen hoc dico de 
toto genere Graecorum: tribuo illis litteras, do multarum artium disciplinam, non 
adimo sermonis leporem, ingeniorum acumen, dicendi copiam, denique etiam, si 
qua sibi alia sumunt, non repugno; testimoniorum religionem et fidem numquam 
ista natio coluit, totiusque huiusce rei quae sit vis, quae auctoritas, quod pondus, 
ignorant...hi si Graeci fuissent, ac nisi nostri mores ac disciplina plus valeret 
quam dolor ac simultas, omnes se spoliatos, vexatos, fortunis eversos esse 
dixissent. Graecus testis cum ea voluntate processit ut laedat, non iuris iurandi, 
sed laedendi verba meditatur; vinci, refelli, coargui putat esse turpissimum; ad id 
se parat, nihil curat aliud, itaque non optimus quisque nec gravissimus, sed 
impudentissimus loquacissimusque deligitur...qui autem dicit testimonium ex 
nostris hominibus, ut se ipse sustentat, ut omnia verba moderate, ut timet ne 
quid cupide, ne quid iracunde, ne quid plus minusve quam sit necesse dicat! num 
illos item putatis, quibus ius iurandum iocus est, testimonium ludus, existimatio 
vestra tenebrae, laus, merces, gratia, gratulatio proposita est omnis in impudenti 
mendacio? sed non dilatabo orationem meam; etenim potest esse infinita, si mihi 
libeat totius gentis in testimoniis dicendis explicare levitatem.
Will you then listen to others as witnesses on those points, respecting which you 
yourselves ought rather to bear witness to others? And what witnesses are they?
In the first place, I will say that they are Greeks...But I say this of the whole race 
of Greeks; I allow them learning, I allow them a knowledge of many arts; I do 
not deny them wit in conversation, acuteness of talents, and fluency in speaking; 
even if they claim praise for other sorts of ability, I will not make any objection; 
but a scrupulous regard to truth in giving their evidence is not a virtue that that 
nation has ever cultivated; they are utterly ignorant what is the meaning of that 
quality, they know nothing of its authority or of its weight...If these men had 
been Greeks, and if our habits and principles had not had more influence than 
indignation and hostility, they all would have said that they had been plundered, 
and harassed, and stripped of their fortunes...When a Greek witness comes 
forward with a desire to injure a man, he does not think of the words of his oath, 
but of what he can say to injure him. He thinks it a most shameful thing to be 
defeated, to be detected, to allow his enemy's innocence to be proved. That is the 
contest for which he prepares himself; he cares for nothing beyond. Therefore, it 
is not the best men, nor the wisest, but the most impudent and talkative men who 
are selected as witnesses... And when a man of our citizens gives his evidence, 
how carefully does he restrain himself, how scrupulously does he regulate all his 
expressions, how fearful is he, and anxious not to say anything covetously or 
angrily,-- not to say one word more or less than necessary! Do you think that 
those Greeks are so too? men to whom an oath is a joke, evidence a plaything, 
your opinion of them a shadow, men who place all their credit and profit and 
reputation, and triumph telling the most impudent lies. But I will not spin out 
what I have got to say. Indeed, my speech would be interminable if I were to take 
it into my head to unfold the faithlessness of the whole nation in giving evidence 
(Cicero Pro Flac. iv-vi.9-12).1
1 The translation is by C. D. Yonge (1875:429-31).
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With these words Marcus Tullius Cicero summed up Greek witnesses. Cicero was 
defending a provincial governor charged with extortion and had obvious motives. He 
needed to discredit his opponent’s witnesses, and his speech would have appealed to a 
Roman jury of the Late Republic. It is unclear whether Cicero’s accusations have any 
basis in fact. What they do reveal, however, is how Greek litigation could be understood 
and characterised by someone from another culture when he wanted to develop 
stereotypes for his own ends.
Modem scholars are faced with a similar choice to Cicero. In the study of Classical 
Athenian juries we inevitably make comparisons between our own world and that of 
Cleon and Demosthenes. It is a common caveat that one must acknowledge the 
difference between modem western and ancient Athenian courts. Never has this caveat 
been more appropriate than in studying relevance in Athenian courts.
In this thesis “relevance” is used in relation to the types of arguments speakers used and 
the types of evidence they submitted. Both can be viewed as relevant or irrelevant to the 
main issue of the trial. Forensic speeches contain material which would currently be 
regarded as inappropriate or irrelevant. In these speeches defendants may discuss their 
public services or good characters,2 34 5make appeals for pity, or deride their opponents’ 
characters and citizenship.71
There has been no comprehensive study of relevance in Greek judicial oratory to date. 
Scholars sometimes list some key references, derived ultimately from Spengel’s early 
study, to show that the ancients viewed emotional arguments or discussions of character 
and services as irrelevant (Aristotle Rhet. 1354al5-24; Lycurgus i.l 1-13), that the 
Areopagus forbade irrelevant pleading (Lysias iii.46; Lycurgus i.l 1-13; Pollux viii.l 17; 
Lucian Anach. 19; Aristotle Rhet. 1354al5-24),6 and that in forensic orations irrelevant 
pleading is sometimes described as speaking ê o) tou npayM^TOS.7
Modem discussions of relevance in legal argument rarely move beyond these references. 
Scholars sometimes contrast modem common law courts, where judges direct a jury on
2 Finley (1975:143-5).
3 Todd (1993:89-90).
4 Ibid. See also Todd (1990a:25), Dover (1989:22).
5 Bonner (1927:78).
6 Spengel (1828:96-7); Bruns (1896:487-8); Bonner (1905:14-15, 1927:73); Lipsius (1905-15,111:918); 
Voegelin (1943:13-15); MacDowell (1963:43-44); Lossau (1964:19-20); Wankel (1976:150-2); Wallace 
(1989:124 and n.l 12); Carey (1997:18); Carawan (1998:158 and n.33); Whitehead (2000:238-9).
7 Bonner (1905:14-15). As discussed in Chapter Four, other terms are frequently used.
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legal issues, and the Athenian system, where decisions were made by dikastai without 
detailed legal knowledge. On the basis of that contrast, they conclude that Athenian 
juries could ignore evidence and law in reaching their decisions, in comparison to 
modem courts that, we are told, prioritise law and rules of evidence and eliminate 
nonlegal considerations.9 In a classic example of the method, the Victorian barrister and 
translator of Aristophanes, Benjamin Rogers, stated his opinion (“as an English 
lawyer”), “that it would be difficult to devise a judicial system less adapted for the 
administration of justice.” 10 Other authors are less explicit, but a general view has 
developed that Athenian juries frequently ignored law and evidence and this assumption 
ultimately rests on the authority of modem conceptions of law and the role of the courts.
I am not arguing that we can avoid modem perspectives. It is a historiographic reality 
that today’s scholars inform their opinions with their own, culturally-derived, 
understandings. It is important, though, to bear it constantly in mind, since modem 
theories about relevant argument in Athenian courts centre around the Eurocentric 
contrast between modem legal systems characterised by strict legal processes and more 
informal systems that permit nonlegal factors. There is always a danger that, like Cicero, 
we will do little more than give voice to stereotypes and prejudices, and concentrate 
more upon convincing our audience than upon developing a relatively objective 
picture. * 11
The influence of modem conceptions of law in the study of Athenian lawcourts emerged 
in the late eighteenth century. Since then, theories about relevance in Athenian courts 
can largely be characterised as a battle between three sets of partly overlapping, but 
essentially competing, narratives:
8 It is traditional to note that the Greek word 5iK aO Tf|9 , commonly translated “juror”, can mean both 
“judge” and “juror”, and that Athenian dikastai fulfilled both these roles. See Todd (1993:82-3).
9 This point is discussed in detail in Chapters Two and Three. See Beauchet (1897, 1:xx); Hirzel (1900:57- 
60); Vinogradoff( 1922:64-5, 1928a:16, 1928b:42); Weiss (1923:73-6); Paoli (1926:122, 1933:35, 39-45, 
67-8); Bonner (1927:74-6, 78-88); Wyse (1905:476-77); Bonner and Smith (1930-38,11:298-302); Gemet 
(1937:121); Arangio-Ruiz (1946:242-3, n.l); J.W. Jones (1956:121-2); Ruschenbusch (1957:260-6); 
Biscardi (1970:219-21, 227-30; 1982:362-71); Grimaldi (1980:301); Edwards and Usher (1985:232); 
Hillgruber (1988:112-20); Todd (1990a: 19, 1993:54-5, 59-60, 2000a:24); Todd and Millett (1990:14); 
Millett (1990:177); Scafiiro (1997:53); Christ (1998:41, 195, 208); Allen (2000:175).
10 Rogers (1875:xxxv). Similar views were expressed by Maine (1890:75-6) and Bonner (1927:78-82). 
For a recent version of the same argument, see Allen (2000:171-9).
11 This brings to mind postmodern claims that history is little more than the imposition of narratives on the 
past, and that evidence gains meaning solely from being correlated with these narratives. See, for 
example, Ankersmit (1989:137) and White (1973:30). While I hesitate to nail my colours to this particular 
mast, in the context of the history of relevance in Athenian courts it has a certain heuristic value.
• jurors did not feel bound by law and evidence, but based decisions on factors such as 
emotional arguments and prejudices;
• jurors sometimes followed law and evidence, but frequently departed from them to 
indulge their sense of equity; and
• jurors generally had a “positivistic” approach and based their decisions primarily on 
evidence and law.
Since the eighteenth century, historians of the Athenian lawcourts have focussed on 
particular topics - equity pleas, emotional pleas, slanders, legal pleas - that are pertinent 
to relevance in a modem western court. They have focussed on the occurrence of these 
topics in ancient sources. I would submit that this methodology is flawed, because 
scholars have not tried to measure the overall occurrence of the topics in our sources, 
but have selected passages to fit their cases. At times it appears that they have trawled 
through ancient oratory looking for the juicy bits. There has been no real attempt to 
engage with this oratory as a whole, and as a result our basic knowledge of legal 
relevance has changed little since the eighteenth century. Rather than considering the 
overall character of the material in ancient oratory, assessing its variability and inherent 
patterns, and seeking to understand what that variation and those patterns might reveal, 
scholars have focussed on extremes. Convincing arguments can in fact be made that 
Athenian jurors did follow juristic principles, or abandon the law in favour of equity, or 
judge on the basis of character and civic merit. One is reminded of Erasmus Darwin’s 
comment on his brother Charles’ theories: “The a priori reasoning is so entirely
1 ̂
satisfactory that if the facts won’t fit in, why so much for the facts is my feeling.”
In this thesis forensic oratory is viewed, in effect, as a statistical population. It is only 
when we consider the overall balance of arguments in all speeches, and in any speech, 
that we can really know how common or uncommon was irrelevance in Athenian courts.
Structure of the Thesis
Chapter Two begins with a survey of early eighteenth-century views of Athenian juries. 
This survey is important for understanding modem theories. In the eighteenth century, 
the battle lines on our topic were drawn and the forces in support of each theory 
marshalled. While their backgrounds and political views are different today, in a sense
12 Letter 23rd November 1859, in Darwin (1888:233).
modern scholars are still firing from the same ramparts. During the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, scholars formed into camps that, in part, matched their support for 
monarchy or democracy, and interpreted the behaviour of Athenian juries as either 
wholly arbitrary and capricious or no worse or better than that of modem juries.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century a new tradition began to emerge among some 
German scholars. Its major proponents claimed that Athenian courts could decide for 
equity rather than law, and that much of the nonlegal argument in a court was actually 
based around these equity pleas. This tradition still has considerable influence. A 
number of scholars responded that there was no explicit theory of “equity” in Athenian 
courts, and that, overall, jurors followed law and evidence. 14
In Chapter Three I will concentrate on the modem versions of the eighteenth-century 
theory that Athenian juries ignored law and evidence. Those who currently support this 
theory highlight the use, by litigants in Athenian courts, of emotional appeals, 
discussions of character, public services and slander, but state that such topics must be 
explained as part of competition for honour and status in Athenian society. 15 They claim 
that there was no concept of the rule of law in Athens independent of the will of the 
people, that there was a “high tolerance for perjury” 16 and that Athenian society 
accentuated competitive values over “quiet” values such as justice or altruism.
Chapter Four will commence with a discussion of the concept of relevance in Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric, because that is where most scholars have started and we need to begin there to 
unravel the issues. I will then outline the evidence for relevance in forensic oratory, and 
discuss what that evidence tells us about the sort of arguments that Athenians 
considered irrelevant. The evidence provides us with a basis for identifying the sorts of 
arguments that were commonly considered irrelevant - slander, abuse, discussion of 
character and liturgies, other crimes, lies about actions or character, appeals for pity and 
jokes and ridicule. The most common complaint was that one’s opponent was 
introducing new claims that were not in the written charges and reply.
|J Todd’s (1993:91) claim that German scholarship has been hostile to the Athenian courts, whereas 
English scholars have been more optimistic, is somewhat simplistic. Antidemocratic views of Athenian 
justice originated in Britain with Tucker (1781), Gillies (1792[ 1786]) and Mitford (1785, 1818), while the 
theory that Athenian courts had a concept of equity originated in Germany with Seeliger (1876:673-74), 
von Wilamowitz-Möllendorf (1893:362), Hitzig (1897:180-81) and Hirzel (1900:57-60).
14 See in particular Meyer-Laurin (1965).
13 See in particular Adkins (1972), Gamer (1987), Cohen (1995a, 1995b), Christ (1998) and Allen (2000). 
16 Faraone (1999:110).
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In Chapter Five I will use this evidence to assess the degree to which forensic oratory as 
a whole can be characterised as relevant or irrelevant (and, by extension, legal and 
nonlegal). The evidence shows that, on the basis of the definitions reached in Chapter 
Four, the overwhelming majority of orations stuck to the issue and were relevant. The 
evidence also shows that many speeches did contain some irrelevant material, but that 
this is usually a very small proportion of any speech, and nonlegal factors are seldom 
intended to have priority over the legal case. Accordingly, the evidence indicates that 
speakers expected to win their cases on the basis primarily of legal, rather than nonlegal, 
factors.
Chapter Five will also analyse the evidence for the Heliastic oath. The use of the oath by 
litigants is characterised by an emphasis on lawful verdicts, rather than nonlegal or 
equity-based verdicts. In Chapter Six I will discuss the use of evidence in Athenian 
courts, noting that there is little to support the idea that perjury was more common in 
Athens than in any other jurisdiction ancient or modem. Independent witnesses did 
exist, and were frequently used. Witnesses who were not independent commonly appear 
in family disputes or inheritance cases, where it is debatable whether any other 
witnesses could have been produced, and in many of these cases speakers are at pains to 
provide independent witnesses as well where they can.
Finally, in Chapter Seven I discuss appeals for pity in Athenian courts, noting that these 
are seldom made as nonlegal pleas, but that speakers generally claim pity based on the 
overall legal justice of their cause.
Discussion of the Sources
There is no single ancient work on the legal concept of relevance in Athenian courts. As 
a result, we have to reconstruct the concept from available sources. In doing so, a range 
of methodological issues needs to be discussed.
The speeches of the Attic orators are our chief source for the study of Athenian legal 
procedure. We have 150 of these speeches, of which 104 were forensic speeches 
delivered in Athenian courts (see Appendix One; another forensic speech, Isocrates xix, 
was delivered in Aegina). A few forensic speeches were delivered by the orator 
himself. The majority, however, were written by the orator, working as a logographer or 
speechwriter, for other people. The precise relationship between a logographer and his 
client is debated, though the logographer probably provided advice and a speech and 
may also have sought information on the opponent’s case for a client.19
In addition to the works of the ten orators, we have other speeches preserved in histories 
and philosophical works. Three of these purport to have been delivered in trials - the 
speech by Euryptolemus in defence of the generals at their trial after the battle of 
Arginusae (contained in Xenophon’s Hellenica i.7.16-33) and two apologiae, by Plato
17 During the first century AD a canon of the ten “best” Attic orators, judged by standards of literary and 
rhetorical style, was developed. The orators deemed worthy of inclusion in the canon were Antiphon 
(speeches dated c.430-413 BC), Andocides (c.410-391 BC), Lysias (c.411-380 BC), Isocrates (c.403-340 
BC), Isaeus (c.380-340 BC), Demosthenes (c.365-322 BC), Aeschines (c.345-330 BC), Lycurgus (330 
BC), Hyperides (c.340-322 BC) and Dinarchus (323 BC). See Dobson (1919); Edwards (1994); Jebb 
(1876); Kennedy (1963). Problems of attribution, for example of speeches in the Demosthenic corpus, are 
not relevant to this study. The speeches date from about 420 to 320 BC, though the majority are clustered 
in two main periods - from about 420-380 BC and from about 350-320 BC. The speeches of Isaeus and 
some of Demosthenes’ early works are all we have to fill the gap. Although some form of court must have 
existed at Athens before 420 BC, we have no speeches from the earliei periods of Athenian history.
18 The remaining 45 speeches (largely by Isocrates and Demosthenes) are deliberative (assembly) orations 
or epideictic (display) pieces. In this thesis, I have excluded Andocides iv as it is generally thought to be a 
pastiche (Edwards 1995:131-6; MacDowell 1998:159-61; Heftner 2001:51-4). I consider that the 
remaining 104 forensic speeches were actually delivered before a court. Some of these have had their 
doubters, notably Demosthenes xxi (Plutarch Dem. xii.4); my reasons for including this are discussed in 
Appendix One. Recently Porter (1997) has suggested that Lysias i is another pastiche because it includes 
comic stereotypes about adultery. It is simpler to presume that the comic stereotypes in Lysias i reflect the 
logographer’s skill in developing arguments that he thought would appeal to the prejudices of his 
audience. Lysias’ speeches contain many such stereotypes (Gärtner 1997). Porter does submit some 
additional points to support his interpretation, but these are largely trivial. For example, the scarcity of 
rhetorical topoi in the speech (Porter 1997:436-9) may be a reflection of the fact that the speech was 
delivered in a homicide trial before the Delphinion, and standards were rather different there than in 
normal dikasteria (MacDowell 1963:43-4); in addition, an elaborate rhetorical subterfuge may not have 
suited the open character Lysias was trying to create.
19 See Dover (1968:148-74); Lavency (1964:68-122); Usher (1976:32-5). Direct evidence on the role of 
the logographer is rare; from Rhet. ad Alex. 1444b3-6 we can glean that logographers provided both 
advice and a speech, as did Roman advocates later (Cicero De Orat. ii.xxiv. 102-4); this contradicts the 
view (Lavency 1964:192; Todd 1993:95-96) that logographers did not generally provide advice, but wrote 
speeches only.
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and Xenophon, that claim to be Socrates’ case in his defence. The speeches have some 
forensic verisimilitude, but they are not included in the detailed analyses in Chapter Five 
for the following reasons:
• Diodorus Siculus (xiii.101) contradicts Xenophon’s account of the Arginusae trials. 
Xenophon is probably more likely to have known the facts, but his account may have
91been distorted because he wished to stress the illegal nature of the trial.
• The apologiae by Plato and Xenophon are unlikely to be accurate accounts. Given 
their authors’ pro-Socratic bias and likely audience (private groups of friends) they 
may not represent the real arguments Socrates used (and in any case, the 
inconsistencies between the two speeches self-evidently show that one at least must 
be inaccurate).2J
In addition to speeches, there are occasional references to Athenian legal procedure in 
philosophical works and rhetorical handbooks and some longer accounts of particular 
aspects in Aristophanes’ Wasps and the Athenaion Politeia {AP). Philosophical works 
(notably Plato’s and Xenophon’s dialogues) and the WaspshavG been used to deride 
Athenian courts (see Chapter Two). There are, however, major problems with this 
approach:
• Aristophanes’ Wasps satirised jurors for ignoring law in favour of other factors when 
deciding cases (Wasp157, 159-60, 240, 286, 323, 340, 550-86, 893, 900).24 We 
cannot be sure that the play represents the opinions of the Athenian demos at large
90-1 exclude the much later apologiae like Libanius i-ii. There is also the Plataean Debate in Book iii of 
Thucydides’ History, delivered in a “trial,” although in this case of a whole state, and further speeches 
delivered outside the legal system, but in situations which were akin to trials, such as Critias’ accusation 
of Theramenes and the latter’s defence (Xenophon Hell. ii.3.24-49) and the trial at Thebes of the assassins 
of Euphron (Xenophon Hell, vii.3.1-12). We also possess fifth-century B.C. sophistic pieces written in the 
style of defence speeches for legendary characters (e.g. the Helen and Palamedes of Gorgias, the Dissoi 
Logoi, the Ajax and Odysseus of Antisthenes and the Odysseus of Alcidamas). None of these cast much 
light on our topic, except insofar as they all stick to the main issues of the trials. Similarly, the speeches 
incorporated in histories are of limited use as they may have been tailored by the historians to highlight 
particular points (Macleod 1997:242-6; Pelling 2000:119-22).
21 Andrewes (1974).
22 Kelly (1996:152-3). Tarrant (1993:32) points out that with such a readership Plato may not have felt 
that historical accuracy was important.
23 For the view that Plato’s Apology is historically accurate, see Allen (1980:33-6) and Brickhouse and 
Smith (1989:50, n.7). For the alternative view, see the recent review by Barrett (2001). Although I 
concede that Plato’s Apology may have been the first of many such apologiae, I do not consider that this 
of necessity proves that it is historically accurate.
24 The Wasps was interpreted this way in the nineteenth century (Mitchell 1820-22,11:162-8; Rogers 
1875:xvi-xvii). The view has never entirely gone away, and can be found in a rather more nuanced reading 
by Pelling (2000:137, 176).
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(or, even if it does, whether they were warranted). The Wasps is a comedy, and 
comedy by its very nature distorts and deceives. Aristophanes’ portrait o f jurors is 
sometimes accepted because similar comments were made by antidemocratic critics 
(Plato Apol. 34c, 35c; Xenophon. Apol. 4, Mem. iv.4.4; Old Oligarch Ath. Pol. i. 13, 
18; Isocrates, xv.142), but his criticisms are not as clearcut as is sometimes 
claimed. If we are to believe from the Wasps that jurors cared solely for their own 
self-interest, then we have no methodological alternative but to conclude that 
Athenian daughters would often greet their fathers with a tongue kiss and try to steal 
their money, since these comments occur in the same part of the play as the most
97sustained criticism of jurors (Wasps 608-9).
• The Wasps is unique; we do not have another play which provides so detailed a
9 8picture of jurors or of legal procedures. There are only occasional comments in 
Aristophanes’ other plays,29 New Comedy30 or Roman comedies based on Greek 
originals, so we have little in the way of comparanda with which to judge the 
degree of distortion in the Wasps.
25 Gomme (1938:97-103); De Ste Croix (1972:231-4); Chapman (1978:60-3); Horsley (1982:72-3); 
Sandbach (1985:29-31); Forrest (1986:232).
26 Bowie (1993:97-101); MacDowell (1995:175-79).
27 The point is that incest was a common taboo in Greece, but tongue kissing was a sexual act 
(Aristophanes Clouds 51, Thesm. 132, Wealth 1194; Henderson 1975:182), though not all sexual kissing 
needed to involve the tongue (Xenophon Sym. ix.6).
28 The second Mimiamb of Herodas (Pornoboskos) is written as a mock prosecution speech. A number of 
forensic topoi have been identified in the Miniamb (Hense 1900:230-1; Headlam 1922:70-2; Porter 
1997:443, nn.80-1), but it was probably written roughly during the period 280-270 BC, and its author 
Herodas lived in Egypt or Asia Minor. He may have portrayed Athenian litigation as it appeared to an 
outsider, and we should not expect him to have been closely familiar with it. Although forensic allusions 
abound in the Miniaaib, it v/ould be wrong to say that it is a parody of a court speech. Herodas’ main aim 
was to depict the character of the Pornoboskos (Cunningham 1971:81); therefore forensic material would 
only have been included insofar as it assisted the narrative and raised a laugh, and whatever information 
the second Mimiamb offers us about Athenian court procedure is likely to be distorted.
29 See Aristophanes Clouds 208, Knights 1316-18; schol. Aristophanes Knights 1317; schol. Aristophanes 
Birds 1695a.
30 Scafuro (1997:157) suggests the arbitration in Menander’s Epitrepontes was decided on a combination 
o f law and fairness, but her interpretation is far-fetched, being based on the law of “finders-keepers” rather 
than a real law. There are methodological problems that are unique to New Comedy. At times, some 
historians treat New Comedy as a direct reflection of fourth century legal practice (e.g. Hunter 1994:23 
[Menander’s Plokion as evidence about the epikleros], 32-3 [Menander’s The Rape o f the Locks as 
evidence for women’s kyria]). This approach presumes that Athenian law remained virtually unchanged 
from the fourth century into the third. We do not know if this was the case, but it seems unlikely as during 
the third century B.C. Athens had a very different constitution (O’Neil 1995:108).
jl Roman Comedy offers a further methodological problem - untangling Roman elements from Athenian 
(Paoli 1962:50-69, 1976:32-3, 48-52, 62, 66-7, 72-9). This may be possible in some cases, but is probably 
not possible in relation to relevance. Roman courts could be as prone to the influence of character and 
services as Athenian ones (e.g Cicero Pro Publio Quinctio i.l, 2, 5; Terence Eunuchus 759-61), so it 
would be a dubious procedure to interpret every such occurrence in Roman Comedy as evidence for 
Athenian stereotypes.
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Plato’s and Xenophon’s dialogues have fictional settings. It is seldom clear, when 
they refer to courts, whether they are even representing the opinions of the elite 
minority to which they themselves belonged, let alone a balanced view. Some 
scholars argue that Plato and Xenophon, who had little love for the Athenian 
democracy, cannot be entirely trusted as sources on the way its institutions 
functioned.
These methodological issues mean that we effectively have to abandon Aristophanes, 
Plato and Xenophon as reliable sources in their own right on Athenian juries. We can, it 
is true, still use them and rhetorical handbooks to draw out particular points and to 
confirm that particular issues were generally well known. Nevertheless, they provide 
only limited and partial pictures of legal procedure, and we are better served by 
concentrating on the 104 forensic speeches delivered in Attica.
Numerous methodological issues affect our interpretations of these speeches. There is 
insufficient space to discuss all of these here, but as others have devoted considerable 
attention to many of them the task is also unnecessary. Some issues are, however, 
particularly important to this thesis:
• Only a small percentage of disputes probably came to court.34 The penalties that 
applied, in some cases, to unsuccessful litigants, along with fees for bringing 
litigation, may have encouraged disputants to settle out of court. Those disputes that 
did go to court may therefore have been higher profile or relatively intractable cases.
• It is likely that only a small minority of speeches delivered in courts were written by 
logographers. From what little we know about the logographers’ fees, it seems that
32 A. H. M. Jones (1957:43); Finley (1962:7, 1975:136); Dover (1974:2). There is even ancient authority 
for such skepticism; Athenaeus (220a) noted that “most philosophers are by nature even more abusive 
than the comic poets” (ne4)ÜKaai Ö’ oi nAeicrroi tu)v 4)iAoaö<l)ü)V tcov KUipiKWV KaKnyopoi päAAov 
elvai). This view may, however, be idiosyncratic.
33 For a review o f earlier research on Athenian law see Gemet (1938). For historiographic discussions on 
sources o f Athenian law see Wolff (1957, 1962, 1969, 1975); Dover (1968, 1974:5-13); Todd (1990b, 
1993:18-63); Carey (1994a); E. M. Harris (1995:7-16) and Scafuro (1997:25-67).
j4 The majority o f disputes were probably resolved by private means, the Eleven, the Forty deme judges or 
public and private arbitrators. See on these judges and arbitrators Lipsius (1905-15,1:220-33); Gemet 
(1955:103-19); Harrison (1968-71,11:64-8); MacDowell (1978:206-9) and Scafuro (1997:383-99). The 
point that arbitrators probably settled many private disputes was made by Ruschenbusch (1982:36-7).
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only wealthier Athenians could afford their services. Many speeches delivered in 
lawcourts may have been delivered ex tempore, or prepared by the litigants 
themselves. Our surviving speeches may therefore be skewed towards speeches 
written for wealthier Athenians.
• Not all logographers’ speeches may have been circulated, depending upon a variety 
of factors such as the wishes of the client and the outcome of the case.36 Many of 
those that were circulated may not have sparked the interest of the later scholars who 
developed the canon of the ten orators. Our remaining speeches represent a 
particular attribute (rhetorical technique) that was sought by later scholars, and this 
attribute was a crucial factor in their continued preservation. Even with respect to the 
ten orators, our sample is fragmentary; for example, we have lost most of the 
speeches attributed to Hyperides.
• Generally we have only “half a window” on a case. Out of the 104 speeches, we 
have only two cases where the speeches of both the prosecutor and the defendant 
survive (Aeschines ii vs. Demosthenes xix in the Embassy trial and Demosthenes 
xviii vs. Aeschines iii in the Crown trial), plus one imperfect match (Lysias vi vs. 
Andocides i in the Mysteries trial). We also have multiple speeches delivered for one 
side in the same trial (Lysias xiv, xv [Against Alcibiades]\ Demosthenes xxv, xxvi 
[Against Androtion]', xxvii, xxviii [Against Aphobus]\ xlv, xlvi [Against Stephanus];
35 Wevers (1969:96); Edwards and Usher (1985:127); Hunter (1994:51-2). Logographers’ fees were quite 
high, which may mean that generally the wealthier sections of Athenian society consulted them. 
Philostratus (Lives o f the Sophists 499) tells us that Antiphon was attacked in comedy for “selling 
speeches composed contrary to justice for large sums of money” (Xöyous Kara TOÜ öiKcdou 
^UYKeipevous cxnoöiöopevou noXAmv xPHMÖn"U)v; see also Antiphon Fr. la [Gagarin], 10-11). 
Dinarchus (i.l 11) similarly claimed that Demosthenes had become wealthy as a result of his activities as a 
logographer. Dover (1968:149, 158) cited Aristophanes’ Clouds 462-75, where the Chorus tells 
Strepsiades that if he learns rhetoric he will be besieged by people “wanting to discuss and talk over with 
you troubles and lawsuits over enormous sums of money, in the hope of consulting you on problems to 
which it will be profitable for you to turn your intelligence (Dover’s translation).” The word ä^ ia , 
“profitable,” indicates that one could expect significant fees for legal advice. The last piece of evidence is 
more circumstantial. We hear from Dem. xlix.21-2 that “Lysias the sophist” paid large sums of money for 
the teenage courtesan Metaneira. It is generally thought that Lysias the sophist is the same as Lysias the 
logographer (Carey 1989:3 n.19). It is known (Lys. xii.6-11, POxy 1606 Frr. 1-2) that Lysias lost much of 
his family wealth and property during the rule of the Thirty, though it is clear that he did not lose all his 
wealth as he was able to aid the democratic cause whilst in exile (Carey 1989:3, POxy 1606 Fr. 6). For 
Lysias to afford the substantial expense of moving, feeding and accommodating Metaneira and her 
companions attests to his having made up a large amount of his lost wealth since his return to Athens, 
probably as a result of his activities as a logographer.
36 Dover (1968:151, 159-60).
37 We know of other orators, such as Phocion, Demades, Hegesippus and Pytheas; cf. Edwards (1994:68). 
Their forensic work is not preserved, though Libanius (Hypothesis to Demosthenes v/7.3) assigns On 
Halonnesus to Hegesippus. Speakers occasionally mention other logographers - eg. Hyperides iii.3, who 
accuses Athenogenes of being a speechwriter and an Egyptian.
j8 The phrase is from Rydderch (1997:122). This point was made by Wolff (1969:4).
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Hyperides v, Dinarchus i [Against Demosthenes]). We are usually dependent on a 
single speech, which may contain bias and distort issues and can be difficult to 
interpret in isolation.39
• Litigants could sometimes form a group to increase their chances of winning a case. 
Such groups could take several forms. Thucydides (viii.54) notes that some men 
formed cabals (^uvoipoolai) to help each other in lawsuits and elections.40 There 
appear to have been two main forms of assistance - a man might help a friend by 
attacking his rivals in an effort to deflect the lawsuit,41 or friends could act as 
ouvnYOpo* and deliver speeches on behalf of the litigant in whose name the case had 
been brought.42 In most cases, we have only one of the speeches delivered in support 
of the litigant (the exceptions are Lysias xiv and xv and Hyperides v and Dinarchus 
i). As a result, the speeches we have that were delivered by synegoroi may be missing 
key arguments that were presented in the overall case.
• We know the final outcome in the case of 23 speeeches and possibly two more 
(Appendix One), but generally there is no independent check on our interpretations of 
what might have been deemed relevant in any case. Dover noted that we really have
39 Erbse (1977:210).
40 On the judicial role of ̂ uvcopooiai see Sartori (1967:30-1). This is the only instance in our extant 
sources of ̂ uvu)(J0öiai referring to cabals to help each other in lawsuits. Normally the word refers to 
conspiracies (eg. Thucydides vi.21.3, vi.61.1, viii.69.2) or, if it means cabals, does not specifically occur 
with a mention of lawsuits (Thucydides viii.48.2). The ^uvwpoaiai are usually connected to the 
frequently-mentioned groups of eiaipoi (e.g. Calhoun 1964[ 1913]:40-1, Gomme et al. 1981:128). These 
groups often have oligarchic associations (Gomme et al. 1981:130), and some caution must be exercised 
as there are several different kinds of groups, including philosophical clubs, friendships and client 
relationships, which could be referred to as eTcdpoi (Longo 1971:155). Groups of eTcdpoi with clearly 
judicial roles, however, occur regularly enough in fourth-century oratory to be considered a regular 
feature, see Calhoun (1964[ 1913]:40-96, Longo (1971:71-4, 80, 84-97, 102, 154); Strauss (1986:20).
41 In his story about Chaimides, Xenophon recounts how Aristarchus helped Charmides by taking his 
enemies to court {Mem. ii.9.5-7), and a similar tale is told by Antiphon in his speech on the Choreutes 
(Antiphon vi.35-6).
42 Rubinstein (2000:58-9, 261) has identified 31 speeches in our corpus that were delivered by 
auvrjYOpoi. The frequency with which groups formed for litigation is also revealed by an unusual source 
- defixiones, or lead curse tablets dedicated by litigants prior to a trial. Virtually all the extant Classical 
Athenian judicial tablets curse the opponent and his GÜvöiKOi, while others curse the opponent and his 
ouvnYOpoi, witnesses and various other associates. See Wünsch (1897:Nos. 66, 94, 103, 106-7); 
Audollent (1904:Nos. 49, 60); Trumpf (1958:97); Jordan (1985:Nos. 6, 19, 42,49, 51, 68, 71); SEG 
xliv.226; Costabile (1999:92-4, 99, 101-2). Faraone (1991:16) has suggested that at times judicial tablets 
may have “looser, political connotations” (ie., they do not relate to specific court cases), noting the 
occurrence of women’s names on a few tablets and the fact that women could not testify in court. I would 
note here that women could give oaths as evidence (Demosthenes xxxix.3-4, xl. 10-11; see MacDowell 
1963:99, 106-7). In addition, one tablet which binds the wife of Purias and her tongue, also curses eight 
men, seven of whom are practising speeches and one of whom will give evidence, and wishes them to be 
of no account before either the court or the arbitrator (Audollent 1904:No. 49, Gager 1992:131-2). 
Accordingly, I doubt Faraone’s hypothesis. Faraone’s comment (1999:112) that the testimony of Purias’ 
wife is not mentioned because she could not appear in court ignores the fact that only one of the men is 
giving testimony.
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evidence only for what a speaker wished a jury to believe and thought they would 
find credible.43 With the majority of speeches where the result is unknown, we must 
make the further assumption that a speaker is putting forward arguments that are 
likely to win the case, and is unlikely consciously to say anything that would work 
against him. This assumption is tenable, but only just, because clearly in all cases 
speakers presented cases they hoped would win, but one side had to lose. Litigants’ 
expectations need not have coincided with jurors’ expectations.
• Some or all of the speeches we have may have been revised after delivery to include 
material that was not actually delivered in court. This is a large and complex 
problem, and due to space limitations is discussed in greater depth in Appendix Two.
These methodological issues do restrict our ability to interpret Athenian forensic 
speeches. They mean that we have a very, very small sample of the speeches that were 
actually delivered in trials. We simply do not possess any speeches presented in courts 
that were convened to hear specific types of suits, such as the courts chaired by the 
nautodikai, the xenodikai, street or market officials or others.44 We have mostly 
speeches written by logographers,45 and only a small sample of these. This does not 
mean, however, that our sample is so small and so distorted that we cannot use our 
extant speeches to study the types of arguments used and classify those arguments as 
relevant or irrelevant. It is likely that the preserved speeches may still present a 
reasonably accurate picture of the sorts of evidence and argumentation that were 
considered appropriate in Athenian courts. In the first place, there are no a priori 
grounds for assuming that speeches written by the canonical ten Attic orators would 
have contained more or less relevant and irrelevant material than the vast bulk of 
speeches that we have lost. In the second place, our corpus of forensic oratory is one of 
the largest corpora known from the ancient world. As a result, we can probably 
generalise from the 104 speeches about the ways in which the Athenians understood 
relevance, but we will need to be aware of possible distortions. Some of the 31 speeches 
delivered by synegoroi, for example, may concentrate on minor topics as the main issues 
were dealt with by other speakers whose speeches are lost.
43 Dover (1974:13).
44 For a summary of these specific courts see Harrison (1968-71,11:21-36).
45 The exceptions are Aeschines i-iii, Andocides i and Lycurgus i.
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Sources of Weakness in the Athenian Legal System
A number of modem authors have identified weaknesses in the Athenian legal system 
that, they claim, allowed jurors to make nonlegal decisions as a result of irrelevant 
pleading. Before summarising these limitations, I should note that to identify them as 
limitations is, in part, to validate the distinction between legal and nonlegal pleading. 
This is a distinction derived from modem concepts of the role of juries and lawcourts. 
We have no real evidence that the Athenians thought of them as limitations, or that they 
could even have conceived that their legal system could work in any other way. By 
focussing on limitations we may be led to obscure the ways in which Athenian courts 
actually worked. As many modem scholars have focussed on these limitations, however, 
it is necessary to discuss them here.
In the first place, an Athenian court was not a place of calm deliberation and silent 
contemplation. It seems that courts were noisy and crowded, and this may have made it 
difficult for some jurors to concentrate on all that was said, or form a balanced view. 
Jurors were known to interject or heckle, and the roaring of a jury is referred to by more 
than one ancient author.46 Spectators went to watch important trials (Andocides i.25, 
105; Aeschines i.77, 117, 173, iii.8, 56, 207; Demosthenes xviii.196, xx.165, xv.98, 
xxx.32, liv.41, lvi.48). They were cut off from the court by flimsy partitions47 and it is 
possible that spectators could watch court cases and contribute to the noise level. 
Finally, jurors were packed fairly tightly into a court; juries numbered several hundred 
men49 and Aristophanes (Wasps 1102-21) talks about them swarming together like 
larvae, hardly able to move a muscle.
As a result of crowding and noise, it has been suggested that crowd psychology may 
have played a role in courts, and that jurors could have become a mob whose decisions 
may have had little to do with facts or law.50 This argument should be treated with 
caution. Athenian meetings in general appear to have been noisy events; meetings of the 
Assembly were also rowdy51 and Aristophanes’ caricature of a meeting of the ßouArj
46 Xenophon Apol. 14-15; Plato Apol. 20e, 21a, 27b, 30c; Aristophanes Wasps 623-4; Bers (1985:10).
47 Boegehold (1967:119); Travlos (1974:508).
48 Lanni (1997:187-8), though I would note that direct evidence for thorubos is limited to jurors.
49 AP liii.3, lxviii.l. The numbers o f jurors varied in a manner that we cannot reconstruct, though 
generally public cases had larger juries (of about 500 men) than private cases. See Todd (1993:83-84).
50 See in particular De Romilly (1975:24-38); Allen (1980:24-5); Missiou (1992:6-8).
51 Hansen (1999:146-7); Carey (2000:52-4); Tacon (2001).
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{Knights 624-82) may indicate that this could be a lively occasion. Although Athenian 
social gatherings appear to have been noisier than our own, we should not presume that 
jurors were incapable of paying attention and following an argument. Given the range of 
cultural differences in the use of space and tolerance of crowding levels52 it would be 
unwise to generalize about ancient Athens on the basis of modem Eurocentric 
assumptions. It is significant that no ancient author actually claims that crowding or 
noise distorted or undermined justice , while both Aristotle and the Old Oligarch 
considered that large groups of people could prove better judges than small ones.54
More seriously, Athenian court procedure was designed to limit the scrutiny of the 
evidence. Witnesses were not cross-examined; speakers could cross-examine their 
opponent, but this appears to have been a limited and fairly short procedure (e.g. Lysias 
xxii.5). As a result witness statements could be manipulated to support a speaker even 
when they were in reality neutral or hostile.33 Furthermore, in dikasteria jurors were not 
permitted to discuss their verdicts (though it appears the Areopagus did this); they had 
to vote once the speakers finished. The absence of time for reflection or consideration of 
the evidence, and the absence of any opportunity to debate views, may have contributed 
to some confusion amongst jurors.56 Some modem authors argue that it led juries to 
abandon law and facts and concentrate instead on the character of the litigants and the
cn
interests of the polis. It would be unwise to be too dogmatic on this point. We should 
not presume, simply because modem courts rely on cross-examination and deliberation, 
that an Athenian juror was incapable of forming an opinion on the evidence presented to 
him.
So too we should not place too much weight on the claim, frequently made, that as 
Athenian jurors were amateurs they did not have enough legal knowledge. This lack of 
knowledge may have made them easy prey for unscmpulous orators, who could 
convince jurors to vote against what was lawful. The crucial problem here is that we do 
not know just how much legal knowledge an average Athenian had. Some authors point
52 See, for example, Hall (1966); Evans (1978:4-9).
53 Aeschines i.35 contains the text o f what purports to be a law banning interruptions or thorubos in the 
Boule and the Assembly. However, this document is o f uncertain status; while it is thought to be spurious, 
it is possible that it was based on a genuine law (Drerup 1898:307; Harrison 1968-71,11:4, n.l).
54 Aristotle Pol. 128la39-128 lb 14, 1281b32-7, 1282al4-40; Old Oligarch Ath. Pol. iii.7.
55 Carey (1994b: 101-6).
56 Allen (1980:24).
57 Notably Cohen (1995a: 105).
58 Anon. (1826:337-8); Heitsch (1984:7); Ober (1989:169); Scafuro (1997:51-3); Wolf (1956:164).
15
out that jurors would have gained knowledge from sitting on the Council, attending the 
Assembly and working as officials; many may also have been habitual jurors, and 
formed a good knowledge of legal issues over time.59 Each year the Assembly was 
responsible for scrutinising the existing laws and hearing proposals for revising or 
adding laws (Demosthenes xxiv.20-3). Proposals for new or revised laws would be 
considered by the vopoBsTai, who were selected from those who had sworn the 
Heliastic oath (sk täv opcopoKOTcnv) .60 Consequently, one should expect that jurors 
would have a good knowledge of the laws. I would also add that the level of 
participation in Athenian democratic institutions appears to have been quite high,61 and 
interest in major lawsuits was also high. Accordingly, we should not expect that 
Athenians would have had only slight knowledge of their laws.
Another weakness that is often identified is not actually procedural, but substantive; the 
vagueness with which Athenian laws are commonly phrased, which left “gaps” where 
some cases were not actually covered by law, or it was not clear how a law should be 
applied. Some have argued that vague statutes would have left the jurors with no hope 
of working out whether someone had actually broken the law, and would have led them 
to rely more on character evidence in reaching a verdict.64 This argument effectively 
condemns Athenians as idiots. We have no evidence that an average Athenian could not 
identify what, for example, he considered üßpis or impiety, and that he could not decide
59 Gagarin (1989:113); Gomme (1962:185); E. M. Harris (1994:134-6).
60 Demosthenes xxiv.21. Some (e.g. MacDowell 1975:73, Rhodes 1995:318, 2003a:129) argue that by the 
middle of the fourth century BC nomothetai no longer needed to be selected from jurors. This argument 
has been doubted by Hansen (1978:154-7, 1980:97, 1985:363-5). It rests on two pieces of evidence. The 
first-(MacDovell 1975:65) is that Demosthenes xx.93 shows that the law on nomothesia had been 
repealed and that, as it is not specifically stated that nomothetai were now jurors, they no longer needed to 
be jurors. This argument ex silentio would need to be supported by other evidence to be decisive. The 
second piece of evidence (MacDowell 1975:69) is that Demosthenes xxiv.27 shows that nomothetai 
comprised 1,001 jurors plus the Boule. Hansen (1985:364) has suggsted that the second claim is incorrect 
as it is precluded by the syntax of Demosthenes xxiv.27. His claim may be too ambitious; the syntax of the 
passage does not really preclude the possibility that the Boule joined with the nomothetai in drafting laws. 
The key lies in the precise meaning of the word ouwo|JO0£T£iv. Unfortunately, we have little to go on 
here; Hansen takes it to mean that the Boule cooperated with, or assisted, the nomothetai, but 
ouwo|JO0STeiv could equally mean “joining with [someone] to draft laws.” The word occurs once more 
only in Greek literature, in Plato Laws 833e, where again it could have either meaning. Even if we accept 
MacDowell’s view, however, Demosthenes xxiv.27 need not indicate that nomothetai were regularly 
drawn from outside those who had sworn the Heliastic oath; the passage may well reflect an unusual 
procedure for a specific circumstance, since the meeting of nomothetai was called for a festival day 
(Hansen 1978:154-5).
61 Sinclair (1989:140-1).
62 The youthful Demosthenes was moved to become an orator when he saw the public adulation granted to 
one man whose speech won an important case (Plutarch Dem. vi).
63 Ruschenbusch (1957:263-4); Sealey (1994:51-2); Todd (1993:58, 2000a:26-7).
64 Notably Allen (1980:26) and Cohen (1995a: 105); see also Scafuro (1997:52).
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whether a speaker so accused was guilty, on the evidence presented, or not.65 We also 
have no evidence that Athenian audiences were incapable of untangling the various 
tricks and pettifogging of the speakers. Open texture is a feature of all law codes, and 
exists because legislators cannot predict all possible circumstances.66
Although it is not wise to stress these various limitations too much, it is worth noting 
that they may have contributed to an overall pattem of behaviour in court. They show 
that a trial became a contest over what was actually said at the time. Jurors would have 
had to base their decisions on the claims made by each speaker at the precise moment of 
the trial. Generally, they would have had no other source upon which to base their 
knowledge of the facts of the case or other evidence, and they may have depended on 
the speakers for much of their knowledge of the relevant laws. Accordingly, success in a 
case depended very much on the ability to present one’s case clearly and persuasively, 
and may also have been susceptible to more random factors such as variation in the 
attitudes of the jurors or popular sentiment.
Summary
One of the problems of studying the legal concept of relevance in Athenian courts is the 
way in which modem views of how a case should be discussed in court have been 
applied to Athenian juries. This perspective is unhelpful for understanding our subject. 
Scholars have tended to focus on two extreme views that are products of a modem 
conception of a legal system. In a modem common law court, where relevance is strictly 
determined, slanders and discussion of character would seldom be allowed. When 
applied to Classical Athenian courts the modem perspective produces an unsolvable 
paradox. Either the Athenians stuck rigidly to law, or they frequently abandoned it. It is 
foolish to deny that these extremes exist. Clearly, however, both sides cannot be right; 
the Athenians cannot have both accepted laws and ignored them. Perhaps both sides are 
wrong. The extremes are, after all, extremes. It is just as false to characterise Athenians 
as sober jurists, as to deride them as vulgar brawlers. Modem scholars have paid little 
attention to the overall variance of Athenian oratory, and the pattern that might be 
discerned from it and used to characterise Athenian jurors. If we study the range of 
arguments in oratory, we find that speakers generally included both legal and nonlegal
65 One is reminded o f Justice Potter Stewart’s comment “I can’t define pornography, but I know it when I 
see it.”
66 See E. M. Harris (1994:138-40).
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arguments in their speeches, depending on a range of factors. By focussing on the 
extremes, modem scholarship has blurred the actual picture. A concern with deriding 
Athenian juries for listening to nonlegal argument, or upholding their respect for law, 
ends up reinforcing the extreme positions. More importantly, it leaves no opening for 
seeking to understand why some speeches are predominantly nonlegal, and when 
speakers would use legal or nonlegal arguments. This thesis will be based on the overall 
pattem of forensic oratory, and that includes the extremes, but as part of the entire range 
of variance.
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Chapter Two Law and Equity in Athenian Courts
This chapter considers the historical development of theories about relevance. It also 
discusses two of the theories identified in Chapter One - the “equity” theory that 
speakers could base their case on fairness in opposition to law, and the “positivistic” 
theory that juries were bound to follow law and evidence only. The two theories have 
grown, in part, in response to each other, and therefore I deal with them together.
Early Reconstructions of Athenian Jurors
There has been a tradition of viewing Athenian juries in a dim light. Ancient 
philosophers condemned them for their perceived prejudice, for heeding supplications 
and for failing to pay attention to laws or the details of the case (Plato Apol. 34c, 35c; 
Xenophon. Apol. 4, Mem. iv.4.4; Old Oligarch Ath. Pol. i. 13, 18; Isocrates, xv.142). 
Xenophon, for example, has Hermogenes ask Socrates:
OÜK opqcs tcx ' AQnvaicov öiKaorrjpia cbs ttoAAökis psv oüösv äöiKoüvTas Xöycü 
rrapaxBsvTES arrsKTEivav, ttoAAökis öe aöiKOÜvTas r) ek tou Aoyou 
oiKTioavTes fj enixaprro)? einovTas ansAuoav;
Don’t you see that the Athenian dikasteria have often been carried away by a 
speech and executed innocent men, and have often acquitted guilty men either 
because they took pity on them because of their speech or because the [speakers] 
curried favour when they spoke (Apol. 4)?
Both Xenophon (Apol. 22, Mem. iv.4.4) and Plato (Apol. 34c, 35a) stress that Socrates 
refused to make any of the customary emotional appeals at his trial. Xenophon states:
Kai ÖT8 Tqv ünö MeArjTou ypa^nv e^euye, tcüv dAAoov eicüBötcüv ev toTs 
öiKacrrnpiois npos xdpiv te toTs öiKacrraTs öiaAsyeoBai Kai KoAaKEÜeiv Kai 
ösTaBai napö toCis vöpous Kai öiä Tä TOiaÜTa noAAaiv noAAdKis ünö tu>v 
öiKacrrcüv acjiiepsvoov, ekeTvos oüöev rjBEAnoE tcüv sicüBÖTUJv ev tcü öiKacrrnpiu) 
napä Toüs vöpous noirjoai, dAAä pgölcos äv d^EBsis ünö tcüv öiKacrrcüv, si Kai 
pETplcüs Ti toütcüv EnoiqoE, nposiAsTO pdAAov toTs vöpois sppsvcüv dnoBavsTv 
fj napavopujv r̂jv-
And when he defended himself against the charge brought by Meletus, although 
it is the custom of other men in the dikasteria to ingratiate themselves in 
speaking to the jurors and to flatter them and beg against the laws, and by such 
means many have often been acquitted by the jurors, he in no way wished to 
carry out the familiar practice in the courts against the laws, but, even though he 
might easily have been acquitted by the jurors, if he had done anything of this 
kind even in moderation, he preferred to die, standing by the laws, rather than to 
live by breaking them (Mem. iv.4.4).
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At the end of his Apology Plato made a statement of principle about just conduct in a 
lawcourt, implying that such conduct was not to be found in Athenian dikasteria:
0ÜÖ8 öiKCdöv poi ÖOKS? elvai öeTo0ai Tou öiKaoTOÜ oüÖ8 öeöpevov 
äno(J)eÜYeiv, äXAä öiöäoKeiv Kai neiGeiv. oü yäp eni toütu) Kd0r|Tai ö 
öiKaaTns, eni tcü Kaiaxapi^eoGai Tä öiKaia, äAA’ eni tcü KpiveivTaÖTa- Kai 
öpcüpoKeiv oü xapieToGai ols äv öoKfj aÜTco, dXAä öiKdoeiv KaTä toüs vöpous. 
oükouv xpn 0ÜT8 rjpäs 80î 8iv üpäs emopKeTv oü0’ üpäs e0i£ea0ar oüöeTepoi 
ydp äv rjptüv eüoeßoTev.
I don’t think it is just to beg the juror, or to get acquitted by begging, but rather 
to teach him and persuade him. For that’s not why the juror is sitting, to give 
favours about matters of justice, but to judge those matters; and he has sworn, 
not to grant favours to anyone he pleases, but to judge according to the laws. 
Neither should we accustom you to breaking your oath, nor ought you to become 
accustomed; for neither of us would be acting piously (Apol. 35c).1 23
Athenian Old Comedy also satirized jurors. Aristophanes charged that jurors could be 
influenced by bribes and supplications, rather than the evidence (Wasps 550-86). His 
jurors are keen to do harm to the accused (321-22, 340), are moved by supplications or 
jokes (560-61), defendants must recite the speech from Niobe or play the flute to get off 
(579-81), and wills are ignored (583-86).
These criticisms of jurors were picked up in later antiquity. Cicero, for example, refers 
to Plato’s Apology and claims that Socrates was unfairly condemned (De Or at. i.230- 
33). Other authors criticised the unstable nature of the demos and derided Athenian 
democracy in general. The Romans in turn influenced early Christian and Renaissance 
scholars. From the sixteenth century, three traditions developed in scholarship on 
Athenian juries:
• The first was concerned simply with sorting out the Athenian legal system. These
1 The general point made by Plato and Xenophon is that emotional appeals to the jury are not only unjust, 
but illegal, though the precise nature o f the illegality is never specified. Presumably anything that detracts 
from a judgement on the facts alone is illegal, insofar as it ensures that guilty parties are not punished for 
breaking a law.
2 Roberts (1994:104-18).
3 The earliest modem work on Athenian law was carried out as part of a bitter and intemperate argument 
in print between the monarchist Salmasius and his rival Heraldus. Their work concentrated on defining the 
legal issues and on source criticsim, but was intensely polemical; their diatribes, however, were directed 
against each other. For example, Salmasius (1645:769) claimed that he had found nothing on Athenian 
witnesses that did not deserve a shepherd’s pipe or a corrective cane (nihil me in eo invenisse nisi 
pastoritia fistula dignum & censoria virgula notandum”). Heraldus retorted that clearly Salmasius had 
conjunctivitis (1650:440; “Atque hoc lippientibus oculis vidisse te docet nos pagina 834. istius capitis 
Ultimi”).
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scholars built the foundations of our understanding of Athenian legal institutions and 
procedure.4
• The second argued that the good aspects of Athenian democracy should be emulated. 
This view appears to have originated with Florentine scholars seeking to legitimse 
their own popular rule, 5 678but became influential in later libertarian philosophy, notably
* 7Rousseau and some German thinkers.
• The third derided Athenian democracy in an effort to bolster current monarchies 
against demand for parliamentary government. By the eighteenth century it had
o
become dominant.
One of the earliest historical works to expound the monarchist view was Jean Bodin’s 
Method for the Easy Comprehension o f History, in which Athenian democracy was 
denigrated as emotional and random and inferior to monarchy, which linked government 
to ability and also had the sanction of God.9 Bodin asked: “And how can a multitude, 
that is to say, a Beast with many heads, without jugement (sic) or reason, giue (sic) any 
good counsel? To aske counsell of a multitude (as they did in old times in Popular 
Commonweals) is to seeke for wisdome of a mad man.” 10
Bodin’s comments were picked up by eighteenth-century authors who criticised 
Athenian democracy. Few had much to say about Athenian juries, though the trial of 
Socrates was regularly seen to prove the capriciousness of the Athenian mob and its lack 
of a rule of law. 11 Direct criticism of Athenian juries originated in a pamphlet by Josiah
4 Potter (1818[ 1697-8]: 120-48); Stanyan (1766,1:134-5, 153, 177); Tittmann (1822:193-239). 
Hudtwalcker (1812:xiii) referred to the need “dieser Stall des Augeias gw Aiigi werden.”
5 See Roberts (1994:121-27).
6 Rousseau (1997[1755]: 116-17).
7 In Germany, praise for the Classical Athenians appears to originate with an appreciation that their artistic 
greatness was achieved under a democracy (Winckelmann 1764,11:324-25). The view that democracy 
could ennoble character and political life was raised by von Herder (1968[ 1784-91]: 194) and Hegel 
(1888:260-64, 268-72).
8 Ralegh (1820, IV:81, 93-94); Harrington (1887[1656]:152, 161-62, 176); Filmer (1940[1680]:84-89, 
93-94); Swift (1701:93-98); Montagu (1760:6, 10-12); Goguet (1775,111:36-38, 232-33); Rollin (1775, 
IV:228-48, VII:71); Tucker (1781:211-12, 215-17, 220); Young (1786:59-65, 227-28; 1793:8-17, 45, 53- 
54); de Mably (1796, IV:79-80; X:174, 192); Bisset (1796:xxiii, 6-8, 67-73, 83, 146-7).
9 Bodin (1945[1583]: 192-93, 269, 270-79, 282). See also Bodin (1606:250-51, 543-44, 717-18).
10 Bodin (1606:702); the translation is by R. Knolles.
11 Stanyan (1766,11:55-7) compared Socrates to a Christian martyr, thereby implicitly condemning the 
Athenians. Rollin (1775, IV:228-29) spoke of Socrates’ noble demeanour at his trial, and his refusal to 
flatter the judges. Goldsmith (1784:379) argued that Socrates had been unjustly condemned, even though 
he had defended himself honestly and nobly and not stooped to the usual trickery of speakers in courts. Sir 
William Young (1786:198) stated that Socrates refused to plead in his defence - “but what defence could 
avail, when virtue was the crime!” Bisset (1796:127) claimed that Socrates was tried by a court 
“composed of the most furious and ignorant of the populace.”
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Tucker. Following Aristophanes, he states that every man brought into court had to 
flatter and cajole the jury in the hope of being acquitted, and suggests that, if one were 
to imagine their speeches in modem words, the following would be typical:
My client is a rich and generous Man. If you will decree for him, he shall treat 
his Judges with splendid entertainments at Ranelagh, Vauxhall, and Sadler’s 
Wells, and at other Places of Diversion. Moreover he will give you Tickets to go
19for several Nights to both the Theatres, &c. &c. &c.
Tucker’s comments were put in a more authorative way by Gillies and Mitford, who 
helped establish the modem study of Greek history. Both viewed Athenian democracy 
as mob rule, 14 and deemed Athenian juries inferior to British juries because of their 
apparent prejudice and passion, inattention to law and evidence, and lust for prospective 
rewards. 15 Gillies asserted that Socrates was wrongly condemned by “the mob of the 
Heliaea, a court, for so it was called, consisting of five hundred persons, most of whom 
were liable, by their education and way of life, to be seduced by eloquence, intimidated 
by authority, and corrupted by every species of undue influence.” 16 Mitford argued that 
democratic courts were populated by “the poor, the idle, the profligate” 17 who rendered 
life and property insecure by their avarice, so that the “glorious security provided by the
i o  '
English law” was unknown. Instead it was not even necessary to allege that a specific 
crime had been committed; “as passion and prejudice, or the powers of oratory, or 
solicitation and bribery, moved, condemnation or acquittal were pronounced.” 19
Mitford’s views were developed by an anonymous reviewer who wrote the first detailed 
study of Athenian courts. He derided jurors as mean of rank and character, ignorant of 
jurisprudence, prone to passion and lacking in intelligence, and generally inferior to “the 
twelve 'good men and true,’ to whom an Englishman undoubtingly submits his honour,
12 Tucker (1781:224-25). Tucker did not cite any references, offering instead an excuse that would be 
welcomed by every harassed student: “Only let me add, that I would have produced the very Passages 
from the original Authors, as Vouchers for the general Truth and Justness of the Parallel, [mutatis 
mutandis] if I had had the Convenience of Greek Types at the Place where I am printing (1781:225).” 
lj Momigliano (1966:57).
14 Peardon (1933:84-85, 92-93) pointed out that Gillies and Mitford’s views were by no means separate 
from their clearly highlighted interests in using history to protect the British Constitution against 
democrats and to undermine the possible influence of the French and American revolutions. As Peardon 
notes (1933:89), Mitford had visited France in 1776 and detested the democratic views he encountered 
there; his most strongly anti-democratic comments were composed after the French Revolution and were 
written with the “lurid background of Jacobin France.”
15 Gillies (1792[ 1786], 111:130-3, 469-72); Mitford (1785:230-2, 1818, V:7-14, 88, VIT359-60, 372-3).
16 Gillies (1792[1786], 111:131).
17 Mitford (1818, V:10-ll).
18 Mitford (1818, V: 12).
19 Mitford (1818, V:14).
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his property, his person.” 20 The reviewer cited Plato and Cicero, but also cited forensic 
oratory, suggesting that “there is scarcely an anomaly in law or a violation of the first 
principles of jurisprudence, which is not to be found in its pages, either pressed upon the
*91acceptance of the people or sanctioned by their practice.”
These early studies set the parameters for later discussions of Athenian democracy. In 
particular, they initiated the view that Athenian juries ignored law and judged on the 
basis of emotion or prejudice. Gillies and Mitford were extremely influential, and there 
is scarcely a relevant publication from the nineteenth century which does not echo their 
distaste for Athenian courts. Even though later authors’ politics may be different, the 
seductively negative view of Athenian courts has maintained its hold over scholarly 
opinion to this day.
From a current perspective, these early histories are of dubious worth. Their treatment of 
sources is generally doubtful and does not stand up to analysis. They were swiftly 
challenged by scholars with a more supportive view of Athenian democracy, notably 
George Grote.24 In Chapter xlvi of his History o f Greece Gro.te agreed that emotion
20 Anon. (1826:335).
21 Anon. (1826:350). Mitford (1818, V) had earlier summarised selected forensic speeches to illustrate the 
low quality of justice in Classical Athens. Interestingly enough, there may have been a general prejudice 
during the eighteenth century against English juries for their perceived willingness to reach decisions 
contrary to law (King 1988:283-91). The popular expression of this view can be seen in Lismahago’s 
verdict, in Smollett’s The Expedition of Humphry Clinker, that juries were “generally composed of 
illiterate plebians, apt to be mistaken, easily misled (Smollett 1771:241).” This popular prejudice should 
not be ignored as a possible source of eighteenth-century distrust of Athenian juries.
22 Bisset cites Gillies extensively and dismisses Athenian courts as mob rule (1796:83), where “proof is 
disregarded, amidst prejudice and passion. The forms of justice may be observed, the substance is 
neglected.” One of Mitford’s earliest converts was Mitchell, who, in his translation of Aristophanes’
Wasps, quotes Mitford extensive!} -ad contrasts Athenian law unfavourably with English law (1820-22, 
11:162-8). Thirlwall (1835-40:222-6) echoed both Mitford and Mitchell in condemning Athenian jurors as 
representatives of the lowest class of people, prone to passion and completely deficient in the ability to 
weigh up arguments and evidence. His analysis was largely based on Aristophanes’ Wasps. Thirlwall 
himself was followed by Forsyth (1879[ 1849]:26-7, 31-2, who made numerous comparisons between 
Athenian and English juries (especially at 1879[1849]:31-2, 38-9, 45, 51). For other Mitfordian comments 
on Athenian juries see Hudtwalcker (1812:39); Boeckh (1842[ 1817]:227-8); Wachsmuth (1837, 11:201- 
3); Keightley (1839:166, 285-6); Curtius (1867-73, V:119-20) and Lytton (1874:450-2). For general 
comments on the influence of Mitford see Peardon (1933:84), though he should be read with the caveat 
that, although Mitford’s general influence was limited, the specific influence of his picture of Athenian 
courts carried all before it during the nineteenth century, even in the face of Grote’s strenuous opposition.
23 For example, the anonymous reviewer accepts Aristophanes’ views as fact (eg. 1826:334, 336) and is 
similarly credulous about all statements in forensic oratory (eg. 1826:338, 350-1). Gillies 
(1792[1786]:469) and Goldsmith (1784:379-80) accept Plato’s Apology at face value. Mitford (1785:230) 
accepts Aristotle’s views of democracy at face value. For an exhaustive list of Mitford’s methodological 
errors and political biases against democracy, see Grote (1826:284, 297-330), while for a general but 
nonetheless devastating summary see Peardon (1933:91). Anon. (1827:228-51) delivers a point-by-point 
refutation of the anonymous reviewer’s comments on Athenian juries.
24 Initially, Macaulay 1860[1824]); Grote (1826:286, 307), Anon. (1827:238). See also Arnold (1830-35, 
1:669).
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could sometimes count for rather more than reason in a court, because jurors primarily 
gained information about a case from orators’ speeches rather than from factual sources 
such as witnesses, but stressed that overall juries would base decisions on law and the 
facts of the case. He supported his argument by citing the weight placed on the authority 
of law in the Heliastic oath.
Grote’s views on Athenian democracy were attacked on a number of fronts,27 and his 
critics focussed on the lawcourts. They argued that nonlegal arguments played a key role 
in deciding a case, due to the lack of legal expertise enjoyed by an average jury, which 
encouraged its members to indulge prejudice and passion as whim took them.28 Grote’s 
critics had won the day by the early twentieth century. Of the few who seem to have 
agreed with him, Fränkel picked up his emphasis on the Heliastic oath, suggesting it 
bound Athenian jurors to consider law as the primary factor in their judgements. Only in 
exceptional circumstances, he argued, where a law did not cover a particular matter, 
wrerc jurors permitted some flexibility; here they were to use their “most just opinion” 
(Yvcbpin Tn öiK aiO TdTfi). Fränkel did not discuss Yvcbpn Tfl öiKaiOTÖrrn at length, but it 
was to become crucial to our understanding of relevance.
Hirzel, Vinogradoff and Equity Principles
During the nineteenth century scholars identified concepts of fairness or equity in 
speeches. Hirzel linked them to yvoipn Tfl ÖiKaiOTdTfi, noting that appeals to unwritten 
law (dypa^os vopos), comprising the general customs and traditions of a polis, were 
occasionally made in forensic oratory (e.g. Lysias vi.10). Aristotle (Rhet. 1375a28- 
1375b4) was the key basis of his argument:
4>avepöv ydp on, edv pev evavnos fi ö YCYpaPMevos Ttp npaYpom, tco koivw 
vöpo) xPHOTeov Kai toTs emeiKeaiv cos öiKaicnrepois.33 Kai on to Yvcbpn Tfi 
dpicrrn tout’ ecrri, to pf) navTeXtbs xPH^Qai tois YEYpappevois. Kai on to pev
25 Grote (1826:297, 1867[ 1848]:396-8).
26 Grote (1867[1848]:373-4, 388-9).
27 See the discussion by Turner (1981:234-58).
28 Burckhardt (1998[1872]:80, 229); Rogers (1875:xxxv-xxxvii); von Pöhlmann (1911[1890]:236);
Abbott (1891:269-64); Headlam (1891:37); Beauchet (1897,1:xx).
29 Wyse (1904:512) noted that Athenian legal procedure “opened a wide door to chicanery and jesuitical 
acts.” For similar condemnations see Pickard-Cambridge (1914:88-90); Weber (1917:158); Glotz 
(1929:251); Bonner (1927:74-6, 78-88); Bonner and Smith (1930-38,11:298-302).
30 Fränkel (1878:454-5, 465).
31 Seeliger (1876:673-74); Hitzig (1897:180-81).
32 Hirzel (1900:14-19, 22-29). Hirzel identified two types of unwritten law; one comprising the customs of 
the polis, the other general ethical constructs common to all Greeks (such as incest taboos). See Ostwald 
(1973).
Following Mirhady (1990:395-6) in preferring this reading to enisiKecrrepois (bs.
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enieiKes äei pevei Kai oüöenoTe peTaßaXXei, oüö’ ö koivös (K aT ä 4)üaiv yap 
eonv), oi öe Ŷ YpaMMSVoi rroXXaKis.
For it is clear that, if the written law is opposed to our case, we must employ 
common law and equity as more in accordance with justice. And that this is [the 
meaning of] to the best of one’s judgement, not to use the written laws 
absolutely. And that equity always remains and never changes, and nor does the 
common [law] (for it is according to nature), but the written [laws] often [do] 
(Aristotle Rhet.1375a28-1375b4).34
Hirzel suggested that yvüipq Tfj öiKaiOTÖrrn effectively gave jurors a licence to dispense 
with statutes, and that in practice juries regularly indulged their sense of “equity” 
(enieiKeia). His theory was expanded by Vinogradoff, who argued that Aristotle’s 
concept of enieiKeia described the means by which speakers could introduce nonlegal 
arguments in court. He suggested that law provided a baseline upon which Athenian 
juries founded their decisions, but that it was common to depart from this base when no 
law applied, or when applicable laws were vague, or even when an applicable law 
would, in the circumstances, result in an injustice. He drew attention to the following 
two passages in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Rhetoric:
...to emeiKes öiKaiov pev eonv, oü tö koto vöpov öe, aXX’ enavöpGoopa 
vopipou öiKaiou. ainov ö’ öti ö pev vöpos KaBöXou näs, nepi evicuv ö’ oüx 
olov T£ öpBtos eineTv KaBöXou. ev ols oüv aväyKq pev eineTv KaBöXou, pq olov 
T8 öp8ü)S, tö (bs eni tö nXeov Xapßavei ö vöpos, oük ayvocov tö 
apapTavöpevov. Kai eonv oüöev qirov öpBös- tö yap äpapTqpa oük ev tü) 
vöpa) oüö’ ev TO) vopoBeTfi aXX’ ev Tfi cj)üoei toü npaypaTÖs ecrriv eüBüs yo(p 
ToiauTq n T(̂ v npaKTCov uXq eonv. ÖTav oüv Xeyn pev ö vöpos KaBöXou, 
aupßfj ö’ eni toütou napä tö KaBöXou, tötc öpBcos exei, fl napaXeinei ö 
vopoBeTqs Kai qpapTev anXo)S einciov, enavopBoüv tö eXXeicJjBev, ö köv ö 
vopoBeTqs aÜTÖs oütcos äv einoi ckcT napcuv, Kai ei fjöei, evopoBeTrioev äv. 
öiö öiKaiov pev eon, Kai ßeXTiöv tivos öiKaiou, oü tou anXccs öe aXXä toü öiä 
tö anXcüs apapTrjpaTOS Kai eonv auTq rj 4)üois q Tou emeiKoüs, enavöpBcopa 
vöpou, fj eXXeinei öia tö KaBöXou. toüto yap arnov Kai toü pq navTa kotö 
vöpov elvai, öti nepi evicov äöüvaTOv BeaBai vöpov, (bare qjqcjjiapaTOS öeT.
...equity is justice, but it is not [justice] according to law, but a correction of 
legal justice. The reason for this is that a law is always a general statement, but 
in relation to some cases it is not possible to make a general statement correctly. 
Therefore, in cases where it is necessary to make a general statement, but it is 
impossible to do so correctly, a law takes account of the majority of cases, even 
though it recognizes that it is making a mistake. And [the law] is no less correct; 
for the mistake is not in the law nor in the lawgiver but in the nature of the case; 
the subject matter of things is always irregular. Therefore whenever a law makes 
a general statement, and then [a case] arises in relation to this [law] which is 
against the general statement, it is then correct, in a case where the lawgiver has
34 Yvwpq T(j apicrrri appears to be the same as Yvwpq Tq öiKaiOTcrrq (Carey 1996:37).
35 Hirzel (1900:57-60).
36 Vinogradoff (1922:64-5, 1928a:16, 1928b:42).
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made an absolute statement and omitted [something] and committed an error, to 
correct the omission in such a way as the lawgiver himself would have made the 
statement had he been present, and would have decided if he had known [about 
such a case]. Hence [equity] is just, and is better than one sort of justice, but is 
not better than absolute [justice] but [is better than] the mistake that results from 
the absolute statement. And this is the nature itself of equity, a correction of the 
law in matters where it omits [something] because [it is] a general statement.
This is the reason also why not all cases are [decided] according to law, because 
it is not possible to lay down a law in relation to some cases, so that there is a 
need for a decree [of the Assembly] (Aristotle EN 1137bl 1-29).
to yap enieiKss öoksT öikouov elvai, eon öe enieiKes tö napä töv 
yeypappevov vopov öikcciov. oupßaivei öe toüto Tä pev cxkövtgüv tö öe 
eKÖvTGOv Tcov vopo0eTtov, öckövtcüv pev ÖTav Aä0q, ckovtcov ö’ ötov pq 
öüvcüVTai öiopioai, äAA’ ävayKaTov pev q KaööXou eineTv, pq q öe, äAA’ tbs eni 
tö rroAü. Kai öoa pq pqxöiov öiopioai öl’ äneipiav, oTov tö Tptbaai oiöqpq) 
nqAiKcp Kai noiw nvi. ünoAeinoi yäp äv ö aiobv öiapi0poüvTa. äv ouv q 
aöiöpiarov, öeq öe vopo0eTqoai, avayKq änAtbs eineTv, äxrre Käv öoktüAiov 
excav enapqTai Tqv xeipa q naTa^q, KaTa pev töv yeypappevov vöpov evoxös 
ean Kai aöiKeT, kotö öe tö aAq0es oük ocöikcT, Kai tö emeiKes touto eoTiv.
For equity is thought to be justice, but equity is justice beyond the written law. 
This occurs in some cases with the will, and in other cases without the will of the 
legislators, without their will whenever they overlook something, and with their 
will whenever they are unable to give a precise definition, but there is a need to 
make a general statement, or, when it is not necessary [to do so], they make a 
statement that applies to most cases. And in as many cases as are difficult to 
define through inexperience, such as wounding with an iron object of such a size 
and what kind. For life would come to an end for one who enumerated [the 
cases]. So if the matter should not be precisely defined, but there should be a 
need to make a law, it is necessary to frame an absolute statement, so that if [a 
man] wearing a ring should raise his hand or strike [someone], then according to 
the written law he is guilty and commits a crime, but in fact he commits no 
crime, and this is equity (Aristotle Rhet. 1374a26-1374bl).
In the first passage Aristotle states that a law framed as a general statement may not 
account for all possible situations, and that equity is required to correct a miscarriage 
of justice. His argument in the Rhetoric is similar, but Aristotle also suggests that equity 
can correct an unjust law. By striking someone while wearing a ring a man has 
theoretically struck them with a piece of metal and broken the law, but in fact he has not 
committed a crime. The first passage is a discussion of general legal principles, and so 
cannot be taken as evidence for the practical application of equity in a court; however, 
the discussion in the Rhetoric concerns arguments to use in court, and therefore shows 
Aristotle believed appeals for equity were possible in court.
371 have translated n a p ä  here as meaning “beyond” rather than “contrary to” the law, following Grimaldi 
(1980:300). For this meaning see LSJ s.v. C.8.
38 See also Aristotle Pol. 1228a41-1282bl3.
39 This point was made by Mirhady (1990:400).
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Vinogradoff agreed with Hirzel that a speaker could introduce enieiKeia by appealing to 
Yvujpn Tfl öiK aiO TäTfj.40 He suggested that enieiKeia “amounted in practice to a liberal 
interpretation and application of legal rules.”41 A speaker could appeal to equity even if 
there were no gaps in the law, and convince jurors to ignore laws altogether, or to 
consider legal interpretations that were in reality outside the actual meaning of a law 42 
As evidence for his theory Vinogradoff noted the treatment of testaments and contracts 
in Athenian forensic oratory, including what he suggested were equity arguments in 
Isaeus iv.12,43 Hyperides iii.13,44 and Demosthenes xxxii45
In assessing the “equity” theory, it is important to work out exactly what point Aristotle 
was making. One problem is that his discussion of equity is inconsistent. In 
Nicomachean Ethics 1137b he argues that equity should only apply when the law omits 
to allow for a particular case. Aristotle’s statement “And this is the nature itself of 
equity, a correction of the law in matters where it omits [something], because [it is] a 
general statement” seems unequivocal. Yet in the Rhetoric enieiKeia is something 
different, amounting to a correction of existing law through the claim that equity is 
superior to law.46 Furthermore, in the Rhetoric enieiKeia is linked to yvoopn Tfl 
öiKaiOTdTfi, yet in the Nicomachean Ethics it is not.
The inconsistencies probably reflect the different purposes of the two works. In the 
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle’s object is to discuss justice, and to make the point that 
written law cannot perfectly ensure justice. Equity is therefore needed to fill in the gaps 
in the law. In the Rhetoric Aristotle’s concern is more practical, to outline various 
tactics for winning a case in court. In this case, arguing that equity should be applied 
only when there is a gap in the law does not offer a particularly useful approach, since 
what is needed is a recourse when the speaker does not have written law on his side 
(Rhet. 1375a27-9). Accordingly, equity needs to be used more widely, as the basis of an 
appeal to correct unjust laws. This is also why, at Rhet. 1375b 16-17, when he presents 
the balancing arguments in favour of written laws, Aristotle states that if the written law
40 Vinogradoff (1928b:42).
41 Vinogradoff (1928b:42).
42 Vinogradoff (1922:66, 68-69, 1928a: 17-19).
43 Vinogradoff (1922:66-67). There is insufficient space here to discuss his claims in detail.
44 Vinogradoff (1922:68, 1928a:20-21).
45 Vinogradoff (1928c:32-34).
46 Grimaldi (1980:300); Mirhady (1990:397-99).
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is on the speaker’s side he should argue that it is not just to abandon written law in 
favour of Yvdbpn Tfj öiKaiOTäTf).
That Aristotle’s aim in the Rhetoric was more practical is clear from 1374bl-18, where 
Aristotle lists types of equity pleas. The list includes appeals that errors and misfortunes 
should not be considered on the same basis as crimes; that one should make allowances 
for human failings; that one should consider not the law but the lawgiver and look, not 
at the letter of the law, but at the intention of the lawgiver; that one should not consider 
the action but the purpose; that one should consider not how someone is but how he has 
always (or for the most part) been; that one should remember good treatment rather than 
bad, and benefits received rather than offered; that it is better to be judged by agreement 
than by violence, and better to arbitrate than go to court.
The items are not internally consistent, but are appropriate depending on the 
circumstances in which one chooses to use them. One might consider that the list 
broadly covers all sorts of nonlegal argumentation. Against this, some point out that 
Aristotle grounds his discussion in terms of supplementing law. There is little point in 
distinguishing errors, misfortunes and crimes if em eiK S ia  is simply intended to cover all 
sorts of nonlegal argumentation.47 A discussion of the meaning of the law is grounded in 
the assumption that it is the law that matters, not an assumption that the law may be 
dismissed. We should note here the use of to  em e iK es  in the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 
1444al0-14. This handbook advises a litigant who admits the charges to claim an error 
or misfortune, and to say that forgiving error is equitable and just. Aristotle’s discussion 
of equity in the Rhetoric was also made in this context, as Aristotle introduced it in 
relation to people who admit facts but deny the charge (1373b40-1374al0). One could 
argue, for example, that to convict a man for assault with a dangerous weapon when he 
struck whilst wearing a ring is unjust, and likewise to convict someone of homicide 
when the murder was accidental is also unjust. The handbooks show that em e iK e ia  
could have been useful in rare cases where a speaker had to admit guilt but was 
nonetheless trying to be pardoned. Equity can be used to offset the law in these 
circumstances, but not as a broad prop on any occasion.
How closely does Aristotle’s concept of equity match the forensic speeches? Although 
general issues of justice or fairness occur fairly frequently in forensic speeches, they are
47 von Leyden (1967:6-8); Grimaldi (1980:304).
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never termed enieiKeia. Generally, to emeiKes/emeiKeia refer to moral characteristics 
and could be translated “reasonable”, “decent”, “respectable”, “honest”, “fair” or 
“moderate”. There is no instance where a speaker directly appeals for eniekeia in a 
forensic speech, and we do not find speakers seeking to replace written law with a 
broader concept o f fairness.49 The word does not occur, for example, in Antiphon’s 
second Tetralogy (iiiß.6-10, iiiö.5-8), where the imaginary litigant admits the charge but 
pleads error or misfortune. Similarly, whenever speakers allude to yvcbpn Tfl öiKaioidTfi 
they do so in contexts characterized by overall pleading in accordance with law that 
revoke any notion o f enieiKeia.50
In discussions of justice, enieiKeia is sometimes contrasted with öiKaiov, indicating that 
it could generally have an extra-legal meaning, equivalent to equity (Sophocles Fr. 703 
[Nauck]; Gorgias Fr. B6 D-K; Herodotus iii.53, Antiphon ii.2.13).51 In a few instances, 
the word appears to be used in Aristotelian terms:
d\A’ Yva MH Meiöias cmpqTOv äYüJvlaryrai öexa pvcjv ökqv, npös rjv oljk 
anqvTa öeov, Kai ei pev qöiKqKev, öiKqv öd), ei öe pq, dno<j)ÜY!T dnpov 
’ABqvaicov eva elvai 5eT Kai prjTe ouYYveopqs pqTe äöyou piyre enieiKeia? 
pqöepiäs tuxeTv, a Kai toTs övtcos döiKouoiv änavO’ ünäpxei.
But so that Meidias might not contest a case with a fixed penalty of ten mnai, 
which he did not attend when he should have, and so that, if he had committed a 
crime, he might pay the penalty, and if he had not, he might be acquitted, one of 
the Athenians had to lose his citizen status and obtain neither sympathy nor a 
right of defence nor any sort of equitable treatment of any type, which even real 
offenders all receive (Demosthenes xxi.90).
ecoptov yap toüs nepi tcüv oupßoÄaioov KplvovTas ou toTs emeiKeiais 
Xpojpevous, äXAä toTs vöpois rrsiBopevous.
...for they saw that the men who judged in relation to contracts did not apply 
equity but obeyed the laws (Isocrates vii.33 [a symbouleutic oration]).
durr’ oljk ä^iov 0ÜT8 KaTa xdpiv OÜT8 KaT’ enieiKeiav oute kot’ oüöev q KaTä 
toüs öpKOUS nspi auTcov 4jq4)iaao0ai.
48 See the discussions in Stoffels (1954:20-5) and Fortenbaugh (1996a: 152), and Lysias ix.7; xvi.l 1; 
xix.13; Isocrates i.38, 48; iv.63; vii.68; xi.l; xiii.21; xv.149, 195, 212; Demosthenes xix.32, 223; xx.155; 
xxi.207; xxii.40; xxiv.215; xxv.18, 86; xxvi.16; xxxiv.40; xxxvi.50; cf. also Plato Epist. vii.325b; 
Sophocles Or. 1127; Thucydides iii.40.4. A similar meaning of enieiKeia may be observed in oratory of 
the Roman period, where it can mean “modesty” and refers to the sort of character a speaker would try to 
project; cf. Hermogenes On Types o f Style 345-52. This meaning shows echoes of Aristotle’s definition, 
notably in the argument that a modest character would be displayed through the plea that the speaker was 
coming to trial against his will and the matter could have been settled among friends and relatives (ibid. 
346).
49 Meyer-Laurin (1965:2, 35, 39); Harris (1994:140); Carey (1996:36-7, 43).
50 Biscardi (1970:225-6); Johnstone (1999:41-2).
51 See also Stoffels (1954:31-3).
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Consequently, it is not right that you should vote in accordance with favour, or 
with equity, or in accordance with anything else than the oaths you took about 
these matters (Isocrates xviii.34 [concerning the juror’s oath]).
The first passage is a general denunciation of Meidias’ destruction of Straton rather than 
a technical plea, so the context is too broad to offer much help. The second passage has 
been seen as indicating that equity considerations were applied in court during Isocrates’ 
time. It is unclear how historically accurate Isocrates’ claim is, but the passage surely 
indicates that Isocrates and his audience could acknowledge that jurors could consider 
equity, not law, in contract disputes.
The third passage is precisely the sort of argument posited by Aristotle (Rhet. 1375M6- 
17) to be used against a claim for eniekeia in conjunction with YVGbpn TH apicrrn. The 
passage proves that an appeal to enieiKeia could be attacked as against a reasonable 
conception of the juror’s oath, though the fact that Isocrates’ speaker felt it necessary to 
mention a vote in accordance with equity may indicate that an appeal to equity was not 
unknown in Athenian courts. The passage does not indicate whether such an appeal 
would be made on the basis of gaps in the law, or by an attempt to counter an existing 
law.
Two possible passages is a very meagre yield from such a large corpus of evidence. We 
should not be surprised that there is so little evidence for enieiKeia in forensic oratory. If 
enieiKeia was mainly useful in situations where a speaker admitted the charge, then 
there are virtually no speeches in our corpus that fit this circumstance. The speaker of 
Lysias i admitted the charge, but claimed that his actions were lawful; obviously there 
was no need for equity in that case. Otherwise, there are no speeches where the speakers 
admit guilt.
How then are we to interpret the evidence for equity that Vinogradoff identified in 
forensic speeches? Vinogradoff may have erred in assuming that equity arguments 
always had to be introduced through an appeal to Y ^ M fl Tfj öiKaiOTÖnrn. Aristotle 
outlines a broad range of circumstances in which an appeal to equity may be tried, only 
one of which is to appeal that the written law does not allow for a particular case. In
52 Vinogradoff (1928a: 19); Bonner and Smith (1930-38,11:302).
It might be objected that Kpivovras does not clearly refer to jurors. Certainly, in some forensic 
speeches the term can refer to prosecutors (e.g. Antiphon iv. 1.1, 1.3); however, when Isocrates uses it and 
its cognates he tends to refer to jurors (e.g. xv.31).
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other situations the purpose of the equity argument is that the law, if applied rigidly, 
would result in an injustice.
So do the nonlegal arguments that Vinogradoff identified constitute clear evidence that 
equity could override law? When they make their pleas it is striking that the speakers 
give primacy to law and structure their arguments in legal terms. For example, in 
Hyperides iii.13 the speaker frames his argument on the basis that the law makes unjust 
agreements invalid, and then seeks to prove this by applying existing laws to his 
situation (Hyperides iii. 14-21).54 The speaker does not appeal to another authority than 
law. In this regard, the speeches actually reflect Aristotle’s advice in the Rhetoric. As 
noted above, Aristotle outlines strategies to employ when a speaker does not have the 
laws on his side, such as pointing to conflicts between laws or ambiguous wording 
(Rhet. 1374a; see also Rhet. Ad Alex. 1443al2-38). In Hyperides iii the law was 
certainly against the speaker, but it is important to note that he was not making an 
outright attack on law but seeking to subvert it within a legalistic framework.
Further Equity Arguments
Vinogradoff s arguments were adopted by a number of other scholars who identified 
further examples of equity arguments in forensic oratory.55 Paoli argued that a 
“subjective foundation” of law dominated, because a law only had authority if it 
coincided with the will of the people. Accordingly, fairness, emotion and character 
discussion could undermine law if jurors believed that a legal decision would result in 
injustice.56 Paoli noted that this system was especially evident in major political trials 
such as the Crown case,57 but occurred in all situations:
Ma nei casi ordinari, quando il processo non avesse carattere politico, in caso di 
conflitto fra una soluzione evidentemente equa e la contrapposta soluzione 
legale, come si conteneva il giudice? Noi riteniamo ehe, anche in questi casi,
54 ep£? Ö£ npös upas atnriKa paAa AQnvoYevrys, ws ö vöpos Aeyei, öaa äv £T£pos £T£pco 
öpoXoynan, KÜpia £?vai. Td ye öikcxicx w ßeXncrre- Tä Ö£ pf) Toüvavriov cmaYopeüsi pn KÜpia 
£lvai.
55 For example, Weiss (1923:73-6); Gemet (1937:121); Arangio-Ruiz (1946:242-3, n.l); J. W. Jones 
(1956:121-2, 135).
56 Paoli (1926:122, 1933:35, 39-45, 67-8; see also Gemet 1937:121). Paoli’s examples were Demosthenes 
xliv.8, xxxiii.27 and xxxvi.26-7.
57 Paoli (1933:40: “il quale sostenne la sua accusa su di una rigorosa linea di diritto, aveva la legge dalla 
sua”)- This interpretation of the Crown case has gained a fairly wide acceptance, in part due to the 
authoritative survey by Gwatkin (1957).
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quando l’antitesi fra le due soluzioni fosse irrimediabile, il giudice sacrificasse la 
legge.58
Ruschenbusch argued that the vagaries of Athenian legal procedure would have ensured 
a very inconsistent regime, since jurors were laymen with little, if any, legal knowledge. 
The ease with which jurors could follow their passions simply exacerbated the situation, 
so that identical cases could be judged legal or illegal on different days simply on the 
basis of “pure arbitrariness:”
Das bedeutet aber, daß eine Handlung, die Heute als Unrecht beurteilt worden 
war, am nächtsten Tage als Recht betrachtet werden konnte. Die Rechtsprechung 
lief damit auf reine Willkür hinaus, die dann infolge des primitiven 
Prozeßverfahrens und der Rabulistik der Advokaten nicht mehr zu überbieten 
war.59
Positivistic Jurors
Few scholars have followed Grote and Fränkel and suggested that Athenian jurors 
focussed on law and evidence. Erik Wolf fleshed out the theory. Like Ruschenbusch, he 
observed that there were weaknesses in Athenian legal procedure, but argued that jurors’ 
concerns were answered by “ein überängstliches, formalistisches Festhalten am 
Wortlaut der gesetze und Volksbeschlüsse.” 60 In forensic speeches the discussion of law
58 Paoli (1933:40). The extra cases produced by Paoli as evidence that appeals were made to equity 
actually provide little support for his argument. He drew attention, for example, to the phrase Kai eav 
pev £K tu)v vöpcov pn Cmdpxn, ÖiKaia öe Kai 4)iAdv0pwna (|)aivu)VTai XeyovTes, Kai oütw 
ouYXWpoupev in Demosthenes xliv.8. However, the phrase öiKaia öe Kai (J)iAdv9p(ona 4)aivajVTai 
XeYOVTes is not the basis of a plea, but hyperbole; the point is actually to link an unlikely fact (the case 
being more just) with the implication that the opponent’s case is also unlikely. Elsewhere in the speech the 
speaker stresses that his claim is founded upon law (xliv.7, 14, 46, 60, 66-8) and factual testimony 
(xliv.15, 31). I also fmd very little to convince me in Paoli’s citation of Demosthenes xxxiii.26 and 
xxxvi.26-7. In both cases the speaker is broadly discussing the meaning of the law. In xxxvi.27 he offers 
his opinion of Solon’s intention in framing the law limiting the time for bringing a suit, but this is 
incidental to his case - as the speaker says, the law clearly outlines the time limit (xxxvi.26) and this is the 
key issue.
59 Ruschenbusch (1957:265). Some authors also draw attention to Lysias x.7, which they consider to be an 
appeal against the actual wording of the law to its broader spirit (Grimaldi 1980:301; Edwards and Usher 
1985:232). However, the argument appears flawed. Firstly, it is unclear that the speaker is appealing to the 
spirit of the laws. He states (x.12) that certain words in the laws as drafted are not to be understood as 
limiting the application of the law only to charges framed with reference to those words; words such as 
“vow” (eniopKnaavra) or “flee” (öpaoKd^eiv) can also be understood to mean “swear” (öpöaavTa) 
or “run away” (änoölöpdöKeiv), for example. The defendant’s case is essentially semantic, and 
therefore the speaker’s point is that to take the words literally, rather than to consider the actions for which 
everybody uses those words, is ludicrous (Lysias x.10). This is why, in the remainder of the speech, the 
speaker draws attention to other laws, or laws which still exist but are phrased in obsolete language, as 
they support his claim that it is the action described by the word, rather than the word itself, that is 
important. Secondly, the speaker’s opponent does not appear to have claimed that the laws were invalid, 
but rather that the claim was not legally admissible. He was still upholding the authority of the laws, rather 




was “positivistic.” 61 Wolf accepted that nonlegal pleas could be made, but suggested 
that law was the most important element in a speech in influencing jurors’ decisions.
This “positivistic” view of Athenian jurors was a key prop in the articles by Hans Julius 
Wolff. He followed Fränkel in holding that the Heliastic oath bound jurors to judge in 
accordance with law, and claimed that Yvcnpn Tfi öiKaiOTdrrn was simply a subsidiary 
expedient which was rarely used:
Aus alledem ergibt sich: Das Gesetz war ein Befehl, der befolgt werden mußte.
W olff rejected the possibility that an Athenian jury might come up with a spontaneous 
interpretation that did not accord with law. Emotional appeals and character discussion 
he saw as supplementary arguments designed to deceive a jury, which were unlikely to 
have been crucial in determining a case; success depended on convincing jurors that the 
law applied to the case, for they constantly kept the purpose and wording of the law in 
mind .64
Wolff argued this theory in a number of short articles, but presented little evidence. His 
case was based, to a degree, on the assumption of a universal “Greek” law. Fortunately, 
his student, Meyer-Laurin, presented a detailed analysis based on forensic speeches. 
Meyer-Laurin noted that Aristotle was not a useful guide to Athenian practice, and that 
speeches were dominated by attention to laws. Like Fränkel and Wolff, he stressed the 
rigid binding of jurors under the Heliastic oath to the law and dismissed YV(i)|jr| Tfi 
öiKaiOTdTfi as a subsidiary expedient in rare cases where no applicable law existed, and 
therefore little use as evidence for the consistent application of equity principles.63 He 
surveyed the speeches that previous authors had argued contained equity arguments and 
claimed that they were in fact devoted largely to legal argumentation.60 He concluded 
that equity considerations had no legal significance:
Hier hat sich jedoch gezeigt, daß die Sprecher in dem Bestreben, sich auf
gesetzliche Gründe zu stützen, eher zu rechtlich Zweifelhaften und abwegigen
Bestimmungen gegriffen haben, als sich auf den offenkundigen Dolus des
61 Wolf (1956:343-4).
62 Wolf (1956:345).
6j Wolff (1962:18 [emphasis in original]).
64 Wolff (1962:10-13, 1968:15-16, 18-19, 1969:2).
65 Meyer-Laurin (1965:29), following Wolff (1962:18).
66 Meyer-Laurin (1965:11, 14, 19, 20-22, 26).
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Gegners zu berufen. Das läßt die Schlußfolgerung zu, daß 
Billigkeitsgesichtspunkte rechtlich noch keine Bedeutung gehabt haben.
Meyer-Laurin accepted that equitable arguments could be made in court, but, like Wolf 
and Wolff, suggested that such arguments did not actually have any legal meaning. They 
were merely a common form of “artificial proof’ in Athenian courts. In this context, 
he noted that speakers could resort to all manner of psychological means and methods in 
an effort to win their case, including appeals to sympathy, slander and personal insults - 
all of which also fall under the category of artificial proofs. In rare circumstances, he 
conceded, such artificial proofs could win a case despite the law. Following the accepted 
interpretation of the Crown case, he saw this as one such example in which the stronger 
legal argument failed, but explained this as a reflection of political circumstances.69 
Generally, however, he felt that law was the primary consideration in court, and 
nonlegal arguments were secondary.
The Revival of Equity
The “positivistic” theory has been accepted by some scholars. The first thing to note 
about the contest between it and the “equity” theory is that they are talking at cross 
purposes. The focus of the “positivistic” theory is on the juror himself, and the 
principles that the juror would have kept in mind when judging. By contrast, the focus 
of “equity” theorists is on the speakers in court, and the range of arguments they brought 
to bear. In terms of the evidence, “equity” theorists are in a stronger position. We have 
ample evidence through forensic oratory of both legal and nonlegal pleading. We have 
very little evidence, however, for the thoughts and interests of Athenian jurors. The key 
prop in the “positi vistic” theory is the Heliastic oath, and its command that jurors should 
vote in accordance with the laws and the decrees. Yet the theory is distressingly circular; 
the oath bound jurors to vote in accordance with the law, but the evidence that they did 
so is the oath.
In ancient literature there are remarkably few non-forensic comments on Athenian 
jurors, and these present a mixed result. Within forensic oratory, one of the clearest 
statements is Demosthenes xxiv.95-7; the speaker notes that jurors can be misled by
67 Meyer-Laurin (1965:24-5).
68 Meyer-Laurin (1965:25), following Wolff (1968:18).
69 Meyer-Laurin (1965:32).
70 For example, Meinecke (1971:280, 355-7); Finley (1985:101-3); Triantaphyllopoulos (1985:26-7); 
Bleichen (1986:139); Meier (1999:418).
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speakers, and can only decide on the basis of the arguments that are put to them. If we 
were to consider the statement generally applicable, we could argue it means the speaker 
who presented the most persuasive arguments could win, even if those arguments were a 
corruption of law. In this vein, Hillgruber concluded that legalistic interpretation was 
essentially designed to persuade the jurors rather than to resolve juristic problems. 
Athenian laws were vaguely phrased and often silent on particular matters; this 
allowed considerable freedom in legal interpretation. Speakers interpreted laws to make
7 0
them fit the facts of the case.
This would have ensured that jurors did not confine themselves strictly to legal 
principles, and the evidence indicates that judgements were not always based on the 
laws. Jurors were, Hillgruber conceded, bound by their oath to vote according to the 
laws, but they understood this oath not as a summons to extreme obedience to the letter 
of the law, but rather as an instruction to vote for justice:
Die Heliasten waren zwar an ihren Eid gebunden, kcxtq toüs vöpous 
ijjr|4>isTG0ai, aber sie verstanden diesen Eid nicht als Aufforderung zu einem 
extremen Buchstabengehorsam gegenüber den Gesetzen, sondern als Auftrag, tcx 
Skala HJncji êaGai.74
Hillgruber cites a number of occasions on which speakers exhorted the jury to decide 
what was just (Andocides i.31; Lysias xv.8; Demosthenes xx.167, xxi.4, 212, xxiii.194, 
xxiv.175, lviii.61). What was just was not necessarily identical with what was lawful. 
Jurors adopted a flexible approach, and were not bound by juristic principles or equity.76 
However, Hillgruber concluded that it did not follow that Athenian legal practice was 
governed by the pure arbitrariness posited by Ruschenbusch. He suggested that the 
jurors would have fairly closely exammeü the facts of the case, and the various 
arguments presented by the speakers, so that in the majority of cases (where political
• • 77concerns were not involved), there would have been a “satisfactory” resolution.
71
71 This passage is quoted and discussed at greater length in Chapter Five.
72 Hillgruber (1988:107).
73 Hillgruber (1988:105-7, 112-13, 116).
74 Hillgruber (1988:112-13).
75 Ibid. Hillgruber’s identification of pleas based on justice can be traced back to Paoli (1933:40), who 
earlier noted the occurrence of such pleas and labelled them examples of equity pleas.
76 Hillgruber (1988:119-20: “Die Athener sind offensichtlich bei der Lösung juristischer Probleme sehr 
flexibel gewesen, da sie sich an kein juristisches Prinzip gebunden fühlen, weder an ein Prinzip der 
Billigkeit - insofern ist die Hauptthese von Meyer-Laurin zutreffend - noch an ein starres 
Gesetzesprinzip”).
77 Hillgruber (1988:120); similar conclusions were reached by Bleicken (1984:384-85) and Gehrke 
(1985:30).
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Other authors have criticized the “positivistic” theory by claiming that it is incorrect to 
argue that law had primary importance over other types of evidence. Like Hillgruber, 
they dispute Meyer-Laurin’s claim that appeals to more general considerations of justice 
were of less importance than legalistic pleading, and condemn Meyer-Laurin for 
“selective quotation” by dismissing such passages as rhetorical.79 They note that a law 
itself was introduced into court as one of a number of types of evidence. If law was a 
type o f evidence, then they claim that law need not have been crucial to a case, and 
therefore speakers were free to base their argument on a range of pleas, including 
appeals to fairness or equity. Todd argues that speakers could have presented laws 
which appeared to contradict each other, “but the oath sworn by the dikastai obliged 
them in such circumstances not to discover what was ‘the law’ in a particular situation, 
but rather to reach a verdict while giving proper weight to those laws which had been 
cited in evidence before them.” The implication is that Athenian juries were free to 
decide on whatever grounds were actually argued, whether legal or nonlegal.
This revival of equity arguments has one major weakness - its contention that arguments 
based on justice were as valid as legal pleas. As noted already, speakers do not appeal to 
an authority over law, and when nonlegal arguments are made they do not coincide with 
the claim that the law does not apply. This casts doubt on whether jurors actually 
accepted broad concepts of justice as superior to law. The main evidence that jurors 
were not solely bound by law is Biscardi’s point that law was one of a number of types 
of evidence. This apparent equality of law with evidence, however, is based on 
Aristotle’s classification {Rhet. 1375a24-5) o f “artless” and “inartificial” proofs 
(aTexvoi niOTsis) and “artful” or “artificial” proofs (evrexvoi nicrreis).83 As with most of
78 Biscardi (1970:219-21, 227-30; 1982:362-71); Todd (1990a:19, 1993:54-5); Todd and Millett 
(1990:14); Millett (1990:177).
79 Todd (1993:54-5).
80 Biscardi (1970:232), following a point that was made earlier by Gemet (1955:67); Todd (1993:59-60); 
Scafiiro (1997:53); Allen (2000:175).
81 Biscardi (1970:232); Todd (1993:58-8); Christ (1998:41, 195, 208) and Allen (2000:175-6).
82 Todd (1993:59-60).
83 As noted by Gagarin (1990:24), nioreis, although conventionally translated as “proof’, really does not 
convey any sense that such proof automatically proves anything. Rather, niOTeis are the material that are 
used to support an argument; the argument is still needed to convey the meaning of the nicrreis. Among 
the artless proofs he listed witnesses, tortures, contracts, oaths and laws. Only the first three are listed at 
1355b; oaths and laws are added at Rhet. 1375a22. This classification is followed by, for example, 
Harrison (1968-71,11:133-54); MacDowell (1978:242-7); and Soubie (1973-74:184). The artificial proofs 
include moral character, emotion and common topics (basically a shopping list of rhetorical tricks, 
including probabilities, examples, maxims, enthymemes [a type of syllogism], demonstrative topics, 
illusory topics and refutations). Similar distinctions were drawn by the roughly contemporary Rhetorica 
ad Alexandrian 1428al7, although that handbook conspicuously did not include laws. It distinguished 
proofs drawn “from the words and deeds and persons themselves” (eJ; aÜ Ttbv Ttbv Xoywv koci TU)V
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his work, Aristotle has established a taxonomy to give order to his ensuing discussion. 
There is no evidence that the taxonomy carried any weight in court; indeed, the terms 
örrexvoi nicrreis and evreyvoi nicrrsis were apparently invented by Aristotle (Quintilian 
Inst, v.l .1). It is significant that Cicero, in presenting rhetorical devices for use in 
Roman courts, could adopt Aristotle’s distinction {De Orat. ii.l 16-9); nobody, however, 
has suggested that laws had equal status with evidence in Roman courts.
In this regard Carey states:
The juror’s oath indicates clearly that although in presentational terms the laws 
are not distinguished from other forms of direct evidence, they have a 
fundamental importance denied to items such as depositions. And although the 
oath allowed for decisions in areas where the laws gave no guidance, almost all 
cases which came before the lawcourts were based on accusations of breaches of
85specific laws.
Carey also points out that law was afforded a more privileged position than other artless 
proofs. The penalty for introducing a non-existent law was death, whereas the penalty
os
for false witness was damages to the prosecutor. Accordingly, it seems that the 
procedural orientation of Athenian courts was towards law, and that law may well have 
had greater authority than pleas for justice or fairness.
Hillgruber’s view that the Heliastic oath supported a vote for justice is also dubious. 
Each juror swore ipn^ioupai Korrä toüs vöpous (I will judge according to the laws),87 
and our understanding of the word vopos indicates that it generally refers to valid and 
binding rules when the term is used to denote written statutes. It is difficult to see how 
this can be construed as permitting a vote for justice in opposition to law. Speakers tend 
"tu interpret the oath as incompatible with conferring favours. Demosthenes states that
8Q
jurors swore to judge without favour or hostility (outs ydcpiTOS eveiC out’ ex0Pa?), 
while, as noted above, Isocrates xviii.34 states that, having sworn their oath, it is not 
right that jurors should vote according to favour or equity. Lysias (xiv.22) similarly
npd^ewv Kai tcüv ävSpwnajv) from “supplementary” proofs (eni0£TOi). The first type o f proof 
included probabilities, examples, tokens, enthymemes, maxims, signs and refutations, and the latter the 
opinion of the speaker, witnesses, tortures and oaths.
84 Solmsen (1941:186-7) and Gagarin (1990:23 n.5) make the point that the terms occur regularly in later 
writers on rhetoric, but do not occur prior to Aristotle.
85 Carey (1994a: 183).
86 Carey (1996:34).
87 Aeschines iii.6. For discussion on the wording see Harrison (1968-71,11:48), MacDowell (1978:44).
88 Ostwald (1969:20, 40,43).
89 Demosthenes lvii.63; see also xix.l.
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States that request for favours are unjust, since they are really a request to break the oath 
and disobey the laws.
Litigants may state that the jurors have sworn, through their Heliastic oath, to vote for 
justice, but they never use the oath to make a plea that is based on justice in opposition 
to law. To take two of Hillgruber’s examples, Andocides i.31 and Lysias xv.8, both do 
contain the claim that jurors have sworn to vote Tä öiKaia, but these comments follow 
fairly extensive discussions of pertinent laws. Lysias xv.8, in fact, begins by claiming 
that, if a law has been broken, it is not just to ignore this. As discussed in Chapter Five, 
when speakers use the oath to refer to justice they usually rely on a claim that their case 
is both just and in accordance with law.90 Johnstone notes “speakers did not urge the 
jurors to disregard the law in the interests of justice, did not suggest that justice alone 
should inform their decision, did not oppose justice to the law, did not even argue that 
justice was a necessary supplement to areas not covered by the law.”91
On the other hand, the fact that speakers could deliver nonlegal or equity arguments 
must indicate that legal pleading could be rather more open than “positivistic” scholars 
claim. To argue that nonlegal arguments had no effect is simply incredible; it is unlikely 
that they would occur so regularly if they were not expected to influence jurors. Todd 
may be on the right track when he notes that laws did not supply rules which jurors had 
to follow, but set the limits within which they had to resolve disputes. On the face of 
it, his claim is internally inconsistent as it is difficult to see how something that sets 
limits cannot be considered a rule, but if laws are viewed as setting parameters which 
could be distorted and manipulated by speakers, we can envisage that jurors could be 
convinced they were fc’ lowing the law even when they were being led up the garden 
path.
The Recent Revival of the Importance of Law
Recently, Meyer-Laurin’s arguments have been resurrected by E. M. Harris, who also 
deals with some of the more recent criticisms of the position. Harris stresses that the 
Heliastic oath commanded jurors to vote in accordance with the law In addition, he 
points out that there are frequent passages in forensic speeches where speakers discuss 





mainly in speeches given by defendants. Since it was customary for the accuser to 
discuss the law under which he brought his case, the defendant normally had no need to 
have the law read out again.” 94
Harris also denies that Athenian jurors can automatically be assumed to have possessed 
no legal experience95 and criticises the common belief that the “open texture” of 
Athenian laws would have made it impossible for jurors to grasp the meaning of a law 
(see the discussion in Chapter One) .96 Harris surveyed a number of speeches and claims 
that they were decided primarily on legal grounds, notably the Crown case. He claims 
that Ctesiphon’s decree did not breach the law and concludes that Aeschines’ legal case 
was quite weak. In summarising his arguments, Harris notes that “litigants pay careful 
attention to substantive issues and questions about the interpretation of law; they would 
only have done so if they considered themselves bound to adhere to the letter of the 
law.” 98
Harris does concede that Athenian courts could “on occasion” let their passions overturn 
the law, but suggests that these occasions were “aberrations from the norm.” 99 This is, in 
fact, the crux of the argument. How common was it for a jury to look to law, or nonlegal 
considerations? What was the weight that the jurors gave to the various types of 
argument that were placed before them? As noted before, scholars have tended to 
emphasise one class of material (e.g. legalistic discussion) over another (e.g. pleas for 
pity or equity). The very different characterisations of Athenian justice that have 
resulted reflect these varying emphases.
93 Harris (1994:133).
94 Harris (1994:134).
95 Harris (1994:134-6). Gagarin (1989:113; 1997:20) lays similar stress on the possibility that Athenian 
jurors had greater legal knowledge than is usually acknowledged.
96 Harris (1994:138-9, 2000:27-35).




Chapter Three Litigation and Social Competition
In recent years the theory that Athenian juries ignored law and evidence in favour of 
nonlegal factors, such as the characters of the litigants, has resurfaced in a new form. Its 
proponents asserts that social values shaped the character of juries. The argument 
originated with Adkins, who noted the importance of competitive values in ancient 
Greek, and especially Homeric, society. 1 2He argued that Greeks basically evaluated 
actions in terms of shame and honour - shame would accrue for failing in a competitive 
pursuit, while victory brought honour.
Adkins claimed that in Classical Athens competitive values were able to overturn law in 
a court. His chief evidence for this point was a number of passages in which speakers 
brought their life and character before the court. His argument hinges on the 
assumption, not clearly stated, that such pleas were actually successful, and more 
important to winning a case than appeals to law or justice, since success in competition 
as revealed by the character of the litigant would be of greater interest to an Athenian 
jury.4 5
Gamer extended Adkins’ theory, using passages from Athenian tragedies to pinpoint 
competitiveness and desire for honour as major moral traits in Athenian society:
Given the importance of honor, even a judge, whose function was to dispense 
dike, would be so concerned with the opinions, praise and blame of others that 
he might choose to gain honor from the many rather than rule in accordance with 
the facts of the case.3
Gamer claimed that there is actually little clear evidence for what the Athenians meant 
when they praised the rule of law. They would have been influenced by their moral
1 Adkins originally based his views on Homeric Greece, classifying it as a “shame-culture.” With life 
being a struggle for survival, “success is so imperative that only results have any value (1960:35).”
Martial attributes such as skill and courage were prized above quiet virtues such as justice; as Adkins put 
it, those who suffer from wrong-doing do not admire it, but since skill and courage are more crucial than 
justice for survival right-doing was less highly prized by society (1960:55).
2 Adkins (1960:154), followed by Carter (1986:1-2); Gamer (1987:27, n.23); Ferguson (1989:6-9). The 
notion of ancient Greece as a “shame-culture” was first put forward by Dodds (1951:17-18). Adkins was 
not the first to highlight the importance o f honour, and o f competitive values, in Greek society; see for 
example Burckhardt 1998[1872]:69-72.
3 Adkins (1960:209, 1972:139).
4 Burckhardt ( 1998[ 1872]: 183) similarly connected competitive values with litigation, though he did not 
consider the point in detail. R. Osborne (1985:52-53) later echoed Adkins’ views with his claim that 
courts were a “public stage” for playing out “private enmities.”
5 Gamer (1987:10), who cites Euripides Hec. 852, 1240 in support. These references do not prove the 
point, however. Although Agamemnon in the play is concerned about the views of his troops, and this may 
influence his decision, it is clear from the context that Agamemnon’s decision will also be based on what 
he considers just, having heard the facts o f the case.
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values, which, following Adkins, he saw as elevating wrong-doing over right-doing if it 
guaranteed results.6 Accordingly, praising one’s own achievements and deriding one’s 
opponents was not irrelevant, but “a deep Greek tendency which simply allows the 
competition to be removed to a higher and more general level.” 7 Such praise and 
derision proved that one had achieved results and attained honour, and allowed a 
speaker to turn a court case into a contest over honour and status. Gamer notes that 
courts had a clear competitive aspect, including the antagonistic form of proceedings
o
and the use of language which echoed sporting contests and battle. Law was not always 
important in court; if a defendant was guilty “he could ask to be acquitted or to win the 
case on the basis of past excellence in achievement and service.” 9
Gamer’s views have been further developed by Cohen, who argued that Athenian 
citizens were fundamentally concerned with striving to win honour, and establishing 
their worth in relation to other men. 10 He claimed that, because social relations were 
competitive, Athenian society became dominated by patterns of feuding behaviour, in 
which friends supported each other and tried to harm their enemies. 11 Like Gamer, 
Cohen argued that the Athenians’ competitive values were transferred to the courts. The 
competitive rivalries that could erupt in feuds, and the networks of friends that citizens 
established, conditioned the way courts operated. Lawsuits were a formalized 
competition for honour and status, with decisions based more on the parties’ deeds and
17character than on any actual facts of the case.
One problem, as Cohen notes, is that speakers frequently urge the jurors to decide on the 
basis of the law, and applaud the virtue of the rule of law. On the face of it, competitive 
values are in conflict with the requirements of the rule of law, since individuals may be 
willing to subvert the law in order to further their own interests. Cohen argues that in
6 Gamer (1987:18).
7 Gamer (1987:62-63).
8 Gamer (1987:59-62, 70).
9 Gamer (1987:63). Unfortunately, Gamer’s sole references here are to the victory of Eumelos in the 
chariot race, and Agamemnon’s victory at javelin throwing, in the Iliad, which are hardly evidence for 
Athenian practice, and Isocrates xv.4-5, where Gamer claims Isocrates lost an antidosis because his 
opponent based his case on Isocrates’ profession and its effects on society. Isocrates actually claims that 
his defeat was unjust, in part because his opponent amplified his wealth by drawing upon Isocrates’ 
reputation for teaching rhetoric. It would be unwise to press this single, biased comment to prove so 
critical a point.
10 Cohen (1995a:62-3). Cohen interpreted Aristotle’s Rhetoric and the orators as showing that society 
emphasised rivalry for status, envy and revenge.
11 Cohen (1995a:62).
12 Cohen (1991:155, 1995a:6l-2, 77, 104-5, 184-6).
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Athens law ultimately gained its sanction only from the support of the demos,lj and 
since the jury would be attuned to competition and the pursuit of honour they would 
understand speakers to be asking them to judge on the basis of the parties’ “civic 
merit.” 14
Cohen argues that character became the central issue at the trial. Claims about litigants’ 
reputation and conduct are “as relevant as the factual conflict upon which the suit is 
technically based.” 15 In expanding upon this point, Cohen amends it; he portrays the 
facts of the case as completely subverted by the process of supplying and evaluating 
evidence. Cohen suggests that the weaknesses of Athenian legal procedure (see Chapter 
One) gave jurors little hope of evaluating the claims made by opposing parties. As a 
result, they could only judge claims by assessing the litigants themselves, and analysing 
their “reputation, character and status as citizens.” 16 Cohen adds that witnesses were no 
help to jurors since “the role of witnesses at Athens is shaped by agonistic values,” and 
witnesses in Athenian courts had little function other than to lie for the party that 
brought them forward. Accordingly,
In an agonistic society where prosecution is only by private initiative, where 
everyone knows that individuals seek revenge and pursue feuding relations 
through the courts, where there is no cross-examination of witnesses or expert 
evaluation of evidence, where the trial is of extremely limited duration and 
confined to two opposing speeches, where the available means of proof of 
factual claims are in any event extremely limited, and where the principle of 
solidarity means that witnesses are generally expected to lie for the side on 
whose behalf they testify...litigants have wide scope to create a factual context to 
explain the enmity they share with their opponent in a way which suits their 
needs. In doing so they are constrained only by the limits of probability and 
public knowledge, two central forms of argument in forensic rhetoric. In short, 
when courts are faced with cases where both opponents manipulate the same 
topoi to justify their cause, how can the judges decide whether this is, in fact, a 
case of legitimate revenge for wrong done, a sycophantic prosecution for 
financial gain, or a trumped up charge in the tit-for-tat of feuding relations? 18
Cohen discusses numerous speeches to support his argument, including Demosthenes 
xxi, 19 the famous Crown exchange between Demosthenes xviii and Aeschines iii, and
lj Cohen (1995a:56, 184-5, 1995b:242, following Ober 1989:304; the same argument was used by Gemet 
1937:122 to justify a claim that jurors would prefer equity to law).
14 Cohen (1995a: 184, citing the example o f Lysias xxx.l, 26-8).
15 Cohen (1991:159, repeated at 1995a:93. See also Cohen 1995b:242).
16 Cohen (1995a: 106-7).
17 Cohen (1995a: 107).
18 Cohen (1995a: 105).
19 Cohen (1995a:90; see also 1991:157-9).
42
Demosthenes liii. 1 -2 Against Nikostratos. He presents many examples of the use of 
character and emotional pleading and argues that they formed the basis of a case. 
Cohen’s comments on the procedural limitations of courts on their own hardly prove 
that jurors would have been forced to concentrate on the character, reputation and status 
of the speakers, so the crucial link in his theory is that jurors were unable to trust the 
testimony of witnesses. If all evidence is seen to be perjured, and all testimony 
inevitably corrupt, then jurors would have little option but to fall back upon the 
litigants’ characters as a basis for decision-making.
The view that Athenian witnesses were by and large perjurers has been common since 
the late eighteenth century, when Gillies claimed that they “might be purchased at 
Athens for the small sum of a few drachmas.”22 In more recent years it has become 
associated with three studies, by Soubie, Humphreys and Todd:
• Soubie claimed that a proportion of Athenian witnesses attended court to express 
support for their side, rather than provide objective facts. His key item of proof was 
Demosthenes liv.32, where Ariston had argued that Conon’s witnesses were his 
friends and therefore likely to be testifying for him out of solidarity. Soubie also 
claimed that a number of other speeches proved that friends and relatives were 
brought out to support a cause.23
• Humphreys argued that most witnesses in Classical Athens were “overtly partisan”, 
and friends or kinsmen of the litigant.24 She claimed that they were in court to appear 
as supporters of the speaker, rather than to offer independent corroboration of his 
account, and that the content of their testimony was often unimportant or irrelevant.
• Todd similarly suggests that the essential function of a witness in Classical Athens 
was to support relations or friends, not to testify to facts or tell the truth. Todd’s 
evidence for this claim is largely based on procedural distinctions between Athenian 
and modem courts. Witnesses generally could not be cross-examined, and he claims 
there are very few attacks on the credibility of opponents’ witnesses, though it is
9 0
20 Cohen (1995a: 102-4).
21 Cohen (1995a:97, 126, 131, 180).
22 Gillies (1792,111:130); see too Anon. (1826:344-45).
23 Soubie (1973-74:179, 182-3, 188, 201).
24 Humphreys (1985:315, 322).
25 Humphreys (1985:322-4); her arguments are discussed further in Chapter Six.
26 Todd (1990a:23-4, 27-31, 1993:96-7).
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often claimed that the opponent’s witnesses are lying. Finally, there was no such 
thing in Athens as a subpoena, but litigants had to provide their own witnesses.
Cohen suggests that speakers would regularly ask friends and relatives to lie for them in 
court. He notes the frequent references in forensic speeches to false testimony and cites 
Demosthenes xxix.22-3 as evidence that people would give false testimony due to 
bribery, friendship towards one party or enmity towards one party. He also asserts that
9Q
suits for false witness were common. Like Todd he stresses that it is not the nature of 
the testimony that is important as much as the identity of the witness. Cohen compares 
Athenian practice with nineteenth-century Corsica, where he claims witnesses were 
compatriots of disputing parties and routinely lied for their side. According to 
Demosthenes, Cohen states, “it is simply to be expected that enmity is taken to justify
„  • »32perjury.
Cohen draws upon two main speeches to flesh out this picture. Firstly, he notes that in 
Lysias vii the speaker draws attention to his opponent’s lack of witnesses, and states that 
the opponent will say that he could not find any because they were frightened of the 
speaker’s wealth and influence. According to Cohen, the speaker says (Lysias vii.30-32) 
that “the judges should disregard the accusation of his enemies and instead look at his 
conduct as a citizen including his many benefactions to the state.”33
Secondly, Cohen draws attention to Aeschines’ comment in Against Timarchus that he 
has called friends of the opponent to prove his accusations, to negate the expectation 
that witnesses will lie for their friends (Aeschines i.47-8). According to Cohen, 
Aeschines goes on to state that the jurors should base their judgements, not on what 
witnesses say, but on a man’s habits, life and associations. Aeschines cites a fragment of 
Euripides, which Cohen translates as “I have already judged many disputes and have 
listened to witnesses competing against one another with conflicting accounts of the 
same event. Like any sensible man I determine the truth by looking at a man’s nature
27 Todd (1990a:23-4).
28 Cohen (1995a: 107).
29 Cohen (1995a: 111).
30 Cohen (1995a: 109-15, 129); Humphreys (1985:323); Todd (1990a:30).
31 Cohen (1995a: 108-9).
32 Cohen (1995a: 107).
33 Cohen (1995a: 109).
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and his life (Euripides Phoenix Fr. 812 [Nauck]).”34 As Cohen notes, this fragment 
“surely appeals to widely held convictions.”
Besides this fragment, there is actually very little evidence in forensic speeches of 
witnesses competing against each other. Cohen cites Demosthenes xlv.37-8 as “a world 
of fraudulent litigation in which everyone fabricates testimony and documents”, and in 
particular the lines “Why did one group of witnesses testify to these facts and another 
group to these? As I explained before, they divided the fraud.” He also cites the report 
in Demosthenes liv.31-2 of the conflicting testimony of Conon’s and Ariston’s 
witnesses.37 Otherwise he has remarkably little evidence for competing witnesses. When 
discussing Lysias iii, for example, he falls back upon outright assumption: “Clearly, the 
judges will be confronted with totally incompatible versions of what happened, both
T O
supported by numerous eyewitnesses.”
Critique of Social Competition Theories
There has been little discussion of “social competition” theories. Rubinstein pointed 
out that “there are at least as many private speeches in which the speaker does not depart 
from the issue at hand...as there are speeches which invite comparison of the entire lives 
and characters of the litigants.” She also noted that Cohen assumes that attacks on an 
opponent must always occur with self-praise, and implied that this is not the case.40
Such statements are too general to be definitive, and as a result a more detailed critique 
is offered here, and detailed analyses of the data of forensic oratory are presented in
34 nör| öe noXXwv npeSrjv Xoygov «puns,/ Kai rröXA’ d p iX X i iB e v T a  papTuptov üno/ Tävavri’ eyvcov 
oupcpopäs jjids nepi./ K äyw  pev oütco, xcootis ecrr’ avijp oocpos,/ XoyRopai TäXnOes, eis dvöpös 
(puoiv/ OKoncüV öianrdv 0’, nvTiv’ npepeueiai. For his discussion see Cohen (1995a: 110-1). Cohen’s 
translation is very similar to Humphreys’ (1985:323). I do not think the fragment actually says that the 
witnesses are “competing” against each other. The second and third lines are in secondary speech, so the 
aorist passive participle d|jiXXr|0£VTa agrees with the accusative subject Tcxvavri’; “I have often seen 
that the opposite has been contended by witnesses about the one event.” I accept that dpiXXdopai often 
means “competing” (c.f. Plato Rep. 328a, Laws 833a; Euripides Her. 960; Xenophon Anab. iii.4.46; 
Dinarchus i. 103), but in the Euripidean context of disagreements between people one might better 
translate it here as “contended” or “argued” on the basis o f Suppl. 195, Iph. in Aulis 309, Hec. 291, Her. 
1255.
35 Cohen (1995a: 111).
36 Cohen (1995a:111).
37 Cohen (1995a: 129).
38 Cohen (1995a: 134).
j9 Carey (1997:16) pointed out, in citing Cohen’s work, that witnesses are expected to testify to facts. E. 
M. Harris (2000:32-33) notes that Cohen and Ober exxagerate the open texture of law.
40 Rubinstein (2000:174). I have found references to a more wide-ranging rebuttal o f Cohen’s work by E. 
M. Harris and forthcoming articles on how litigants “stuck to the point” by both Rubinstein and Rhodes, 
but as these are unpublished I have not been able to see them.
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Chapters Five and Six. “Social competition” theories are flawed on several counts. In 
the first place, the characterisation of witnesses as family supporters who were expected 
to lie for their side is at best partial and at worst seriously deficient in its treatment of the 
evidence. In the second place, the analysis of the rule of law ignores significant 
contradictory evidence. Finally, the picture of popular morality drawn by Adkins,
Gamer and Cohen pays insufficient attention to the important role of concepts of 
fairness or justice.
Perjury in Athenian Courts
Chapter Six assesses the use of evidence in Athenian courts in some detail. As a result, 
the discussion here provides background for the comprehensive assessment of the data 
presented in that chapter.
Accusations of perjury are found in Athenian forensic speeches. Cohen cites a number 
of instances, nearly all of which are either outright claims that the opponent’s witnesses 
are lying (Andocides i.7; Demosthenes xix.216, xxi.l 12, 139, xxix.22-5, xlv.37-40, 
liv.31-2; Isocrates xviii.51-8; Lysias xix.4) or suggestions that people are scared to 
testify because of a party’s wealth and power (Lysias vii.21-2; Demosthenes xxix.22-5). 
In many of these cases witnesses are friends or relatives of a party, and in certain cases 
(e.g. Demosthenes liv.35-6) it is clearly suggested that friends and relatives will lie for 
their party.
Speakers do not claim that perjury is generally accepted behaviour, or that the sole 
function of a witness is to express support for their party. On all occasions the 
accusation is made that the opponent has brought forward false witnesses; the implied 
contrast is with the speaker’s own witnesses.41 In both Andocides i.7 and Lysias xix.4 
the speakers openly condemn the practice, noting that often perjurers have unjustly 
destroyed (äöiKO)S änoXeoavTes) people and their punishment has come too late for 
their victims.
Similarly, in Demosthenes liv.35-6, when Ariston suggests that Conon’s witnesses 
support him as they are his friends, he goes on to state “But I actually provide the 
doctors as witnesses.”42 The implication is that Conon’s friends are willing to lie, but 
that Ariston’s witnesses are speaking the truth. As a first point, then, and leaving aside
41 See Mirhady (2000:188).
42 Dem. liv.36: äXAä kqi papTupas iaipous napexopai.
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whether or not witnesses’ accounts may conflict, it is clear from the sources that Cohen 
cites that providing false testimony was viewed as criminal behaviour.
In response it might be argued that in law witnesses were expected to tell the truth, but 
in practice no one actually expected them to do so. Clearly, in some cases witnesses 
must have lied, and friends and relatives will also have lied for their side. This is 
probably a common feature of litigation. Depending on the facts of the case and the 
opponents’ likely arguments, a speaker may have decided that offering false witness was 
worth taking the risk.43 At other times, they would have refused. Speakers can claim that 
their opponents could not get their friends to testify for them as this would have meant 
committing perjury (Demosthenes xxx.23).44 Although the procedures for obtaining and 
presenting witnesses in Athens differed from today, this does not necessarily indicate 
that witnesses were there to lie and express support. Todd’s argument appears to be 
based on an illogical syllogism, that because the procedure was different therefore the 
aim was different. Yet this is by no means clear from the forensic speeches. The 
evidence that Todd, Soubie and Cohen provide might look more convincing if 
accusations of false witness or co-opting friends and relatives to tell lies were not clearly 
identified in rhetorical handbooks as a topos designed to undermine the opponent’s 
evidence.43
Carey pointed out that “witnesses are always required to attest a fact based on personal 
knowledge or experience; they are never required simply to express their support and are 
therefore not merely a presence.”46 All of the passages that Soubie claimed indicate 
support by family and friends in fact can be disputed. In every case the speaker calls 
witnesses to testify to facts.47 In one speech, Demosthenes lvii, the speaker does rely
4j Polyaenus (Strat. i.40.1) provides an anecdote which shows such a circumstance. Alcibiades hid a 
dummy in a small dark room and brought each of his friends in, telling them that he had murdered the man 
and needed their help so that he could escape the danger. Some refused to help, but Callias agreed. 
Polyaenus’ story was epitomised in the Leonis imperatoris stratagemata vii.2, where Alcibiades’ test 
included selecting friends who were willing to support him in court (auvaytovi^opevous). The difference 
in wording may be an attempt by the later author to elucidate the passage, so we should not press too far 
this hint that Alcibiades’ friends might have assisted him in litigation.
44 Mitchell (1996:14) notes that in Demosthenes xxix.22-4 and Aeschines i.47 witnesses were friends o f  
the opponents, and therefore more likely to be presenting evidence that was not in the speakers’ favour.
45 Notably in the fourth century B.C. Rhet. ad Alex. 143 Ib24-1432a3. Later rhetorical handbooks also 
reproduced the topos; cf. Apsines Tech. 5.12, Anonymous Seguerianus Tech. 189. Aristotle briefly refers 
to the topos at Rhet. 1376a29-32.
46 Carey (1994a: 184); see also Gagarin (1990:28, 30) and Soubie (1973-74:197). Mirhady’s comment 
(2000:186) that “the identity and status o f the witness, besides his being a free male, was irrelevant” seems 
a little too sweeping. Otherwise the speaker o f Demosthenes liv.35-6 would not have attacked the 
character of his opponent’s witnesses.
47 The cases are (Soubie 1973-74:183): Demosthenes xxviii. 10-13; xliii; xlviii and lvii.
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mainly on friends and relatives, but as the case is about citizenship and the speaker 
needs to prove his parents’ citizen status this is hardly surprising. In another speech 
cited by Soubie the speaker calls apparently impartial witnesses. The contention that it 
is the identity of the witness rather than the content of their testimony that is important 
must be doubted.
A key problem is that claims of perjury were presented to undermine an opponent’s 
case, and it is unclear how valid such claims may have been. Fortunately, there is a little 
external evidence that sheds some light on Athenian concepts of perjury. This evidence 
matches the impression we get from forensic oratory that perjury was commonly viewed 
as unjust. Aristotle, whom Cohen cites in support of his portrayal of Athenian 
“agonistic” values, stated that providing false witness was wicked (Pol. 1236bl 5-28) 
and unjust (Virtues and Vices 125 lb5).49 That providing false testimony was generally 
considered unjust may also be evidenced by one of the fragments of Antiphon the 
Sophist’s Truth (POxy 1797). Here the writer constructs a sophistic argument in which 
he contrasts giving true evidence - which is generally considered just conduct - with the 
moral problem that simply by giving evidence against someone one may harm that 
person and therefore do them an injustice.50 Accordingly, from this perspective “it is 
clear that jurors’ judgements and private arbitrations and public arbitrations with a view 
to a final settlement are all contrary to justice, for what benefits some harms others.”51 
Legal justice inevitably ensures that there must be a victor and a loser in any dispute, so 
one party must be injured, and in moral terms causing harm to anybody is unjust. 
Although the passage is fragmentary, it may well indicate that witnesses in an Athenian 
court were normally expected to give true evidence, regardless of the damage that could 
cause to an individual, and that jurors’ judgements were generally understood to reflect 
this.
48 Demosthenes xlvii. 17 (01 napayevopevoi), 24 (a magistrate and members of the symmory), 27 
(magistrates).
49 See also Aristotle EN 1131 a7-9, where he groups perjury with crimes such as theft, adultery, poisoning 
and procuring. Aristotle is also contemptuous o f lying at EN 1127a28-9: Ka0’ aÜTÖ öe TO pev ipeüöos 
(jiaüÄov Kai ipsKTÖv, to 5’ äXriOes KaAöv Kai erraiveTÖv.
50 POxy 1797 column i. 1-9: Tou öiKaiou [anouöjaiou öokoüv [tos tö] papTupeiv ev cxAAf)Aois 
TaAnBfj [öiKaiojv vopi êTai [eivai] Kai XPHO'IJOV [oüöev] nrrov eis [Tä tcov] ävSpwnwv 
[eniT]r|öeüpaTa. See also Decleva-Caizzi (1989:214-22).
51 POxy 1797 column ii.63-70: cpaiveTai öe Kai tö öiKa êiv Kai tö Kpiveiv Kai tö öiarräv önws äv 
nepaivr|Tai oü öiKaia övra; tö yöp [ä]AAous wqjeAoüv äA[Aojus ßAamei. tö Kpiveiv is translated 
“deciding” by Pendrick (2002:189) and “giving verdicts” by Gagarin (2002:187); my translation is 
tentative, but reflects the apparent emphasis in the fragment on legal procedures.
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Indeed, Athenian procedure contained a number of well-known sanctions against 
providing false witness. The existence of these statutes need not indicate that people 
never provided false witness; but, as Carey has noted, the orientation of the statutes is 
towards matters of fact, and, in conjunction with the other sources discussed above, 
the statutes indicate that giving false testimony or appearing simply to support a family 
member was not necessarily considered appropriate conduct in an Athenian court.
In part, it appears that Cohen’s argument is being driven by the analogy he has drawn 
between Athens and feuding societies, and, more specifically, between Athens and 
nineteenth-century Corsica. In the latter context, friends and relatives are recorded as 
providing false witness in support of their party when feuds reach court. An analogy is 
not proof, however, and must be tested against historical evidence. In this case, although 
our evidence indicates that a speaker could claim false witness to undermine his 
opponent’s case, it by no means proves that providing false witness was socially 
acceptable, or even common behaviour in an Athenian court. All our evidence indicates 
is that the topos of making an accusation of perjury was used in a number of cases to 
attack opponents.
What then of Cohen’s other contention, that Athenian litigation was characterised by 
witnesses competing against each other, and as a result speakers urged jurors to consider 
their character as the most significant form of evidence? The striking aspect of this 
claim, as noted above, is that there is actually very little evidence to support it. Cohen’s 
contention, that the speaker of Lysias vii.30-32 urged the jury to rely on the speaker’s 
character and not witnesses, is seriously misleading. The speaker actually claims that the 
Areopagus should be guided by “what I have said and by the rest of my conduct as a
52 These included the dike kakotechnion against a litigant who suborned a witness (Demosthenes xlvi.10, 
xlvii.l, xlix.56; see Leisi 1908:139-41; Lipsius 1905-15,111:783 and MacDowell 1978:245); the dike 
pseudomarturion against a witness who had provided false testimony or testimony contrary to the laws 
(Demosthenes xlvii.l; see Leisi 1908:121 and Harrison 1968-71,11:124-31) and an anadikos dike, under 
which a plaintiff who had successfully accused someone o f false witness would be allowed a retrial
(<anadikia) in cases arising from xenia, false witnessing and disputed estates (Theophrastus Nomoi Fr. 5 
[Szegedy-Maszak]; Behrend 1975:148-50). The penalty for anyone convicted three times of 
pseudomarturia was disfranchisement (Andocides i.74; Hyperides ii. 12). Finally, witnesses could also 
take the exomosia, or oath of disclaimer, and decline to testify by claiming they were not present at the 
crime scene or that they had no knowledge of the case (Harrison 1968-71,11:143-5; Carey 1995). Todd 
(l990a:37-8) argues that the dike pseudomarturion referred to “illicit” rather than “false” evidence on the 
basis that Stephanos was not an important witness in Phormion’s case (Demosthenes xlvi.5-8), and that 
therefore the real purpose of the prosecution was to pay back someone who had “ratted” on the family. 
This ignores the fact that other dikai pseudomarturia (e.g. Demosthenes xlvii) are based on allegations 
that witnesses who were not family or friends testified to facts which they could not have known.
53 Carey (1994a: 184).
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citizen” (koi 8K twv eipnpevcüv Kai sk Tps aXAq? noArrelas). The former point is given 
much more emphasis in the speech, and on numerous occasions the speaker points out 
that he has the evidence of witnesses to back him up (vii.l 1, 17, 20, 25, 30) and asks the 
Areopagus to give greater credit to the side which has produced witnesses rather than 
the side which did not (vii.33, 38, 42). The speaker’s character is given much less 
emphasis (vii.30-3,41), and is actually presented as a sort of example to support the 
likelihood that he would not have removed the olive stump. In other words, character 
evidence is intended to support witness evidence, not to replace it.
As for Cohen’s other major piece of evidence, the fragment of Euripides, it is unclear 
how far this should be pushed. We do not have any idea o f the context in which 
Euripides penned the original words,54 which is underscored by two different 
interpretations of the same passage. Cohen interprets it as referring to a juror, although it 
only states that the speaker has been chosen as a judge (Kpnfjs). Kprrfjs can also be used 
o f a private arbitrator (Menander Epitr. 223, 226) and Scafuro takes this passage as 
referring to an arbitrator.33 The main verb of the first clause, f|pe0r|v, means “I have 
been chosen.” As jurors were selected by lot, but private arbitrators were chosen by the 
disputants, this is further evidence that the passage may refer to an arbitrator.56 As 
Aeschines states (i.152) that the speaker in Phoenix was defending himself against his 
father, the passage may originally have referred to private disputes. Given that there is 
disagreement about whether we are dealing with a juror or an arbitrator, one is entitled 
to wonder whether Cohen places too much weight on this fragment as evidence that 
jurors ignored witnesses and determined cases on character. There is some evidence that 
arbitrators and jurors applied different standards when judging disputes.57
Cohen’s other evidence for competing witnesses does not hold up. The passage in 
Demosthenes xlv.37-8 that he claimed showed both sides’ witnesses gave false,
54 We have every reason to be sceptical o f the context in which the fragment is preserved - Aeschines’ 
speech Against Timarchus (i. 152). That speech is characterised by a dearth of testimony on the main point 
o f the case (that Timarchus prostituted himself - Dover 1989:22), and it is therefore not surprising that 
Aeschines suggested the jurors should pay more attention to character and rumour than witnesses.
55 Scafuro (1997:398). The key verb in the phrase “I have often observed that the opposite has been 
contended by witnesses about the same event”, eyvoiv, can also be used as a technical term for making a 
decision in an arbitration (AP 53.2; Demosthenes xli.28) and Scafuro therefore translates the phrase “have 
I decided the arguments o f witnesses.” I should note here that 1 do not accept Scafuro’s translation, though 
I accept the possibility that the passage refers to an arbitration.
561 owe this observation to Douglas Kelly.
57 Isaeus ii.29-33; Aristotle Rhet. 1374M9-22, ö yap öiaiTrpf|$ to enieiKes-öpgc, ö öe öiKaoTijs töv 
vöpov; Kai toütou eveKa öiamrrfjs eupeGq, önws tö emeiKes iaxup.
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competing testimony, is actually a reference to false testimony from two different sets of 
witnesses who both appeared for the speaker’s opponent. It is also not clear that
r o
conflicting witnesses are present in Demosthenes liv. Carey has drawn attention to the 
drafting of Conon’s witnesses’ deposition. He points out that it is ambiguously worded, 
so that it is not clear who struck and who was struck. Carey places the document within 
a wider group of witness documents that are worded so as to support a speaker’s case, 
but which in fact are ambiguous or unclear, so that a witness may avoid outright lying.59
A similar tactic may well have been used in Lysias iii. At one point in this speech the 
speaker states that his witnesses contradicted Simon’s testimony (iii.37). This 
contradiction, however, is in relation to what they saw on the street, rather than the more 
crucial points of the case - who started the fight and who wounded Simon and with 
what. In relation to these points the speaker was evasive - he did not state whether he 
had a weapon, nor did he say how Simon was injured and by whom; rather, he noted 
that “in this confusion we all had our heads split open (iii. 18).”60 It seems reasonable to 
interpret this evasiveness as evidence that Simon could possibly have brought forward 
witnesses to say that the speaker started the fight and struck Simon, and the speaker was 
trying to counteract this with artful manipulation, rather than outright contradiction.61 
The speaker did claim that Simon started the fight, but provided no witnesses for this 
statement.
The Rule o f  Law
If witnesses did not automatically lie, then we should question Cohen’s and Gamer’s 
claim that the “rule of law” had to be consistent with competitive values. It is much 
debated whether in Classical Athens the “rule o f law” equaled a lawful process based on 
equality before the law, or was simply a euphemism for the supremacy of the will of the 
people over statutes. Cohen pays particular attention to Demosthenes xxi.224, where 
Demosthenes states that the laws are simply written texts, and only gain power from the 
support they gain from the jurors. One might also point to Aristotle’s claims (Pol.
58 Humphreys (1985:332).
59 Carey (1994b:99-100). Carey supports his contention with “a more secure case” in Demosthenes lix.54, 
where there are discrepancies between the deposition and the interpretation the speaker places upon it.
60 ev toutu) Tto 0opüßco ouvTpißöpeBa tcxs KecfiaXäs anavTes.
61 The speaker’s willingness to name Simon’s companions (iii. 12) may indicate that these are the very 
people Simon has called as witnesses, and the speaker is therefore trying to undermine their credibility.
62 Cohen (1995a:56); Gamer (1987:10). See also Ober (1989:299-304), and Paoli (1933:35-45).
6j See, for example, Hansen (1999:84, 351); de Romilly (1971:139-54); Ober (1989:249-304); Ostwald 
(1986:497-524); Sealey (1982:301-2).
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1292a7-38, 1292b34-1293a9) that the mob or demagogues could control democracies, 
so that laws were not sovereign, but the mob; or to the manifestly illegal procedure 
imposed by the Ecclesia during the trial of the generals after the Battle of Arginusae 
(Xenophon Hell, i.6.24, Diodorus Siculus xiii.97.1).
Guthrie, who supported the view that Athens had the rule of law, cited Herodotus 
vii.104, Euripides Suppl. 429-31, Thucydides ii.37, Plato Crito 50a-53a, the late fifth or 
early fourth century B.C. Anonymus Iamblichi iii, vi-vii [D-K] and references in forensic 
oratory such as Demosthenes 25.15-20 to support his position.64 Gamer spent some time 
trying to dismantle Guthrie’s references. He correctly assailed Herodotus vii.104 as 
reflecting Spartan customs rather than Athenian,63 but his attempts to downplay Suppl. 
429-41 and Thucydides ii.37 seem rather desperate.66 There are also methodological 
flaws in Gamer’s analysis. He presented a number of passages from tragedy to “prove” 
that competitive values might subvert jurors’ belief in law, arguing that tragedy was 
likely to reflect fifth-century BC Athens. The possibilities of reconstructing political 
and social history from tragedy are hampered by the heroic settings of tragedy, and the 
resulting interplay between the fictional dramatic world and any contemporary echoes
c  o # #
that may be inferred from it. This problem is exacerbated when we analyse tragedy for 
evidence of particular ethical views, as opposed to evidence of civic institutions. It is 
difficult enough to identify what moral viewpoint the playwright was actually putting 
across. It is even harder to work out whether the Athenian audience, in whole or part, 
may have agreed with him.69 Characters may say something that is appropriate to the 
plot of the play or the scene, or the mood the poet is trying to convey; it cannot be taken
64 Guthrie (1971:69-73); see also Vlastos (1964).
65 Gamer (1987:20).
66 Gamer (1987:24) based his criticisms of Thucydides ii.37 on Pericles’ friendship with Protagoras, and 
Protagoras’ skill in using forensic oratory to make the weaker argument stronger. While this may reveal 
that a speaker could interpret the law to suit his own ends, it in no way proves that the will of those in 
power could subvert the rule o f law. Similarly, in dealing with Eur. Suppl. Gamer (1987:23) claims that, 
although Theseus claims that a weak person is guaranteed victory over a more powerful opponent if his 
case is just, he “is absolutely certain that his wish alone is sufficient to ensure the city’s action”, citing 
lines 350 and 393-4. Gamer fails to allow for the restrictions placed on the playwright by the mythical 
setting. If the play blends mythical and contemporary attitudes, it may only obliquely represent the 
realities of Athenian democracy.
67 Gamer (1987:11-12). To a degree, he is travelling a well-worn road here, as few modem authors would 
argue that tragedy does not, in some way, reflect contemporary democratic attitudes and values (Meier 
1988:236-8; Blundell 1989:88-95, 269-70; Cairns 1993:240-63; Griffith 1995:108-10; Goldhill 2000:35). 
The more difficult question is to what degree the values are uniquely democratic (Rhodes 2003b: 106-12, 
119).
68 (Easterling 1997:21-3, 28-37; Griffith 1995:111-14; Pelling 1997:1-6).
69 It is also relatively easy to find opposing views on morality or politics in different plays by the same 
poet (Dover 1974:17).
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as certain that what they say is proof of Athenian ethics. For example, Euripides’ 
infamous line from Hippolytus (612), rj yAwoo’ opopox’, n öe 4>PHV cxvtapoTOS, 
outraged many Athenians and was used in a lawsuit against Euripides to discredit him 
(Aristotle Rhet. 1416a3 7-40).70
In this regard, Gamer could be accused of some selectivity. While there are some 
Athenian dramas which do appear to portray justice as the creation of those in power, 
one could equally (and with perhaps as little real linkage to Athenian practice) refer to 
Sophocles OT 603-10, 656-7. Here the tyrant Oedipus is deciding what is lawful on the 
basis of his opinion alone; yet his behaviour is criticized by the Choms (656-7) and 
Jocasta (646-8). It is difficult to believe that Athenian audiences were not intended to 
feel similar disapproval for the actions of the tyrants in Antigone and Hecuba. If the 
audiences were being asked to disapprove, does this mean that they were being asked to 
condemn a contemporary practice or a mythical situation? It is impossible to say; but, 
given contemporary evidence from Athens that indicates respect for law, I find it 
difficult to believe that the plays are making direct comments on the Athenian 
lawcourts.
Athens, like any state, was not immune from illegal actions. The execution of the 
generals after Arginusae was clearly illegal. Athens was occasionally subjected to such
77stresses, but there is little evidence that the popular will regularly overturned the laws.
70 Recently, Gamer’s approach has been taken further by Pelling (2000:167-88), who has suggested that 
Aeschylus’ Eumenides and Euripides’ Orestes raise disquieting questions about justice, which may be 
linked to contemporary concerns about the administration of justice in Athenian lawcourts. The problem 
with this thesis is that the evidence for disquiet is the disquieting questions themselves. Griffin (1998:55- 
61) has rightly criticised this sort of approach.
71 For discussion of this scene see Knox (1998:86-90) and Scodel (1984:64-7).
72 During the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. Athens underwent a great deal of constitutional change, and 
there is evidence of differing attitudes to law and the power of the demos in this period. In the second half 
of the fifth century B.C., we have evidence for some questioning of laws, the system of justice and the 
nature of the constitution. At the one extreme, one might point to Euripides’ notorious assaults on social 
mores (eg. Andr. 173-6, Fr. 402 [Nauck]). At the other, one might point to philosophers’ frequent 
discussions of legal justice, such as Antiphon’s On Truth. It is unclear how much influence these extreme 
views had on popular opinion; judicial developments do not appear to have been influenced by 
philosophers’ enquiries (Wolff 1970:80). What does seem fairly clear, however, is that the later fifth- 
century B.C. marked a period of unprecedented power for the demos, if the judgement of usually hostile 
sources such as the Old Oligarch (i.5) may be believed. This power was wielded through regular changes 
and confusion in legislation. One hears of the existence of contradictory laws, and the frequency with 
which the Athenians changed their laws led Plato Comicus to satirize them by saying that a man who had 
been absent from Athens for three months would not recognize it as he walked past the walls, since with 
regard to the laws it was not the same city (Fr. 239 [PCG]). During the Peloponnesian War Athens’ 
democracy was subjected to considerable constitutional stress. The power of the demos was expressed 
through illegal actions, such as the Arginusae trial. Thucydides records that customary values were 
abandoned during the early years of the Peloponnesian War (i.52, iii.82). The culmination of this relative 
legal chaos was a series of oligarchies and democratic restorations. The first oligarchy, the Four Hundred,
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During the fourth century Aristotle claimed that that what is lawful is just (EN 1129a34- 
5, 1129M2-14, 1130b21-5), and that a principal tenet of democratic justice is that the 
poor shall not enjoy any greater advantage than the rich {Pol. 1291b30-8, 1310b28-36, 
1317a40-1317b7). Similar statements occur in fourth-century oratory; speakers claim 
that equality under the laws means that poor people deserve the same protection as the 
rich (e.g. Demosthenes xxv.16, Isocrates xx.26), and that equality before the laws is one 
of the hallmarks of democracy (Aeschines i.5, Demosthenes xxi.188). There is also 
evidence that people would obey laws against their wishes (e.g. Plato Crito 50-53a, 
Aeschines i.4-6, iii.16, Demosthenes xxv.75-6).
Cohen dismissed these statements by claiming that a belief in the rule of law depends 
upon a fiction which sees legislation as somehow separate from political realities. He 
asserts that the popular, democratic, view of the rule of law in Athens is radically 
different from the view of Athenian democracy proposed by Aristotle.74 The Athenians, 
he suggests, were only too aware of this “doublethink,” as demonstrated by 
Demosthenes’ comments at xxi.224 that the laws are only made powerful by the support 
of the jurors. Yet Demosthenes (xxi.225) goes on to say that someone who has broken 
the laws must not be allowed to escape punishment because of his liturgies, pity, 
personal services or forensic skill. It seems inescapable that Demosthenes’ argument 
here, at least, is that the rule of law as imposed by a jury overrides personal and public 
interest. Even more direct statements of this point may be found at Aeschines iii.16, 
where Aeschines comments that, when a speaker says one thing and the law another, the 
jurors ought justly to give their vote to the law; or at Demosthenes xviii.123, where 
Demosthenes satirically observed that he did not think their ancestors built lawcourts so 
that the jury could listen to people abusing each other with scandalous accounts of their
came to power through manipulating the constitution (Demosthenes xxiv.154; Thucydides viii.67). After 
the final restoration of the democracy the Athenians instituted a number of legislative reforms, including 
establishing a coherent, unified lawcode and setting in place constitutional checks on making laws and 
decrees. During the fourth century the Athenians’ legal freedom was restricted by devices such as the 
graphe paranomon and graphe nomon me epitedeion thenai, the appointment of nomothetai and the 
separation of laws from decrees (Sinclair 1989:221; Orrieux and Pantel 1999:284-7; Hansen 1999:174, 
307, 336). In 348 BC, when Apollodorus tried to pass a decree on the basis o f the doctrine that “the 
people should have the power to do what it wished with its own property” (KÜpiOV ö’ HYOupevos öeiv 
TÖv öfjpov eivai nepi tu)v cüjtoü ö ti äv ßoüÄrrrai npä^ai), his proposal was indicted by graphe 
paranomon and nullified (Demosthenes lix.4-5).
73 Cohen (1995b:240, and 232 where he links Aristotle’s views to Athenian democracy). Aristotle 
considered that in radical democracies the mass of poor people are sovereign rather than the law {Pol. 
1292a 1-6, 1293a7-9), though he did not specifically state that Athenian democracy suffered from this 
problem. Indeed, his view that in radical democracies the demos may overturn the laws through decrees 
does not fit our knowledge of fourth-century Athens, where the complex systems for changing laws in 
fourth-century Athens indicate an institutionalized status for law (Hansen 1999:175-6).
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private lives, but so that the people could convict someone if he had clearly committed a 
crime against the city.
In other words, Cohen’s argument enjoys little real support from fourth-century orators. 
There is simply no evidence that law was customarily seen as a target to be repudiated 
whenever it clashed with the interests of the demos. Attacks on written law as a category 
are conspicuously absent in forensic oratory. Our one great example of the triumph of 
the popular will over law, the trial of the generals after Arginusae, is famous precisely 
because such an event was highly irregular.76 Taken together, the sources indicate that 
laws could be seen to be independent of the will of the demos, and that courts could be 
expected to uphold this “rule of law.”
Athenian Moral Values
How realistic is the picture Adkins, Gamer and Cohen draw of Athenian moral values? 
Scholars do stress the importance of desire for honour and competitive values in 
Classical Athens.77 Character discussion also occurs often enough in forensic speeches 
to invite the suggestion that demonstrating one was of value to the community was 
virtually an “official orthodoxy.” But it is by no means clear that alternative views had 
no effect on jurors’ decisions. Athenian literature contains a number of comments on the 
problems brought about by love of honour and speakers may state that they are not 
seeking revenge in court or condemn those who introduce character or emotion in an
o  1
effort to escape law. Although we should not underestimate the importance of 
competition, neither should we underestimate the possibility that “quiet” values could 
undercut the competitive values of rivalry and revenge.
74 Cohen (1995a:56).
75 Carey (1996:36).
76 A. H. M. Jones (1957:54). The decisions in the Arginusae trial were made, not by a jury, but by the 
Ekklesia, exercising its judicial functions in eisangeliai. This precise function was later removed from the 
Ekklesia during the fourth century BC.
77 Dover (1974:226-29); Blundell (1989:26-30).
78 Whitehead (1983:60); cf. Dover (1974:296-9).
79 Pearson (1962:17-18, 170, 197); Sinclair (1989:188); Walcot (1978:61-2, 69); Wilson (2000:188-90).
80 See Lysias xxxi.2; Isocrates xv.27; Demosthenes xviii.278-9; liv.5-6. A. H. M. Jones (1957:58), in 
discussing speakers’ claims that they are seeking revenge, offers the rather more prosaic interpretation that 
they are trying to make it clear they are not sycophants.
81 For example, Antiphon v. 11-12, vi.7-8; Lysias xiv.23; Demosthenes xix.239, 277, 281, 310, xxi.225, 
xxxviii.27, lix.l 16-7; Aeschines iii. 16; Hyperides ii.9, iv.32, v.40; Lycurgus i. 150; Dinarchus i. 14-17, 92, 
103, 108-111, ii.8, 11, iii.20.
82 On the importance of revenge in Athenian society see Dover (1974:182-4); Gehrke (1987) and the 
recent discussion by W. V. Harris (1997). I agree with Harris (1997:366) that Herman’s (1993, 1994) 
attempt to downplay the significance of revenge in Athenian morals takes inadequate account of the 
evidence. On the other hand, there is some diversity in our sources; Xenophon’s and Plato’s Socrates, for
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On the face of it, there appears to be a contradiction here. It is difficult to see how a 
society which openly upholds agonistic values could simultaneously uphold values 
based on cooperation and mutual interest. Part of the explanation for this apparent 
contradiction may lie in the wide range of values that can exist in any single society 
(below); part may also lie in the interpretation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Cohen, quite 
rightly, notes that Aristotle’s discussion of emotions in the Rhetoric is designed to
O '!
provide a reader with the means for persuasion. He appears, however, to ignore some 
key aspects of individual emotions in that work. For example, Cohen suggests that 
Aristotle’s comments in the Rhetoric on envy and anger demonstrate that “social 
relations are essentially evaluative and competitive.”84 Yet in discussing anger, for 
example, Aristotle points out that anger is defined as a desire for revenge on account of 
an apparent insult which is unjustified (Rhet. 1378a30-2). The cause, that the insult is 
unjustified, is crucial to Aristotle’s discussion (Rhet. 1380M6-18), and underpins the 
persuasive force of any appeal based on one’s anger that is designed to excite listeners 
to share that anger. This link between anger and injustice is ignored by Cohen; yet it is 
crucial to understanding Aristotle’s views of revenge. Revenge is pleasant insofar as it 
relates to redressing an injustice; as Aristotle notes, “anger is not aroused against what is 
just.”85
In his broader work, the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defined virtue in relation to the 
choice of actions and emotions, and in particular in relation to observing a “mean” 
standard of behaviour between excess and deficiency (EN 1106b35-l 107a3). This 
observance of the mean underpins his entire discussion of emotions and virtue.
Aristotle sees envy and unjustified anger as excessive, and thus by definition they are 
not the choices or actions of a virtuous person, since virtue resides in the observance of 
the mean. Aristotle also admits behaviour that appeals to mutual interest, rather than 
competition; for example, altruism (EN 1155b31, Rhet. 1380b35-1381a6), benevolence 
(Rhet. 1385al7-19) and justice (EN 1129b25-l 130a3). When discussing altruism,
example, famously preaches that revenge is unjust (Xenophon Mem. 2.6.24; Plato Crito 49c-d, Rep. 332b- 
336a).
8j Cohen (1995a:62); and see also Fortenbaugh (1979:133, 138) and Aristotle Rhet. 1380b28-32.
84 Cohen (1995a:62).
85 ou yiyveTai yäp q öpyn npös tö öixaiov {Rhet. 1380bl6).
86 In relation to virtues, Aristotle suggested, for example, that the mean between fear and confidence was 
courage; the mean between vanity and smallness of soul was greatness of soul; and the mean between 
irascibility and a lack o f spirit, gentleness (EN 1107b 1-1108al0). In relation to emotions, he suggested 
that the mean between bashfulness and shamelessness was modesty, and the mean between envy and 
malice was righteous indignation (EN 1108a33-l 108b6).
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Aristotle clearly states that loving someone entails wishing good things for that person’s 
sake and not one’s own, and when discussing justice he argues that it is the practice of 
perfect virtue, because a just man practises this virtue towards others and not merely by
o o
himself. His discussions of altruistic virtues explicitly exclude the possibility of self-
• qqinterest. Consequently, Cohen’s emphasis on envy and anger seems to focus on a small 
slice of the overall range of emotion and virtue. To understand those emotions properly, 
one needs to see where they fit into Aristotle’s overall scheme. This scheme shows that 
envy and unjustified anger are signs of a deviant, if not evil, character.
In a similar vein, Aristotle’s discussion of honour shows that people can possess both 
excessive and defective desires for honour. Aristotle does note that honour is the 
greatest external good, and most sought hy men of rank (EN 1123b 17-18); and he notes 
that it is possible to desire honour more than is right, or to be so unambitious as to not 
care for it altogether (EN 1125b7-8). He notes that those with an excessive desire for 
honour are called <J)iÄÖTipo9 (EN 1125b8). This term is important to evaluating “social 
competition” theories. Cohen argued that, at Athens, being willing to litigate implied 
being willing to obtain a public judgement of one’s social position and identity, and that 
“this is, of course, what philotimia, the competitive pursuit of honor, is all about.”90 The 
meaning of the word is actually rather more complex than that. In Classical Athens, 
(J)iÄ 0Tipia did mean a desire for public honour and recognition, but the word carries a 
range of meanings that can only be understood in terms of the ways in which people 
achieved honour and the ways in which the demos conferred honour. Competition is not 
at the core of any of the meanings.91
In the Rhetoric Aristotle commented that “honour is a mark of a reputation for good
87 soto) öri to (j)iXeTvTÖ ßoüXeoBod tivi ä oicrai äya0d, SKeivou eveKa äAAä pn aÜTOÜ (Rhet. 
1380b35).
88 on  6 exwv aCnf|v Kai npös eiepov öüvcrrai Tfj cxpein XPnoQai {Rhet. 1129b31-2).
89 See Konstan (2000a:4).
90 Cohen (1995a: 186).
91 Aristotle notes that philotimia can mean both being “more fond of honour than most men” and being 
“more fond of honour than is right” (EN 1125b9-22). Philotimia can often be a negative trait, referring to 
a selfish desire for advantage (eg. Pindar Fr. 210, Thucydides ii.65.7, iii.82.8, Euripides Iph. in Aulis 527, 
Phoen. 531-2). In Against Neaira it is used to describe the way Phrynion openly abused her in front of  
onlookers (Demosthenes xlix.33); here we must understand the word as showing that Phrynion was 
striving for honour through his abuse. At other times philotimia can be a term o f praise for someone’s love 
o f honour (eg. Aristophanes Frogs 678, Isocrates v.l 10, Xenophon Mem. iii.3.13). In these circumstances, 
it is not always clear why love of honour is being praised. In the second half o f the fourth century, 
however, when philotimia is cited with approval, it generally refers to “performing services to the 
community, to which the community is expected to respond by conferring Tipij in gratitude” (MacDowell 
2000:224; see also Dover 1974:230-3; Fisher 1976:28).
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works, and those who have done good works are justly and most particularly honoured, 
although he who is capable of good works is also honoured {Rhet. 1361a35-7). ” Good 
works appear to be actions that improve the safety or quality of life of the citizens; in the 
Nicomachean Ethics 1122b 19-3 5 Aristotle describes how a great-souled man gains 
honour through spending money on the community, for example on liturgies (see also 
Xenophanes Fr. 2 D-K; Xenophon Hiero vii.9-10). The most obvious example is 
Alcibiades, who used his victories in the chariot races at the Olympic Games and the 
magnificence of his liturgies to claim popular honour (Thucydides vi.16.2; Plutarch Ale. 
11-12). Similar examples can be found in the Attic orators (Aeschines iii.19; 
Demosthenes xxi.67, xlii.24, xlvii.54; Isaeus vii.36; Lysias xxi.22).
The demos could give concrete expression to its honour for benefactors in a number of 
ways. Aristotle lists sacrifices, memorials in verse and prose, rewards, sanctuaries, 
precedence, tombs, statues, public maintenance, barbarian practices such as 
genuflection, and gifts {Rhet. 1361a40-3). We have numerous instances of these sorts of 
rewards being conferred upon citizens as a mark of honour for their services or goodwill 
to the people of Athens. For example, contemporary inscriptions honour individuals 
with crowns,94 statues95 or grants (such as exemption from taxation),96 free meals in the 
Prytaneion ' or a front seat at the theatre. Inscriptions honour individuals for 
philotimia as well as a number of other virtues, including andragathia, arete, 
dikaiosyne, epimeleia, eunoia, eusebeia, eutaxia, prothymia and sophrosyne 99
92 TiMH ö’ eerri pev oripeTov eüepYenKfjs öö^ns, Tipcoviai öe öiKodcos pev Kai paXicrra oi 
eüepyeTriKÖTes, oü pqv dXXä Tipdiai «ai ö öuväpevos euepYSTeTv.
92 Even hc.c there is some variation in meaning; Lycurgus (i. 139-40) claimed that some litmgios should 
not deserve gratitude from the people, suggesting they conferred little public benefit; greater liturgies 
which did deserve honour were serving as a trierarch, or building walls to protect the city, or spending 
one’s own money for the public safety. His aim, however, was to undercut one of Leocrates’ likely pleas, 
by restricting philotimia to items which highlighted public security, and therefore could be easily 
contrasted with his accusation that Leocrates was guilty of treachery.
94 There are numerous examples; Henry (1983:22-45) discusses some 48 inscriptions. See for example 
IG I3.102.8-14 (410/09 BC), II2.212.21-33 (347/6 BC), II2.466.30-40 (307/6 BC), II2.557.16-18 (c.303/02 
BC).
95IG II2.450X.7-12 (314/13 BC), II2.555.12-14 (307/03 BC), II2.513.4-5 (f.s.iv BC).
96 See, for example, IG II2.10.5-9 (404-400 BC); II2.18.6-8 (393 BC); II2.31.6-25 (386/5 BC); II2.141.5- 
14, 31-35 (378-360 BC); II2.212+.13-34 (346 BC); II2.1147 (mid-fourth century BC); cf. Aeschines
iii. 177-89, Demosthenes xviii.l 18-20, xxiii.198, Walbank (1978:4-6).
97 See, for example, IG I3.106.23-24 (409/08 BC), II2.226.26-31 (c.343/2 BC), II2.3856.16-18 
(c.307/03 BC). Henry (1983:262-90) discusses some 36 examples from the fifth and fourth centuries BC. 
See also Aristophanes Knights 280-83, 575-6, 702; Demosthenes xx.120, xxiii.130; Dinarchus i. 143; M. J. 
Osborne (1981:159, 167-8).
98 See for example IG II2.1187 (329/8 BC), II2.500.31-36 (302/01 BC). Henry (1983:291-310) discusses 8 
examples from the fifth and fourth centuries BC.
99 Whitehead (1993:65).
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Philotimia is often discussed in terms that make it clear that it is not only consistent 
with cooperative values, but also with the rule of law (e.g. Aeschines i. 196;
Demosthenes xxiv.210, Plato Laws 841c4-5). Demosthenes’ Against Meidias, for 
example, can be characterised as suggesting that Demosthenes’ philotimia serves the 
city in accordance with the laws, but Meidias chose not to display his philotimia 
lawfully and therefore threatens the rule of law.100 Aeschines (iii.20) claims that the 
Areopagus so desire honour (cj)iX0Ti^0ÜVTai) that if one of their members commits a 
crime, even if by mistake, they punish him.
Clearly, in performing public services, an Athenian may have been inspired by 
competition to perform greater public services than his rivals. Our sources do not really 
elevate competition, however, and concentrate instead on Aristotle’s “good works” and 
cooperative values. This strikes a discordant note alongside the claims by Gamer and 
Cohen that honour was the central object of political competition.101 Cohen, for 
example, states:
Competition necessarily produces enmity. Since a basic moral principle of Greek 
societies from Homer onward is that justice requires one to help one’s friends 
and harm one’s enemies, enmity and rivalry inevitably produce mutual attempts 
to harm, hinder, defeat and dishonor one’s enemies. Honor is centrally at stake in 
such interactions.102
Competition between the politicians o f the fifth and fourth centuries can be, and has 
been, analysed in these precise terms.103 Aristotle identified honour as the ultimate goal 
o f political life (EN  1095b14-31, Pol. 1302a31 -bl 8). In Classical Athens, probably the 
most basic reward of honour was power, and it has been suggested that “for most 
Athenian leaders hono’-r war largely, or perhaps simply, a means of acquiring 
power.” 104 Power enabled politicians to influence public life, both in the assembly and 
the courts. Aristophanes’ frequent jibes against Cleon’s willingness to indict people for 
imaginary crimes may be explicable in terms of Cleon’s ability to influence popular 
juries.103 In addition, Pausanias (vi.7.5) recounts the story of Doreius of Rhodes, victor 
in the Pancration at the Olympic Games, who was taken before the assembly in Athens
100 Fisher (1992:334-5); cf. Demosthenes xxi.61-9, 222-6.
101 Gamer (1987:18); Cohen (1995a:63).
102 Cohen (1995a:65-6).
103 Dover (1974:226-36); Sinclair (1989:152-61, 174-9); Davies (1993:114-5). See Aeschines i.129, 
Demosthenes xii.76, Thucydides ii.46, Xenophon Hiero vii.3-4.
104 Sinclair (1989:179).
105 Aristophanes Knights 235-9, 255-65, 278-9, 300-3, 442-6, 475-9; Wasps 240-4; MacDowell 
(1995:109-10).
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after fighting against them in the Peloponnesian war. “When they met in the Assembly 
and observed that so great and famous a man had come to such a situation in the guise 
o f a prisoner, their opinion towards him changed, and they released him without doing 
him any harm, even though they might with justice have punished him severely.”106
How, then, do we reconcile the very real power that men could gain with the evidence of 
our sources? It is possible that Classical Athenians could view honour more broadly 
than the simple product of political power. Desire for honour did not of necessity require 
bitter rivalry. Non-competitive activities could also result in a citizen gaining honour, 
and some degree of influence. Someone who did not engage in political life at all, such 
as Charmides in Xenophon Mem. 3.7, could be called influential. A regular topos 
consisted in denying that the speaker had previously had any interest in political life or 
litigation, which is surprising if honour and status could only be gained through 
competition. Furthermore, Athenians could gain honour from being considered 
dikaios, or for their dikaiosyne. A mid-fourth century BC inscription honours the arckon 
thesmothetes, Callias, for holding his office excellently, justly and incorruptibly, and 
rewards him with a crown of olive for his arete and dikaiosyne toward the people of 
Athens. Numerous inscriptions honour officials for their dikaiosyne, which may be 
understood in an epigraphic context as honest and upright behaviour on the part of 
someone who could have taken advantage of their position but did not do so.109 
Similarly, Aristotle {Pol. 1283al 6-22), in discussing the sound management of a state, 
commented that more was needed than the ability to claim honour; justice and virtue
106 0)9 Ö’ 69 6KKXl"|OiaV OUV6X0ÖVT69 CXVÖpa OUTGO (J6Y0(V KCXI 5 0 ^ 9  69 T000UT0 pKOVTa 
eGeäaavTO ev oxnjjan aixpaXdbTou, peianirrrei a<|)iaiv 69 ainöv f\ yvcbpri Kai aneXBeTv cxcjnaaiv 
oüöe epyov oüöev äxapi epya^ovTai, napöv v , y . o t noXXä Te Kai oüv tco öikcucü öpäaai.
107 See Lateiner (1982:6-9) for examples from Lysias, and Carter (1986:112-3).
108IG II2.1148.3-9. See also II2.1143.3-6 (beginning of fourth century BC), II2.1153.4-5, II2.1253.3-8,
II2.1254.1-4, (mid-fourth century BC), II2.2834.1-2 (337/6 BC), II2.415 11.12-16 (330/29 BC), II2.1258 
(324/3 BC), and Merritt and Traill (1974:48-9, No.38.75-8 [341/0 BC]) for inscriptions honouring 
officials as dikaios. Veligianni-Terzi (1997:209) points out that dikaios is seldom found in fourth century 
BC inscriptions. It is also worth mentioning, in this context, Aristides’ reputation for justice, which was 
manifested in his refusal to engage in unjust or illegal behaviour in court cases and arbitrations (Plutarch 
Arist. 4, 6). It is possible that Plutarch may have invented these anecdotes, but as Aristides’ reputation for 
justice is confirmed elsewhere (Aeschines ii.23, iii.181; Eupolis Demoi Fr. 99, lines 80, 91, 118-19; Fr. 
102; Fr. 105 [PCG]; Herodotus viii.79; Plato Gorgias 526b) Plutarch’s point may be accepted. On 
Plutarch’s methods in the Lives see Pelling (1990:27-9, 36-41, 2000:44-58).
109 Whitehead (1993:67-8); and see generally Dover (1974:66); Havelock (1969:68-9); Tritle (1988:142- 
3). Aristotle {Virtues and Vices 1251 b3-5) includes in his definition of dikaiosyne a willingness to 
preserve ancestral customs and institutions and the established laws, to tell the truth and to keep 
agreements. Inscriptions include IG II2.223A.7, 12 (342 BC), II2.1140.10-12 (early fourth century BC), 
II2.1142.4 (early fourth century BC), II2.1145.5-6 (c.353/2 BC), II2.1149.6-8 (f. s. iv BC), II2.1191.23-6 
(321/20 BC), II2.1202.7-8, 17-18 (313/2 BC), II2.1203.15-16 (324/3 BC), II2.1257.1-2 (324/3 BC), 
II2.2821.6-7 (351/0 BC), Merritt and Traill (1974:42-6, 48-9 - Nos.26.21 [348/7 BC], 34.12-13 [343/2 
BC], 35.4, 38.76, 80-81, 84 [341/0 BC]).
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were necessary as well. Virtuous action formed the cornerstone of his ethical system, 
and acting justly, and in accordance with established laws, was one of the keys to 
virtuous action (EN 1103M-7; 1130a29-31).110 Accordingly, the sources offer little 
support for the argument that Athenian moral values were concentrated on competition 
for honour and that quiet virtues, such as justice, were unimportant.
What I am arguing here is essentially the point that a number o f authors have made in 
relation to Adkins’ portrayal of Homeric values. This is that those values appear to 
admit a broader range of morality than Adkins had allowed.* 111 Greek literature after 
Homer indicates that both competitive and cooperative values coexisted down to and 
during the period of Classical Athens. One of the clearest examples from Classical 
Athens is Sophocles’ Philoctetes. In that play Neoptolemos is informed by Odysseus 
that if he tricks Philoctetes into giving him his bow, even though the act is shameful 
(79-80), he will be called the most devout of men for all time (85) and help the Greeks 
win the war (109, 113). This is a fairly clear statement that wrong-doing is justified by 
the results and the honour it will bring. Neoptolemos originally goes along with 
Odysseus’ argument, even though he considers deceit shameful (86-95, 100, 108), and 
gains the bow. When everything appears won, however, he relents and hands the bow 
back, noting that he won it by base and unjust means (1234) and wants to atone for his 
crime (1224). In this new guise Neoptolemos makes it clear that he has justice on his 
side (1251), and the moral of the play is clearly that just actions are superior to unjust
110 Lest it be objected that “justice” here could mean whatever was sanctioned by the demos, I should note 
that Aristotle defines justice in legalistic terms. Aristotle notes (EN 1129b26, 1130a3) that justice is 
displayed by people towards other people. öiKCXiooüvr] and cxöiKia are used in several senses (EN
1129a27) defined at EN 1129a32-3, where Aristotle observes that a lawbrcukei is unjust, and a man who 
takes more than his due and is unfair is unjust. TO öikcuov means both what is lawful and what is fair (Ö 
T£ vöpipo? Kal Ö Taos; EN  1129a35). Aristotle goes on to identify a variety of types of justice concerned 
with lawful relations between people. What is lawful is the statutes of the lawgiver (Td T£ (bpiopeva ünö 
Trjs vopoBeTiKn? vopipd eon; EN 1129M2-14).
111 Adkins’ work was flawed in two major respects. Firstly, the concepts of “shame-culture” and “guilt- 
culture”, derived from Ruth Benedict’s (1946:222) work on Japan in the 1940s, were repudiated by the 
1960s, largely because they were incapable of explaining variation in morality within a single group of 
people and because Benedict’s work was based on selective omission or treatment of non-conforming data 
(M. Harris 1968:405,443-6; Leaf 1979:223-4). Secondly, a number of authors have pointed out that the 
Homeric epics contain a range of passages in which moral approbation is reserved for acts of fairness or 
justice, and that these concepts appear to have been more significant than Adkins allowed (Long 
1970:124-6; Lloyd-Jones 1971:5-8, 1990:261; Dover 1983:39; Cairns 1993:140, 255; Zänker 1994:2-5). 
For example, at Od. xxi.331-34 Penelope notes that the suitors cannot enjoy a good reputation (eimAeias) 
by dishonouring Odysseus’ estate, which tends to indicate that honour would not be bestowed for 
committing unjust acts (see on this passage Long 1970:134 and Dover 1983:39). Similarly, at //. xvi.384- 
89 Zeus is said to send storms to punish men who by violence pronounce crooked judgements in the 
market place and drive out justice (see the discussion by Lloyd-Jones 1971:6).
112 See Lloyd-Jones (1990:263 [Pindar], 269 [Euripides], 271-2); Cairns (1993:170 [Theognis i.27-30], 
240-1, 249, 252-4 [Sophocles], 390 [Plato]); Kyriakou (2001:25, 31 [Bacchylides]).
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ones. It is not clear whether Sophocles is outlining a general Athenian view here, but 
the key point is that, in the moral world posited by Adkins, Gamer and Cohen, this sort 
of revulsion for deceitful means to achieve victory should be virtually impossible.
These examples show that, if a jury did judge in accordance with popular moral values, 
although it might be swayed by discussion of competition and honour it might also be 
swayed by the numerous appeals to justice and law in forensic speeches. If juries based 
their decisions on their general moral values, it is unlikely that decisions would be made 
on the basis of character and emotion alone.
One of the key claims underpinning the “social competition” argument is that a litigant 
could admit his guilt but appeal to be let off on the basis of his civic virtue, as suggested 
by Gamer (above).114 Yet there is no occasion in forensic oratory where such a plea is 
actually made.115 In Plato’s Euthyphro 8c-d Socrates and Euthyphro agree that it would 
be impossible for a litigant to admit he has done wrong, but claim he should not pay the 
penalty. Where speakers raise the issue of character it is generally in conjunction with 
legal appeals and discussion of the facts of the case. The argument appears to be based 
on negative evidence, in that on a few occasions speakers attack the possibility of their 
opponents appealing to civic virtue to win the case. The use of a topos such as this may 
indicate that appeals to civic virtue could help, but it does not indicate that such an 
appeal alone was sufficient to win a case. Carey rightly points out that Gamer’s 
statement “grossly oversimplifies” the matter.116
How likely is it that an Athenian jury represented a single mass of people sharing a 
dominant set of moral values? Caution is required here. Although some anthropologists 
claim that cultures are characterised by widely shared beliefs and values, or beliefs and 
values that are sanctioned by the majority of the group, others have pointed out the 
virtual impossibility of characterizing any group of people on these terms. In any human 
group there is considerable disagreement over most moral issues. Individuals’ social 
networks tend to comprise people with similar values, and individuals may generalize
113 For recent discussions of Philoctetes and Athenian moral values see Caims (1993:252-63); Falkner 
(1998), Hawkins (1999).
114 Cohen (1995a: 184) essentially advocates the same position when he suggests that speakers ask the 
jurors to decide a case “upon the civic merits of the litigants rather than by applying the law.” I am not 
aware of any case where a speaker actually makes so direct a plea. As I will show in Chapter Five, 
speakers usually appeal to the law as well as to their civic merit.
1,5 Fisher (1976:28-9).
116 Carey (1994a: 185-6, n.30).
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the values they think are shared to a larger group which does not actually share the 
values at all. 117 Given the dependence of modem anthropology on a limited number of 
informants to develop ethnographies, and the dependence of “social competition” 
theories on anthropological models, one is entitled to wonder how much such models 
actually tell us about Athenian popular morality after all. Any given jury on any given 
day is likely to have possessed a mass of different values and norms, with great variation 
in perceptions of any moral issue. For example, some jurors may have cared more for 
law than character, and others the opposite. Others may have paid greatest attention to 
the facts of the case and what appeared to be just. Others may have weighed up the 
admixture, or been moved by appeals to emotion. This mass of varied perceptions and 
values would be reflected in the jurors’ decisions. If anything, then, we should expect to 
find that forensic speeches would cater for a variety of attitudes, and include discussion 
of law, character and the facts.
This leads us to the final criticism of social competition theories - that their adherents 
ignore large slabs of oratory in which speakers discuss the facts of the case and the 
application of law (see Chapter Five). If going to court were simply seen as a contest to 
affirm one’s social standing over an “enemy,” and jurors had no hope of resolving a case 
except on the basis of character alone, one wonders why speakers bothered to introduce 
the law or the facts at all. By contrast, in a situation where the moral standpoints and 
interests of each juror were likely to vary, a simple appeal to character and prejudice 
may not have been sufficient, and speakers may also have needed to discuss facts and 
the application of law.
The Importance of Context
Few authors have tried to gauge the interaction between legal and nonlegal arguments in 
an Athenian court. Missiou notes that there is no consistent picture in forensic speeches 
of arguments based on character and good deeds. Although some speakers may dwell on 
this sort of material, others may portray such arguments in a negative light. She 
suggests that it is best to assess such arguments in context - that is, in light of the speech 
as a whole and their likely importance to a case.
117 For a useful summary o f the issues see Aunger (1999:S94-5).
118 Missiou (1992:29-30).
Carey notes the Athenian conception of the court system and modem conceptions differ 
in several key aspects, notably in relation to what material was considered relevant. In 
Athens, emotional appeals, references to civic virtue and character assassination are 
common, as well as witnesses who are clearly not impartial. “The trial is thus placed 
squarely in the context of the lives of the parties concerned.” 119 But conceptual barriers 
did exist between the lawcourts and everyday society in some important areas. Carey 
accepts that emotional and character material would be considered by juries; they could 
help them develop a view of the credibility of the litigant, and could also be crucial in 
the final verdict. In some cases the Athenian legal system allowed no flexibility in 
sentencing, and considering character could have been one way for the jurors to
1 A
introduce flexibility:
But it is a mistake to suppose that as a general rule the main issue becomes an 
appendix at the trial. A crude reading of the orators shows that, in general, 
information about the career and character of the disputants plays a much 
smaller role (quantitatively) in Greek trials than the main issue. It is moreover 
important to note that we do not find speakers in court admitting that their case 
is weak and asking for a verdict in their favour on the basis of factors outside the 
case. It was evidently difficult to win a case on character-assassination and self- 
praise. 121
Carey ends up asserting that the jurors’ decisions were often based on law, though he 
accepts that nonlegal considerations played a large role in influencing the final 
verdict. 122
The crucial factor that these two authors have raised is the overall balance of arguments. 
When legal and nonlegal arguments are considered together, both claim that a simple 
plea on the basis of character or emotion wovV« probably not have succeeded. Their 
arguments are attractive, but it must be noted that they are not demonstrated. As a result, 
one of the major tasks of this thesis is to see whether Carey and Missiou are right and 
relevant discussion generally outweighed irrelevant pleading.
119 Carey (1994a: 175-6).
120 Carey (1994a: 182, 1997:18).
121 Carey (1994a: 182).
122 Carey (1996:34, n.8).
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Chapter Four The Concept of Relevance in Athenian Courts
In this chapter I will analyse more fully the concept of relevance in Athenian courts. A 
concept of relevance is mentioned in most of the major books on Athenian lawcourts. 
Little attempt has been made to define it since Bonner’s work a hundred years ago.1 2His 
study was not exhaustive. While it is generally recognised that the Athenians understood 
relevance as speaking to the issue, there has been little consideration of how the issue 
was defined and what a lawcourt would consider outside the issue.
Relevance in Aristotle
Modem discussions of relevance usually begin with Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Book One of 
the Rhetoric discusses rhetoric as a method or system (Texvn)- Aristotle uses the words 
e^o) TOÜ npdYpaTOS six times in Book One (1354al5-18, 22-23; 1354M7-20, 27; 
1355a2, 19). He tells us that most handbooks devote themselves to Tcbv e t̂o toü 
rrpdYMCcros and explains “For slander and pity and anger and such emotions are 
[directed] not to the issue, but to the juror (1354al8).”3 Next Aristotle tells us that 
speaking e ô) toü TTpaypaTOS is correctly forbidden in the court of the Areopagus, for it 
is wrong to pervert the juror’s feelings, to arouse him to anger or jealousy or pity. 
“Further, it is clear that the only business of the litigant is to demonstrate that the fact is 
or is not, that it has happened or not; whether it is great or small or just or unjust, insofar 
as the lawgiver has not drawn a distinction, is for the juror himself to decide and not to 
leam from the litigants (1354a23).”4
Aristotle suggested that lawgivers should as much as possible leave little discretion to 
the jurors. “If this is so, it is clear 4hat those who draw other distinctions write 
handbooks about what is irrelevant to the issue (Td toü npaypaTO?), such as what 
must be the contents of the proem or the narrative, or each of the other parts [of the
1 Bonner (1905:14-15).
2 See, for example, Lossau (1964:19); Wankel (1976:151); Wallace 1989:124 and n.l 12); Carawan 
(1998:158 and n.33) and Whitehead (2000:238-8).
3 öiaßoÄq ydp Kai eAeos kou öpyq Kai Td TOiaÜTa nd0n Tfjs ipuxqs oü nepi tou npaypcaos 
eanv dXAd npös töv öiKaarqv.
4 sTi ÖS 4)avepöv öti toü pev öp̂ iaßqTOÜvTOS oüöev eanv efyo toü öeT̂ ai to npäypa öti eanv q 
OÜK eanv q Ŷ YOvev q oü yeYOvev ei öe peya q piKpöv q öiKaiov q äöiKOV, öaa pq ö vopoBeTqs 
ÖKupiKev, aÜTÖv öq nou töv öiKaaTqv öeT yr/vwaKeiv Kai oü pavBdveiv napd twv 
dp([)ioßqTOÜVTWv.
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speech]. For they are concerned with nothing in their handbooks except how to place the 
judge in a certain state of mind (1354b20).”3 *5
Aristotle’s final comments in Book One are to note that it is less worthwhile speaking 
ê cjo toü npdypaTOS in deliberative oratory, as the only thing necessary is to prove the 
truth of a statement, whereas in lawcourts it is useful to win over the hearers, and that is 
why in many places the law prohibits Aeyeiv toü npaypocros (1354b27, 1355a2). It 
is clear that all other writers of handbooks include tcx e^o) toü npdypaTOS (1355al 9).
In Book Three Aristotle discusses appeals, noting that they are made to place the listener 
in a certain emotional state. He outlines a range of material, adding: “But we must not 
forget that all such things are ê co toü Aoyou; for they are only addressed to a worthless 
listener who will hear Tä e^oj toü npdypaTOS, since if he is not such a man, there is no 
need of a proem, except to make a summary statement of the case, so that like a body it 
may have a head (1415b5-6).”6
Aristotle’s main points seem clear, though their precise meaning is disputed. Material 
that is.e^co toü npdypaTos is extrinsic to the matter or the subject of the speech. At a 
general level, Aristotle is criticizing the inclusion of emotional appeals in a forensic 
context. He notes that emotional appeals are commonly placed in proems and epilogues, 
and that other writers of rhetorical handbooks concentrate on such material that is 
toü npdypaTOS. Two matters are disputed in modem scholarship: the nature of 
Aristotle’s criticism of emotional appeals, and the nature of his comments on the 
divisions of speech.
It is traditional to view Aristotle as claiming that ail use of fjGos or ndGos is irrelevant.7 
Based on this view, some scholars have claimed that Book One represents an ideal 
rhetoric, derived from Plato, in which factual discussion is contrasted with extraneous 
matters such as emotional appeals, and identify an inconsistency between this ideal
3 ei öij Taü0’ oütojs exei, <l>cxvepöv ön Tä toü npäypaTOs TexvoAoyoüaiv öooi TccAAa
Öiopi^ouöiv, oTov n öeT tö npooipiov n Tf|v öinynaiv exeiv, Kai tcov äAAoov ekootov popicov
oüöev yäp ev aÜToTs äAAo npaypaTeüovTai nAf|v öncos töv KpiTfiv noiöv uva noiijowoiv. The 
phrase noiöv Tiva literally means “a certain kind of person;” on the translation of the phrase see 
Fortenbaugh (1996a: 163).
6 öeT öe pT) AavGdveiv ön ndvTa ê w toü Aöyou Tä TOiaÜTa- npös (J)aüAov yäp äKpoaTqv Kai 
Tä ê to toü npäypaTos äKOÜovra, enei äv pfj toioütos fi, oüGev öeT npooipiou, äAA’ fi öoov tö 
npäypa eineTv Ke4)aAaiwöa)9, Tva exn wonep ocopa KeOaAtjv.
7 This view, first developed by Spengel (1828:96-7), was consolidated by Cope (1877:6-7).
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rhetoric and the succeeding discussion elsewhere in the Rhetoric of emotion. As a 
result, Fortenbaugh speculates that the Rhetoric is an amalgam of two books written at 
different times and showing two different views of the function of rhetoric.9
By contrast, Grimaldi argued that not all emotional appeals are irrelevant, and that 
Aristotle was talking only about appeals which are outside the issue.10 Grimaldi did not 
discuss the matter in detail, and does not deal with Aristotle’s comment in Book Three, 
where he states directly that all such appeals are outside the matter (1415b5-6). Other 
authors have presented a range of explanations. For example, Sprute believes Aristotle 
was writing an “ideal” handbook of rhetoric for an ideal world while understanding that 
no such world exists.11 Others view the apparent paradox in the Rhetoric as a result of 
Aristotle’s varying aims in the work - providing useful advice (such as how to make an 
emotional appeal), and discussing the theory and function of rhetoric as an art, which 
requires more complex argumentation than making simple emotional appeals. This 
argument is as unconvincing as it is circular; it explains away the inconsistencies as a 
result of differing prior aims, but the the inconsistencies themselves are evidence for 
these prior aims.
It is possible that the paradox is actually something of a mirage. In Book One Aristotle 
never actually states that he will not discuss emotional appeals, or that they have no 
place in rhetoric. At 1356al-4 he in fact makes it clear that they do have a place. He is 
not disowning emotional appeals, but criticising other authors for concentrating on them 
alone and ignoring the other elements of the “system,” such as “enthymemes which are 
the body of proof (1354al4-15).” Irrelevant arguments are indeed bad arguments, but 
they are also potentially of little use to a speaker; as Aristotle, notes, if all trials were 
carried on as they are in some states, there would be nothing left to say if irrelevant 
arguments were excluded, since the handbooks have provided no other advice on
8 Cope (1877:6); Sprute (1994:119); Barnes (1995:263); Fortenbaugh (1996b: 167-70); Frede (1996:264- 
65).
9 Fortenbaugh (1996b: 171-2, 175-80). Later in Book One Aristotle comments that there are three methods 
o f proof in rhetoric - the character o f the speaker, disposing the hearer in a certain way (by which he 
means arousing an emotional response) and factors in the speech itself (1356a 1-4, 14-16). Aristotle notes 
that persuasive arguments alone are not enough, but an orator must show himself to have certain qualities 
and his audience must think he is disposed in a certain way towards them, and themselves be disposed in a 
certain way towards him (1377b 16-20). Finally, in Book Three Aristotle goes on to discuss the uses of 
emotional appeals at length.
10 Grimaldi (1980:9, 11,24); see also Striker (1996:297-98).
11 Sprute (1994:119-20).
12 Lossau (1964:19) suggests Book Three is practical advice for the reader, whereas Book One is a 
philosophical introduction.
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rhetoric (1354al9-21). If this interpretation is sound, there is no inconsistency. Aristotle 
is admitting that emotional appeals are irrelevant, but instead of advocating their 
excision, is recognising that they should be properly mastered along with other elements 
of the art o f rhetoric. It is possible that the degree of influence on Aristotle by Plato in 
Book One has been overstated.
It has also been suggested that Aristotle is claiming that “a concern with the technique 
and technicalities of speech structure” are irrelevant.14 He seems to have been 
understood this way in antiquity, as later authors concluded that proems and epilogues 
were forbidden by the Areopagus (below). This interpretation is unfounded. Aristotle is 
not criticising the existence of divisions of speech at 1354b20 and 1415b5-6, but 
handbooks that insist on what the contents of those divisions should be. He is drawing 
attention to the view of other authors that (for example) emotional appeals should be 
placed in the proem, as this is the most effective way of swaying the audience’s 
emotions.15 Once again, he is attacking their concentration on irrelevant emotional 
appeals at the expense of the “system” of rhetoric.
Relevance after Aristotle - ancient and modern scholarship
Four authors from later antiquity discussed relevance. The earliest, Quintilian, asserted 
that Athenian orators were forbidden to stir the audience’s passions, or deliver a 
peroration (Inst, ii.xvi.4, vi.i.7, x.i.107, xii.x.26).16 In the second century A. D., Pollux 
(viii.l 17) claimed that the Areopagus prevented speakers from making proems or appeal 
to pity,17 and Lucian (Anach. 19) stated that the Areopagus forbade proems and
lj Schlitrumpf (1994:103) also argues that Aristotle is presenting emotions as part of a whole “system” of 
rhetoric. I would disagree, however, with his claim that Aristotle’s system is still Platonic. It seems to be 
another inconsistency that Aristotle should be following Plato both in proposing an ideal rhetoric and in 
proposing a real-world rhetoric.
14 Lossau (1964:19); Grimaldi (1980:24).
15 Parallels are often drawn (eg. by Hellwig 1973:162-63; Sprute 1994:101-2; Fortenbaugh 1988:262-63, 
1996b: 169) between Book One and Plato’s Phaedrus 266d-67d. Plato also discusses rhetorical 
handbooks, and notes that some of them outline the divisions of speech, but he does not explicitly criticize 
their existence, though his tone in the Phaedrus and Politicus 305b8 is generally depreciating.
16 Et Athenis quoque, ubi actor movere adfectus vetabatur, velut recisam orandi potestatem (ii.xvi.4); Id 
sensisse Atticos credo, quia Athenis adfectus movere etiam per praeconem prohibebatur orator (vi.i.7); Et 
fortasse epilogos illi mos civitatis abstulerit (x.i. 107); tarnen quae defuisse ei sive ipsius natura seu lege 
civitatis videntur, adiecerit, ut adfectus concitatius moveat, audiam dicentem, Non fecit hoc Demosthenes? 
(xii.x.26). Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria was completed about A.D. 95.
17 npooipid^eoBai öe oük ê fjv oüö’ oiKTî eaOai.
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emotional appeals and that attempts would be silenced by the herald. In the third 
century A.D., Anonymous Seguerianus (Tech. 33) claimed that the Areopagus did not 
allow proems or epilogues.19
When modem scholars began to write the history of Greece, they drew on the whole 
range of ancient sources and used Quintilian, Pollux and Lucian to confirm and extend 
Aristotle. They decided that emotional pleading (including appeals to pity), proems and 
epilogues were forbidden on the Areopagus. This view continued after the advent of 
more “scientific” history in the nineteenth century. By the late nineteenth century, 
when modem concepts of Athenian juries began to crystallize, this view of the
99Areopagus had become established.
Prior to the discovery of the Athenaion Politeia, it was generally assumed that rules on 
relevance were confined to the Areopagus. Cope, for example, disparages “Quintilian’s 
carelessness in extending to all the lawcourts of Athens, a practice actually prevailing at 
the most only in one of them,” noting that extant orations provided direct evidence to 
the contrary.23 The Athenaion Politeia shows, however, that litigants in dikasteria also
18 qv Ö8 tis q 4>poiMiov eTrrq npö toü Xoyou, ws euvoucrrepous cmepyeoauo aCrroüs, q oTktov q 
öeivcoaiv 8^o)0ev enayq to) npdypan  - ola noXAa pryropwv naTöes enl toüs öiKacrräs 
pqxavcbvTai - napeABwv ö KqpuE; KaTeaidbnqaev eüBüs, oük etov ÄqpeTv rrpös Tqv ßouXqv Kai 
nepinemreiv tö npäypa ev toTs Aöyois, dis yupvä Tä yeyevqpeva oi ’ ApeonayTiai ßAenoiev.
19 q ev ’ Apeicü ndyco ßouXq oÜTe npooipid^eoBai ei'a oÜTe eniÄoyi^eoBai. Quintilian’s source is 
unknown, but there seems to be a considerable difference between the information we find in Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric and the comments of these scholars. All may be based on a common source, as they all agree on 
the exclusion of proems and emotional appeals, and both Quintilian (vi.1.7) and Lucian mention a herald. 
Quintilian’s views seem directly opposed to the Rhetoric as he claims all courts enforced these 
prohibitions, whereas Aristotle only mentioned the Areopagus. It is possible that Quintilian may have 
misunderstood Aristotle (Kennedy 1994:179 notes that Quintilian was “not always precise in his 
quotations or paraphrases of what Greek writers had said” and that he appears to be selective in his use of 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric), but it is also possible that there was a separate source which was itself inaccurate. 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric had been lost for about 200 years prior to its rediscovery in about 80 B.C. (Plutarch 
Sulla xxvi; Strabo xiii.54), so an independent tradition about relevance may have developed during this 
time. There are some meagre indications of lost traditions in the early Empire concerning Athenian legal 
procedure. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (First Letter to Ammaeus 1) attacked the view that Demosthenes 
learnt his art from Aristotle’s rhetoric, while Athenaeus (xiii.590f) tells us that after Hyperides’ acquittal 
of Phryne, the Athenians passed a decree that no speakers should appeal for pity and no defendants, male 
or female be exposed to the open gaze while on trial. There are no clearly known sources for either 
account.
20 Montagu (1760:77); Goguet (1775, II;23-24); Rollin (1775, IV:285); Goldsmith (1784,1:65); Mitford 
(1785:344). Montagu (ibid) held the Areopagus up as superior even to English juries in this regard: 
“Happy if the pleaders were restricted to this righteous method in our own courts of judicature, where 
great eloquence and great abilities are too often employed to confound truth and support injustice!”
21 See Meier and Schömann (1824:719); Spengel (1828:96-7).
22 See Cope (1877:8); Bruns (1896:487-8); Lipsius (1905-15,111:918). They are generally followed in the 
major modem account of Athenian homicide procedure - MacDowell (1963:43-4).
23 Cope (1877:8).
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swore to speak to the matter,24 while Antiphon (vi.9) mentions a similar rule in the 
Palladion.25
It is generally assumed that irrelevant pleading was defined in the same way by 
dikasteria as by the Areopagus. Modem scholars combine evidence from speeches 
delivered before all types of courts and define irrelevance as consisting in slander, 
emotional pleas and discussion of services and character.26 Few have considered the 
implication that, if all courts had the same rule, then if we are to believe ancient authors
97proems and epilogues would have been forbidden in dikasteria too.
Where authors have considered that relevance must have been defined differently in 
different types of court, they have confined themselves to a few general comments. 
Carawan suggests that the rule was more restrictive and better respected on the 
Areopagus than elsewhere, citing Lycurgus i. 11 -13. In that speech, Lycurgus 
recommends that the dikastai take the Areopagus as their model, which may suggest 
that legal standards in the two courts were seen to differ.Wallace29 argued that the mle 
was always phrased as ê co tou npaypaTO? Aeysiv on the Areopagus, and as speaking 
eis to npaypa before other courts, which “suggests that the Areopagus had its own 
provision.” However, the phrase e^o) tou npayM^TOS is not used before the Areopagus 
in Lysias vii.42 where the speaker raises the issue of relevance. It is found used in 
dikasteria in speeches by Isaeus (Fr. 1 [Forster]), Lycurgus (i.l 1-13, 149) and Hyperides 
(iv.31-2), and appears three times in Demosthenes’ dikasterion speech Against 
Eubulides (lvii.33-4, 63, 66) - a speech which also three times contains the phrase eis to 
npdcYM« (lvii.7, 59, 60)! This more than any other speech would indicate that Wallace’s 
argument is incorrect. The two phrases appear to be positive and negative expressions of 
a single idea. “Speaking outside the matter” is simply the logical opposite of “speaking 
to the matter.”
24 K[a]i 0[io]pvLi[ouai]v oi ävnöiKOi eis aCrrö tö npaypta] epeTv (AP 67.1).
25 cfövou öicoKovres Kai tou vö|jou oütgos exovros, eis aÜTÖ tö npäypa KaTriYopelv.
26 See Bonner (1905:16-18); Lipsius (1905-15,111:918-20); Voegelin (1943:13-14); Wankel (1976:151- 
52).
27 Lossau (1964:19-20) did compare Aeschines’ use of the rule on relevance to Aristotle’s and argued that 
they were generally similar, but his references to Aeschines i . l66, 170 and iii.201-2 do not really support 
the conclusion that strictures against divisions of a speech were believed to be irrelevant. The passages do 





It is unclear whether a different rule on relevance was applied in the scrutinies of 
magistrates, the dokimasiai and euthynai. Bonner thought so, citing Lysias xvi.9.30 In 
that speech, a dokimasia before the Boule, the speaker states that in other cases it is right 
to make one’s defence only about the charges themselves, but in dokimasiai it is just to 
give an account of one’s whole life. Weißenberger countered that in a dokimasia one 
was actually supposed to answer formal questions about one’s life, but this did not mean 
that the routine could be extended into the elaborate accounting of liturgies we find in 
Lysias xvi.9-21. This claim does not sit well with the evidence of Lysias xxiv and 
xxxi, which are also dokimasia speeches. The speaker o f Lysias xxiv. 1 emphasises his 
whole life in response to the charges brought by his opponent. The speaker of Lysias 
xxxi.2 claims that his Bouleutic oath requires him to disclose if he knows anyone of 
those chosen by lot to be unsuitable for service on the Boule, which perhaps indicates
• ' X ' Xthat a more general discussion of character and services was relevant. To further 
complicate the matter, the speaker of another dokimasia speech, Lysias xxvi.3, claims 
his opponent will discuss his character and deeds rather than the charges, and suggests 
that this will be irrelevant to the issue. The speaker of this speech does not state that 
such a plea is unjust, instead briefly depreciating his opponent’s services and character 
(Lysias xxvi.4-5).
This contradiction between the speeches can be resolved if we assume that dokimasiai 
and euthynai had the same rules concerning relevance as other trials. As will be 
discussed below, there was no concrete prohibition on irrelevance as such (outside the 
Areopagus and perhaps other homicide courts), but a more flexible situation in which it 
was up to the speaker to prove the relevance or otherwise of his case. In this situation, 
speakers could claim as relevant arguments that other speakers, on another occasion, 
might label irrelevant. It is this flexibility that we observe in Lysias’ dokimasia 
speeches.
Despite the apparent existence of an Areopagite rule, speakers appear to have flouted it 
regularly, since the extant Areopagus speeches contradict Quintilian, Pollux and Lucian 
by containing material those authors identify as irrelevant. Lysias iii contains a proem 
(1-5), and a short peroration (46-8) that contains a brief appeal for pity (48) and
30 Bonner (1905:16); see also Voegelin (1943:14, n.13) and Adeleye (1983:297-300).
31 öokcT Ö6 poi, ü) ßouArj, ev pev toTs äAAois aywoi nepi aÜTtuv jjovcov tü>v KonriYOpr)lJeva)v 
npoarjKeiv änoAoyeiaGai, ev öe tcus öoKipaaiais öikcxiov elvai navrös toü ßiou Aöyov öiöövai.
32 Weißenberger (1987:50), building upon a point made earlier by Frohberger (1871:12-13).
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comments on public services (47). There is also a brief digression to introduce an 
irrelevant charge of criminal behaviour against the opponent, which the speaker admits 
is ê o) tou TTpaYMaTOS (45). Lysias vii contains a proem (1-5) with an extensive 
emotional plea to undermine the opponent’s character. Lysias iv.20 has an appeal to 
pity, while iv.19 and vii.41 contain statements about the speakers’ good public records 
and services. Finally, in his account of the Areopagus’ inquiry into Theogenes’ wife, 
Apollodorus tells us that Theogenes begged and pleaded and supplicated himself to the 
Areopagus, insisting that he had been tricked; the Areopagus, we are told, pitied him 
(Demosthenes lix.81-83).
In response to this, Wallace has claimed that “the tradition that [appeals to pity] were 
forbidden on the Areopagus is both late and contradicted by evidence from Lysias.”34 As 
we shall see below, Wallace is certainly on the right track.
The more general point is also made that all courts appear to have allowed appeals for
^  c  #
pity and proems. As a result, Athenian courts are sometimes viewed as places where 
rules on relevance, even if they existed, had little real enforcement or meaning. Some 
attempts have been made to explain this. Adkins noted that the long list of liturgies in 
Lysias xvi flew “in the face of the justice that the juries swore to observe.”37 He then 
sought to prove that in reality discussion of liturgies was not irrelevant, but in fact a 
crucial part of the defence - something that was best explained by viewing Athenian
t o
litigation as part of the relentless competition over status and honour. Not surprisingly, 
his interpretation proved attractive to those with similar ideas, and has been echoed by 
Gamer and Cohen.39
This interpretation does present us with a conundrum. If discussion of one’s character 
and liturgies is actually relevant, why is it so often labelled irrelevant in forensic 
oratory? That it is labelled irrelevant is shown below. There is a further problem, that 
the clear testimony of a number of authors writing in late antiquity about what was 
relevant on the Areopagus is contradicted by forensic oratory. There is also the problem 
that we have a somewhat confused picture of the application of relevance in other






39 Gamer (1987:62-3); Cohen (1991:155, 1995a: 190-1).
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Athenian courts, with a number of modem scholars concluding that mles on relevance 
were simply ignored.
The resolution of this conundrum lies in a re-examination of the evidence. Modem 
scholarship has been too heavily based on the mantra passed down from late antiquity, 
and has tried to fit forensic oratory into the picture drawn by Aristotle, Quintilian,
Pollux and Lucian. We would be better served by analysing what forensic orations 
themselves say, and then comparing them to Aristotle and later authors to see where 
they match and differ.
Terminology of Relevance
Table 4.1 lists all the “contexts” I have found in Athenian forensic oratory' where 
speakers discuss relevance.40 The table presents only the actual phrases which bear upon 
the terminology of relevance; the contexts themselves provide broader information 
about the material that could be viewed as relevant or irrelevant.
There are 96 contexts in all, derived from 46 speeches and one fragment of Isaeus. 
Overall, the list is characterized by a great variety in phrasing, and there is no consistent 
terminology for describing relevance. The most common grammatical formation is a 
prepositional phrase, usually with a noun following the preposition. The familiar phrase 
8^0) toü npdypaTOS occurs nine times in four speeches, while eis aÜTÖ to npaypa 
occurs eight times in five speeches. The phrase nepi [aÜTOÜ] toü npccYporroe also 
occurs eight times, but may have been fairly widely used in discussing relevance as it is 
also used in this way by Isocrates (Antidosis xv.104), and Aristotle (Rhet. 1354al8). It 
also reappears much later as the phrase used by Lucian (.Anach. 19) in discussing the 
Areopagus’ views on relevance. Less common prepositional phrases involving the word 
npaypa are ünep [aÜTOÜ] toü npaypaTOS (thrice), nepi twv [auTcb] nenpaypevaiv 
(twice), nepi twv npaypaTOdv (twice), ünep tcüv nenpaypevcov (twice), npös to 
npaypa (twice), en’ aÜTOÜ toü npaypaTO? (once), eis töv toü npaYpocToe auTov 
(once) and dno toü npaypaTO? (once). The latter is echoed in compound form in the
401 use the word “contexts” because a speaker may, in discussing relevance, spend one or more sections 
dealing with a single point, and it would therefore be incorrect to separate sections belonging to a single 
argument. Two contexts have been excluded from this analysis. Isocrates xix.16 includes the phrase nepi 
pev CXUTOÜ TOÜ npaYPCtToe, but as the speech was delivered under Aeginetan, rather than Attic, 
jurisdiction I have excluded it. Isocrates xv.104 contains the phrase XPH öe TÖv ünep exeivoü Xöyov 
oük äXAÖTpiov elvai vopi êiv toTs evecnuxji npaypaaiv, oüö’ epe Äeyeiv ê m Tfjs Ypa^fjs. As this 
is an epideictic oration it is also not considered here, except insofar as it bears upon the general picture 
derived from forensic oratory.
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phrase änö Tps üßpeoas Kai tcov nenpaypevaiv, found once. The phrase ärro toü 
npdypaTOS is the only one of these phrases to be found in later lexicographers and 
linked to relevance.41
A total of 41 references include some form of the word npaypa. The basic meaning of 
the word, according to LSJ s.v., is “that which has been done, a deed, act”, but it can be 
extended from that to include ongoing actions, work, circumstances, matters or facts and 
even intellectual positions (Aeschines iii.79) or plots (Demosthenes xxix.27). In forensic 
oratory npaypa is commonly used to refer to the object of the suit, the charge, or the 
case as a whole.42 A classic example of this meaning is Demosthenes xxiv.5: to pev ouv 
npaypa, nepi ou 5eT vuv yvcovai.43
There are a number of instances where, in discussing relevance, a speaker uses a more 
specific term than npaypa. As a result we get e^a) trjs ypa^rjs (twice, and also in 
Isocrates xv.104); Tps Kainyopias, ê co ti tqs npeoßeias TaÜTr|$, toü
napavopou (once each), unep tujv [ainou] KaTnyopoupevaiv (twice), unep Tps 
evöei^ecos, nepi [aCrrcuv povoav] tcov KaTpyopripevcov (twice), nepi toü eyKAppaTos, 
nepi toü npoßouAeupaTos, nepi Tfjs papTUpias, nepi Tfjs evöei^eoos, eis aÜTÖv njv 
4>övov, npös Td KaTriyopripeva (once each), dnö Tfjs ünoGeaecas (thrice), dnö Tqs 
dnoXoyias and eni Tr)? ünoBeoews (once each). Some of these, such as ypacjin?, 4>ovov, 
or npeaßeias, are synonyms for the case as a whole. Others refer to the charge under 
which the case is brought (KaTriyopias and its cognates, eyKXnpccTOs), the indictment 
(evöei^ecas) or orders under discussion (npoßouXeüpaTOs).
Outside forensic oratory we find a similar picture. Plato (Theat. 172e) notes that in 
courts a litigant’s opponent would hold the unoypa4>n against him, from which it is not 
possible to deviate (uiv cktos ou pryreov). In this context unoypacjin means an 
accusation, and is a synonym for a charge.44 Furthermore, Thucydides (iii.61.1) uses the
41 See Harpocration s.v. dno toü npdypaTOS and Suda s.v. dno toü npdypaTOS. Harpocration 
defines the phrase dvri toü cmwOev Ar||JOO0svns kot’ “ Avöponojvos. I cannot fmd the phrase in 
Demosthenes’ Androtion, but can fmd it in his Timocrates. Some passages of the Timocrates are virtually 
identical to passages of Androtion, but xxiv.6 is not one o f them.
42 Amerio (1984:180-90).
4j For other examples, see Andocides i.37, Demosthenes xl.58, Lycurgus i.66.
44 This use of unoypa^n is rare. In Athenian forensic oratory the verb unoypdipas meaning “to accuse” 
is attested at Demosthenes xxxvii.23. In much later times it is found in Themistius Or. xxvi.313c (Tqv 
dvTwpooiav...nv unoypaipovTai). To these LSJ s.v. adds Euripides Her. 1118, but this seems 
mistaken; see Barlow (1996:172), who suggests that in Heracles 1118 it means “indicate”, “suggest” or 
“hint.”
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term ê co tujv npOKeipevwv in the Plataean Debate to refer to matters outside the case 
currently under discussion. These external references may indicate that it was relatively 
common to define the case through a more specific word than npaypa. The contexts in 
which the more specific words appear are similar to those in which npaypa is used, so 
references which use a more specific word do not seem to have a more specific 
meaning.
Another pattern that can be observed in Table 4.1 is the use of a prepositional phrase 
where the object of the clause is replaced by a relative pronoun and a verb. We thus find 
nepi gjv dvTOjpooav, nepi ounep upas 5eT lyn^eaSai, nepi aiv eyKeKApKe, nepi gov 
6ÖIG0K8, nepi oü paAicna npoarjKev airra) t ö v  Aoyov noieTa0ai, nepi gov (J)euyei, nepi gov 
o u k  dyGivî eTai, nepi &v pf] eäv Aeyeiv, nepi gov prj KaTnyopryrai, nepi ou peAAeie Tpv 
i|jfj(j)Ov cjoepeiv, oü Ka0’ öv eiaeApAubas, unep wv pp ßouXeüeo0e, unep u>v dyaivrtfi 
(once each).
A third pattern is the use of verbs that indicate diverting, leading astray, twisting, or 
simple deceit. Table 4.1 supplies napdyeiv (ten times), e^ancaav (eight times), 
anayeiv (four times), (joevaxi^eiv (three times), änapTäv, näpdnreiv, nXdTreiv, 
nXaväv and peTacrrpe(t)eiv (once each), for example. Sometimes two verbs are used to 
reinforce each other, as for example e^anaiäv ö ’ upas neipaoeTai nXdrrGov Kai 
napayGov (Demosthenes xxii.4), touto yap nXdnouoiv outoi Kai napayouai 
(Demosthenes xxxviii.9) and napayoov to) Xöya), cos oü ndvTa pepapTuppKe Td ev tco 
YpappaTeiG) yeYPa MMeva, Kai e^anaioov upas (Demosthenes xlvi.l). These verbs can 
be found in non-forensic contexts with the same meaning of leading astray or deceiving, 
especially in relation to giving a speech. e^anaTdv, for example, is used in this way by 
Aristophanes {Knights 1115-9, Wasps 281), dndyeiv by Thucydides (ii.59.3, ii.65.1) and 
Plato {Phaedr. 262b), and napdyeiv by Plato {Rep. 383a).
The variety of phrasing evident in Table 4.1 may indicate that there was no specific 
legal term for relevance in Athenian courts. If this was the case, then it must be 
considered that there was no actual law on relevance in Athenian courts (except perhaps 
on the Areopagus). In forensic oratory speakers regularly cite laws using consistent 
phrasing. For example, the term for being “caught in the act” is consistently expressed 
as being taken err’ aÜTO^ojpip both in forensic oratory (Aeschines i.91; ii.88; iii.10; 
Antiphon i.3, 9; v.48; Demosthenes xix.121, 132, 293; xxiii.157; xxxix.26; xlv.59, 70,
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81; Dinarchus i.29, 53, 77; ii.6; Isocrates xviii.53; Lysias i.21; vii.42; xiii.30, 85-8) and 
in general prose and poetry (Aristophanes Wealth 454; Eupolis Marikas Fr.193 [PCG]; 
Euripides Ion 1213; Herodotus vi.72.2; vi.137.3; vii.6.3; Plato Apol. 22a; Rep. 359c; 
Laws 942a; Xenophon Symp. iii. 13; Oec. xviii.3)45 A more complex example is the 
phrase used to indicate that an inheritance (or an heiress) is open to claim. Although the 
word order may vary, we consistently find the words pf] enlöiKOV e lv a i (Isaeus ii.2; iii.3, 
43, 66, 67, 73; iv.28; v.16; vi.3, 46, 52, 58, 59; vii.3; xi.10, 24; Demosthenes xliii.69; 
xliv.46). The consistent phrasing in these cases indicates that the speakers are citing the 
wording of laws (or, in the case of en’ aÜTO(})ü)pa), a legal term that has passed into 
common usage).46
A further point in favour of this argument is that some of the phrases that are used in 
discussing relevance can also be used in forensic oratory with completely different 
meanings. Demosthenes describes “people who were not involved in a matter” with the 
words toTs ê co toü npaypaTOS ouaiv (xxi.15) or tcüv s^co toü npaypaios övtcüv 
(xxi.45). Elsewhere, we find him describing the same idea with the phrases tcüv e£;co tcüv 
eYKÄnMOtTCüv övtcüv (xxiii.42) and ê co tcüv ev Tfj oir/Ypa^fi YSYpappev^v (xxxiv.3). 
Elsewhere, speakers use the phrase nepi toü npaYM^TOS (without discussing the issue 
of relevance) to refer to something that is part of a matter (Demosthenes xxii.30; xlvii.l, 
3, 46; Isocrates xviii.58). If a phrase such as ê co toü npaYpaTO? was derived from a 
law on relevance, it would have struck an incongruous note when being used to refer to 
people, rather than arguments.
Relevance in Law and Oath
Speakers regularly claim that relevant argument is just (Aeschines i. 175-76; iii. 193-97; 
Antiphon vi.7-10; Demosthenes xviii.9, 59; xix.202; xx.1-2; xxii.4; xxiii.95-7; xxxv.41; 
xxxvi.61; xxxviii.9; xxxix.35; xl.20-21; xli. 12-14; xlv.47-50; xlviii.36; li.3; Iii.1-2; 
lvii.33; lviii.22-25, 41; Hyperides iv.31-32; Isaeus xi.47; Lycurgus i. 11-13; Lysias 
xvi.9). Only on two occasions does a speaker claim that the law forbids irrelevance
45 In one case (Sophocles Ant. 51) it is phrased npös aÜTo4>(üpov, perhaps for metrical reasons.
46 Although Athens did not have the legalistic formalism characteristic o f later Roman and modem 
common law courts, it nonetheless did enjoy a fairly standard use of legal terms (Todd 2000a:32-34). 
Scholars sometimes posit a much sloppier use of legal terms (e.g. Finley 1951:8), although Finley 
nonetheless relies on the assumption o f formalism to explain his view that hypotheke and prasis epi lysei 
were separate forms of real security. E. M. Harris (1993:76) rightly notes that apparent imprecision 
sometimes reflects modem assumptions rather than ancient reality.
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(Lysias iii.46 and Antiphon vi.9).47 Lysias iii was delivered before the Areopagus, where 
we have external testimony (Aristotle Rhet. 1354a23, Lycurgus i. 13) that irrelevance 
was forbidden. Little is known of rules in the Palladion, where Antiphon’s sixth speech 
was delivered, but this passage of Antiphon has been seen as proving that there was also 
a law for that court upholding relevance.
The picture is muddied by a passage in Antiphon (v.l 1) in which the speaker claims that 
his opponents have illegally tried him as a kakourgos even though the charge is murder. 
He suggests that they should, if trying him for homicide, have sworn an oath49 in which 
they swore to confine their prosecution eis oüjtöv töv 4>ovov. If the speaker had been 
tried in a homicide court, it seems most likely that he would have been tried for 
intentional homicide, in which case he should have been tried before the Areopagus.50 
This presents us with a paradox, since if we accept the evidence of Lysias iii, the law, 
rather than an oath, restrained irrelevance before the Areopagus.
In this regard Glotz and Mederle suggested that only the references to the law were to be 
trusted. Mederle argued that Antiphon may have confused the provisions of the law and 
the oath, since anyone who swore the oath was also bound by the law.51 Glotz argued 
that speakers simply stated in the oath whether they were guilty or not, with no further 
claims about the facts of the case. He claimed support from two passages in forensic 
oratory:52
II est aise, apres cela, de voir ä l’aide de quel sophisme le rheteur a pu 
transformer un serment declaratoire et reel en un serment promissoire et 
imaginaire: d’une part, l’accusateur est tenu ä une declaration sur les faits de la 
cause (eis oüjtöv Tqv (j)övov, cbs EKTeiva); d’autre part, les lois du Palladion et de 
V Areopage defendent ä l’accusation de sortir de la cause (tou vopou outgo? 
8XOVTOS, eis oüjtö to npaypot KcnriYopeiv, oü vöpipöv earn/ e£co toü 
npaypaTO? Aeyeiv); done, en pretant le serment declaratoire sur les faits de la 
cause, on admet les lois du tribunal dont eile releve, et Ton jure implicitement de 
respecter ces lois. Ainsi il ne reste en faveur d’une diömosia promissoire 
d’autres temoignages que ceux de deux ou trois grammairiens. Encore sont-ils 
contredits par d’autres grammairiens et par tous les contemporains des 
institutions qu’ils pretendent decrire.
47 Lysias iii.46 (oü vöpipöv ecmv e^co tou npaypaTO? Aeyeiv); Antiphon vi.9 (toü vopou outgos 
exovtos, eis airro to npaypa KaTriyopeiv).
48 Wallace (1989:124).
49 touto Ö8 öeov oe öiopöoaaöai öpKOv töv pey'OTOv Kai ioxupöiaiov.
50 MacDowell (1978:117).
51 Mederle (1902:16).
52 Glotz did not provide references, but his citations are from Lysias x.l 1 and Antiphon vi. 16.
5j> Glotz (1906:151-52), followed by Bonner and Smith (1930-38,11:166).
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Glotz’s thesis does not sufficiently explain the emphasis that the speaker of Antiphon v 
places upon the oath,54 and neither Lysias x.l 1 nor Antiphon vi.16 should be viewed as 
containing the entire text of the homicide oath.53 All the lexicographers agree that the 
prosecutor swore that he was bringing the charge about the matter in dispute against the 
guilty party, while the defendant swore that he had not committed the crime raised in the 
charge.56 Their entries indicate that speakers could swear oaths that provided details of 
the charge and the accusations that supported the charge. This is, in fact, what forensic 
oratory actually shows us (Antiphon i.28; Lysias iii.4; Demosthenes lix.9-10). Glotz 
perhaps too readily discounts lexicographers and places too much weight on a couple of 
passages taken out of context.
There seem to be two other possibilities - either the vopos mentioned in Lysias’ third 
speech, and perhaps even Antiphon’s sixth speech, is in fact the preliminary oath sworn 
by the parties at the start of each homicide case, or litigants in homicide courts swore an 
oath to stick to the matter even though there was already a rule that they should do so. 
The former possibility simply reverses Glotz’s argument. Consequently, it is worth 
revisiting the possibility that there may have been both a law and an oath.
The oath sworn at the start of a homicide trial is mentioned in several sources, but there 
is no direct evidence outside Antiphon that it prohibited irrelevance.57 It is at least 
possible that litigants’ oaths were themselves derived from the terms of homicide laws, 
which might indicate that the speakers of Lysias iii and Antiphon v were correct to refer 
to laws on relevance. There are some meagre indications that the oath reflected 
homicide laws. Demosthenes (xlvii.72) tells us that the laws of Draco ordered relatives 
of the deceased to take proceedings against murderers, as far as the sons of cousins, and 
that in the oath it is laid down who the relative is. Elsewhere, Dinarchus (i.46-47) tells
54 MacDowell (1963:93).
55 In the case of Lysias x, the speaker is discussing the semantics o f words for ‘killed’ and using the 
homicide oath as an example. He had no need to cite more than the relevant clause of the oath as a result. 
In the case o f Antiphon vi the speaker is discussing his opponent’s claim that he committed the murder 
ßouXeüaavTa, and had no need to discuss more than this issue.
56 Harpocration s.v. avTwpooia; Hesychius s.v. avTCopoaia and öicopooia; Lex. Sabb. s.v, öicopooia 
(Papadopulos-Kerameus 1965[1892-93]:52,1.8); Lex. Rhet. s.v. ävTCopooia Kai ävTopvüvai (Bekker 
1814:200); Pollux viii.55; Suda s.v. ävTCopooia and öicopooia. Glotz combines both types o f oath in 
making his argument.
57 On the oath, see Antiphon i.28; Demosthenes xlvii.73, lix.9-10; Lysias x.l 1, iii.l, 4; and Philippi 
(1874:85-96); Mederle (1902:14-16); Lipsius (1905-15:830-31); Bonner and Smith (1930-38,11:165-66); 
MacDowell (1963:90-98); Harrison (1968-71,11:99-100); and Hansen (1981:15).
58 ksXsusi yap  ö vöpos, w ävöpes öiKaorai, toüs npoanKOVTccs sne^isvai psxpi ävsipiaöwv, Kai 
sv Tip öpKCp öiopî STai ö Ti npoafiKCOV eariv. The text of the last clause is disputed. I prefer the 
manuscript reading “defined” (öiopi^STai) for “inquired” (enepcoTav, which has the authority of Pollux
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us that Demosthenes broke the oaths he took on the Areopagus in the names of the holy 
goddesses and the other gods, by whom it is lawful to swear there.59 It is possible that 
the laws of Draco outlined the procedure for trials, including the items to be sworn in 
the oath. If this is the case, then there could very well be both a rule on relevance and a 
requirement for speakers to swear to stick to the matter at the trial. The evidence is not 
good, however, so on this issue uncertainty must remain.
In forensic oratory öiKoaov is regularly used to indicate that something has a legal basis 
(see Chapter Five). Accordingly, the regular claim in oratory that irrelevance is unjust 
may indicate that there was commonly held to be some ban on it in dikasteria. Such a 
ban must clearly have existed by the last quarter of the fourth century B.C., as it was 
recorded in the Atkenaion Politeia (67.1). The key to understanding the nature of any 
ban in dikasteria lies in the wording used there - ö[io}pvü[ouoi]v oi cxvriöiKOi eis aÜTÖ 
to npaypla] epeTv. The key word is ö[io]pvü[ouai]v, which indicates that litigants 
swore on oath to confine themselves to the matter.
Little is known about preliminary oaths sworn by litigants in dikasteria. Hansen 
suggests that the litigants swore the oath mentioned in the Atkenaion Politeia at the trial 
itself.60 The Atkenaion Politeia outlines the procedure as it unfolded on the day, though 
it does not actually state that the oath was sworn in court. There is no other evidence 
that litigants swore a preliminary oath in a dikasterion, although it is known that the 
litigants’ oaths in homicide trials were sworn in the court before the trial.61 The use of 
the verb öiöpvupi may show that the Atkenaion Politeia is indeed referring to an oath 
sworn at the start of the trial, as this is the verb regularly used for the oaths sworn by 
litigants at the start of homicide trials. In this regard, it contrasts with the verb that is 
generally used to refer to the other major oath sworn by litigants before a trial, the
viii.l 18, where he appears to quote this passage) as I know of no Athenian oaths that comprised questions, 
rather than testimony to a fact.
59 eniwpKriKU)? pevTas oepvas 0eas ev ’Apeicp ndyto Kai toÜ9 äÄXou9 0eoÜ9 oÜ9 ckci 
öiopvuoBai vöpipöv eon.
60 Hansen (1999:200).
61 Antiphon vi.14; Demosthenes xxiii.67, 71. This was something of a vexed issue previously, with 
Lipsius (1905-15,111:831) and Bonner and Smith (1938,11:166-67) claiming that litigants in dikasteria 
only swore oaths at the anakrisis. MacDowell (1963:96-97) discusses the evidence and settles for the 
oaths being sworn at the trial.
62 Antiphon i.28, Demosthenes xlvii.73, lix.9-10. Lysias x .l 1, iii.l, 4. ölöpvupi can also refer to pledges 
or oaths which were not required by law but were given by someone on his own initiative (Aeschines 
iii.150, Demosthenes xviii.283, 286, xl.41, xlix.67, lvii.44; Isaeus xi.6; Lycurgus i. 127; Sophocles Track. 
254; see Bonner and Smith 1930-38,11:165, n.6) or even oaths sworn by witnesses (Aeschines iii.l56).
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ävroapooia, the oath sworn at the anakrisis. The normal verb there is ävTÖpvupi, and 
öiöpvupi is not used in forensic oratory for this oath.
Another ban on irrelevance in dikasteria derived from the Heliastic oath. Some speakers 
claim that, by ensuring their opponent does not make irrelevant arguments, the jurors 
will be upholding their oath.64 What purports to be a full text o f the Heliastic oath can 
be found at Demosthenes xxiv. 149-51,65 and this shows that jurors swore to vote on “the 
very matter that the prosecution is about” (öiaipn<t>ioüpai nepi airroü ou äv  n öico^is rj, 
Demosthenes xxiv.151).66 This may have been the key phrase in the oath that was 
understood as forbidding irrelevance. It is indeed interpreted on these very terms in a 
speech delivered by Apollodorus, where he notes that the jurors have sworn to judge, 
not on what the defendant claims, but on the very matters that the prosecution is about, 
and, therefore, pij 5e tout’ excels nepi ov ouk äycüviüjeTai \ e y i i to (Demosthenes 
xlv.50).
In summary, it is possible that there were indeed separate proscriptions on relevance in 
homicide courts and general courts. In relation to homicide courts, it appears that there 
was a rule on relevance and that litigants also swore an oath. In dikasteria, there does 
not appear to have been any rule, though the litigants swore to stick to the matter and the 
jurors swore to judge on the actual matter.
Although speakers had sworn their oath, they still enjoyed the flexibility to raise
63 Plato (Apol. 27c) states that Meletus öicopoow ev Tfj avTiypa^n- ävTiYpout>n here appears to be a 
synonym for avTCupooia as the charge referred to (that Socrates believes in new deities) is the same 
charge referred to in Apol. 24b, where Plato uses the word ävTcnpoaia. It may be that, outside forensic 
oratory at least, authors could be looser in their choice of terms. For the use of avTopvupi see 
Demosthenes xliii.3; Isaeus iii.6, v .l, 16, ix.l, 34; Isocrates xvi.2. Isaeus v.16 proves the oath was sworn 
at the anakrisis.
64 Aeschines i. 170; Demosthenes xxii.4, 43-6, xxiii.19-21, xxxvi.61, xlv.47-50, lviii.25; Lycurgus i.l 1-13. 
See also Antiphon vi.10, where he notes that the jury will not convict for any reason other than the crime 
itself; TaÜTa ya p  Kai öaia Kai öiKaia. This last phrase may be an allusion to an oath sworn by the 
Ephetai sitting in judgement in the Palladion.
65 This text has been questioned, notably because it omits some clauses known from other sources, and 
may include some spurious material. There is general agreement that a number of clauses known from 
several sources did in fact appear in the oath, including commitments to vote according to the laws and 
decrees of the Athenian people and the Boule, and, in a case not covered by law, to vote according to the 
most just opinion. Further commitments (which are not accepted by all scholars as genuine) were to vote 
without favour or enmity and after hearing both sides. For discussion on the clauses in the Heliastic Oath 
see Fränkel (1878); Lipsius (1905-15,1; 151-3); Bonner (1927:73); Bonner and Smith (1930-38,11:152-6); 
Harrison (1968-71,11:48); MacDowell (1978:44); Todd (1993:54); Hansen (1999:182-3).
66 Fränkel, Lipsius, Bonner, Harrison and Hansen agree that the Oath included a clause to vote on the 
matter. The phrase at Demosthenes xxiv. 151 is repeated (with some minor variations) at Aeschines i . l54 
(ünep aÜTtbv qjn4>i£ib0ai cov äv rj öiooEjs rj) and Demosthenes xlv.50 (öiKäaeiv y ä p  opwpÖKaB’
ü pete... ünep aÜTU)v d)v äv rj öitô is rj).
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irrelevant matters in dikasteria if they so desired. In the absence of a law on relevance, 
they could not be sued for irrelevance. They were therefore free to introduce any 
argument and endeavour to convince the jurors that it was relevant. Depending on the 
circumstances of the case, they may have adopted very different tactics at different 
times. In some situations speakers may have felt able to concentrate on law and the facts 
of the case, if their case was strong on those points. If they had a legally or factually 
weak case, they may have felt that their best option lay in their character and public 
services, or in assassinating their opponent’s character. In such cases they would claim 
that the material was relevant.
The only sanction on their conduct was the mood of the jury. On several occasions 
speakers ask the jury to stop their opponent, or to order him to discuss relevant issues 
(Aeschines i. 175-76, iii.201-8; Demosthenes xix.97, xlv.50). Similarly, speakers could 
comment that the jurors would perhaps criticise them if they were irrelevant 
(Demosthenes lvii.33). Jurors would, if they thought a speaker was being irrelevant, 
interrupt with cries of “Why are you telling us this?” (Hyperides i.Fr.2, iv.31), and 
speakers would try to convince jurors that they should be allowed to raise certain points 
(Demosthenes lviii.41, 48). This system was clearly open to manipulation by skilled 
speakers, but on occasions jurors could indeed stop someone from speaking;
Apollodorus famously was prevented from replying to Phormio (Demosthenes xlv.6). 
We have only one possible example, though, of jurors stopping a speaker from being 
irrelevant, and not a very clear one at that. Aeschines (ii.4, 153) commends the jurors for 
“throwing out” (e^eßdXAsTe) Demosthenes’ story about the Olynthian woman. This may 
possibly be a reference to jurors preventing Demosthenes from indulging in irrelevance, 
though it is also likely that the jurors simply did not credit the story and therefore 
stopped Demosthenes from using it. There is no trace in Demosthenes’ own speech of 
the jurors preventing him from speaking, though it is perhaps significant that the story is 
dealt with fairly briefly (xix. 196-99) in comparison to Demosthenes’ other slanders, 
which may indicate (if the speech reflects what was said in court) that he had to cut 
short the tale.
In homicide courts the picture is less clear. If there was no law on relevance, speakers
67 It may be that dikastic thorubos is what Aristotle (Rhet. 1355a3) had in mind when he said that in the 
lawcourts the judges themselves take adequate precautions against irrelevance (ckcT ö ’ aÜTOi ol Kpuai 
toüto Tqpouoiv iKavtos).
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would have enjoyed the same flexibility as speakers in dikasteria. If there was a law 
against irrelevance, however, then one would expect speakers to be more circumspect. 
There is some evidence, albeit superficial given the general paucity of homicide cases, 
that irrelevant arguments were used less extensively in cases before homicide courts 
than before dikasteria. The matter is uncertain, however, and the weight of negative 
evidence is worth noting here, for in all of the extant ancient literature we never hear of 
anyone being sued for breaching a law against irrelevance.69
In practice speakers must have been fairly confident that the jurors would not stop them 
from raising certain issues. As the Younger Pliny remarked in a letter to Arrianus 
discussing legal procedure, you cannot tell whether an argument is irrelevant until you 
have heard it.70 Athenian jurors would have had to listen to the irrelevance first before 
deciding whether to condemn it or condone it, and at Athens there was the added 
complication of the size of the juries. Large juries of several hundred men may have had 
a diversity of opinions over any issue, so whereas some may have felt that an issue was 
irrelevant, others may not. Athenian courts did not have an official to stop the speakers 
when they were being irrelevant, as was the case in Rome,71 so there does not appear to 
be any workable method in Athenian procedure for preventing speakers from being 
irrelevant. Obviously if some jurors disliked what was being said they would have felt 
free to heckle the speaker, but they could only stop a speaker if a majority of jurors felt 
the same way.
Defining Relevance
The basic meaning that is common to all the references in Table 4.1 is that there is a 
matter at issue (however defined) and that some issues are extraneous to that matter. 
This is a fairly well recognised point in relation to familiar phrases such as e^oi toü
68 For example, Lysias makes more extensive use of the evidence of good citizenship in the non-homicide 
case xxi.1-10, and scripted extended appeals for pity in xxi.25 and xxiv.6-7. Similarly, a lengthy 
discussion o f the opponent’s other crimes can be found in Lysias xiii. 62-68. These may be contrasted 
with Lysias’ decision to restrict his discussion of Simon’s other crimes to one single instance in iii.45, or 
the brief mention o f the speaker’s services in Lysias vii.41.
69 Mederle (1902:16). In procedural terms, the only way I can envisage that a speaker could have indicted 
his opponent for irrelevance would have been to make clear in court before the case had finished that he 
intended to sue him for it, in much the same way as a speaker would indicate his intention to sue an 
opponent’s witness for perjury. The fact that we never hear of any such procedure is perhaps instructive 
that there was no law.
70 Pliny Epist. vi.ii.6: “Praeterea, an sint supervacua, nisi cum audieris, scire non possis.”
71 Aulus Gellius NA i.22.6.
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npaypcxTOS, but it holds for all the references in the table. Despite this, there has been 
little attempt to define what sort of argument was outside the matter. In this section I 
will explore how the matter was defined, and what sort of discussion would commonly 
be considered irrelevant in Athenian courts.
The use of words such as tcov KaTrjYOpnMevtov or tou £YK̂ nMaT09  in contexts where 
the speaker is talking about relevance helps define a key aspect of the matter - that it 
would be defined in relation to the charge made by the prosecution as written down. The 
charge would set the boundaries of the matter, including what the basic issue was about, 
and what sort of discussion one might expect to hear in relation to that issue. 
Demosthenes (xviii.9) alludes to this when he notes that if Aeschines had confined his 
speech to the matters on which he was prosecuting, he would immediately be giving his 
defence on the probouleuma. Speakers could claim that they should be judged simply 
on the charge alone, and recount all that happened in connection with it (Antiphon 
vi.8).74 Lycurgus (i.90-91) gives examples of what sort of things to recount on the issue 
- that Leocrates did not sail, that he did not leave the city and that he did not settle in 
Megara.73 Demosthenes (xix.335-36) provides a similar discussion in claiming that the 
case is not about the peace, or about other men’s guilt, but about Aeschines’ role.
We possess only two copies of actual graphai.76 The first is Dinarchus Fr. 14 [Burtt], 
the beginning of a speech. The speech commences with the charge, in which Dinarchus 
claims ßAaßiys from Proxenus for two talents, and recounts a series of claims on how he 
sustained damage. The second is recorded by Plutarch (Ale. 22) as the eisangelia 
brought by Thessalus against Alcibiades for impiety in profaning the Mysteries. This 
also includes a general charge and then a series of specific claims that outline how the 
impiety occurred. In addition to these, Aeschines’ graphe in the Crown case is discussed 
at length by Demosthenes (xviii.56-59). According to Demosthenes, the charge 
concentrates on the actions that are claimed to be illegal (that Demosthenes should be
72
72 See Grimaldi (1980:9) and Westermann’s (1868:17) comment on Demosthenes xviii.9: “Ausserhalb der 
Sache liegende und gleichwohl herbeigezogene, ausserwesentliche Puncte (sic).”
73 ei pev oüv nepi wv eöiwKe pövov KcnriYÖpnoev Aioxivrys, Käyw nepi cüjtoü toü 
npoßouAeüpaTOS eüBüs äv äneAoYOÜpnv.
74 eyd) öe äEjöü) npurrov pev nepi cüjtoü toü npccypaTOS KpiveoSai, Kai öiriYnaaaBai ev üpTv Tä 
Ycvöpeva ndvra.
75 oü ydp toüto öeT Aeyeiv, äAA’ ebs oük e ênAeuaev, oüöe Tijv nöAiv eyKaieAinev, oüö’ ev 
Meydpois KaTcpKqoe- TaÜTä ecrri TeKpqpia toü npdYPorros.
76 The graphai were read as evidence in Demosthenes lviii.36 and Lysias xiv.47, but the text is not 
preserved. In On the Crown Demosthenes (xviii.53) has the graphe read out but the preserved text is 
widely viewed as a forgery (See Goodwin 1904:34).
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crowned with a golden crown, that the crown should be proclaimed in the Theatre at the 
Great Dionysia, that Demosthenes should be crowned on account of his various good 
points and deeds) and on showing that they are against the laws. The graphe here 
appears to cover the main points of the case, and one is reminded of a speech by 
Hyperides where the speaker claims that jurors should not listen to prosecutors until 
they have examined the main point of the trial and the written reply, to see whether the
77laws have been broken or not.
References to the preliminary oaths sworn in homicide cases indicate that they included 
a summary of charges (Antiphon i.28; Lysias iii.l, 4; Demosthenes lix.9-10). References 
to the avTcopoaia indicate it also included a summary statement of the charges 
(Demosthenes xliii.3; Isaeus v.1-2, ix .l, 34).78
Statements about the charges also appeared in the öiapapTupia (Isaeus iii.7; 
Demosthenes xliv.45; Lex. Rhet. Cantab, s.v. öiapapm pia) and the napaYpacj)f| 
(Demosthenes xxxii.23, xxxiv.17). We also possess three partial copies of the written 
accusations made in private speeches (to £YK̂ nM°0- In Against Pantaenetus the speaker 
has portions of the eYK^nP0 read out (Demosthenes xxxvii.22, 25, 26, 28, 29, 32), and it 
contains a charge (that Nicobulus has harmed the speaker by laying a plot) and a list of 
claims to prove that charge. In Against Aphobus III Demosthenes (xxix.31) reads out the 
beginning of the eyKAnpcx, and this contains the charge that Aphobus has his money as a 
guardian, and then the first o f a series of claims about the money that was stolen. Little 
is left of the £YK̂ nMa  in Against Nausimachus (Demosthenes xxxviii.14-15), but it 
appears to have contained a charge that a debt was owed, and claims to prove that 
charge.79
Finally, we possess a copy of the charge and the reply made in a öikf) ipeiiöopapTUpicav, 
Apollodorus’ suit Against Stephanus (Demosthenes xlv.46). The charge states that
77 Hyperides iv.4: eni twv önpodoov cxŷ vojv oü XPH toüs öiKacrrds npÖTSpov Tä Ka0’ eKacrra 
Tps KairiYOpias ürropeveiv cxKoüeiv, npiv [äv] aÜTÖ tö Ke<j)dAaiov toü dycovos Kai Tf)v 
ävnYpacJiriv e^eidawaiv ei ecrriv 6k twv vöpaw n PH-
78 Plato’s Apology (19b, 24b and possibly 27c) provides some parallels here, as Meletus’s avTwpoaia  
includes a list o f charges. These charges also turn up in the cxvTGopoola that Diogenes Laertius (Socr. 
ii.40) claims was submitted in Socrates’ case, though as his list contains nothing not already known from 
Plato it may be derived from the Apology. Isocrates (xvi.2) also tells us that his opponent spends more 
time slandering his father than rrepi U)V d vnhpooav öiödöKOVTSS. Plato (Theatetus 172e) also notes 
that the charge that one litigant always holds over the other’s head, from which it is not possible to 
deviate, is the dvTwpooia. These sources confirm that the cxvTCupoaia would include details of the 
charge and the accusations.
79 SYKAripaTa were presented in Demosthenes xxxiv.16 and xxix.38, but the texts are not preserved.
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Stephanus gave false testimony about what was written ev to) YpappaTsio). Stephanus’ 
reply (avTiypac^ri) is that he gave true testimony. The cxvTiYpa(j)r| is also crucial in 
determining the issue o f the case. Apollodorus goes to great lengths to define the case as 
being about all of the written testimony, not about certain parts of the testimony 
(Demosthenes xlv.45) and to claim that the jurors should not pay attention to the issues 
o f the original case, but to the issue raised in this charge - that Stephanus gave false 
testimony (xlv.47-50).
The above evidence indicates that a case could be defined through the written charge 
made by the prosecutor, and the written reply made by the defendant. The charge would 
contain a basic accusation about an illegality (in the above examples from private suits, 
damage and a debt respectively), with claims to prove that. The reply made by the 
defence would then set the boundaries of the case, and the matter at issue would be 
defined in accordance with the claims outlined in the charge and the points made in 
reply by the defence, the type of claims made in a charge would probably vary with 
the type of process being used. For example, as Demosthenes’ On the Crown was 
delivered in a graphe paranomon, Aeschines’ charge had to prove that laws had been 
broken and identify those laws. In the two private suits above, which were delivered in 
dikai blabes, the law was less crucial than proving that damage had actually been caused 
and for what amount, so the eyKAfiMaTa concentrate on claims and actions.
On three occasions speakers go to some effort to point out that it is the charge made by 
the prosecutor that defines the issue, not counter-accusations made by the defence. 
Apollodorus made this point (Demosthenes xlv.50) in raising the Heliastic Oath. 
Aeschines (i. 178-9; iii.193) makes the same point, claiming that by allowing the defence 
to mislead them with counter-accusations the jurors are led away from the matter at 
issue. Such accusations are a regular feature of discussions on relevance. Some 56 of the 
contexts in Table 4.1 include a claim that the opponent is seeking to lead the jury astray
80 Classical Greek rhetoricians did not devote much attention to defining the charge injudicial oratory, 
apart from basic discussions on whether the matter was a question of fact or law, which underlay 
rhetorical exercises as far back as Antiphon’s Tetralogies and Antisthenes’ Ajax. In the second century 
B.C. defining the issue was more important, featuring in Hermagoras’ stasis-theory, which became a 
fundamental element of Hellenistic and Roman-period oratory. Kennedy (1994:98) notes that stasis theory 
defined the charge in the way outlined here - it began with the charge of the prosecutor, and the claims in 
that charge, and the written reply by the defendant, which provided the answering claims, and thereby 
“focused the basic conflict.”
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by making irrelevant accusations or claims. What might constitute an irrelevant claim 
would be specific to each case. For example, in On the Crown Demosthenes (xviii.59) is 
point outs that Aeschines has made Greek affairs and debates relevant to the case by 
attacking as false the wording in Ctesiphon’s decree that Demosthenes in speaking and 
acting has acted in Athens’ best interests. In Against Timarchus Aeschines (i. 166-67) 
states that Demosthenes’ irrelevant claims will be about Macedon - “There will be a lot 
about Philip, and the name of his son Alexander is going to be mixed up in it.” In this 
case the claims are irrelevant because Demosthenes will be attacking Aeschines’ public 
career, rather than speaking about the charges against Timarchus.
At times speakers claim that their opponents are introducing ridiculous stories. Ariston 
states that Conon introduced all kinds of scurrilous and irrelevant claims before the 
arbitrator, such as “that Ctesias was the son of Conon by a whore (Demosthenes 
liv.26).” On another occasion, a speaker remarks drily that of course his opponent 
cannot be expected to admit his debt and say that he has been justly indicted, but instead 
will invent accusations and excuses, some of which have been used ten thousand times 
before (Demosthenes lviii.22-23). Sometimes the claims appear to be little more than an 
attempt to undercut what may be a legitimate defence by branding it irrelevant 
(Demosthenes xx.1-2, 98; xxiii.90, 191; xxxviii.9; xlvi.l; lviii.48, 52; Hyperides iv.4-5; 
Lycurgus i.90-91). We also find the opposite tactic - transparent attempts to introduce 
what appear to be irrelevant arguments by claiming that they are relevant (Demosthenes 
xxii.21-24; xxxvi.54-55).
Speakers could also claim that irrelevant considerations included discussion of public 
- services (eight times), character (nine times), other crimes (four times), lies about
81 Aeschines i.166-9, 178, iii.193; Antiphon vi.9-10; Demosthenes xviii.9-11, 34, 59, xix.88, 92, 97, 192- 
5, 202, 242, 335-6, xx.1-2, 98, xxii.4, 21, 42-6, xxiii.90, 95, 191, xxvii.53, xxix.13, xxxv.41, xxxvi.61, 
xxxviii.9, 19-20, xxxix.35, xl.20-21, 61, xli. 12-14, xlv.47-50, xlvi.l, xlviii.36, liv. 13, 26, lvii.7, 34, 63, 
lviii.22, 48, 52, lix.6; Hyperides iv.4, 10, 19, 31; Isaeus iv.5-6, vi.59, xi.47; Isocrates xviii.35-36, 40; 
Lycurgus i.l 1, 90-91; Lysias xxxii.21.
82 Kai pie pnöeis änapTäv ünoXaßn töv Xöyov Tf)? ypacfns, e'? * EXXnviKäs npd^cis Kai 
Xöyous epneaw ö yäp öiwkwv toü ipn^opaTOS tö Xeyeiv Kai npömeiv Tä apicrrd pe Kai 
yeypappevos Taü0’ ws oük äXnÖrf outös eotiv ö toüs nepi ändvTwv twv epoi nenoXrreupevwv 
Xöyous oiKcious Kai avayKaious tq ypaefn nenoiriKcbs. See also the similar comments at Isocrates 
xvi.3 and Lysias ix.3.
83 noXüs pev ydp 0  OiXinnos ecuai, ävapeixönosTai öe Kai tö toü naiöös övopa ’ AXe^dvöpou.
84 äXX’ eTaipas elvai naiöiov aÜTto toüto.
85 Antiphon v.l 1; Isocrates xvi.2-3; Lysias vii.41-2, xii.38, xiv. 16-19, xvi.9, xxvi.3, xxviii.12.
86 Aeschines iii.203; Demosthenes xxiv.6, xxxviii. 19-20, lviii.41; Hyperides iv.32; Isaeus vi.59, xi.47; 
Lysias ix. 1, xxvi.3.
87 Aeschines iii.203-4; Antiphon v.l 1; Demosthenes lvii.66; Lysias iii.44-6.
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actions or a person’s character (sixteen times), slander (eighteen times), personal 
abuse (six times),90 jokes and ridicule (twice),91 threats (once)92 or appeals for pity (five 
times). Speakers could also claim that their opponent’s irrelevance will be part of their 
rhetorical skill (twelve times),94 or their shouting and railing (three times).95 Lycurgus 
(i.l 1) also condemns speakers who offer advice on public affairs rather than discussing 
the matter itself 96 His comment is reminiscent of Plato’s statement (Theat. 172e) that oi 
aytoves oüöenoTe thv äXXoos äXX’ äei Tf]v rrepi aÜTOÜ.
A classic formulation of the irrelevance of past public services and crimes is at 
Antiphon v .l l ,  where the speaker states that he should be tried for the murder itself, and 
not be convicted of anything else, even if he had committed many other crimes, nor 
pardoned for his good deeds, no matter how many he had performed. Hyperides builds 
a similar argument, stating that it is outrageous that his opponents condemn Euxenippus 
for being rich, and for having amassed his wealth dishonestly:
ä  eis pev töv aytova  toutov oüöev öf|nou  ecrriv, erre noXXä outos KeKTrp-ai erre 
öXiya, toü öe  XeyovTOS KaKopöia Kai ünoXriUJis eis toüs öiKacrräs oü öiK aia, 
cbs äXXoBi nou outoi Tnv yvtopnv a v  a x o in o a v  rj en ’ aÜToü tou n p äyp aT os, Kai 
noTefpov] äöiKe? u p a s  ö  K piv[öp]epos rj ou.
This is surely nothing to do with this trial, whether he possesses great wealth or 
small, and to raise the matter is malicious and is an unjust assumption about the 
jurors, that they would base their judgement on other matters than the very 
matter itself, and whether the man on trial commits a crime against you or not 
(Hyperides iv.32).
Another explicit statement of the irrelevance of arguments based on an opponent’s 
character may be found in a speech by Lysias:
Ti noTe öiavonöevT es oi ovtiöikoi tou pev n p a y p a T o s napnpeXrjKaai, töv öe  
Tponov pou en ex e ia n a a v  öiaßäXXeiv; nÖTepov a y v oou vres öti nepi tou
88 Aeschines i. 178, iii.207; Antiphon vi.7; Demosthenes xviii.9-11, xxii.21, xxv.38, xxix.13, xl.21, xli. 14, 
xlviii.36, lii.l, lvii.33, 66; Hyperides i .l l ,  iv.19; Lycurgus i.l 1-13. Wankel (1976:149) had already noted 
that accusations of irrelevance commonly included a claim that one’s opponent had told lies.
89 Aeschines i.l67, iii.207; Antiphon vi.7; Demosthenes xviii.10-11, 34, xxii.21, xxv.36, xxxvi.61, xli. 13, 
lvii.33; Hyperides i.9, iv.31; Isaeus xi.47, Fr. 1 [Forster]; Lycurgus i .l l ,  149; Lysias ix.l.
90 Demosthenes xviii.10-11, xxii.21, xxv.36, xxxvi.61, li.3, lvii.34.
91 Aeschines i. 175; Demosthenes liv. 13.
92 Demosthenes xxv.36.
93 Aeschines i.l 13, iii.207; Demosthenes xxxviii. 19-20, xxxix.35; Lysias xxviii.14.
94 Aeschines i. 166-9, iii.201-2; Demosthenes xix.336, xxii.4, xxxv.41, xli. 12, xlvi.l, lii.2, lviii.25, 41; 
Dinarchus i.l 13; Isaeus xi.59.
95 Demosthenes xxxvi.61, xl.61; Isaeus xi.59-60.
96 oupßouAeüouaiv evTauBa nepi twv koivwv npaypaTcav.
97 rj pev prj aAXa KaTriyopnoeiv epou fj eie aÜTÖv Tijv cj)övov, 6s eKTeiva, ev w out’ äv KaKd 
noXXä eipyaopevos nXiaKÖppv äXXw n aÜTU) tu) npaypaTi, out’ äv noXXä äyaBä eipyaapevos 
T0ÜT0I9 äv eatp^öpnv toTs ayaBoTe.
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npaypaTO? npoorjKei Aeyeiv; n Tööe pev enicrravTai, nyoupevoi 5e Arjaeiv nepi 
[tou] navTO? nAeia) Aöyov rj tou npoarjKOVTOS noiouvTai; ön pev oük epoü 
KaTacJjpovnoavTes aAAä tou npaypaTO? tou? Aöyou? ttoioüvtou, aacjia)? 
enicrrapai' ei pevTOi üpä? oTovtcxi ör ayvoiav ünö tgov öiaßoAcov neioGevTas 
KaTaijjr|(i)ieTo0ai pou, tout’ äv Gaupdoaipi.
Whatever did my opponents have in mind in disregarding the subject of the case, 
and seeking to slander my character? Don’t they know that it is proper to speak 
on the matter? Or do they know this, but consider that it won’t be noticed that 
they talk much more about anything other than what they ought to? That they 
make their speeches out of contempt, not for me, but for the subject of the case, I 
understand clearly. If, however, they think that you will, from ignorance, be 
persuaded by their slanders to condemn me, this would indeed surprise me 
(Lysias ix.1-2).
The basic reason for discussing relevance during a speech was, of course, strategic. By 
claiming his opponent was being irrelevant, a speaker tried to undercut his opponent’s 
argument and bolster his own case. By claiming his own arguments were relevant, a 
speaker either tried to give his arguments greater authority, or to introduce claims that 
were not listed in the written charge but may have been essential to winning his case. A 
classic example of this kind is discussion of a past history of enmity, which may have 
initially seemed irrelevant to the charge, but could support a defendant’s claim that the 
prosecution was sycophantic or trumped-up. Diodorus supports his case against 
Timocrates with a discussion of past enmity (Demosthenes xxiv.6-16) which is prefaced 
by the comment that this is not irrelevant.
Speakers sometimes claim that their opponent has introduced irrelevant arguments so 
that they will need to waste time on the false charges in their own speech, thereby 
leaving less time to discuss pertinent issues (Demosthenes xxvii.53, xlv.47; Hyperides 
i.9-11, iv.31-2). At other times a claim about relevance seems to have been a tactic used 
to shore up a case that was legally or factually weak. Speakers might slander opponents’ 
characters or past actions, and claim that these are relevant (Demosthenes xxxvi.54-5, 
lvii.59, 60, 63). In the first of these speeches, the speaker introduces witnesses to 
Phormio’s character (which are clearly irrelevant) and justifies this by claiming that they 
prove that Apollodorus’ charges are sycophantic. In the second speech the speaker 
introduces various stories about his opponents’ past crimes, claiming that it is relevant 
to show how wicked they are. On another occasion, a speaker eked out his dokimasia 
speech with a long list of his past good services and actions, claiming that they were 
relevant (Lysias xvi.9).
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Relevance in the Crown Case
The Crown case is one of the few instances where speeches made by both the 
prosecution and the defence are preserved. The question of relevance features regularly 
in the speeches, which cast additional light on how it might be defined.
As Table 4.1 shows, Aeschines refers to relevance six times. The first three references 
are somewhat unusual. On each occasion Aeschines makes a brief digression from a 
discussion to attack Demosthenes’ actions or character, and then exits the digression by 
noting that he does not want to digress from his point. The next three references form 
part of a larger argument in which Aeschines discusses what the appropriate form of 
defence should be, and tells the jury to make Demosthenes adopt such a course. He 
suggests that they should tell Demosthenes to address the legal issues first, and then the 
issue of whether he deserves the crown (iii.205). As Aeschines notes, his speech did 
follow this general pattern, outlining a range of legal issues (iii.9-50) and then indulging 
in a longer and concerted assault on Demosthenes’ public career (iii.51-192). Aeschines 
states that he has only briefly mentioned Demosthenes’ private life, concentrating on his 
public crimes (iii.204). His speech does contain only a little abuse, slander and 
discussion of unrelated crimes (iii.51-3, 76, 171-76, 207, 209-10, 213-14, 231, 241, 242- 
47, 248-49).98
In his reply, Demosthenes discusses relevance three times in the first quarter of his 
speech. He claims that Aeschines has not kept to the written charges, but has talked 
about other matters and told lies (xviii.9), along with personal abuse and slander 
(xviii.10-11). He claims that Aeschines expected him not to review his public career and 
discuss the abuse and slanders instead, and notes that he will do no such thing 
(xviii.l 1)." Next he states that if  Aeschines had not made charges that were not in the 
indictment, he would not be speaking on other matters, but since Aeschines has used 
every accusation and slander he must say a few words in reply to each charge
98 As Gwatkin and Shuckburgh (1890:208) note, the attack on Demosthenes’ private life is fairly brief, 
“but, on the other hand, it is more or less continuous throughout the speech by means of innuendoes and 
epithets; and is again and again recurred to.”
99 Demosthenes does not follow the order of speech proposed by Aeschines, but reviews his own career 
(and Aeschines’) between xv iii.l8-110, then briefly answers the legal issues (xviii. 111-25) and then 
follows this with an extensive attack on Aeschines (xviii. 126-59) before moving once again into an 
extensive account of his own public career (xviii. 160-296).
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(xviii.34).100 Later, after discussing his role in the Peace of Philocrates, he argues that he 
is not being irrelevant by discussing Greek affairs and speeches, for Aeschines has made 
all his public career relevant by attacking the clause in Ctesiphon’s decree that 
Demosthenes, in his speeches and actions, has acted in Athens’ best interests (xviii.59).
Modem authors commonly presume that Demosthenes is claiming that Aeschines’ 
claims about the Peace of Philocrates are among the irrelevant slanders and 
accusations.101 Their view is derived from a common belief that Demosthenes xviii.9-52 
can be seen as a single coherent argument in which Demosthenes replies to Aeschines’ 
irrelevant charges. On the face of it, this presents us with a conflict, as it does not 
make sense for Aeschines’ claims about Demosthenes’ policies to be irrelevant (xviii.9- 
11, 34) and then, only a little later in the speech, to be relevant (xviii.59). It may be that 
Goodwin’s grouping of Demosthenes xviii.9-52 into a single argument may be a little 
too sweeping. At xviii.9-11 Demosthenes refers to abuse and slanders, and then at 
xviii. 12-16 he builds upon this claim and makes one of his strongest points, asking why, 
if he had committed so many crimes in the past, Aeschines did not indict him before, but 
chose to attack Ctesiphon instead. At xviii. 17 he states that this argument (Aeschines’ 
previous inaction and unjust attack on Ctesiphon) proves that all the charges have been 
made equally without justice or truth. He notes that he wishes to examine the charges 
individually, and especially the lies about the Peace of Philocrates and the embassy. He 
then goes on to discuss the Peace at 18-33. At 34 he mentions irrelevance again, and 
immediately launches into an attack on Aeschines’ role in the Peace (xviii.35-49), 
summing the discussion up by noting that it is Aeschines’ fault for having bespattered 
him with the dregs of his own wickedness and his crimes (xviii.50).103 He then states 
(xviii.53) that he will now answer the indictment itself.
The mention of relevance at Demosthenes xviii.9-11 sets the scene for the general point 
on Aeschines’ injustice to be made at xviii. 12-16. The injustice provides the link to the 
ensuing discussion of the Peace of Philocrates, which is swiftly dealt with and then 
followed by another mention of relevance. In this instance, it is not an excuse for the
100 on pr) KaTnyopncJavTos Aiaxivou pr|öev Tfjs YPa^fb, oüö’ äv iyü  Aöyov oüöev’ 
enoioupnv erepov ndaais ö’ amais Kai ßAaa^npiais &pa toütou KexPHMevou cxvaYKri Kcxpoi 
npos EKaoTa twv KcnriYOpnpevGov piKp’ cxnoKpivaaQai.
101 See Goodwin (1904:259-60); Yunis (2001:129).
102 Goodwin (1904:261); Usher (1993:176); Yunis (2001:129).
103 am os 5’ OUTÖ9, wanep ewXoKpaaiav nvä pou Tfjs novnpias Tfjs eauTOÜ Kai twv 
äöiKripdTiüv KaiaoKcödoas.
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preceding discussion, but rather an excuse for what is to follow - the irrelevant attack on 
Aeschines’ role at xviii.35-49.104 Accordingly, there is no inconsistency between the 
first two mentions of relevance at xviii.9 and 34, and the last at xviii.59. The first two 
references are part of Demosthenes’ rhetorical strategy, to claim that Aeschines’ 
approach had been unjust, and also to bury his own weakest point - his role in the Peace 
o f Philocrates - under a general accusation of irrelevance, slander and abuse.105 The final 
mention is simply justification for the long eulogy of his own career that is to follow.
All the mentions of relevance have a tactical basis, and are designed to justify 
Demosthenes’ approach and downgrade Aeschines’ at the same time.
Comparison between Forensic Oratory and Philosophy
Aristotle’s general claims about relevance, and especially his comments about emotional 
appeals, are supported by forensic oratory. Speakers complain about jokes, threats, 
shouting and appeals for pity. Such comments are not as common as complaints about 
abuse, slander, character discussion or talking about past crimes. These comments 
themselves are not as common as the fundamental claim that, by raising charges or 
claims not in the indictment or the written reply, a speaker was introducing irrelevant 
material.
Consequently, while Aristotle provides insights into the sort of arguments that could be 
considered irrelevant, he does not offer an exhaustive analysis. Forensic oratory reveals 
that emotional appeals are part of the picture on irrelevance, but only a small part.
Developments Over Time
Table 4.1 includes references from nine of the ten Attic Orators. Relevance is discussed 
throughout the period of forensic oratory, and by some of the earliest (Antiphon) and 
latest (Dinarchus) orators. No clear pattern can be discerned in terms o f the development 
o f phrases. Phrases such as e^oa tou npaYMorros, eis aÜTÖ to npaypa and nepi [ccütoü] 
tou npaypaTOS occur in both early and late works.
104 This point is made by Goodwin (1904:23) and Usher (1993:184).
105 On this issue I differ from Goodwin (1904:260), who sees the Peace of Philocrates as one of 
Demosthenes’ strong points, because “later events had triumphantly vindicated his own course of action.” 
Demosthenes’ role in the Peace actually appears to have been somewhat inglorious, but the memories of 
the Athenians on his role appear to have been short, allowing him (and Aeschines) to sidestep the blame. 
Given popular feeling against the Peace, however, it is difficult to see it as anything other than a weak 
point in Demosthenes’ career, requiring the smokescreen of his accusations about irrelevance (see 
Cawkwell 1969:165, 1978:92-95).
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Lipsius considered that a rule on relevance must have been introduced to dikasteria just 
before the Athenaion Politeia was composed in the last quarter of the fourth century 
B.C., as it was so poorly attested before then.106 Some support for his view might be 
gained from Athenaeus’ story about Hyperides’ defence of Phryne; Athenaeus 
(xiii.590e) tells us that after the case a decree was passed pqöeva oiKTî eaGai tcov 
XeyovTcav ünep tivos ppöe ßXenöpevov töv KaTnYOpoupevov q Tqv KaTqYopou|j£vqv 
KpiveoGai. As Phryne was tried before a panel of dikasts, such a decree can only have 
applied to dikasteria.
There are a number of problems with Athenaeus’ story that preclude it from supporting 
Lipsius’ argument. In the first place, we do not really know the date of the trial of 
Phryne. It is safest to note that the trial could have happened any time during 
Hyperides’ floruit, which was about 350 - 322 B.C. In the second place, there are major 
questions over the reliability of Athenaeus’ sources. Davies, citing the Fragmenta 
Historicorum Graecorum, attributes the passage about the decree to Hermippus the 
Callimachean, a second-century B.C. biographer, who is also presumed to be following 
an earlier tradition penned by Idomeneus of Lampsakos.109 That work, however, actually 
only sources the first line of Athenaeus xiii.590e (about Euthias’ hatred of Phryne) to 
Hermippus.110 Athenaeus himself cites a range of sources on Phryne, including 
Hermippus, Idomeneus, Alcatas, Apollodoms, Herodicus, Callistratus, the comic poets 
Poseidippus, Timocles and Amphis, the speech against Phryne by Androtion and 
Hyperides’ own speech. Even if we accept that Hermippus was the author, his reliability 
is itself open to doubt,* 111 and indeed there are a range of inconsistent accounts of the 
trial that cast doubt on the version in Athenaeus.
106 Lipsius (1905-15, 111:918-9).
107 Bartolini (1976:117-18) notes that dates of 350 and 340 B.C. have been proposed, but depend on the 
assumption that the trial must have been held before Anaximenes (who wrote the speech delivered by 
Hyperides’ opponent Euthias) went to Macedon, which itself is based on the assumption that he must have 
gone there before Aristotle went in about 343/2 B.C. This is little more than a house of cards.
108 Cooper (1995:304).
109 Davies (2000:214); he cites FHG III, F. 66.
110 Müller and Müller (1853,111:50).
111 Hermippus’ value as a biographer has won varied appraisal, though he may be typical of Alexandrian 
biographers - in which case little reliance can be placed on his version of events (see Fairweather 
1974:238-39; Flower 1994:48-49, Fraser 1972,11:656).
112 Cooper (1995:313-14) notes that there is a degree of variability in the story as presented in ancient 
rhetorical treatises, with Phryne sometimes rending her robe and striking her breast rather than being 
disrobed. He also notes that the earliest source of the story, Poseidippus Ephesia Fr. 13 [PCG] has Phryne 
grasping each juror by the hand, rather than revealing her bosom. He therefore suggests that Hermippus’ 
version is an ancient fabrication, originally perhaps by Idomeneus in the third century B.C. (Cooper 
1995:315). Davies (2000:214) made the further point that the decree as recorded by Athenaeus does not 
accord with the practice of Athenian courts. He notes that it would be impossible for people on trial to
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That being said, Lipsius underestimates the degree of discussion of relevance in forensic 
oratory prior to the Athenaion Politeia, and consequently Rhodes is correct to insist that
in
Lipsius’ view need not be believed. Table 4.1 shows that in fact the majority of 
references to relevance predate the last quarter of the fourth century B.C. Changes to 
Athenian legal practice are probably best sought in 322/1 B.C. after the Macedonian 
conquest, when the Athenian constitution was altered and a property qualification was 
instituted for jury service, and as a result Antipater is said to have “terminated the jury 
courts and the orators’ debates.”114 The Athenian constitution changed eight times in the 
period down to 260 B.C.,115 and little is known about the lawcourts in this period, but 
perhaps the consistent belief of later authors that appeals to pity were forbidden in 
Athens might have had its origin in the changes that took place after the end of the 
Classical period.
Summary
In summary, irrelevance was most commonly seen to lie in new claims or accusations 
that were not outlined in the written charges under which the case was brought.
Speakers could also, however, refer to discussions of character, crimes or past services, 
slanders, abuse and lies as irrelevant, along with appeals to pity. In this regard forensic 
oratory bears some similarities with the picture to be derived from Aristotle and his 
successors, but the picture derived from Quintilian, Pollux and Lucian is seriously 
flawed and should be abandoned.
The Heliastic oath did not outline what kind of argument was irrelevant. It was up to the 
jury to decide this for themselves, and for speakers to convince them. As a result, what 
was irrelevant may have depended to a degree on the specific facts of a case. The 
contexts presented in Table 4.1 do show that appeals to character or services, 
discussions of unrelated crimes, slanders and abuse and appeals to pity could be
defend themselves if they were not to be seen by jurors, and therefore concludes that the decree is an 
invention. His argument appears implausible however; Athenaeus is being coy in his use of the word 
ßÄenö(Jevov, which here means not just “looked at” but “the parts usually covered being looked at.” This 
meaning becomes clear from what Athenaeus goes on to say, when he notes that Phryne was better 
looking sv TO?9 pf] ßÄEnopEVOis - “in the parts that you could not otherwise see.” Accordingly, 
Athenaeus is referring to a decree prohibiting uncovering the private parts, rather than a decree forbidding 
litigants to appear in court.
113 Rhodes (1993:719).
114 Suda s.v. Demades, Ö9 KaT£Äua£ Tä öiKaoTrjpia Kai toüs pnTOpiKOÜs aycova?. See the 
discussion in Beloch (1904:77-80) and Ferguson (1911:22).
115 Ferguson (1911:95).
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regularly viewed as irrelevant. They also show, however, that a speaker would still be 
prepared to use such arguments if they suited his case.
Table 4.1 shows little real difference between dikasteria and homicide courts. Speakers 
would denounce irrelevant arguments in both courts, but would still make use of those 
arguments if they could get away with it. In the next chapter I will discuss the picture 
presented by forensic oratory as a whole, to see how common relevant and irrelevant 
arguments were, and what factors might be related to their occurrence.
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Chapter Five Legal and Nonlegal Pleas
Using the information presented in Chapter Four, this chapter will define legal and 
“nonlegal’ pleas and assess their importance in forensic oratory. It will consider whether 
nonlegal pleas were given priority over legal ones. It will then assess speakers use of 
the Heliastic oath to make legal or nonlegal pleas and will go on to evaluate the 
evidence for concepts of equity and justice in Athenian legal procedure.
Definitions and Methodology
As noted in Chapter Four, forensic speakers identify as irrelevant discussion of public 
services or character, other crimes, lies about actions or character, slander, personal 
abuse, jokes and ridicule, threats and appeals for pity. The most common assertion is 
that the opponent is making irrelevant accusations. Many of these have also been 
identified as irrelevant by modem scholars. 1 Relevant pleas are those pleas that are to 
the point - that is, they discuss the charge and the allegations contained in the charge, 
and seek to prove or disprove them.
In general, I identify “irrelevant” as “nonlegal.” Thus an appeal based on character or 
services will usually be an “irrelevant” plea and nonlegal. The definitions are not black 
and white and cannot be applied to every situation. At times speakers will be completely 
to the point, but if their pleas are based on general notions of justice opposed to statute 
law they will be “nonlegal.” Similarly, legal discussions about other crimes or irrelevant 
accusations will be “nonlegal.” As a result, when I use the terms “relevant” or 
“irrelevant” in this chapter I am referring narrowly to the topics speakers have 
identified, as outlined above and in Chapter Four. When I use “legal” or “nonlegal” I am 
interpreting relevant or irrelevant arguments in the context of the speech, and in 
particular whether pleas are clearly outside the issue.
As Chapter Seven will show, appeals for pity can be made as part of a legal plea, and are 
not automatically irrelevant. They are irrelevant when part of an appeal based on 
character or services. At times even discussion of liturgies will be relevant. For
1 Dobson (1919:67), Bonner (1927:78), Adkins (1960:202-3,1972:139), Hardcastle (1980:19-22), Ober 
(1989:141) and Todd (1993:90, 2000a:24), for example, mention discussion of one’s services and 
character assassination. On abuse see Lipsius (1905-15,111:919); Leisi (1908:108); Dobson (1919:67-73, 
232-33, 295-96); Bonner (1927:78-81); Bonner and Smith (1930-38,11:123); Voegelin (1943) and Carey 
(1994c:31-32). Bonner and Smith (1930-38,11:22-24), Dover (1974:198) and Wolff (1975:8) mention 
appeals for pity.
example, the speaker of Lysias xix.21-33 outlines a series of liturgies performed by his 
family to prove that they have spent all their money and are not holding any back from 
the state (xix.27). Similarly, as both Aeschines (iii.49-50) and Demosthenes (xviii.57- 
59) make clear, discussion of Demosthenes’ public services during the Crown speeches 
is relevant, as it relates to the clause in Ctesiphon’s decree that Demosthenes “always 
speaks and does what is best for the people.”
In defining abuse, I note that speakers may often call their opponents a variety of names, 
and I sometimes classify these as nonlegal. Not all abuse, however, is nonlegal.
Athenian speeches frequently include random name-calling, which may accompany 
nonlegal arguments or may be included in legal arguments. Labelling every single 
epithet as nonlegal may lead us to misunderstand the Athenians’ tolerance for insults 
and to exaggerate the amount of nonlegal argument.2 34 It is significant here that, of the six 
speakers who label abuse as irrelevant, five link abuse to slanders.5 Slander itself is, as 
Carey points out, intended to cause hostility against an opponent, often by accusing 
them of immoral acts or crimes.6 As irrelevant arguments they are closely linked to 
discussion of other crimes or lies about actions or character. Accordingly, where abuse 
is clearly part of a slander (for example, that Aristogeiton is a habitual criminal, as the 
speaker of Dinarchus ii.2 states) I classify it as nonlegal, but where a speaker calls his 
opponent a name simply for emphasis or effect as part of an otherwise legal argument, I 
do not record it.
An additional difficulty lies in classifying irrelevant accusations. In practice it is almost 
impossible to define exactly what accusations might have been irrelevant without having 
both speeches delivered in a case. When defendants identify such accusations they do so
2 Spengel (1987[1863]:35). When they discuss Demosthenes’ private actions the speakers are being 
irrelevant, as these are not covered in the decree; as a result Table One classifies some of Demosthenes’ 
discussion of his past career as irrelevant (xviii.10, 252-57, 268-69). The boundary between private and 
public interests in Athens could be blurred, as Humphreys (1993:31) points out, but in these two speeches 
we may draw it sufficiently. The distinction is drawn by both speakers themselves, and relates to activities 
rather than interests.
3 For example, Demosthenes xxxv.5, 7, 8, 15, 30, 31, 32, 35, 39, 40, 41, 42, 46, 49, 52 (I classify sections 
41, 42 and 52 in this speech as nonlegal); xxxvii.2, 3, 8, 13, 15, 31, 39, 42, 45, 47, 52 ( I classify only 
parts of sections 48 and 54 as nonlegal); xxxix.2, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 34 (I classify the whole speech as 
nonlegal but relevant argument) and xli.20, 23, 24, 25, 29 (I classify the whole speech as legal argument). 
Examples o f this sort of abuse include addressing an opponent with insulting vocatives.
4 Wallace (1994:121-22) suggests that some abuse was tolerated in the interests of free speech, but 
outright slanders about sensitive issues such as cowardice or parental abuse were not.
5 Demosthenes xviii.10-11, xxii.21, xxv.36, xxxvi.61, li.3, lvii.34.
6 Carey (1994c:31-32). Carey identifies a number of types o f slanders, some of which, however, could fall 
into the category of passing insults (such as accusations that an opponent is a sycophant).
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to justify discussing them, and as the accusations were already raised by their opponent 
it is often best to classify the response as relevant. Accordingly, Aeschines’ responses to 
Demosthenes on Cersobleptes and the Phocians (ii.81-96) and the Olynthian woman 
(ii.4, 153-58) are classified as relevant here, as Aeschines was responding to 
Demosthenes’ irrelevant accusations. Demosthenes’ slur about the Olynthian woman
*7
(xix. 196-99) is however classified as irrelevant.
Prosecutors may also identify issues as relevant or irrelevant to justify discussing them. 
For example, Diodorus states (Demosthenes xxii.21-24) that Androtion will argue that, 
by claiming he was a prostitute, the prosecution are abusing and slandering him. 
Diodorus attempts to justify his allegation, but in this case I classify the plea as 
irrelevant. The charge was one of making an illegal proposal, not one of being forbidden 
from making any proposals at all, and the accusation of prostitution therefore seems to 
me to be irrelevant.
In general, a degree of interpretation is necessary. Where I consider an accusation is 
clearly outside the charge (insofar as it can be reconstructed) I classify it as irrelevant. 
The clearest examples are accusations about cutting sacred olives or breaking grain laws 
that are raised during cases that have nothing whatsoever to do with these offences 
(Demosthenes xxxiv.37, xxxv.51, xliii.71). Even here some interpretation is necessary; 
when Ariston claims that Conon is also guilty of hybris and cloak-stealing 
(Demosthenes liv.24), these claims are relevant because they relate to the actual charge 
of assault, rather than crimes committed on some other occasion.
I do not always agree with previous scholars’ attributions of some topics as “nonlegal.” 
For example, some claim that arguments about the intention of the lawgiver were
o
nonlegal and designed to undermine the authority of law. There is some support for this 
view from Aristotle (Rhet. 1374bl-18), who notes in his discussion of enieiKeia that one 
could appeal to the lawgiver rather than to the law, and to the intention of the lawgiver 
rather than the language of the law. This does not mean, however, that all discussions 
about the intention of the legislator are equity arguments. Aristotle was not making a 
general statement but was offering options for speakers to use when the law was against
7 The slur was no idle piece of slander that could be ignored; Aeschines (ii.4) claimed that the story had 
especially outraged him and that if he failed to prove the accusation false, then even if he were clearly not 
guilty of all the other charges he would deserve death. Given the degree o f prejudice that the story could 
have aroused, it was clearly relevant for Aeschines to attempt to refute it.
8 Hillgruber (1988:107-20); Thomas (1994:124); Scafiiro (1997:53).
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them and they wished to invoke equity. It is therefore significant that when we do find 
speakers discussing the intentions of the legislator they do not admit that the law is 
against them, but instead seek to prove that their actions fit the law as they define it (e.g. 
Demosthenes xxii.ll, xxxvi.27, lviii.ll; Hyperides iii.21; Isaeus ii.13; Lysias iii.43-43, 
x.7; see also Rhet. ad Alex. 1422M-25). Accordingly, it is misleading to call such 
arguments nonlegal, since arguments about the intention of the lawgiver are always 
grounded in the assumption that it is the authority of the law that counts. They are not 
assaults on the authority of the law, but rhetorical attempts to use that authority to make 
it appear that the laws fit one’s case.9 Even if a speaker offers a quite specious 
interpretation of a law, he is still making a legal argument. In modem common law 
systems barristers may offer an interpretation of law that a judge will determine is 
incorrect or unsound; such interpretations are considered relevant argument in a modem 
court. It would be strange indeed to insist that only correct legal interpretations could be 
classified as legal arguments in forensic oratory.10
Similarly, I do not agree with some scholars’ claims that speakers’ interpretations of 
law, or adaptations of particular circumstances to fit laws, were nonlegal equity 
arguments.11 An attempt to fit circumstances to law, or to interpret law to fit 
circumstances, is, as Meinecke recognised, a legal argument, even if it is specious, since 
it relies on the authority of law for its persuasive force. Certainly the speaker of 
Hyperides iii appears to be twisting the meaning of laws to arrive at what would, 
effectively, be an illegal decision; but illegal and nonlegal are two different things, and, 
as pointed out in Chapter Two, the speaker frames his arguments within the context of 
existing laws to make a legal claim, rather than a nonlegal claim that relies upon equity 
replacing law.
9 See Johnstone (1999:26, 33 and 145, n.23).
10 This does not mean that I classify all discussions of the intentions o f lawgivers as legal argument. The 
classification depends on the context o f the discussion within any speech. Lycurgus’ claim, for example, 
that there was no penalty for Leocrates’ crime because lawgivers had not expected such a thing to happen 
(i.9) is classified as legal argument. Lycurgus used the eisangelia procedure to prosecute Leocrates, and in 
this case the law was general enough to permit the charge, even though strictly speaking there was no law 
against the crime. As Lycurgus was able to make his case under the law, however, his charge must be 
classified as legal and the discussion at i.9 is also legal. By contrast, the similar claim at Lysias xxxi.27 is 
classified as nonlegal, even though it deals with exactly the same charge (deserting the city in a time of 
crisis). This time the procedure was a dokimasia, and, as argued in Chapter Four, it is not clear that 
speakers could make general accusations about past crimes during a dokimasia. As a result, I have erred 
on the side of caution and classified Lysias xxxi.27 as nonlegal argument.
11 Scafuro (1997:53-56); Christ (1998:195-96, 208-11); Allen (2000:168-83).
12 Meinecke (1971:280).
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In claiming that interpretations of laws were nonlegal, modem scholars frequently claim 
that jurors would interpret laws in accordance with social norms and rely upon these, 
even if they contradicted laws. 13 They present very little evidence for this position. 
Christ, for example, bases his claim on the fact that litigants speak of a law as just, or 
occasionally cite common ethical standards or laws from other states. 14 Allen contends 
that only four speeches strongly assert the case for a “rule of law” (Aeschines i; 
Demosthenes xxiv, xxv, xxvi) and argues that the four speeches are “anomalous.” 15 Yet 
she does not prove that Athenian orators appealed more frequently for a verdict based on 
justice than for a verdict based on the laws. Instead, we are given the somewhat 
breathtaking conclusion that only Antiphon urged jurors to vote according to laws, while 
others told jurors to decide “simply, the just things (ta dikaia) ” 16 The comment is 
supported by a footnote to seven speeches, which is hardly an exhaustive list.
The upshot of this is that interpretations of laws or specious legal claims should not be 
derided, in a Eurocentric manner, as irrelevant. Where they are intended to support the 
speaker’s case for or against the charge they are relevant.
The topics that have been identified as nonlegal or irrelevant often tell us more about 
modem preconceptions than about ancient legal procedure. I have concentrated on some 
of the major ones here. Others could be mentioned, for example Scafuro’s claim that 
probability arguments may be based on “the representation of character and...a common 
consensus of what is fair and just in human conduct” rather than discussion of “the 
technicalities of law.” 17 This is a very restrictive interpretation of legal argument that 
would exclude most of the discussion in a modem common law court, not just an 
ancient Athenian one. Scafuro’s claim is based, in part, on her reading of Lysias iii. She 
claims that all the speaker of that oration needed to do was to prove that he did not 
intentionally wound Simon. She notes that he did not do this because he lacked 
bystander witnesses, and further notes that the use of such witnesses would be a 
precarious prop in an Athenian court anyway since such witnesses were not considered 
as respectable as family members. As a result, she claims that the speaker had to rely on 
probability arguments which were designed more to blacken Simon’s character and






appeal to jurors’ senses of what is fair and just than to prove that he did not wound
• 1 Q
Simon. The speaker of Lysias iii did indeed rely on probability arguments and 
constructed an elaborate story designed to blacken Simon’s character; but rather than 
proving Scafuro’s theory, this may simply prove that the speaker actually had a bad case 
and may in fact have started the fight. He did not have any witnesses who could say that 
he did not start the fight. Despite this, his arguments still concentrated on the main 
issues of the case, and consequently very little of Lysias iii is classified as nonlegal in 
Table 5.1.
In classifying arguments I have used the standard section numbers of speeches as the 
basis for classification. This is not a perfect system. Sections are of different lengths, 
though the unevenness would probably cancel itself out over the total corpus. More 
seriously, the use of sections might exaggerate the actual amount of nonlegal pleading. 
Some speeches may contain only a few insults that are classified as nonlegal, but if the 
few nonlegal lines occur in several sections the result could be that as much as 18.75 per 
cent of the sections are classified as containing nonlegal arguments (Lysias xxiii, 
reflecting insults in xxiii.4, 11 and 14). This is clearly a different order of pleading from 
a speech that may contain a continuous nonlegal argument running over several 
sections. The flaw is not fatal, however, as it affects all speeches and we can correct it 
by remembering that a figure such as 18.75 per cent does not automatically mean that 
this entire proportion of a speech is nonlegal, but only that this proportion of the speech 
contains some nonlegal pleas.
A single section within a speech can contain both relevant and irrelevant arguments. A 
section that is generally relevant may contain a one-line slander that has to be noted as 
irrelevant. For example, the proem of Dinarchus ii outlines the legal case, but contains a 
number of accusations against Aristogeiton, including the claim that he is the worst 
character in the polis, or even amongst all men (ii.l), that he has committed many 
crimes (ii.2, 3), and that he is wicked and depraved (ii.4). On other occasions, an 
argument will end in a section and the speaker will then commence another line of 
argument. For example, Demosthenes (xxiv.187) contains the end of a long slander 
against Androtion and the start of a legal discussion about his opponent’s arguments.
The consequence of using section numbers is that on occasions when a section contains
18 Scafuro (1997:60).
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both relevant and irrelevant arguments it is double-counted. This needs to be taken into 
account when calculating overall proportions; at times the relative proportions of 
relevant and irrelevant arguments in a speech will sum to more than 100 per cent, as 
some sections are double-counted. This might have been avoided if I based my 
calculations on lines, for example, or the number of words, but these methods are also 
subject to problems that make them even less useful than calculations based on sections. 
Different texts print different line lengths and it would be difficult to deal with cases 
where only part of a line was classified; in addition, minor particles could swamp word 
counts. Consequently, I have stayed with section numbers as permitting a broad 
understanding of the proportions of relevant and irrelevant arguments.
Some speeches contain bogus sections, or some sections have been cut out by modem 
editors leaving the total section numbers unchanged. I have adjusted my totals to make 
sure that my figures reflect the actual sections counted.
Although speakers generally claim some topics are irrelevant, as I argued in Chapter 
Four there was no law against irrelevance in Athens (at least outside homicide courts).
As a result, speakers could argue that discussion of liturgies was irrelevant, but on other 
occasions claim it was relevant (Lysias xvi.9). It is artificial to define certain topics as 
irrelevant when they were not legally or universally recognised as such. Two factors 
excuse such attempts. In the first place, topics such as services, character, slander, 
abuse, other crimes and appeals for pity are regularly linked to irrelevance in forensic 
oratory, by different speakers at different times and in different types of procedure. The 
use of such topics is also condemned by ancient philosophers such as Plato and 
Xenophon (see Chapter Two). This surely indicates that it is correct to discern a general 
view that discussion of such topics in Athenian courts was irrelevant.19 In the second 
place, topics such as services, character, slander, abuse, other crimes and appeals for 
pity are regularly identified as irrelevant by modem scholars (above). For the purposes 
of testing modem theories on irrelevance, it does not matter if the definitions are 
Eurocentric, as the theories are Eurocentric. Obviously, if we want to understand 
Athenian litigation wie es eigentlich gewesen we must recognise our Eurocentricism and 
correct it where possible; but if we want to test modem theories then it is surely
19 It is notable that, when they want to use such topics, speakers often excuse themselves by claiming they 
are actually speaking to the issue (Aeschines iii.76, 176, 190; Demosthenes lvii.59, 60, 63, 66) or cut short 
the discussion on the basis that it is irrelevant (Lysias iii.46).
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acceptable to classify the occurrences of irrelevant discussions based on justice or “civic 
merit” because these are central to those theories.
While modem scholars have had a fair bit to say about irrelevance, they have been far 
less loquacious about what constitutes relevant argument. By and large, they restrict 
their comments to comparisons between modem western procedure and Athenian courts 
-  noting, for example, the lack of a judge to direct the jurors, or the fact that jurors did 
not deliberate amongst themselves before voting, or that there was no ability to cross- 
examine witnesses. At times they have claimed that some topics are irrelevant, often 
with mixed success, but no scholar has actually set out the key components of relevant 
argument. The most detailed discussions have concentrated on proving that speakers 
would use narrative to make their cases. Johnstone, for example, notes that “judicial 
narratives” had to contain certain elements to qualify as a legal case - they had to 
describe a violation of laws, recount the differences between the two parties and be 
presented by legally competent people. Johnstone further noted that law served as a 
central factor in speeches; it provided a template which determined what issues to 
discuss and how to discuss them.24 At a basic level, Johnstone’s point is certainly one
20 For example, Bonner (1927:74-75); Ruschenbusch (1957:259); Adkins (1972:120-21); Paoli (1933:68); 
Allen (1980:24); Heitsch (1984:6-7); Cohen (1995a: 105); Scafuro (1997:53); Todd (2000a:28).
21 See Chapter Six, where I outline some of the claims made by Humphreys (1985) and argue that her 
conclusions are flawed. Another example would be Usher’s (1999:180) claim that “the amount of 
digressive material [in Demosthenes xxix] seems excessive,” a claim based on the lengthy discussion of 
the original lawsuit out of which this suit for false witness arose. I would suggest that, in practice, speakers 
when engaged in subsequent proceedings often had to discuss the original lawsuit at length to prove that 
their overall case had been based on sound evidence. Their opponents might choose to impugn a trivial 
witness for some minor flaw in their testimony (as Apollodorus did, for example, in Demosthenes xlv). If 
such a ploy had been successful, it might have cast some doubt on the original verdict, and to avoid being 
sunk by minor issues speakers would have chosen to remind the jurors that their original legal case had 
been based on quite strong evidence (as does Demosthenes xxix.33-39).
22 Johnstone (1999:47); Gagarin (2003:199).
23 Johnstone (1999:49-54).
24 Johnstone (1999:62-66); a similar claim was made by Thomas (1994:127) and Scafuro (1997:54-56). 
Hardcastle (1980:12), discussing inheritance disputes, asserted that legal arguments included “those 
arguments which relate directly to the laws concerned with the important aspects of inheritance: the order 
of succession, wills, adoptions and marriage.” Nonlegal arguments, by contrast, were those “not directly 
related to the laws or legal aspects of succession, wills, adoption or marriage.” This definition seems 
unduly restrictive. It would effectively eliminate discussion of witnesses or narrative, unless those were 
specifically linked to a law. Many of the passages that Hardcastle highlights as ‘nonlegal’ are therefore 
classified as legal in this thesis. For example, the speaker’s claims in Isaeus ii that his opponent wishes to 
deprive Menecles of a son is relevant (contra Hardcastle 1980:14-15) as the speaker needs to prove that 
his adoption was valid and based on mutual affection. The speaker’s claim in Isaeus viii.21-27 that he 
spent money on burying Ciron is relevant (contra Hardcastle 1980:15-16) as the speaker is attempting to 
prove he had a more valid claim to the estate than his opponent Diodes, in part by proving that he paid 
money for the funeral expenses (which only the closest relative and heir would be expected to do). The 
speaker’s claim to the estate seems rather poor, and Isaeus viii is something of a masterpiece in making a 
silk purse out of a sow’s ear; that does not mean, however, that claims that are integral to proving the 
speaker’s relationship should be so unjustifiably dismissed as irrelevant.
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worth following in this thesis, insofar as any discussion that is clearly about the meaning 
of laws or that mentions words such as vopos, ewojjos or vopipos must generally be 
classified as legal (though, as noted above, sometimes discussion of laws takes place in 
relation to irrelevant accusations about other crimes that are not part of the charge). As 
an organising principle for the discussion of relevance, however, it is of limited use as 
there is actually only a small amount of direct discussion of laws in speeches (Table 
5.1), and we need to make sense of the larger amounts of narrative, proof, argument and 
analogy.
Rhetorical handbooks are of some use here. Aristotle (Rhet. 1414a - 1414b) argued that 
a speech had two parts, the statement and the proof, and that it could also include an 
introduction and a peroration, and that during the proof section a speaker should outline 
his own arguments and refute his opponent’s. He referred to another handbook by 
Theodorus which made further divisions of the narrative and refutations (Rhet. 1414b). 
Plato (.Phaedr. 266d-e, 267d) also referred to Theodorus’ handbook, and mentioned the 
introduction, narrative and testimony, proofs, probabilities, confirmations and 
refutations and the conclusion among the divisions of a speech. Furthermore, the 
Rhetorica ad Alexandrian (1422b28-1444b35) outlined the various parts of a forensic 
speech including an introduction, narrative, proof (confirmed by evidence, maxims, 
probabilities and general considerations and concentrating on facts or law as the case 
required), discussion of the opponent’s arguments and a peroration which could include 
an appeal to the emotions. These handbooks identify the basic issues that may be 
discussed in a forensic speech, and that therefore may be defined as constituting legal 
argument.25
Modem textbooks on advocacy are also useful. It is justifiable to use them as heuristic 
analogies because, when modem scholars make claims about nonlegal pleas in Athenian 
courts, in the absence of any definition of “legal” they fall back on an implicit analogy 
with modem practice. The analogy from textbooks is therefore acceptable for testing 
modem theories that juries based their decisions on nonlegal factors. Accordingly, I 
have consulted some textbooks, in particular Munkman’s The Technique o f Advocacy, 
which is viewed as a standard work in the British common law system and has been 
widely cited and reprinted since its original publication in 1951.
25 These basic divisions of a speech were also accepted as “normal” during the late Republic at Rome 
(Cicero De Partitione Oratorio ii.27-52).
103
The procedures in modem western courts are markedly different from those in Classical 
Athenian ones. Speeches in modem courts are generally restricted to brief opening and 
closing statements, and much time is taken up in questioning witnesses and presenting 
evidence. Athenian speeches had to encompass all of these roles. That being said, 
opening and closing speeches in modem western courts cover a range of issues that we 
can describe as ‘legal’ argument. Munkman pointed out that a speech has two essential 
parts -  the statement and the proof. The statement outlines the factual basis of the case 
and what is to be proved, and the proof sets out the arguments in support of the 
speaker’s position and against those advanced by the opponent. Munkman noted that 
in addition to this speeches could contain an introduction and a peroration. He noted that 
narrative was an essential part of a speech, as it allowed the speaker to outline the 
factual background and make arguments about the facts. Finally, he observed that 
emotional appeals could be included, though he does not appear to have been talking 
about such overt appeals as we find in Athenian forensic oratory.
It is obvious that Munkman’s discussion owes a great deal to Aristotle, though it is 
nonetheless seen to be a valid description of modem court speeches. With such 
agreement between ancient and modem handbooks it is reasonable to conclude that 
discussion devoted to the statement, proof and narrative is “legal” argument in an 
Athenian speech. This definition of legal argument is also consistent with the 
interpretation developed in Chapter Four of relevance or “speaking to the issue.” If 
relevance was defined as speaking about the charge and the accusations outlined in the 
charge, this is of course much the same thing as Aristotle’s (and Munkman’s) advice 
that orators should speak about the statement and the proof. Accordingly, the basic rule 
of thumb adopted here is that any argument in a speech, so long as it can clearly be 
linked to the charge and the points under discussion, and is not overtly irrelevant such as 
a discussion of public services, should be defined as legal.
When speakers claim that their opponents have relied (or will rely) on their character 
and services, as Adkins noted they generally are not content with noting that such claims 
are unjust, but go on to depreciate their opponents’ services and character. I have been 
unsure how to classify such sections when they occur. If a speaker is seeking to overturn
26 Munkman (1951:145-46). See also Boon (1993:79-83); Hamlin (1985:106).
27 Munkman (1951:148); see also Boon (1993:74).
28 Munkman (1951:149-50); see also Boon (1993:1-2), Crawford (1989:179-84).
29 Adkins (1960:205-6).
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an opponent’s attempt to use irrelevant argument, then his attempt should be counted as 
relevant. If he then in turn attacks his opponent’s character and services his plea should 
be recognised as irrelevant. I have listed these occurrences separately, but lean towards 
concluding that all such sections should be classified as irrelevant, and therefore will 
present figures for nonlegal argument that both exclude them and include them.
There is one final methodological issue to be discussed. Historical examples occur in 
forensic oratory, and at first glance they might appear to be irrelevant. However, when 
such arguments are presented the speaker generally uses them to highlight a particular 
moral aspect or virtue that he claims is at variance with his opponent’s conduct, or at
n  i
risk if the jury does not vote for him. Lycurgus (i.93-110), for example, uses the 
courage shown by the Athenians of old to highlight his claim that Leocrates’ desertion 
was unjust, while Aeschines (iii. 178-88) uses the example of noble ancestors who did 
not receive crowns to support his argument that Demosthenes’ inferior deeds did not 
deserve crowning. Such arguments are used to support the speakers’ main points and are 
therefore relevant.
Table 5.1 presents the overall classification of legal and nonlegal arguments. Some 19 of 
the speeches are incomplete or fragmentary, and while they are included in some 
analyses I exclude them from the study of proportions of legal and nonlegal arguments 
within each speech as any results would be skewed to reflect the state of preservation of 
the speech rather than the original proportions.
The figures as printed in the table require some explanation. The first column contains 
the speech number and author, and the second the total number of sections in the 
speech. For the five columns following, the figure in the bottom line of each entry is 
presented in brackets. This represents the total number of sections accorded to that 
entry. Above the figure in brackets will be further figures; these represent the actual 
section numbers in the speech. Thus Isocrates xvii, for example, has 58 sections in total. 
I classified 55 as legal argument (sections 1-32 and 35-57) and 4 as nonlegal argument 
(sections 33-34 and 57-58). Section 57 is double-counted and therefore the entry (total 
1) appears under the appropriate entry.
j0 Where speakers anticipate an opponent’s argument but concentrate on refuting that argument, rather 
than depreciating their opponent, I classify their plea as legal. An example is Dinarchus i.48-53, where the 
speaker rebuts a claim Demosthenes is likely to raise but concentrates on the issue.
31 See Loraux (1986:132-71), who concluded that historical examples were used to make particular points 
that served to reinforce an idealized view of Athens.
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Relative proportions in forensic oratory
There are in total 6554 sections in the 104 speeches (plus 4 fragments from Hyperides 
i). Of these, Table 5.1 shows that 5422 sections constitute legal argument and 1132 
nonlegal argument. Some 153 sections are double-counted and 153 sections are in the 
class discussed above where I did not allocate them as I am unsure if they should be 
classified as legal or nonlegal. In relative terms, 82.7 per cent of the sections are legal 
argument and 17.3 per cent are nonlegal argument. If we add the unallocated category to
T9the nonlegal category 1285 sections (or 19.6 per cent) are nonlegal.
When the 19 fragmentary speeches are excluded, the total number of sections is 5974, of 
which 4995 (or 83.6 per cent) are legal argument and 992 nonlegal argument (or 16.6 
per cent). Some 140 sections are double-counted and 127 fall into the unallocated 
category. If we add the unallocated category to the nonlegal category 1119 sections (or 
18.7 per cent) are nonlegal.
Legal pleading appears in 101 of our 104 speeches, whereas nonlegal arguments occur 
in 77 speeches (80 if we include speeches where sections were not allocated). This 
indicates that in the overwhelming majority of cases it was seen to be necessary to make 
relevant arguments about the facts and prove one’s case, whereas it was less significant 
to have nonlegal pleas. The fact that nonlegal pleas occur in 80 speeches, however, 
indicates that they cannot be dismissed as occasional aberrations.
What constituted legal argument varied according to the matter at hand. In 67 speeches 
speakers devoted some discussion to the terms and meaning of particular laws or 
decrees, though generally such discussion comprised only a small proportion of any 
speech. Only 583 sections in total comprise such discussion (plus one fragment from 
Hyperides i and 19 further sections that are actually from nonlegal arguments), a mere 
8.9 per cent of the total sections. Such discussion occurred regularly in speeches where 
one might expect a larger proportion of “legalistic” discussion, such as graphai 
paranomon or graphai nomon me epitedeion thenai (e.g. Aeschines iii; Demosthenes 
xxiii, xxiv), though “legalistic” discussion occurred where the circumstances warranted 
it. For example, Andocides (i.71-9, 83-91, 110, 115-16) discussed decrees and laws to
j2 Isaeus v.45 is ‘double-counted’ as both nonlegal argument and not allocated, and therefore I have only 
counted it once in arriving at this total.
33 If we remove incomplete speeches, the figures are 523 sections in total with discussion of laws or 
decrees (plus 13 in nonlegal arguments), or 8.8 per cent.
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prove that he was covered by the Amnesty, while Aeschines (i.l, 3, 9-11, 13-20, 22-25, 
27-34, 73, 119, 138-40, 160) and Apollodorus (Demosthenes xlvi.6-10, 12-27) 
discussed a range of laws about crimes that were generically related.
The data support Johnstone’s claim that legal issues were central concerns in the trial. 
Overall 85 speeches contain claims that the speaker has legal right on his side.34 Other 
speeches may have left out overt claims of legal rights because they were self-evident, in 
particular if the points at issue centred on particular facts, and the interpretation of laws 
was agreed. In this regard, the claim that a plea is supported by proofs such as witnesses
• *3 r
or T£Kpr|pia may be another form of claim that a speaker has legal right on his side. 
Speakers may also highlight the importance o f laws to maintaining order and the 
democratic system-' These figures back up the information derived from the overall 
proportion of legal argument in speeches, and indicate that in a substantial majority of 
cases speakers felt they needed to make a legal claim about their case.
Nonlegal pleas fall into three groups - attacks on the opponent (including abuse, 
slanders, lies about past actions, discussions of past crimes or ridicule); discussion of a . 
speaker’s own character, family and services; and appeals against law based on the 
justice of one’s cause. The last category is very rare and is barely found, though there
34 Aeschines i.1-2, 8, 20, 37, 46, 73, 106, ii.38-39, 45-46, 62, 123, iii.14-16, 19-23, 28-31, 32-34, 48, 176, 
211, 230; Andocides i.10, 29, 71-72, 89, 91; Antiphon i.24, v.8-19, vi.7-10, 50; Demosthenes xviii.56-59, 
83-85, 93, 110-25, 223, xix.9, 82, 131-33, 278, xx.8, 11, 24-25, 35, 37, 50, 53, 63, 87, 88-92, 94, 96, 97, 
98, 99-101, 138, 139, 155, 157, 160, 163,xxi.5-6, 19-20, 31,42, 51,227, xxii. 1-2, 7, 11, 17, 20, xxiii.22- 
94, 220, xxiv.1-2, 22-109, xxv.17, 22, xxvi.l, xxvii.38, 46, 47-48, 53, 58, 65, xxviii.9-10, xxix.22, 27, 39, 
55-57, xxx. 18, 30, xxxii.1-2, 24, xxxiii.1-3, 27, 33, 35, xxxiv.3-5, 33, 42, xxxv.4, 45, xxxvi.3, 23-25, 26- 
27, xxxvii.1-3, 18-21, 33-34, 35-38, 39, xxxviii.l, 3, 4-6, 9, 17-18, 27, xxxix.41, xl.19-20, 39, xli.7, 10, 
xlii.1-2, 4, 14-15, 17-19, 23, 26, 27, 28, 30, xliii.15-17, 27, 41, 50-52, 53-56, 57-61, 62-65, xliv.2-3, 5-6, 
7-8, 15-16, 46-51, 60, 63-64, 65-68, xlv.22, 42, 87-88, xlvi.6-8, 9-10, 12-15, 18-19, 19-21, 22-23, 24-25, 
26-27, xlvii.3, 7, 8, 18, 22, 25, 29-30, 33-34, 40, 48, xlviii.56-57,1.7, 43, 58, 65, li.l, 4, 6, 12, lii.30, 32, 
liii.3, 26-28, liv.13, 16, 17-20, 24-25, lv.26, 33, lvi.2, 34-35, 43, lvii.3, 5, 30, 31-32, 54, 69, lviii.5, 6-7, 
10-13, 14-17, 19-21, 22, 47, 49-50, 50-52, 55, lix.16-17, 52-53; Dinarchus i.l, 4, 6, 7-9, 106, ii.l, 20, 
iii.l, 16, 22; Hyperides i. Fr. iv, 22, ii.4-7, iii.13, 18, 20, 22, iv.4-10, v.1-2, 6-7, 24; Isaeus i.35, 39-40,
ii. 13-16, 45,47, iii.10-11, 39, 42-43, 63-64, 68-70, iv.15-16, 21-22, 31, vi.3-4, 8-9,25-26, 42,44, 47-50, 
63-64, vii.1-4, 17, 18-23, viii.l, 30-31, 32, 34,46, ix.l, 35, x.2-3, 15, 22, xi.1-4, 6, 22-23, 28-31, 34; 
Isocrates xvi.2, xviii. 19, 26, 34, xx.1-2, 8; Lycurgus i.5, 27, 34; Lysias i.26, 27-28, 29-36, 48-50, iii. 17, 
37, vi.8, 12,51-53, ix.8-12, 18, 19, x.3, 13-14, 32, xii.82, xiii.95, xiv.3, 4-6, 8,47, xv.6, 9, 11, xxii.5, 6, 7, 
10, 17-18, xxvi.5, 9, xxviii.l, xxx.5, 17-21, 35, xxxi.2-3, 27-28, xxxii.3, 23-24.
35 Aeschines ii.44; Andocides i.25; Antiphon vi.47-48; Demosthenes xix.120, xxvii.47, xxviii.23, xxix.15, 
xxx.25, 27, 31, xxxiii.4, xxxv.27, xxxvi.21-22, xxxvii.17-18, xl.19, 54, xlv.23, xlix.69,1.29, liv.10, lv. 12, 
lvii.24, 62, 67-70, lix.49; Isaeus viii.28-29, x.15; Isocrates xvii.53, xviii. 16; Lysias vii.30, 42, xiv.53, and 
see the detailed list in chapter six of speakers who claimed their speeches were supported by witnesses.
j6 Aeschines i. 176-79, iii.6-7; Antiphon v.14; Demosthenes xxi.30, 34-35, 188, 223-25, xxii.51, xxiv.5, 
91-95, 210-11, 212-14, 216-17, xxv.15, 17, 20-27, xxvi.1-8, 23-27, xxx.8, lix.l 15; Dinarchus i.84-88,
iii. 16, 21; Hyperides i. 12; Isaeus iii.54; Lycurgus i.2, 3-5; Lysias i.29, 35-36, 48-49, xiv.40, xxxii.23.
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are a number of ‘marginal’ cases that will be discussed later. Speakers do discuss their 
own character, family and services regularly, though this is not as common as one might 
expect from the attention it has received in modem scholarship. Such pleas are made in 
278 sections in 44 speeches, or 4 per cent of all sections and 42 per cent of all
T O
speeches. These contrast with the relatively common attacks on the opponent, which 
are found in 962 sections in 64 speeches, or about 15 per cent of all sections and 62 per 
cent of speeches. There is overlap between the two categories, with 30 speeches 
containing both discussions of liturgies and attacks on the opponent.40
Pleas based on character and services are usually found with attacks on opponents in the 
same speech, except for 12 speeches (Demosthenes lii; Hyperides i, iv; Isaeus ii, vii, xi; 
Lysias iv, vii, xvi, xx, xxiv, xxv). The earliest examples we have of both categories 
come from On the Mysteries. Andocides (i.92-99) included claims that his opponents 
were guilty of various crimes such as owing debts to the state and holding office under
371 classify only Demosthenes xxxix.1-41 as an appeal for justice; other speeches discussed below verge 
on appeals for justice, but were brought under procedures that allowed some flexibility and therefore are 
classified as legal pleas.
38 Aeschines ii.78, 146-52; Andocides i.141-50; Antiphon v.77; Demosthenes xviii.10, 252-57, 268-69, 
xix. 169-73, 229-30, xxi. 155-57, 189, xxviii.22, 24, xxxvi.57, 58-9, xxxvii.54, xxxviii.26, 28, xlv.77-78, 
85, xlvii.54, xlix.46,1.58-62, 63-64, lii.26,29, liv.44, lviii.66-68; Hyperides i.14-18, iv.23,28-30, v.28- 
29, 30; Isaeus ii.35-37,42, iv.27-28, v.41-42, 45-47, vi.59-61, vii.34-42, x.25, xi.50; Isocrates xvi.5-41, 
45-50, xvii.57-58, xviii.16, 58-68; Lysias iii.47-48, iv. 19-20, v.2-3, vii.30-33, 41, x.24, 26-29, 31, xii.20, 
99, xvi. 1-3, 9-21, xviii.1-12, 21-27, xix.9-10, 14-17, 55-64, xx.2, 4, 5-6, 11-15, 22-26, 28-36, xxi.1-19, 
21-25, xxiv.24-25, xxv.12-13, 17, xxvi.21-22. Johnstone (1999:94, 166 n.4) identified 28 speeches in 
which speakers cited their liturgies. My data include all of his references with the exception of 
Demosthenes xxiii.5. The speaker there mentions that he was performing a hierarchy, but this is not part 
of a nonlegal argument, but part of the general narrative of events. I would likewise not classify 
Demosthenes xlvii.23 as a nonlegal argument. The speaker there also mentions his hierarchy as part of a 
general narrative, rather than as part of a nonlegal plea.
39 Aeschines i.26, 39, 43, 58-64, 107-16. 170-73, 189, ii.3, 22-23, 34-35, 40-43, 54, 55, 62, 79, 88, 93, 99, 
108-12, 113, 121, 153, 165, 166, 167-70, 179-82, iii.51-53, 76-78, 171-76, 207,209-10,213-14, 230-31, 
241-53; Andocides i.92-102, 124-31; Demosthenes xviii.32-42, 126-59, 258-66, xix.192-201, 206-14, 
237-38, 241-62, 281-82, 287, 314, 331, 337-40, xx.13-14, 143-44, 147-53, xxi.19-23, 83-125,428-54, 
158-68, 171-74, 184-85, 197-212, xxii.21-24, 47-78, xxiv.123-30, 158-87, 197-203, xxv.35, 38-68, 74, 
76-80, xxvi.16-18, xxix.41, xxxiv.37-40, xxxv. 1-2,41-42, 44, 50-54, xxxvi.36-42, 43-56, xxxvii.48, 
xxxviii.24-25, xl.32-35, 57, xlii.21-25, xliii.68-72, xliv.3l-40, xlv.53-56, 63-76, 79-84, xlvii.49-82, 
xIviii.52-57, xlix.9, 14, 65, 66,1.68, liv.16-17, 36-37, 39-40, lvi.7-8, 10, lvii.58-66, lviii.27-35, 69-70, 
lix.27-28, 33-34, 36, 41-43, 45-48, 64-71, 85-87, 107-9; Dinarchus i.15, 17, 18-36, 46, 78-82, 91-98, 99- 
102, ii.l, 2, 3, 4, 8-13, 14, 15, 18-19, 20, iii.l, 6-10, 15-16; Hyperides ii.9, 10, iii.3, 29-36, v.17-18, 20- 
21; Isaeus iii.37, 40, iv.28-30, v.10-11, 26-27, 35-40, 43-45, vi.38-42, 47-50, 55, viii.40-42, 44, 46; 
Isocrates xvi.42-44, xvii.33-34, xviii.47-57; Lycurgus i.25-27; Lysias iii.44-46, v.4-5, vi.6-7, 11-12, 26- 
34, 46-49, x.9, xii.38-78, xiii.18, 62-69, 70-82, xiv.1-2, 10, 23-31, 35-42, 43-47, xviii.13-14, 20, xix.2,
19, xxi.20-21, xxii.14-16, xxiii.4, 11, 14, xxvi.4-5, 8, 13, 14, 23-24, xxvii.9-12, xxviii.12-17, xxx.2, 6, 9- 
14, 26-35, xxxi.1-34.
40 I should note here that, in adding up the totals, four sections were double counted as the speakers 
changed from attacks on their opponents’ character or services to discussions of their own (Demosthenes 
xlvii.54; Isaeus iv.28, v.45; Lysias xxi.21). To make the figures sum to 1285 sections with nonlegal 
arguments we need to correct the total for attacks on the opponent to 966 and add the 41 sections from 
Demosthenes xxxix which comprise an appeal based on justice.
108
the Thirty. After discussing the dispute between himself and Callias which he claimed 
had caused Callias to prosecute him, he went on to accuse Callias of a range of impious 
acts, including seducing his wife’s mother and disowning his child. At the end of his 
speech he described his ancestors’ public services and then went on to outline his own 
good character and noted (i. 145) that he had ties to foreign kings, cities and private 
individuals that could be of use to the polis.
Similar attacks against opponents occur in some of the latest speeches we possess, such 
as Dinarchus’ speech composed for the prosecution of Demosthenes, which outlines a 
range of accusations against Demosthenes for various crimes including accepting bribes 
to stand by while the Thebans were destroyed (i. 18-22), defending Philocrates (i.28) and 
killing Nicodemus and betraying Aristarchus (i.30). The attack is sustained in several 
parts of the speech and culminates in the claim that the Athenians have had too much 
experience of Demosthenes to believe that someone who had reduced the city from 
prosperity to disgrace could now serve her well (i.93).
Demosthenes delivered a long diatribe against Meidias, noting (xxi.20-21) that Meidias 
had wronged many other people and asking the jurors to deliver one penalty for all the 
crimes, whatever they considered just. Later on Demosthenes (xxi.130) had read out as 
evidence a hypomnema of Meidias’ crimes. In another speech by Demosthenes (xxv.38- 
68), we are treated to a prolonged attack on Aristogeiton’s character and services, 
detailing his various crimes with memorable similes like the description of him going 
through the agora like a snake or a scorpion with sting erect, darting here and there, 
looking for someone whom he can harass with misfortune or slander or some sort of 
evil, and terrify in order to extract money from him (xxv.52).41
While attacks against opponents can be quite extensive, speakers’ discussions of their 
own character, family and services are generally not as lengthy. Of the 44 speeches 
which contain such discussions, only nine have ten or more sections devoted to it 
(Andocides i.141-50; Demosthenes xxi.151-59, 189; Isocrates xvi.5-41, xviii.16, 58-68, 
Lysias xvi.1-3, 9-21, xviii.1-12, 21-27, xix.9-10, 14-17, 55-64, xx.2, 4, 5-6, 22-26, 28- 
36, xxi.1-19, 21-25). The longest of these is Isocrates xvi, a defence by the younger 
Alcibiades of his father’s character and actions. That speech, however, is incomplete, so
41 äXXä nopeüeiai öiä Tqs dyopas, wanep exis q OKopnios qpKO)9 to KevTpov, arrow öeupo 
KcxKeToe, aKonaw aupdopäv q ßXaa^npiav q kökov ti npocrrpinjdpevos Kai Kaiacrrqaas ei<s 
4)ößov apyupiov npd^eiai.
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we cannot be sure what proportion of the original speech comprised nonlegal argument. 
Lysias xviii and xxi are also incomplete, so these three speeches cannot be used for 
calculating the relative proportions of this type of nonlegal argument.
Demosthenes xxi and Andocides i are long speeches, and the speakers’ discussions of 
their character, family and services therefore represent a fairly low proportion of each 
speech (4.4 per cent and 6.6 per cent respectively). The three complete speeches by 
Lysias have a much greater proportion taken up by speakers’ discussion of their 
character, family and services, representing 76.2 per cent, 25 per cent and 50 per cent of 
Lysias xvi, xix and xx respectively. The speakers deliver extensive accounts of their 
conduct as citizens and soldiers (Lysias xvi.9-21, xix.55-64, xx.22-25). All three also 
contain fairly direct appeals to obtain the jurors’ verdict on the basis of their character 
and liturgies (xvi.17, xix.63-64, xx.30-31; similar appeals were also made in the 
incomplete speeches xviii.21-27 and xxi.l 1, 18, 25). This will be discussed further 
below, but at this point it may be commented that the three complete speeches by Lysias 
are clearly unusual in containing such a large proportion devoted to discussion of 
speakers’ character, family and services, which may indicate that the speakers felt they 
had a better chance of winning by using such pleas.
Relative proportions in individual speeches
Overall, the vast majority of sections are devoted to legal argument. This finding alone 
does not conclusively refute “equity” and “social competition” theories. It could be 
argued that, although nonlegal arguments form a minority, in any speech they occupied 
a privileged position and were clearly to be understood as the most compelling 
arguments presented. It is therefore necessary to consider the proportion and 
significance of nonlegal argument in each speech.
Some 24 speeches (19 complete speeches) contain only legal arguments.42 This result 
indicates that “equity” and “social competition” theories cannot be seen as generally 
true. Clearly, in some circumstances speakers felt that they would be better served by 
sticking to relevant and legal arguments. Legal arguments are not correlated with the 
type of procedure or the date at which a speech was delivered. The 24 speeches come
42 Antiphon i, vi; Demosthenes xxiii, xxv, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii, xli, xlvi, li, liii, lv; Isaeus i, ix, xii; 
Isocrates xx, xxi; Lysias i, xv, xvii, xxix, xxxii. The incomplete speeches are Demosthenes xxxii, Isaeus 
xii, Isocrates xx, xxi and Lysias xxxii.
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from a variety of procedures, including a number o f types of dikai, graphai, endeixeis, 
apographai, paragraphai and diadikasiai.4~1 They also come from both early and late 
periods of forensic oratory.
As noted above, 77 speeches contain nonlegal arguments. Some 16 contain sections that 
were not allocated because speakers were responding to their opponents with similar 
attacks. Here I will treat these as nonlegal argument, leaving us with a total of 80 
speeches that contain some form of nonlegal argument. Of these, 13 are incomplete and 
cannot be used to analyse the relative proportions of legal and nonlegal argument.
Table 5.2 presents the relative proportions of legal and nonlegal arguments. The table 
shows that 18 speeches include 10 per cent or less nonlegal argument, 23 have between 
10.1 and 20 per cent, seven have between 20.1 and 30 per cent, nine between 30.1 and 
40 per cent, four between 40.1 and 50 per cent and six have over 50.1 per cent. Of these 
six, two contain 100 per cent nonlegal argument.
Seven speeches’ nonlegal arguments are simply occasional slurs or comments 
(Antiphon v.77; Demosthenes xxviii.22, 24, xxix.4, xxxvii.48, 54, lii.26, 29; Isaeus 
iii.37, 40; Lysias xxiii.4, 11, 14). The remainder contain one or more sections with 
clearly irrelevant or nonlegal argument.
About two-thirds (41) of the 67 speeches contain 20 per cent or less nonlegal argument, 
while about 85 per cent of the speeches contain 40 per cent or less nonlegal argument. In 
these speeches the majority of discussion is legal, concerned with the statement and the 
proof. Accordingly, from this perspective there is little support for theories that speakers 
paid little attention to the facts o f the case or legal discussion but preferred to make the 
case a contest over honour as defined by discussions of services and slanders.
The figures do not, however, support “positivistic” theories. The fact that about three- 
quarters of our speeches contain nonlegal arguments, and that 26 have nonlegal 
comments or pleas in more than 20 per cent of their sections, surely indicates that such 
pleas cannot be dismissed out of hand as unimportant. There are three issues that need to 
be considered here:
4j Dikai include dikai epitropes (Demosthenes xxvii); dikai exoules (Demosthenes xxx, xxxi); dikai 
pseudomarturion (Demosthenes xlvi); dikai blabes (Demosthenes lv) and dikai phonou (Antiphon i, v, vi, 
Lysias i). Graphai include a graphe paranomon (Demosthenes xxiii) and a graphe astrateias (Lysias xv). 
The endeixis is Demosthenes xxv; the paragraphe is Demosthenes xxxiii. The apographe is Lysias xxix. 
There are six diadikasiai (Demosthenes xli, li, liii; Isaeus i, ix; Lysias xvii).
I l l
1. whether the 26 speeches that have more than 20 per cent nonlegal pleading depended 
on those pleas;
2. whether nonlegal arguments, even if making up only a small proportion of a speech, 
were nonetheless highlighted as the most significant arguments in the speech; and
3. what sort of pleas were made along with nonlegal arguments - did speakers mention 
their services and ask for xäpis or for support, regardless of the laws and the facts of 
the case, or was character evidence supposed to supplement the legal argument, 
rather than to replace it?
There are two speeches which clearly depended upon nonlegal argument for their 
success - the two speeches that are classified here as completely nonlegal (Demosthenes 
xxxix, Lysias xxxi). The first speech, a diadikasia over possession of the name 
Mantitheus, is generally made up of relevant argument, with the exception of two slurs 
by the speaker against his opponent for being involved in sycophantic suits 
(Demosthenes xxxix. 19, 25). The speech is classified as nonlegal because it is not based 
on any law; the speaker does not discuss the law until the very end of the speech, when 
he claims that he should win on the basis of the most just opinion, the laws and the 
Heliastic oath, while admitting that his case is not actually covered by laws 
(Demosthenes xxxix.40-41). The speaker’s claims during the speech are based on his 
asserted priority to ownership of the name, and various arguments about convenience 
and justice. The speech includes an outright appeal for the jurors to base their verdict on 
Yvoipn tr öiKaiOTÖrrn, and is therefore nonlegal because it is a plea based on justice 
rather than law.44
The second speech, delivered by a prosecutor against Philon in his dokimasia before the 
Boule, also sticks to a general charge - that Philon is not suitable for entry because of his 
many crimes (Lysias xxxi. 1-4). The speaker outlines three main accusations in support 
of his charge - that Philon deserted the democratic cause during the struggle against the 
Thirty (xxxi.8-16); that he profiteered from the people’s disasters (xxxi.17-19); and that 
his own mother would not let Philon bury her, but gave money to Antiphanes, who was 
not her relation, to do the job (xxxi.20-23). The speaker concludes by discussing some 
of Philon’s likely responses. The speech is classified as nonlegal because it is simply a 
discussion of Philon’s apparent past crimes and character. Although there is debate
44 The speech is discussed in greater depth later in this chapter under the section on the Heliastic oath.
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about the degree to which general discussion o f past life and character was permitted in 
dokimasiai (see Chapter Four), for the purposes of this thesis I assume that such 
discussions are irrelevant and therefore nonlegal.
Another speech, Lysias xvi, contains 76.2 per cent nonlegal argument. The speaker 
devotes a brief discussion to the factual claim against him, that he was a member of the 
cavalry that served the Thirty (xvi.4-8), but devotes most of his speech to a discussion of 
his and his family’s liturgies. The speech includes a statement by the speaker that he 
performed a number of military services admirably in order that, if he were ever to be 
unjustly taken to court, because of his services all the jurors would think him a better 
citizen and he might obtain “justice to the full” (xvi.17).45 The speaker then goes on to 
claim that he has always performed his duty in war and attacked with the first soldiers 
and retreated with the last. He then claims that the jurors should examine from such 
deeds who is a philotimos and orderly citizen, rather than whether he wears his hair 
long.46 In this case it is clear that the factual discussion was important, but the speaker 
certainly places greater weight on the nonlegal discussion and appeals for votes through 
that discussion. It is worth noting, however, that the speaker was not trying to replace 
factual discussion with nonlegal arguments; he was rather seeking to support the factual 
discussion and enhance his case.
Three speeches contain between 50.1 and 60 per cent nonlegal argument (Dinarchus ii; 
Lysias xiv, xxx). Lysias xiv and Dinarchus ii are synegoriae. The speaker of Lysias xiv 
informs us that Archestratides has already prosecuted nepi pev ouv tgov cxAäcüv and 
presented laws and witnesses of everything (Lysias xiv.3). He concentrates on personal 
attack and on discussing particular aspects of Alcibiades’ defence.47 Dinarchus ii was 
delivered against Aristogeiton as one of a series of apophaseis arising out of the 
Harpalus affair. Ten speakers were elected to speak and it seems likely that all ten
43 Kal TCXÜT’ enoiouv oüx ws oü öeivöv rp/oupevos eivai AaKeöaipoviois paxeoSai, cxXA’ iva, eT 
noTS äöiKws eis kivöuvov Ka0icrraipr|v, öiä TaÜTa ßeXTioov ü<J>’ üpcuv vopiüppevos ändvToov tcüv 
öikcucüv TUYXdvoiiJi.
46 Karroi xpn toüs (fciXoTipws Kai Koapicos noAiTsuopevous ck tgov toioütgov OKoneTv, äAA’ oük ei
TIS KOPQC, ölä TOÜTO piOCTv.
47 He notes (xiv.4-5) that the jurors must become lawmakers, claiming that the laws cover desertion not 
only in battle but through failing to appear among the ranks of the infantry (which may indicate that the 
prosecution itself was making a case that was legally weak or imposing a fairly tortured interpretation of 
the law). The speaker concentrates on Alcibiades’ likely claims at xiv.4-15 and then delivers a lengthy 
attack on Alcibiades’ deeds and character, his father and his friends at xiv. 16-45.
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delivered speeches against Aristogeiton. The speech concentrates on a personal attack 
on Aristogeiton. Taken together, the speeches may show that, when we possess only one 
or a few of the speeches delivered on one side in a single trial, and the preserved 
speeches concentrate on nonlegal issues, the key factual and legal issues could already 
have been discussed by other synegoroi.49 They do not prove that an entire case could be 
based on nonlegal pleas.
Lysias xxx begins with a nonlegal plea, an attack on Nicomachus as the son of a slave, 
and the claim that he has committed crimes (xxx. 1 -2). The speaker then discusses his 
main legal issues (xxx.2-6), but next directs the jurors to remember Nicomachus’ 
ancestry and how ungrateful he has been in his illegal treatment of the Athenians, and 
punish him. Moreover, since they did not punish him for his previous crimes they 
should punish him now for them all. After some further discussion of the speaker’s own 
deeds and Nicomachus’ claims, the speaker then returns to the legal issue of the alleged 
impiety of Nicomachus’ actions (xxx. 17-23). This is followed by an attack on 
Nicomachus’ deeds and character (xxx.26-30) and an attack on his supporters (xxx.31- 
35), who appear to include notable political figures as well as magistrates. The speaker 
ends by claiming that if the jurors condemn Nicomachus they will ensure that all the 
affairs of the city can be administered in accordance with the laws (xxx.3 5). The speech 
shows that speakers needed to discuss legal issues to prove their case, but that they 
could also devote considerable time to nonlegal issues. The speech contains a mixture of 
legal and nonlegal pleas, including the nonlegal appeal to the jurors to remember 
Nicomachus’ background and crimes at xxx.6, and legal pleas dealing with the need to 
ancestral sacrifices (xxx. 19, 23). Neither appears to be given priority over the other.
The six speeches with more than 50.1 per cent of nonlegal argument do generally give 
nonlegal arguments priority over legal arguments, but this evidence must be treated with 
caution as two of the speeches are synegoriae and one (Lysias xxx) does not clearly give 
nonlegal arguments priority. What of other speeches that contain a large proportion of 
nonlegal argument? There are four speeches that contain between 40.1 and 50 per cent 
nonlegal argument - Demosthenes xxi, xxii, xlvii and Lysias xx.
48 The speaker notes that there are ten prosecutors at Dinarchus ii.6, but it is an interpretation - albeit a 
reasonable one - that all ten actually delivered speeches against Aristogeiton during the trial (and against 
the other men charged as a result o f the Harpalus affair).
49 Rubinstein (2000:37).
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Demosthenes xxi starts with an outline of the legal case, which runs (with one short 
interruption) until section 82. At xxi.77-82 Demosthenes outlines the origin of his 
dispute with Meidias, which affords him the opportunity to change the discussion into 
an attack on Meidias sustained from xxi.83-168 (but including discussion of their 
ongoing dispute, Meidias’ treatment of the arbitrator Strato and a comparison of their 
liturgies at xxi. 154-59). The nonlegal pleas are then interleaved with legal arguments 
including examples of other cases of committing wrongdoing at the festival (xxi. 175- 
83), a discussion of Meidias’ likely claims (xxi. 186-96) and a final plea to uphold the 
constitution and the laws (xxi.211-227). On several occasions Demosthenes makes it 
clear that he is seeking to undercut Meidias’ use of liturgies to beg himself off (xxi.151, 
169). At xxi. 169-70 he argues that it is not just (öiKaiov) for Meidias to escape paying 
the penalty for his hubris on account of his liturgies, and adds that many men performed 
far greater services than Meidias, but were never granted licence to commit hubris 
against their private enemies as a result. In the peroration Demosthenes develops this 
theme further, noting that the jurors trust in their safety against hubris through the 
security provided by the constitution (xxi.221-22), and claiming that the laws are not 
strong of themselves, but as a result of the jurors’ willingness to enforce them. 
Demosthenes then reaches the climax of his argument:
öei TOivuv TOÜTOI9 ßor|0eiv opoioos (bonep äv aÜTO) ns äöiKoupevo), kcu Tä tcov 
vöpoov äöiKrjpaia Koivä vopi^eiv, ecp’ ötou nep äv Äapßävr|Tai, Kai prfre 
ÄeiTOüpYias prp” eÄeov prfr’ ävöpa pqöeva pryreTexvnv pqöepiav pqT äAAo 
pqöev eüpfjoöai, öi’ ötou rrapaßäs ns toüs vopous oü öuiaei öikhv.
So you must come to their aid just as one would for himself when he is wronged, 
and consider that offences against the laws are a common concern, no matter in 
whose case they are detected, and that neither liturgies nor pity nor any man nor 
rhetorical skill nor anything else has been found, on account of which anyone 
who has broken the laws should not pay the penalty (Demosthenes xxi.225).
In this speech, then, legal and nonlegal argument are roughly equal in proportion, but the 
legal arguments are made first, and once Demosthenes has established his case he 
delivers his attacks on Meidias’ character and (briefly) mentions his own liturgies. The 
attacks on Meidias’ character are intended to undercut his probable attempts to use his 
services to win votes. They are interlinked with legal arguments and the key legal 
argument to ignore Meidias’ services is placed at the very end of the speech. 
Consequently, legal arguments would appear to be given greater weight than nonlegal 
arguments in this speech.
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Demosthenes xxii is a synegoria in a trial where the main legal and factual issues had 
previously been dealt with by Euctemon.50 The speech starts off with a discussion of the 
various claims likely to be made by Androtion, and ends with an extended assault on 
Androtion’s character and services. The speech seems to have had two purposes - to 
cement in the jurors’ minds some of the prosecution’s claims, and to leave them with 
the impression that Androtion was a villain. Nonlegal arguments are placed in an 
important position, continuing until the very end, but as the speech is a synegoria it is 
not clear that the entire prosecution placed such emphasis on nonlegal arguments.
Demosthenes xlvii is a dike pseudomarturion arising out of an earlier case for wounding 
brought by Theophemus against the speaker and which he had lost. The speaker 
discusses legal and factual issues between sections 1 and 48, bringing forward a range of 
depositions and laws in his attempt to prove that Evergus and Mnesibulus had 
committed perjury. After that the speaker goes on to discuss Theophemus’ actions after 
he had lost his earlier case, narrating his opponents’ actions in plundering some of his 
property and causing the death of an old nurse. Strictly speaking, such matters have 
absolutely nothing to do with whether or not Evergus and Mnesibulus committed 
perjury, and are therefore irrelevant accusations as defined in Chapter Four. The 
nonlegal arguments are important, but seem designed to supplement the legal case. The 
speaker does not depreciate his opponents’ characters or services, and his aims in 
discussing the plunder and death seem to be twofold; in the first place, to win sympathy 
and excite anger against his opponents, and in the second place to support his claim that 
the actions were part of his opponents’ strategy in seeking to prevent the case from 
coming to court (xlvii.75-77). The speaker’s point is a dubious one, and the fact that he 
lost the previous case should be remembered, since he possibly made such an extensive 
nonlegal plea to bolster a weak legal case.
Lysias xx starts with a discussion of legal issues which continues until section 22, when 
the speaker switches to nonlegal arguments which continue to the end of the speech
30 Diodorus states that they base their charges upon a witness (Demosthenes xxii.23), and as there is no 
notation for a witness in the speech it seems likely that Euctemon had already presented him.
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(xx.22-36). The speaker^1 concentrates on outlining his family’s good deeds and civic 
services, and then makes appeals to win the jurors’ vote on the basis of those services 
(xx.30-34). He claims his family deserves to be saved by the jurors on account of their 
good character (xx.30), and that they did not perform their services for money but, in 
case they should ever be in court, so they could appeal to obtain the deserved favour 
from the jurors (xx.31, and also 33). The speaker claims they have done everything 
zealously, and their father has never committed a crime, so that they would far more 
justly obtain favour for the things they have demonstrated to the jurors. The speech 
then ends with a resounding (nonlegal) appeal for pity. Like Lysias xiv, the speaker does 
discuss legal issues, but the appeal at the end of the speech is clearly nonlegal and 
appears designed to leave a powerful impression on the jurors. The nonlegal appeal 
would, however, have gained greater weight from following a legal discussion, which 
appears designed to convince the jurors of the basic justice of the speaker’s position.
The speech probably indicates that the speaker felt he needed to discuss legal factors as 
well as nonlegal issues, but that the nonlegal issues could be given some degree of 
priority. This speech is usually identified as a euthyna54 and in this case the basic 
accusation would have been some form of subversion or treason occasioned by 
Polystratus’ role as a member of the Four Hundred. The speaker does not deny this, but 
tries to water down Polystratus’ role by raising several points in mitigation. The speaker 
concedes that Polystratus held office under the Four Hundred (xx.1-2, 5, 13-14), but 
claims that he tried to enrol nine thousand citizens (xx.13) and that he fought bravely at
51 Von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff (1893,11:363-64) argued that Lysias xx is actually two speeches 
delivered in the same case, identifying a change of speaker at xx. i I. His aigument is usually accepted 
today (see for example Rubinstein 2000:153-54 and Todd 2000b:217) but may be unsound. It is based on 
an apparent repetition at xx.6-8 and xx.16-17, and the purported contradiction between the direct 
statement that Polystratus was the speaker’s father at xx.l 1 and the more impersonal discussion of 
Polystratus’ sons at xx.4.1 cannot see the repetition at xx.6-8 and xx.16-17, and the change o f tone at 
xx.l 1 is insufficient proof on its own. Moreover, Wilamowitz’s interpretation does some violence to the 
Greek as it assumes that a forensic speech could start with Karroi - which is unheard of. Wilamowitz was 
aware of the difficulty (1893,11:364) but could offer no explanation. Denniston (1954:558) states that 
koutoi “is occasionally used at the opening of a speech, where its place is normally taken by K ai pf|v-”
He cites only Sophocles Philoctetes 1257, Plato Phaedrus 2 4 Id and Aristophanes Eccl. 47 (though he 
regards the last as uncertain as komtoi there is an emendation). Ussher (1973:80) declared the emendation 
to Ecclesiazusae unnecessary. Philoctetes also offers dubious support for Denniston’s view; several of our 
manuscripts place line 1257 within a single speech by Odysseus, and the matter is too uncertain to afford 
much confidence (Blaydes 1870:256; Jebb 1883:194; Webster 1970:57). Plato Phaedrus 24ID is thus our 
only concrete example, and this is not a new speech but part of an “animated conversation.” It is 
significant that there is no example from forensic oratory o f a speech beginning with KaiTOi.
52 Lysias xiv.31: eT neue K iv ö u v o s  ei'n npTv, e^auoüpevoi nap’ üpwv Tqv a^iav xapiv 
änoXdßoipev.
53 ware noAXw öiKaicnepoi eare, wv neneipaoSe, toütois xapioaoBai.
54 Harrison (1968-71,11:208, n.2).
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Eretria (xx.14). The speaker attacks his adversaries’ own conduct under the Four 
Hundred (xx.15-17). These facts and nonlegal pleas may have been his best hope of 
success.
In these ten speeches where there is a large proportion of nonlegal argument, two things 
should be borne in mind. In the first place, several of the speeches are synegoriae and it 
is unclear that the entire prosecution concentrated on nonlegal issues. In the second 
place, in all the speeches bar the two that are classified as 100 per cent nonlegal 
argument, the speakers began their speeches by outlining legal issues and then 
proceeded to nonlegal pleas. In most cases they later returned to legal issues, and, if we 
exclude synegoriae, only two speeches appear to give nonlegal pleas any priority over 
legal pleas - Lysias xvi and xx.
It is actually a nearly universal pattern in Athenian forensic oratory for a speaker to 
commence with legal discussion and only after stating his basic claim and facts to move 
to nonlegal pleas. As Table 5.1 shows, leaving aside the wholly nonlegal speeches 
Demosthenes xxxix and Lysias xxxi, only three of the 83 remaining complete speeches 
commence with a nonlegal plea, and those pleas are short and swiftly followed by a 
legal statement.55 These are exceptions, however, and the fact that legal issues are 
generally dealt with first indicates that speakers felt it was important to establish their 
legal claim first. This surely indicates that a nonlegal claim would usually have been 
inadequate on its own to win support from the jurors. It is also worth noting that, if 
Cohen’s and Gamer’s theories are correct, we should not expect speakers to waste much 
time on legal issues at all; rather, they should have concentrated on nonlegal issues. The 
- fact‘that 24 speeches do not contain any nonlegal pleas and that most complete speeches 
give legal arguments priority is a fairly strong refutation of their theories.
Direct nonlegal claims
A further point against Cohen’s and Gamer’s theories is the overall scarcity of any 
outright claims for the jurors’ vote on the basis of speakers’ services. If these scholars 
are correct, speakers should highlight their own services and make a direct claim that 
these prove they deserve honour and the jurors’ vote. Crucially, both claim that speakers
55 Lysias xiv.1-2 begins with a brief attack on Alcibiades; Lysias xvi. 1-2 with a brief attack on the 
speaker’s opponents and an assertion of the speaker’s own good citizenship; Demosthenes xxxv.1-2 with a 
brief attack on the Phaselites.
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could admit their crimes but expect to be acquitted on the basis of their services and 
character.56 Accordingly, it is worth checking what proportion of speeches contain direct 
appeals for the jurors’ vote based on a speaker’s services and character, and what 
proportion (if any) contain appeals to ignore law and decide a case on the basis of 
services and character.
Forensic speakers occasionally claim that their opponents will be unable to offer any 
just arguments, but will rely on their services and character. They occasionally make it 
clear that people deserve some reward for their services, sometimes by labelling such a 
reward a “favour” or xapis (that is, something that the recipient cannot demand as of 
right). They may also observe that jurors were thought likely to show such favour to 
people for their liturgies.59 When a speaker discussed his character and liturgies we 
should see this as an attempt to win favour and influence the jurors’ vote. As a result, in 
all 44 speeches where speakers cite their character or liturgies, or their family’s services, 
the speakers are making some kind of plea to have those taken into consideration. Only 
in 15 speeches, however, is this made explicit.60 Andocides (i. 143) claims that his 
ancestors’ services should save him, as does the speaker of Demosthenes lviii.66-69, 
while the speaker of Isaeus x.25 notes that his orderly life should ensure that he not löse 
his mother’s paternal estate. All highlight their own services and claim that these 
deserve some reward, though only seven actually label this a favour or xäpis 
(Demosthenes xlv.85; Isaeus vii.41; Isocrates xviii.67; Lysias xviii.23, 27, xx.30-31, 33, 
xxi.25, x xv .ll, 12-13).61
None of these 15 speakers admit any crime. All, in fact, begin with a discussion of the 
statement and proof (except for Lysias xviii and xxi, which are incomplete speeches). 
Given that the legal pleas are made first, the nonlegal pleas appear to be supplementary
56 Gamer (1987:63); Cohen (1995a: 184).
57 Demosthenes xxv.76; Lysias xii.38, xxx.l, 27.
58 Demosthenes xxi. 160, xlvii.24-25; Isocrates xvi.35; Lysias vi.36.
59 Aeschines ii.4; Demosthenes xxxviii.25-26; Lycurgus i. 139-40.
60 Andocides i. 143, 149-50; Demosthenes x lv .85,1.63-64, lviii.66-68; Hyperides i. 14-18; Isaeus vii.38-41, 
x.25; Isocrates xviii.58-66; Lysias v.2, xvi.17-18, xviii.21-27, xix.10, 63-64, xx.30-31, 33, xxi.l 1, 17-19, 
25, xxv.l 1, 12-13.
61 Johnstone (1999:101, 167 nn.27-35) identified 12 speeches in which speakers asked for xdpis, but I 
would not accept all of these as nonlegal pleas. Andocides (i. 147) notes that none of his ancestors ever 
asked for xdpis for their services in a trial, but does not explicitly claim xdpis. Similarly, while the 
younger Alcibiades (Isocrates xvi. 15, 35, 38) mentions xdpis in relation to his father’s liturgies, he does 
not ask it for himself. Three other appeals for xdpis were legal pleas; Demosthenes (xxi.28) claims it for 
bringing his case against Meidias; Euthycles claims it for indicting Aristocrates’ decree (Demosthenes 
xxiii.93) and Aeschines (ii. 171) claims it for good service on his Embassy.
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to the legal pleas. The speaker of Demosthenes 1.63-64 makes this fairly clear, asking 
the jurors to remember his services along with the witnesses and the decrees and support 
him. Some of the nonlegal pleas, however, would probably have left a strong impression 
on the jurors. Six were delivered at the end of the speech (Demosthenes 1.63-64, 
lviii.66-69; Lysias xviii.21-27, xix.63-64, xx.30-33, xxi.25) and appear calculated to 
persuade the jurors that the speakers were not only pleading a just cause but were men 
of worthy character as well. As noted above, only one of these six speeches, Lysias xx, 
gives nonlegal pleas priority over legal ones.
While speakers could highlight their services and character, their opponents were by no 
means silent in response. There are many appeals to the jurors not to pay attention to 
character and services. On 13 occasions speakers appeal to the jurors not to show any 
Xapis to their opponent. In another 26 speeches we find claims that the jurors should 
not value services or character more highly than the law. This is sometimes coupled 
with examples of Athenians who had performed noble services but who were 
condemned when they broke the law. Apollodorus, for example, mentions that Archias 
was condemned for impiety, despite being a hierophant and a member of the 
Eumolpidae and despite his honourable ancestors and liturgies (Demosthenes lix. 116- 
17). Similarly, Aeschines (iii.195) tells us that Thrasybulus was convicted by Archinus 
of Coele, even though his services were recent, while Dinarchus (i. 13-17) offers us the 
example of Timotheus, who captured 24 cities and was the son of Conon but was 
nonetheless fined 100 talents for accepting bribes. This evidence shows that discussions 
of character and services were not always successful.
Speakers’ reasons for making nonlegal arguments
Although Aristotle (Rhet. 1356al6) criticised other rhetoricians for writing handbooks 
that concentrated on ways to raise emotion rather than on the complete system of 
rhetoric, surviving handbooks actually provide us with very little insight into nonlegal 
arguments.64 The topics are barely discussed in the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum. In
62 Aeschines iii.233; Antiphon vi.9-10; Demosthenes xix.227-29, 239-40, xxi.148, xxiv.67, 175, 
xxxviii.25-26; Lysias vi.7, 37, 53, xii.79-80, xiv.22, 40, xv.l, 10, xxvii.12-14, xxviii.17, xxx.26-27.
63 Aeschines iii. 16, 194-96; Demosthenes xix.l, xx.l, xxi.66-67, xxii.42-46, xxiii. 19-21, 194, xxv.25-27, 
75-80, 80-94, xxvi.16, 19-20, xxxiv.49, xl.42, xlii.2, 9, 15, 24-25, 31-32, xliv.36, li. 11-12, lviii.15, 20, 
lix.l 16-17; Dinarchus i.l 1, 13-17, 23-24, 54, 62-63, 114, ii.8, 14-15, iii.17-18; Hyperides ii.10, iv.14, 32, 
33-37, v.17, 26; Isaeus v.45-47; Lycurgus i.139-40; Lysias vi.35-36, xv.8-11, xxx.l, 27.
64 Such discussions were apparantely contained in handbooks that have been lost. Cicero (Brutus xii.47) 
notes that Gorgias wrote about how to deliver eulogy and vituperation.
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discussing how to secure goodwill, it states that speakers should outline their own good 
points and depreciate their opponents’ deeds. It also states that such material should be 
placed at the end of the speech and speakers can say that it is now time for the jurors to 
offer them xdpi? in return (1442a6-13, 1444b36-1445a26).65 Table 5.1 shows that 36 
speeches do have nonlegal arguments at or near the end of the speech, though they can 
also be distributed elsewhere and, as noted above, few speakers actually ask for xdpi?- 
The Rhetorica ad Alexandrum does show, however, that raising one’s own services and 
depreciating one’s opponent’s was a recognised tactic for winning goodwill and 
arousing hatred of one’s opponent.
Another reason for using nonlegal arguments may simply have been that a speaker’s 
legal case was poor. He may have felt that highlighting his services and abusing his 
opponent gave him a better chance of victory. This would not have been the case all the 
time, as we have examples of speeches made in what appear to be very weak causes (for 
example Demosthenes xlv) that do not have a predominance of nonlegal argument. The 
choice of tactics probably depended upon the facts of the case and the speakers’ 
inclinations as much as anything.
It is possible that nonlegal arguments became a regular feature because speakers had to 
include them to guard against their opponents’ tactics. If a speaker had some services to 
describe, and could also depreciate his opponent’s actions, he was likely to do so, and as 
a result his opponent would have felt that he had to do the same. Prosecutors would 
anticipate the defendant’s irrelevant arguments and depreciate his services, while 
defendants could respond in kind. The fact that a few speakers do claim that character 
pleas could win in court possibly indicates that speakers would have nothing to lose by 
including them and more to lose by not.
Evidence from the results of trials
The evidence we have for the results of trials is worth considering here. We have good 
evidence for the results of 23 speeches (and have some possible proof of the results of 
another two).66 Some eight of these speeches relate to five trials where character might 
have played a part - the trial of Andocides (Andocides i, Lysias vi), the trial of
65 Kai öie îövTes aÜToTs d)9 vüv Kaipös xdpuas npiv twv unriPYpevaiv änoöoüvai (1444b40- 
1445a2). The handbook outlines the kinds o f things to say in eulogy and vituperation (1440b29-1441al4, 
144lb 14-28), but these points are not linked explicitly to forensic speaking.
66 Appendix One provides discussion and sources.
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Timotheus (Demosthenes xlix), the trial of Timarchus (Aeschines i), the trial of 
Ctesiphon (Aeschines iii, Demosthenes xviii) and the trial of Demosthenes (Dinarchus i, 
Hyperides v).
On the face of it, the trial o f Andocides should be a fairly important refutation of the 
view that Athenian juries could reach verdicts on the basis of character and services. 
Andocides was implicated in the profanation of the Mysteries and the mutilation of the 
Herms, two events which at the time excited considerable religious controversy and 
which we should expect to cause considerable antipathy towards those involved. The
z:o
precise nature of Andocides’ involvement in the two crimes is disputed, but it is at 
least clear that Andocides was not condemned for either crime in 415 but probably 
suspected of being guilty of both, and in 400 his opponents charged him with both 
crimes (Lysias vi.51). Given the degree of popular feeling against the two crimes in 415, 
Andocides’ acquittal in 400 needs to be explained. Three factors that are relevant here - 
Andocides’ legal case; the character of his opponents; and the Athenians’ later change 
of heart towards the perpetrators.
In relation to the legal issues, Andocides denies he confessed to profaning the Mysteries 
(i. 10-33) and admits that he denounced others for mutilating the Herms but denies 
actually taking part (i.34-69). Andocides then claims that Isotimides’ decree, which his 
opponents had claimed he had broken by entering sacred places, had been annulled by 
the Amnesty (i.71-90). We do not know how convincingly Andocides’ opponents made 
their legal case, but it is possible that Andocides convinced some jurors that he had the 
Amnesty on his side.
In relation to the character of his accusers, Andocides outlines a series of crimes he 
alleges were committed by Cephisius, Meletus, Epichares and Agyrrhius, including 
support for the oligarchy and impiety (the basic crimes that they were seeking to prove 
against Andocides), and asserts that they are stooges for Callias (i.l 15-31). His claims 
may have had some basis in fact, since the speaker of Lysias vi.42 admits that Cephisius
67 On the controversy and the unpopularity of those involved, see Thucydides vi.27-28, 53, 60.
68 Andocides is not named directly in Thucydides’ (vi.60) account of “one o f the prisoners” who 
denounced others, though he is named by Plutarch Ale. xix-xxi, who may however be interpreting his 
sources rather than passing on an actual historical account. MacDowell (1962:175) cast doubt on 
Plutarch’s account because it differs from Andocides’ own account, and concluded that Andocides was 
probably guilty of profaning the Mysteries, but not of mutilating the Herms (1962:167-76). His view was 
challenged by Marr (1971:329-33) and Furley (1989:552-53). Both sides rely to a degree on supposition, 
and the issue must remain unclear.
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was involved in wrongdoing. Andocides may have succeeded in getting some jurors to 
believe that his opponents were bringing a prosecution that was designed to force him to 
accede to Callias’ demands, and they may also have believed that the prosecutors’ own 
characters were doubtful. As a result, they may have voted for Andocides as the least 
objectionable of several rogues.69
Finally, after 15 years the Athenians may not have felt as passionately about the crimes 
as before. Xenophon (Hell, i.4.11-20) tells us that in 407 B.C. dense crowds of people 
welcomed Alcibiades back to Athens, and, after he delivered speeches in the Assembly 
denying he had committed sacrilege, the Athenians voted him supreme general. If 
Alcibiades, who was widely seen as the main culprit, could win such favour some eight 
years afterwards, one wonders whether the Athenians would have felt much animosity 
towards Andocides, who had only been small fry and was not as influential.
So the trial of Andocides may not really show how Athenian juries might vote in cases 
which involved popular prejudice. As the speech contains a majority of legal argument 
and the nonlegal arguments appear designed to supplement rather than replace the legal 
argument, we can certainly say that nonlegal arguments do not appear to have been the 
most significant in ensuring its success.
The trial of Timotheus by Apollodorus shows that the Athenians could find against a 
man in a trial despite his many public services. Apollodorus sued Timotheus for not 
repaying various loans. Timotheus had considerable prestige in Athens, and the fact 
that Apollodorus won may indicate that prestige would not always win favour in court, 
though a caveat must be made. The date of the speech is not known, but is generally 
thought to be either 369/8 B.C. or 362 B.C.71 After 369 B.C. Timotheus may have lost 
some prestige for failures during the Corcyran expedition and the Egyptian venture. As 
discussed in Appendix One, I consider the lower date more likely. Schaefer originally 
thought Timotheus was recalled from northern Greece in 362 B.C. for failing to take 
Amphipolis, which would indicate a loss of prestige, but as E. M. Harris notes he must 
still have had influence early in 362 B.C. as one of his supporters on campaign was
69 Jurors in an Athenian trial had to vote; there were no abstensions. If jurors could not make up their 
minds about a case, or if they were confused, they may have chosen to acquit, as this was the only option 
open to them if they did not wish to condemn. Andocides could have benefited in this regard.
70 Isocrates xv.107-13, 131; Dinarchus i.13-17. The Athenians erected a statue of him in honour of his 
military campaigns (Aeschines iii.243; Pausanias i.iii.2, i.xxiv.4; Nepos Tim. ii.3).
71 See discussion in Appendix One.
72 Schaefer (1858-85, IV: 142-43).
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crowned then. If we accept the lower date, this case provides reasonably strong 
evidence that a man who enjoyed political prestige could nonetheless lose a private case 
despite his influence.74
The trial of Timarchus, by contrast, may be an example of a man being convicted for his 
notoriety despite a lack of witness evidence of his crimes. There are two issues that 
need to be considered here. In the first place, Aeschines used the procedure known as 
dokimasia rhetoron. As Aeschines (i.28-32) tells us, this procedure allowed orators to 
be tried for a number of crimes, including striking parents or failing to provide for them, 
failing to perform military service or cowardice, being a prostitute or wasting an 
inheritance. Aeschines concentrated on the alleged crime of prostitution, but he also 
discussed other crimes such as the allegation that Timarchus had squandered his 
paternal estate (i.98-104). With respect to the allegation of prostitution he must have felt 
that Timarchus’ past was a matter of general comment in Athens, or his line of attack 
could not have had any hope of success. Demosthenes (xix.284) later admitted that 
Timarchus may have been guilty of committing a crime against himself, which a 
scholiast tells us is a euphemism for prostitution. All of this proves that Timarchus 
must at least have had a juicy reputation, and that Aeschines felt that he could exploit it 
even without strong witness testimony.
In the second place, while Aeschines did not present much evidence, he did present 
some and made a good fist of explaining why he could not present more. He presented 
evidence that Timarchus had squandered his paternal estate (i.100). He also summoned 
Misgolas as a witness to Timarchus’ prostitution (i.48), though as the deposition is not 
preserved it is unclear just how useful it wa .̂ Ills arguments about the difficulty of 
proving prostitution because nobody will admit to this crime at least sound plausible 
(i.44-48, 119-24). Overall, the trial of Timarchus probably does prove that a bad 
reputation could be used to convict someone, but it is worth noting that the reputation 
alone did not convict Timarchus. Aeschines still had to prove that Timarchus’ activities
73 IG II2.110; E. M. Harris (1988:47-48).
74 Apollodorus’ case, while not overly strong, does provide evidence of the loans, and his comments on 
Timotheus’ lack of witnesses (xlix.39, 45, 56-58) may show that Timotheus’ case was weak.
75 As pointed out by Dobson (1919:175) and Dover (1989:22).
76 See also the discussion by Harrison (1968-71,11:204-5).
77 Aeschines (i.80) mentioned the Athenians’ laughter at Timarchus’ double entendres the previous year 
and at the unwitting comments of Autolycus the Areopagite (i.81-85). He also claimed (i. 130) that when 
the name Timarchus is mentioned Athenians immediately ask “Which Timarchus? Timarchus the 
prostitute?” and discussed a comedy by Parmenon mentioning “big Timarchian whores” (i. 157).
78 MacDowell (2000:328-29).
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were illegal and present some evidence that they actually took place, and the fact that he 
felt bound to do this surely indicates that Athenian trials could not be reduced to simple 
contests over honour and status alone.
The traditional view of the trial of Ctesiphon is that it represents a triumph of an appeal 
to Demosthenes’ services over legal argument, though this view has been challenged by 
E. M. Harris (see Chapter Three). Rather than repeat the discussion in that chapter, I 
note here that Aeschines and Demosthenes concentrated on the legal issue of 
Demosthenes’ public policies and their benefits (or otherwise) for Athens. There is 
relatively little nonlegal argument, and it is difficult to see the trial as being decided on 
any grounds other than the legal issues.
Finally, Demosthenes was prosecuted by ten men after the Areopagus named him as one 
of several men who had taken bribes. We have two of the speeches that secured his 
condemnation, an incomplete speech by Hyperides and a long speech by Dinarchus.
Both discuss the possibility that jurors will acquit Demosthenes because of his public 
services, and request the jurors not to place those services above the law (Dinarchus . 
i.ll , 13-17, 23-24, 54, 62-63, 114; Hyperides v.l, 7, 26). Hyperides’ speech generally 
concentrates on legal issues, as does Dinarchus’, though the latter speech also contains a 
large amount of nonlegal argument. With both these speeches, however, it must be 
stressed that the factual and legal issues were taken for granted - Demosthenes had been 
named by the Areopagus, and while his conviction was not therefore a formality it was a 
strong likelihood. The fact that the speakers had to convince the jurors that 
Demosthenes’ services did not deserve to override the Areopagus’ findings indicates 
that jurors could sometimes take such things into account, but the fact that Demosthenes 
was condemned indicates that jurors could also choose to ignore services in favour of 
the law (as represented here by the Areopagus’ apophasis).
The Heliastic Oath and Legal and Nonlegal Pleading
The Heliastic oath has played a pivotal role in discussions of Athenian legal procedure. 
It was the key evidence used, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, to support the 
“positivistic” theory. As E. M. Harris argued, “nothing could make this clearer than 
the oath that all those who served in the Athenian courts had to swear. This oath, known
79 Grote (1867[1848]:388-9); Fränkel (1878:454-5); Wolff (1962:10-13, 18); Meyer-Laurin (1965:28-30).
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as the dicastic oath, pledged every dikastes to vote in accordance with the laws and 
decrees of the Athenian people.” Harris supported his argument by noting that the oath 
is frequently mentioned by speakers, who clearly placed great weight upon it by raising 
it in the “most prominent parts of their speeches, namely, at the beginning and at the 
end.”80
Dismissing the influence of the oath has always been difficult for “equity” theorists. As 
noted in Chapter Two, scholars seized upon Yvoipn TH öiKaiOTorrn» arguing that this in 
practice allowed juries the freedom to abandon law and impose equity solutions.81 
Aristotle’s comment {Rhet. 1375a28-1375b4) that, when the written law was against his 
case, a speaker should ask for Yvwpn Tp cxpicnrn and appeal for equity, was a key plank 
in this argument. The argument has always suffered, however, from the fact that 
Aristotle suggested a counter-argument for speakers to use, that when the written law 
was on the speaker’s side he should argue that Yvti)|Jn TH ÖiKaiOTorrn did not justify 
abandoning the written law {Rhet. 1375M6-17). Very few actual appeals to Yvcopp Tfl 
öiK aiOTÖ rrn can be found in forensic oratory, and consequently it is generally interpreted 
as a desperate expedient for use in extraordinary circumstances.82
This has left scholars who downplay any legal emphasis in Athenian procedure with the 
difficulty of explaining away the clear statement in the Heliastic oath that the juror 
should judge in accordance with laws and decrees. Hillgruber suggested that the jurors 
probably interpreted the oath as a direction to vote for justice. He cited eight speeches 
in which speakers exhorted the jury to vote for what was just in accordance with their 
oath. His argument was adopted by Christ, who argued that jurors “valued legality and 
held the laws in high esteem...[but did not feel] bound to apply individual laws to the * 
letter.” They evaluated laws and based their decisions on their sense of justice, and in 
doing so considered they were keeping their oath. As will be demonstrated below, 
however, this argument is based on a false understanding of what speakers usually mean 
when they talk about “justice” in Athenian courts. In forensic oratory öikcuov and its
80 E. M. Harris (1994:133). Harris identified some 40 occasions in oratory when the oath was cited. He 
used the term dicastic oath, but our sources tell us that it was called the Heliastic oath (Demosthenes 
xxiv.148; Hyperides iv.40).
81 Hirzel (1900:57-60); Weiss (1923:76); Vinogradoff (1928b:42); J. W. Jones (1956:135); Ruschenbusch 
(1957:265); Guthrie (1971:124-25); Sealey (1994:51-58).
82 Wolff (1962:18); Meyer-Laurin (1965:28-31); Hillgruber (1988:117).
83 Hillgruber (1988:112-3).
84 Christ (1998:194-95). It is important to note here {contra Allen 2000:150) that speakers do not ask for a 
vote according to justice, but rather phrase their discussions so that a vote in accordance with the oath is a 
vote for justice, or a determination of the rights of the case.
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cognates have a range of meanings, but when speakers were discussing the Heliastic 
oath the basic meaning was “justice as based on law and legal process.” When appealing 
for justice a speaker was often - but not always - using another expression for a vote in 
accordance with the laws. As noted in Chapter Two, Hillgruber actually cites speeches 
where the dominant meaning of appeals to tö öikcxiov is justice in accordance with the 
laws.
Johnstone has provided the most detailed account of the Heliastic oath to date, and he 
argues that the oath did not permit a vote based on a broad concept of justice that could 
override laws. Johnstone calculated that the oath was mentioned in some 46 speeches, 
and noted that it was linked with upholding laws on 51 occasions and with justice 30
o r
times. He further notes that in court a litigant “never used the oath to make a claim 
based on justice against or opposed to the law.” Litigants often tried to claim that the 
oath and justice both accorded with the laws, and “treated justice and the law as though
07
they were entirely consonant.” '
Johnstone noted that Athenian litigants rarely mentioned Yvoipn Tfl öiKaiOTÖrrn, and. 
only two made any sort of appeal for it, though a third mentioned it (Demosthenes 
xx. 118 and xxxix.39 are the appeals, while Demosthenes xxiii.96 is the third
o o
mention). In both cases, Johnstone suggested that the speakers were not trying to make 
an appeal for equity beyond the law, but were suggesting that Yvd)|jr| TH öiKaiOTCCTfi was 
in harmony with the laws. Indeed, in one case where a speaker admitted there was no 
clear law against his opponent (Lycurgus i.7) the oath was not used to support an appeal 
for equity and Yvcopn Tfi öiKaioiaTfi was not raised. As a result, Johnstone claimed that 
there is little support for the view that a litigant could base an appeal for equity on 
YVüjpn Tfi öiKaiOTäTfi.
Table 5.3 presents all the references to the Heliastic oath that I have found. There are
OQ
109 references in all, from 45 speeches. This is just under half of the speeches in 




88 Johnstone (1999:41-42). Meyer-Laurin (1965:29) viewed Demosthenes xxix as the sole appeal for 
Yvd)pn TG ölKaiOTcrrn in Athenian forensic oratory.
89 Johnstone (1999:36, Table 1) states that the oath was mentioned in 46 speeches, but does not identify 
how often it was mentioned in those speeches. As he did not itemise his data, I am unable to identify the 
speech that I have missed, though my guess is that he included Isocrates xix.15, which I have excluded 
because it was delivered in Aegina, not Attica.
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the Demosthenic corpus. Some 32 references are from graphai paranomon or graphai 
nomon me epitedeion thenai (Aeschines iii; Demosthenes xviii, xx, xxii, xxiii, xxiv; 
Hyperides i), confirming that the oath was commonly cited in these procedures,90 though 
it was also regularly mentioned in Demosthenes’ (xxi) probole Against Meidias and his 
euthyna On the False Embassy (xix). Our sample includes 27 public speeches, 14 
private and 4 diadikasiai,91 and Johnstone suggests that the difference is significant and 
that litigants could frequently give the oath different meanings in public cases.
Twenty-nine references occur near the beginning or end of a speech, confirming E. M. 
Harris’ statement that the oath is generally placed in the most prominent parts of 
speeches (as above), and indicating that jurors did place some weight on the authority 
that the oath could give to their arguments. In most speeches discussion of the oath took 
up a fairly minor portion, and in the few speeches where it constitutes a larger 
proportion of the speech we must suspect that this is simply a function o f the number of 
sections in the speech. The regular appearance of the oath in forensic oratory confirms, 
however, that it was viewed as a useful part of a speaker’s armament. The oath also 
occurs outside forensic oratory, in the legal fictions by Isocrates (xv.21) and Plato (.Apol. 
35c), and as noted above the use of Yvwpn TH öiKcaoTcrrn was discussed by Aristotle 
(Rhet. 1375a28-1375b4, 16-17). Aristotle also mentioned the oath, and the use of Yvd)Un 
Tfj ÖiKaiOTdTfi, at Politics 1287a, where he raises it in a discussion of how officials 
enforce laws. Indeed, the oath appears to have been well enough known in general 
Athenian society to be parodied in comedy; Pherecrates (Krapataloi Fr. 102 [PCG]) 
claimed that the audience would be breaking their oath if they did not vote for him. 
Consequently, the oath appears to have been part of an Athenian’s general knowledge, 
and so when speakers alluded to it they must have expected that the jurors would 
understand the point they were trying to make.
Whether that point was for a lawful decision, or one based on a broader, and nonlegal, 
concept of justice, requires further analysis of the data. On occasions the speaker would 
raise the oath simply to note that it dictated that jurors should listen to him with
90 As noted before by Johnstone (1999:37-40).
91 I classify Demosthenes xxxix (Against Boiotos I) as a diadikasia; my reasons for this are outlined in 
Appendix One.
92 Johnstone (1999:37). The main difference he notes is that litigants in public speeches would link the 
oath to the preservation of the democracy and the politeia, but it is difficult to see this as more than a 
function of our sample. Such arguments were more likely to be made in public procedures that focussed 
on laws or individuals’ past actions.
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goodwill,93 or offer him a fair hearing94 or an equal hearing.95 Generally, however, the 
point a speaker was trying to make by raising the oath was that the jury should vote for 
him. At times a speaker mentions the oath without linking it to anything else, and here 
the effect of the claim is that if the jurors do not vote for him then they will be breaking 
their oath.96 This is the basic point of the fragment of Pherecrates cited above, so it may 
have been a fairly common idea. On 11 occasions speakers invoked the oath in relation 
to the charge that had been made, with the intimation that the opponent was guilty o f the 
charge (or the speaker was innocent) and therefore the jurors should vote accordingly.97
More often, speakers would be more specific and indicate that a vote for them would be 
based on a number of factors. Speakers could invoke the oath to warn the jurors against 
their opponents’ irrelevance, or to claim that a verdict for them would be a pious 
duty.99 By far the most common claim was that, by supporting the speaker, the jurors 
would be upholding the laws. This occurs 56 times as listed in Table 5.3, in 29 
speeches.100 On 17 of these occasions speakers stated that the jurors had sworn to vote 
in accordance with the laws.101 On one occasion a speaker stated that the jury had sworn
1 09to vote in accordance with decrees (without mentioning laws).
Some 26 of the claims that the jurors will keep their oath if they uphold the law include 
the claim that they will also render a just verdict.* 1"  On a further 20 occasions speakers 
claim that the jurors will keep their oath by delivering a just result (without mentioning 
laws).104 All of these bar five are from speeches where the speaker also claims that
93 Andocides i.9; Demosthenes xviii.2, xxiii. 19; Lysias xix.l 1.
94 Demosthenes xxix.4.
95 Aeschines ii.l; Demosthenes xviii.2, 6-7; Hyperides i. Fr.i.
96 Demosthenes xix.132, 161, xxii.4, 39, xxiv.90, xxv.99; Dinarchus ii.20; Lysias xv.10, xviii. 13.
97 Aeschines i. 154; Demosthenes xix.212, 219-20, 284, xxii.43-36, xxiv.78, xliv.14, xlv.50, lviii. 17; 
Hyperides iv.40; Lysias xiv.47.
98 Aeschines i. 170; Demosthenes xxii.4, 43-46, xxiii.19-21, xxxvi.61, xxix.13, xlv.50, lviii.25; Lycurgus
i. 13.
99 Antiphon v.96; Aeschines iii.233; Demosthenes xix.239-40; Lycurgus i.79.
100 Aeschines iii.6, 8, 31, 198, 257; Andocides i.2, 91, 105; Antiphon v.8, 85, 96; Demosthenes xviii.2, 67, 
121, xix.179, 239-40, 297, xx.93, 118-19, 159, xxi.34, 42, 177, 188,211-12, xxii.20, 43-46, xxiii.19, 101, 
xxiv.34-35, 188, xxv.l 1, xxvii.68, xxxiv.45, xxxvi.26, xliii.84, xlv.56-58, xlvi.27, lviii.25, 36, 61, lix.l 15; 
Hyperides ii.5, iv.40; Isaeus ii.47, iv.31, vi.65, viii.46, xi.6, 18; Isocrates xviii.34; Lysias x.32, xiv.22, 40, 
47, xxii.7.
101 Aeschines iii.6, 31; Andocides i.91; Antiphon v.85; Demosthenes xx.l 18-19, xxi.42, xxii.20, xxiii. 101, 
xxiv.34-35, 188, xxxiv.45, xxxvi.26, xlv.56-58, xlvi.27, lviii.25, 36, lix.l 15; Lysias xxii.7.
102 Hyperides v.l.
10j Aeschines iii.8; Antiphon v.85; Demosthenes xviii.2, 67, xix.179, 239-40, xx.l 18-19, xxi.34, 177, 188, 
211-12, xxiv.34-35, xxv.l 1, xxvii.68, xliii.84, lviii.36, 61.
104 Andocides i.9, 31; Demosthenes xviii.126, 249, xix.l, xx.167, xxi.4, 24, xxiii.194, xxiv.175, xxix.4, 
xxxvi.l, 61, xxxix.37-38, 40-41, lvii.68; Isaeus vi.2; Lycurgus i. 13, 128; Lysias xv.8-11.
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jurors will keep the oath by upholding the laws. The five speeches are Demosthenes 
xxix, xxxix, lvii, Lycurgus i and Lysias xv. All of these speeches, with the exception of 
Demosthenes xxxix, have been classified as containing a majority of legal argument 
(Table 5.1), and each speaker claims that their own case is supported by law.103 As a 
result it is difficult to see a verdict for “justice” in accordance with the oath in these five 
speeches as anything other than a shorthand way of saying that the oath requires the 
jurors to vote according to the laws.
In addition to claiming that the jurors should uphold the laws, a speaker could claim that 
they would be keeping their oath if they refused to offer xapis to his opponent.106 The 
speaker of Lysias xiv.22, for example, noted that, if his opponents demanded a favour 
from the jurors (xapi^eoSai), they would be teaching them to break their oath and to 
disobey the laws. He went on to state (xiv.40) that they should not set pity, or 
forgiveness, or xapis above the oath and the laws. The speaker o f Isocrates xviii.34 
similarly notes that it is not right that the jurors should vote out of favour or equity or 
anything else other than the oaths. On a further seven occasions speakers argue that 
the jurors should not set their opponents’ character or services above the oath. This 
evidence shows that speakers could sometimes use the oath against pleas based on 
character or services, and reinforce the fact that generally a speaker invoked the oath in 
order to appeal for a decision in accordance with the laws.
Scholars who believe that jurors could disregard law have to explain how it is that jurors 
could, apparently flagrantly, break their oath. It is generally considered that oaths were 
respected in Classical Athens, and that the Athenians believed someone who broke an 
oath would suffer divine retribution.109 The importance of keeping oaths is regularly 
attested outside forensic oratory. Euripides, for example, could expect his audience to 
believe that Aegeus would keep his oath to treat Medea as a suppliant and protect her 
from vengeance for killing her own children {Medea 736), or that Iphigeneia and 
Pylades would keep their sacred oath to avoid being cursed {Iphigeneia in Tauris 735- 
53). Aristophanes expected his audience to consider Strepsiades’ willingness to break
103 Demosthenes xxix.22, 27, 39, 55-57, xxxix.41, lvii.3, 5, 30, 31-32, 54, 69; Lycurgus i.5, 27, 34; Lysias 
xv.6, 9, 11.
106 Aeschines iii.233; Demosthenes xix.l, xxi.211-12, xxiv.175; Isocrates xviii.34; Lysias xiv.22, 40.
107 wot’ ouK d îov otrre Kcrrä xdpiv oCrre kott’ emeiKeiav oute kcct’ oüöev q kcctcx toüs öpKOus 
nepi auTtuv ipq(})iaaa0ai.
108 Demosthenes xix.l, 239-40, xxi.186-88, xxii.42-46, xxiii.194; Dinarchus iii. 17; Lysias xv.8-11.
109 Plescia (1970:3-4); Mikalson (1983:31, 36).
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his oath to a creditor as one of the unsavoury outcomes of Socrates’ teaching (Clouds 
1228-35). Xenophon expected his readers to believe his account of the oaths sworn 
between Clearchus and Tissaphemes {Anabasis ii.5.5-7) and his claim that Agesilaus 
was so pious that even his enemies trusted his oaths more than their own ties of 
friendship {Agesilaus iii.2). Treaties between states were confirmed with oaths and 
imprecations and reaffirmed by oaths.110
In forensic oratory, speakers similarly reminded jurors of their oath and expected them 
to place weight on not breaking the oath. As noted above, they would occasionally 
remind them that no-one who broke the oath could escape the vengeance of the gods. 
They would also occasionally point out that respect for the oaths was a major factor in 
the society, something that held the city together.* 111 They could also place the 
judgements rendered by jurors who had sworn the oath over judgements delivered by 
people who had not. This perhaps indicates that the oath was seen to be some 
guarantee of appropriate procedure.
Oaths need to be viewed within the wider context of Athenian religious feeling. This is 
not a topic on which we have exact knowledge, but there are indications that Athenians 
could both revere the gods and fear their retribution. The mutilation of the Herms, and 
the impact it had on the Sicilian expedition, are examples of the depth of religious 
feeling in Athens.1 lj There is also evidence of a degree of superstition at Athens; it is 
difficult to believe that people could regularly deposit curses against their enemies, at 
times including “voodoo” dolls, if they did not at least have some belief that such things 
worked.114 That being said, there is evidence of some diversity of opinion on this matter, 
as with most Athenian morals and beliefs. The Athenians could display scepticism about 
oracles (Euripides Helen 744-60, Thucydides v.26, v iii.l),115 and it has been suggested 
that in private at least Athenians may have entertained some doubts about the efficiency 
of oaths and curses.116 Aristophanes could even poke fun at priests for stealing sacrifices 
offered to the gods {Wealth 685-711). We should not, however, use these instances to
110 Adcock and Mosley (1975:216-22).
111 Aeschines iii.6; Andocides i.9; Antiphon vi.25; Demosthenes xix.239-40, xxiii.101, xxiv.78; Lycurgus 
i.79-80.
112 Demosthenes xxiv.58, 78, 90, 148-52, lv.35.
113 Powell (1979a:21).
114 On curse tablets see the references in Chapter One. For “voodoo” dolls possibly linked to Lysias’ cases 
see Trumpf (1958) and Jordan (1988).
115 See the discussions by Parker (1996:211-48) and Powell (1979b:45-46).
116 Mikalson (1983:38).
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downplay the strength of religion in Athens, or to argue that jurors would not have taken 
their oaths seriously.
The question is rather how a speaker could convince the jury that they were keeping 
their oath, even if he was seeking a nonlegal decision. Hirzel argued that the Greeks 
adopted a flexible method of interpreting oaths, considering that they were only bound 
under certain circumstances, and this allowed them to keep their oaths while at the same 
time abandoning them. His argument is ingenious, but it falls down on one key fact - 
nowhere in forensic oratory do speakers indicate that the oath applied only to certain 
circumstances, or that it was a flexible oath. The overwhelming thrust of their 
discussion of the oath is that it bound jurors to vote according to the laws.
The solution may lie in a passage in Demosthenes’ Against Aristocrates (xxiii.95-7). 
The speaker, Euthycles, raises the issue that Aristocrates will claim that his decree is 
lawful because many similar decrees have been subjected to a graphe paranomon but 
not overturned. Euthycles counters that the jurors have been misled, and although the 
decrees were upheld they were still contrary to the laws. If the decrees had been passed 
because the prosecutors had failed to make their case, that still did not make them 
lawful:
OÜK d p ’ eüopKOuoiv oi öiKdoavTes aÜTÖ; vai. noas; eyd) öiöd^oo. yvobiJn Tfl 
öiKaiOTdTfi öiKdaeiv öpoupÖKaaiv, rj öe Tfjs öö^’ d^’ a>v äv dKOÜacoai
napicrraTai- ÖTe toivuv Kcrrä TaÜTriv e0evTO Tf]v tpfj^ov, eüaeßoüai. näs ydp ö 
Mryre öl’ exöpav ö f eüvoiav \if\Tt öl’ dAApv
döiKOv npö(j)aaiv pnöepiav nap’ ä yiyv^ ök£i Bepevos Tijv ipfj^ov eüasße?.
Are the jurors who decided that particular case not observing their oaths? Yes. 
How? I will explain to you. They have sworn to judge with their most just 
opinion, but their forming their opinion is swayed by what they hear. Well then, 
when they vote according to this opinion, they keep their oath. For everyone 
keeps his oath who does not, through enmity or goodwill or some other unjust 
motive, vote against what he believes (xxiii.96-97).
This passage may well explain how Athenians believed jurors made their decisions. 
Jurors could only vote for the most convincing argument; if the speakers had tricked 
them into believing a case was lawful when it was not, the fault lay with speaker, not the 
juror (as Demosthenes went on to suggest at xxiii.97).
117 Hirzel (1902:42-48, 53-56).
118 Literally, “they are acting piously,” though from the context I prefer “they keep their oath.”
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This leads us to yv^Mfl TH öiKaiOTÖrrn. As noted above, there are only three occasions in 
forensic oratory when speakers discuss the issue, though there is also another occasion 
when a speaker mentions that his opponent struck the clause out of a deme oath 
(Demosthenes lvii.63).119 The concept is briefly discussed in the passage from Against 
Aristocrates just cited, though Euthycles did not actually make an appeal to the jurors to 
use their most just opinion. On two other occasions speakers do suggest that the jury use 
yvd)|jn Tn öiKaiOTdTfi. There is a subdued appeal in Demosthenes’ Against Leptines 
(xx.l 18-19), where Demosthenes states that, where there are no laws, the jurors have 
sworn to judge with their most just opinion. He notes that they should apply this to the 
law under discussion, and asks them if it is just to honour their benefactors and just to 
allow a man to keep what has been given to them. If so, then the jurors should do this 
and uphold their oath (eüopKfjTe).
As Table 5.2 shows, the vast majority of Against Leptines is legal pleading, and there is 
very little nonlegal material in the speech. Despite this, there was a valid reason for 
Demosthenes to appeal for YV^Mfl TH öiKaiOTdrrn. Most of his argument was based on 
the benefits of his side’s law for the city, and his claim that Leptines’ law would not 
benefit the city. Much of the argument between sections 5 and 154, for example, 
expands upon these themes, and specific legal quibbles with Leptines’ law are briefly 
dealt with at 29-35, 155-56 and 160-63. Demosthenes uses öikcxiov and its cognates 78 
times in the speech, and on many occasions in this speech the word carries a connotation 
that laws being discussed are just as a consequence of being morally right (e.g. xx.2, 4, 
12, 18, 36, 39, 41, 44, 51, 64, 71, 74, 75, 88, 98, 109, 114, 116, 125-26, 132, 139, 146, 
164, 166). As Demosthenes’ position is largely based on the perceived benefits of his 
law, and the suggested dangers of Leptines’ law, it is not surprising that he concentrated 
on moral issues, though as he is discussing what makes laws just it is clear that he 
viewed justice as derived from law, rather than something to replace law.
There is ancient authority that Demosthenes won his case (Dio Chrysostom xxxi.128- 
29; see Appendix One). The decision may have reflected Demosthenes’ argument that
119 Sommerstein (1989:16-17, 212) has argued that Orestes’ trial in Aeschylus’ Eumenides represents a 
form of Yvwpn Tfj öiKCUOTäTn, drawing attention to lines 483 and 674-75. The phrase does not actually 
occur in the play ; at lines 674-75 Athena asks if she is to command the jurors to cast a just vote (ipncpov 
öiKodav) in accordance with their judgement (cxno yvchpri^)- The play is largely about the problem of 
resolving two just claims, and jurors are twice reminded to respect their oath when they vote (680, 709-10; 
see Podlecki 1989:42-43), so the play may provide an early allusion to YVü)|jr| TO 0iKaiOTcnr|. If so, it 
indicates that the concept was generally understood in Athens, at least early in the fifth century B.C., 
though this does not of course mean that it was frequently raised in court.
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his proposed law was more just than Leptines’, although as Demosthenes appeared as a 
synegoros and the main speech delivered by Phormio is not preserved we cannot be sure 
of this. Even if the jury did decide that Demosthenes’ law was more just, however, this 
does not prove that they overturned the law and delivered a verdict in favour of equity 
on this occasion. Speakers in graphai nomon me epitedeion thenai make it clear that 
they need not only to prove that a law is illegal, but also that it is not in the best interests 
of the polis. This is exactly what Demosthenes was trying to do, and if he did prove
that the law was not in the best interests of the polis then he was following the 
appropriate legal procedure and delivering a legal argument, rather than one based solely 
on justice or equity.
The other appeal for Yvcbpn Tfi öiKaiOTcrrn occurs in Demosthenes xxxix.40-41, a 
diadikasia over the name Mantitheus. Mantitheus notes that the jurors have sworn to 
vote according to the laws, and when there are no laws, yvcapn Tfl öiKaiOTÖrrn. He goes 
on to state that, since there are no established laws about his case, but his case is more 
just, the jurors would justly vote for him. Mantitheus’ case is largely based on the 
assertion that he has a more just claim to the name by reason of the difficulties that 
could arise (xxxix.7-19) and his father’s wishes and actions (20-22). As there was no 
actual law to stop his brother from having the same name, the case was based solely on 
the apparent justice of his cause.
Mantitheus makes this explicit in sections 40-41, where he states that no juror would 
give the same name to two of his children; and as they deem this just in relation to their 
own children, they would make decision for him in accordance with their oath (literally 
“make a pious decision”). He then notes that, on the basis of the most just opinion, the 
laws, the Heliastic oath and his opponent’s admissions, his claim is reasonable and just.
There is good evidence that Mantitheus lost his case. What is disputed is why he lost 
the case. It is generally believed nowadays that Mantitheus brought a dike blab es against 
his eponymous half-brother, seeking damages from him. Harris notes that Mantitheus
120 Yunis (1988:381). The need to prove that a new law was in the best interests of the polis can be seen as 
the means by which Athenians changed their laws to meet new circumstances. If they were limited simply 
to considering whether new decrees or laws were consistent with existing statutes, they would have had no 
flexibility to amend or introduce new ones to fit changed circumstances.
121 wot’ ei (jriöeis nv nepi toütwv Ksipevos vöpos, Kdv outgo öikouws npös epoü thv ipfj4)ov 
808008 (Demosthenes xxxix.40).
122 Carey and Reid (1985:167-68).
12j See Appendix One and E. M. Harris (2000:57-59).
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made few real claims to prove damages, and does not prove that his brother caused him 
to lose money, and therefore finds it unsurprising that Mantitheus lost his case.124 As I 
note in Appendix One, however, there are equally strong grounds for viewing this case 
as a diadikasia rather than a dike blabes, not least because Mantitheus makes it clear 
that he is seeking sole ownership of the name - something which only a diadikasia could 
deliver (Demosthenes xxxix.l, 6, xl.35). Accordingly, it is worth considering again why 
this appeal for YVibpn TH öiKaiOTÖrrn did not succeed. There appear to be two main 
reasons why Mantitheus lost - his father had indeed registered his brother with his
• • • ITCphratry as Mantitheus (xxxix.4, 22) and his brother was older than him (xxxix.27). 
Mantitheus offers some feeble claims in response to both of these. After admitting that 
his father had registered his brother with his phratry (xxxix.4) he notes that his brother 
will claim he was registered as Mantitheus. He attacks his brother’s witnesses, claiming 
they were not intimates of his father (xxxix.22). In response to the claim that his brother 
is older, he asserts that his brother looks younger than him, and then undercuts this 
assertion by suggesting that the jurors should consider his brother his father’s child from 
the date he was adopted, since he (Mantitheus the speaker) had been named Mantitheus 
before then. It seems from this that his brother was going to present witnesses to prove 
that he was registered as Mantitheus before the speaker, and that Mantitheus the speaker 
admitted his brother was older.
If this interpretation is correct, Mantitheus lost his case on the facts. He made an 
effective appeal for justice and Yvcopn Tfl öiKouoTdrrn, but this failed to overturn the 
basic legal right of his brother to use the name he had been given when he was 
registered as a baby. Mantitheus had not attempted to make a direct assault on his 
brother’s legal right to the name, basing his appeal largely on his more just claim.
These two speeches show that, in situations where speakers wished to make a plea based 
on the justice of their cause, they could indeed present an appeal for Yvobpn Tfi 
öiKaiOTdTfi. Although both speakers relied largely on arguments about justice in their 
speeches, they were at pains to claim that their case was not only more just but also in 
accordance with the laws (Demosthenes xx.88-101, xxxix.41). The procedure followed 
in Against Leptines was clearly a legal procedure, and Demosthenes’ appeal for yvü)pn 
Trj ÖiKaiOTdTfi was simply an additional weapon in his armoury of arguments to prove
124 E. M. Harris (2000:57-59).
125 Carey and Reid (1985:167) conclude the brother was indeed named Mantitheus as a child.
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that Leptines’ law was not in the best interests of the polis and his own proposed law 
was more just. In Mantitheus’ case, his appeal was clearly based on justice, rather than 
law (as he himself admitted at xxxix.40, there was no law preventing two brothers from 
having the same name). His claims for justice clashed with the legal right of his brother 
to the same name, and failed. Accordingly, these two speeches prove that an appeal for 
Yvdbpn TH öiKaiOTdTfi that was in harmony with the laws could succeed, but one that 
contravened them could fail. They show that Vinogradoff s theory is incorrect, as it does 
not accord with the only appeals for Yvcbpn T() öiKaiOTorrn that we have.
The majority of the references in Table 5.3 are from contexts that I have defined as 
“legal” pleading. There are three where the oath is discussed as part of nonlegal pleas - 
Demosthenes xix.212, xxiv.175 and xxxix.40-41. The latter is, as discussed above, 
nonlegal as the entire case is based on an appeal for justice, although in this context the 
speaker links justice and the oath to the laws and therefore makes a plea that is 
superficially legal. The other references occur in contexts where speakers raised 
opponents’ crimes to bolster their case. The references indicate that, although the oath 
was most commonly linked to upholding the laws, it could be used to support nonlegal 
arguments (though in all three speeches the speakers are at pains to claim that their cases 
are based on law, and in fact the first two speeches do contain predominantly legal 
argument).
Equity Pleas and Justice
The evidence just presented on the Heliastic oath casts considerable doubt on “equity”
theories, and on the view that Athenian juries did not feel bound by law but would judge
in accordance with more general social norms and their sense of justice. As noted in
Chapter Two, “equity” theories had already been attacked on two main grounds. The
first is that speakers do not directly challenge laws; the second is that there is no
actual evidence that equity pleas were in fact made in court. Some of the major cases
used by Vinogradoff to support his theory, such as Isaeus i, Hyperides iii and
Demosthenes xxxii, were re-examined by Meyer-Laurin, who argued that they do not in
1
fact contain equity pleas but legal pleas.
126 Hirzel (1900:57-60); Vinogradoff (1922:66-69, 1928a: 17-21, 1928b:42); Weiss (1923:73-6); Paoli 
(1926:122, 1933:35, 39-45, 67-8); Gemet (1937:121); Arangio-Ruiz (1946:242-3, n.l).
127 Meyer-Laurin (1965:2, 35, 39); Harris (1994:140); Carey (1996:36-7, 43).
128 Wolff (1962:10-13, 1968:15-19, 1969:2); Meyer-Laurin (1965:24-5); Meinecke (1971:280, 355-7).
129 Meyer-Laurin (1965:4-24).
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The response of the “second generation” of equity theorists was to pick holes in Meyer- 
Laurin’s dismissal of nonlegal arguments as “artful proofs,” and to reassert that the 
constant references to “justice” in the forensic speeches must indicate that jurors did not 
feel bound by the law, but by their general sense of justice. Biscardi and Hillgruber 
argued this in the greatest detail, but it has since been repeated by Todd, Scafuro, 
Christ and Allen. Christ asserts that jurors “determined how and whether to enforce 
laws on the basis of a more fundamental standard - namely, their sense of “what is just”
(ta dikaia).” This argument was challenged by Johnstone who, as noted above,
claimed that speakers generally discuss law and justice together, and that the two are 
therefore consonant. The precise nature of the meanings speakers sought to evoke 
when they used “justice” words is worth considering further.
The Meanings o f  Justice in Forensic Oratory
There is insufficient space here to present an exhaustive analysis of all the occasions on 
which speakers discussed “justice” or used öiKaios/äöiKOS and their cognates. I will 
present some brief comments. I identified a total of 2,467 occasions on which the words 
were used in the 104 forensic speeches delivered in Attica.134 I consider that 596 of the 
2,467 occasions have a clearly legal meaning. They occur in 432 sections in 76 speeches 
(Table 5.4). Demosthenes xxiv accounts for a large number of these occurrences (77 in 
all), though Demosthenes xxiii, xix and xxi are also heavily represented and account for 
39, 38 and 30 respectively. Speakers may make it clear that justice is derived from the 
laws through phrases such as tcx tcov vöpcov öiKaia (Demosthenes xxv.3, 14; 
xxxviii.19) or tcx ev toTs vopois öikcucüv (Demosthenes xlii.4, 15). Such phrases are 
- rare, however, and in most of the 596 occurrences speakers simply link justice with the 
laws by noting that particular actions are just because they accord with law. For 
example, the speaker of Demosthenes xliv.7 states that adoptions ought to be valid if 
justly made in accordance with the laws (öooi äv Kcrrä toüs vöpous öikcucos 
YEViovTai), while the speaker of Demosthenes xxxiii.l links the terms of the dike 
emporike with three “justice” words. Diodorus, in Demosthenes xxiv.31, asked how any
130 Biscardi (1970:219-21, 227-30; 1982:362-71); Hillgruber (1988:105-20).
131 Todd (1990a: 19, 1993:54-5); Scafuro (1997:53); Christ (1998:207-8); Allen (2000:175-83).
132 Christ (1998:195).
133 Johnstone (1999:41). See too Gehrke (1995:30); Carey (1996:41).
134 The total includes three occasions (Hyperides iii.16, 20) where the word is restored, but the 
restorations are generally accepted (Jensen 1917:79; Burtt 1954:444). In reaching the total I checked all 
speeches manually, sometimes with the aid o f indices (e.g. Goligher and Maguiness 1961).
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private man could commit a greater crime than by subverting the laws (ti yap äv tis 
pei^ov nöiKnoev iöidüTn? ävf)p n KaTaXüajv toüs vöpous airrns).
These 596 occurrences account for 24.2 per cent of total occurrences, so a far larger 
number of occurrences are not directly linked to law. Most of these are probably 
unclassifiable. At times, from the context, they appear to be intended to convey a legal 
meaning, as for example in Demosthenes lv, where the words are clearly linked back to 
the charge (Demosthenes lv.6, 7, 8, 12, 17, 19, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35).135 Sometimes justice 
words are linked to legal procedure, for example claims that appeals for pity were unjust 
(Dinarchus i.109; Hyperides ii.9; Isaeus v.35; Lycurgus i. 144; Lysias vi.55, xiv.20, 
xxii.21, xxviii.14; see Chapter Seven); that it was just to produce certain proofs or 
witnesses to support the case (Demosthenes xxix.17, lvii.8, 23; Isaeus iv.21, vi.53;
Lysias vii.33); that relevance was just (Aeschines iii.193; Demosthenes xviii.9;
Hyperides iv.32; Isocrates xviii.45; Lycurgus i.10, 149; see Chapter Four); or that the 
jurors will determine justice with their verdict (Aeschines ii.87, iii.60, 232, 260; 
Antiphon v.8, 92; Demosthenes xviii.126, 249, xix.4, 239, 240, 335, xx.167, xxi.4, 8,
24, 35, 105, 202, 212, 227, xxii.59, xxiii.19, xxiv.34, 58, 177, 207, 214, xxv.30, xxvii.3, 
68, xxviii.23, 24, xxix.4, 28, 35, 41, 58, xxx.25, xxxiii.38, xxxv.5, xxxvi.l, 61, 
xxxix.40, xl.31, 55, 61, xliii. 14, 33, 81, 84, xlvi.4, 28, xlvii.18, 82, xlviii.48, 58, lii.33, 
liv.42, lvii.5, 6, 36, 56, 61, 69, lviii.7, 25, 70, lix. 126; Dinarchus i.5, 6, 106, 111; 
Hyperides ii. 13, iv.40, v.2; Isaeus ii.47, vi.2, 17, vii.45, viii.5, 46; Isocrates xvii.58, 
xviii.10, 16, 34; Lycurgus i.52; Lysias iii.21, 47, vi.14, x.21, xiii.97, xiv.47, xv.l, 11, 
xxiv.27, xxvii.2).136
Sometimes justice is intended to convey a moral meaning which is not explicitly linked 
to law. For example, Aeschines (i. 136) discusses the nature of “just love,” while 
Demosthenes (xxi. 100-101) uses the words in discussing violence and pity. Such moral 
uses can sometimes occur in passages of nonlegal pleading, such as Isocrates xvi.l 1, 12, 
15, 28, 36, 38. They do not always of themselves carry a nonlegal meaning, however;
135 Similar ‘legal’ meanings can be identified in many other speeches (e.g. Andocides i.l [öiKcdws, 
ccöikcüs], 3 [döiKiav, äöiKeiv, öiKaioi, aöiKeiv], 19, 31 [cxöiKoüvTas] 32,49, 51 [äöiKWS, ä ö iK co s], 
53 [öiKaitos, äöiKü)9], 60, 68, 119, 123, 132, 135 [äöiKOÜVTa, öiKaiws], 136 [toüs äöiKOÜvras],
137; Demosthenes xviii.4, 13 [öikociöv], 17, 20 [Tä äöiKfm aia], 21, 31, 53, 71, 109, 193 [äöiKruJ’, 
öiKaicos], 222, 232, 233 [TdöiKruJ’, öiKaitos], 248 [öiKaiws], 250 [öikcxiov], 251 [ööikcüv, öiKaicos], 
266, 273, 279, 280, 298 [öiKaias, öiKcdws], 314, 315).
lj6 This use of “justice” contains something of a meaning like “rights”, since speakers essentially state that 
the jurors are deciding the rights of the matter. Miller (1996:882-84) argues that the Athenians did have a 
concept of “just rights” or claims, though as Allen (2000:150) notes speakers’ claims were contestable, so 
there does not appear to have been an immutable concept of “just rights.”
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when speakers are criticizing their opponents’ crimes, the context may be nonlegal, but 
the words themselves may carry a legal meaning since it is crimes that are being 
discussed. Sometimes the “crimes” are simply moral wrongs, on which occasion a 
nonlegal meaning may be inferred (e.g. Demosthenes xlviii.54, 55; Dinarchus ii.l 1). In 
ten speeches only do speakers make the claim that it is “just” to take account of their 
liturgies or character (Andocides i. 143; Demosthenes xxi.156, xxxviii.28; Dinarchus 
i.17; Lysias iii.48, xvi.17, xviii.25, xx.30, xxi.17, xxv.4, 6).
Justice words are used sparingly in forensic oratory, comprising no more than 0.8 per 
cent of any orator. They occur with much the same frequency in most orators. When 
used they emphasise claims about particular actions, activities, opinions or pleas. The 
patterns demonstrated show that they are more often used about legal claims than 
nonlegal ones.
Direct Attacks on Law
As noted in Chapter Two, speakers never claim that laws are unjust or that the jurors 
should apply a sense of justice in their place. This contrasts with our extant rhetorical 
handbooks, which envisage direct attacks on laws. Aristotle (Rhet. 1375a30-1375b28) 
outlines arguments speakers should use when the law was for or against them.138 The 
Rhetorica ad Alexandrum (1443al 1-38) is comparable in its treatment of ambiguous 
laws, but also suggests that speakers can attack laws as being bad or harmful to the polis 
(1443a20-30).
The closest we get to a direct attack on a law in forensic oratory is in Hyperides iv.4-9, 
where the speaker claims that his oppon^xn ax-ued that the jurors should not follow the 
law on eisangelia (tco eiaaYY^TiKO) vopw). In this case, the prosecutor Polyeuctus had 
brought an eisangelia which the speaker claims was legally invalid. This is not a direct 
attack on a law, however, as the prosecutor had brought the case under tco eiaaYY£^T|K4> 
vopq) itself; rather, it is an attempt to head off the defendant’s likely plea.
137 The figures for each orator are: Aeschines 112 (0.2%); Andocides 38 (0.4%); Antiphon 97 (0.8%); 
Demosthenes 1403 (0.6%); Dinarchus 92 (0.8%); Hyperides 72 (0.6%); Isaeus 109 (0.3%); Isocrates 91 
(0.7%); Lycurgus 79 (0.7%); Lysias 368 (0.7%). In calculating these figures I used the tables for the total 
word counts in forensic speeches published by Berkowitz and Squitier (1986).
138 If the law was against the speaker he should rely on general Greek customs and equity, and claim that 
Yvd)|jn Tfj ÖiKaiOTCrrri means that a juror should not apply written laws rigorously. He should also check 
whether the law is contradictory to another law, or, if the meaning of the law is ambiguous, interpret it to 
suit his case. If the law supports the speaker’s case, he should argue the contrary; YVU)|jr| T(l ÖiKaiOTCrrri 
will now no longer afford a juror any justification for deciding contrary to law.
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Other possible attacks on law also turn out to be legal arguments. Possible attacks 
include arguments that the Amnesty for crimes committed before 403 B.C. does not 
apply, and criticism of the diamarturia procedure. Three speakers argue that their 
opponents should not benefit from the Amnesty (Lysias vi.37-41, xiii.88-90, xxvi.16- 
20). In all three cases, however, the speakers do not attack the Amnesty itself, but try to 
show that their opponents are not covered by it. In relation to diamarturiai, two did 
attack the procedure because it would not allow a jury to judge all claims to an estate 
(Demosthenes xliv.57-59; Isaeus vi.52), and one stated that diamarturiai are 
aöiKcbTorroi of all trials (Demosthenes xliv.57), but neither claimed that the law should 
not apply. Each relied on his own legal claims to the estate (Demosthenes xliv.2-3, 5-6, 
7-8, 15-16,46-51, 60, 63-64, 65-68; Isaeus vi.3-4, 8-9, 25-26, 42, 44, 47-50, 63-64).140 
Christ suggests that jurors may have taken such claims seriously, but fails to show that 
such claims were crucial to a case or more important than other legal claims. The attacks 
on diamarturiai were probably made to secure the goodwill of the jury; when it fitted a 
speaker’s case, he could argue that a diamarturia was the right and proper course of 
action (Isaeus iii.43-44).141
At times speakers may also display some apparent reluctance to rely solely on law. For 
example, the speaker of Demosthenes xxxvii.21, having outlined how the laws support 
his case, adds that in order that the jurors should not believe that he is evading the rights 
of the case because he has the worst of it, he will also address each of his opponent’s 
charges.142 In addition to this, it has been suggested that speakers make quite a fuss 
about being seen to be “legal amateurs,” which, it is suggested, reflects a broader 
suspicion in society of overtly legalistic claims.143 Many of these claims are, however, 
rather exaggerated by modem scholars. While speakers do occasionally state that they 
have been forced to study law because of their opponents (Demosthenes liv. 17,
139 The speaker of Lysias xiii, for example, argued that Agoratus was not covered as he was in Piraeus not 
in Athens, while the speaker of Lysias xxvi distinguished between people who stayed in Athens but did 
not commit crimes and those who were responsible for accusations and arrests. None of these speakers 
tried to establish a case based on equity, and indeed all claimed their cases were lawful (Lysias vi.8, 12, 
51-53, xiii.95, xxvi.5, 9).
140 There is also a hint of antagonism to the diamarturia at Isaeus vii.3.
141 This point is made by Wyse (1904:492). For Christ’s comment, see (1998:216). Christ (1998:213) also 
claims that litigants could claim that paragraphai were similarly an unfair deviation from euthudikia, but I 
cannot find this meaning in the passages he cites (Demosthenes xxxiv.4, xlv.6). The speaker of 
Demosthenes xxxiv.4 simply outlines the legal basis o f a paragraphe, while at Demosthenes xlv.6 
Apollodorus complains that Phormio had an advantage in appearing first.
142 Tva ö’, u) ävöpes ’ A0nvaToi, prj tis oirrrai toTs nepi tujv npayiJdTcov auTcov öiKcdois 
äAiGKÖpevöv p’ erri tout’ cxnoxtopeiv.
143 See in particular Humphreys (1988:486); Christ (1998:203-8); Todd (2000a:31).
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Hyperides iii.13), the point of their remarks may be that they do not wish the jurors to 
view them as sycophants, rather than being a reaction against some deep-rooted 
suspicion of law. In 85 speeches, as noted above, speakers make claims that their cases 
are supported by laws, and it is striking that in the vast majority of these they show no 
trepidation about discussing law.
Some authors have also suggested that Athens had a very free interpretation of contract 
rights. Christ, for example, argues that jurors could regularly overturn wills and 
contracts, though as the only evidence he produces is Hyperides iii Athenogenes 
(contracts) and Aristophanes’ Wasps 583-86 (wills), it is difficult to place too much 
faith in his claim.144 We do not know whether the plea against the contract with 
Athenogenes was successful, and in other speeches speakers place considerable 
emphasis on upholding contractual arrangements (Demosthenes xxxiii.3, 35-36, 
xxxiv.3-5, xxxv.16-22, xxxvi.4-7, xxxvii.17-18, xxxviii.3-4, xlviii.38, lii.3-7, lvi.1-4, 
41). Similarly, speakers who did not inherit an estate may claim that wills are invalid or 
can be forged (Isaeus i. 15-21), but if they were in possession they could claim that the 
will was valid and lawful (Isaeus ii. 1-2). Speakers who felt they had been cheated out of 
an inheritance would rely upon the original will (Demosthenes xxvii.4-8; Lysias xxxii.6- 
7).145
A rather different view of contracts has been offered by Todd, who claims “so absolute 
at Athens was the doctrine of freedom of contract that you could if you wished contract 
out of the protection which the law afforded you.” 146 He argues that the speaker of 
Demosthenes xxxv.39 claims that his contract, dealing with obligations for carrying 
cargc eil a voyage, does not allow anything to have greater authority than the terms 
within it, including a law or a decree. He also states that Demosthenes xlviii proves that 
two people could enter into an agreement to commit a crime, one of whom later 
expected a court to hear his claim to force his erstwhile partner to uphold the agreement.
144 Christ (1998:218-23).
145 In this context, Isaeus xi must be discussed, as it has been seen as proving that jurors ignored the law in 
deciding inheritance disputes. The claims in the speech are based on the degree of relationship of a 
number of relatives, and turn on the precise meaning o f the phrase äveipioü naTs. Wyse (1904:673-74) 
considered that it meant the child of a first cousin, but this is disputed (Thompson 1976:4-6). The 
alternative theory, that the phrase could refer to second cousins, may, if true, prove that the speaker of 
Isaeus xi did indeed have the best legal claim to the estate (Thompson 1976:5).
146 Todd (1993:59).
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Todd’s first point may be disputed. The contract read out at xxxv.10-13 outlines the 
arrangements for the security in the event that the ship is damaged beyond repair but the 
security is saved; the contract then reads Kupidrrepov öe nepi toütcüv äXAo pqöev elvai 
Trjs ouYYPO ^n? (Demosthenes xxxv.13). Later in the speech, the speaker complains that 
his opponent lent the security after the wreck, and argues that this was not permitted 
under the contract (xxxv.36-38). He states here q pev yap auyypa(j)fi oüöev 
KupidoTSpov 6QC elvai Tcov eyyeypaiJiJevcov, oüöe rrpoocjjepeiv oÜTe vöpov outs 
4Jri4)iopa out’ äXA’ oüö’ ötioGv rrpos Tf)v auyypa4>nv. He is not arguing that the 
contract has more authority than any law, but that his opponent should have stuck to the 
letter o f the contract in lending the security, and that nothing would have justified 
departing from it, not even a law or decree. The speaker in fact argues that his stance is 
in accordance with law (xxxv.3-4, 45). His argument seems specious, but he is certainly 
not offering a nonlegal plea or claiming that the contract is above the law.
Similarly, it will not do to press Demosthenes xlviii as evidence of criminal collusion. 
The speaker points out that he came to an agreement with his relative Olympiodorus to 
put in a claim for an inheritance and to divide it between them, pointing out that this 
agreement was enacted according to law and in front of witnesses (xlviii.5-11). In the 
sequence of events that followed he and Olympiodorus first won the estate and then lost 
it, and then at a further diadikasia Olympiodorus won the estate. On this occasion 
Olympiodorus “said exactly what he wanted to” (kcu eXeyev ö n eßoüXeTo) and 
produced false witnesses (xlviii.31, 44). The speaker himself is somewhat equivocal at 
first about his role in the matter, first indicating that he sat in silence on the other 
platform (xlviii.31) but later admitting that he corroborated Olympiodorus’ account 
(xlviii.44). The point of the case is not that the contract was fraudulent; indeed, the 
speaker claims it was lawful and produces witnesses to that effect (xlviii. 11). It is rather 
that the estate may have been won through false testimony. The speaker is not trying to 
get the jury to uphold a criminal agreement, but to overturn an award that he claims was 
won through lying. As we do not possess Olympiodorus’ response we do not know 
whether he admitted his witnesses lied.
Overall, given the absence of attacks on law and the fact that speakers generally claim 
that their cases are lawful, it is difficult to see any real support for the view that notions 
o f equity or justice could be introduced to replace law. One major disputed point
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remains - the cases that some modem scholars claim were fundamentally based on 
equity in opposition to law.
Possible Equity Pleas
Some of the cases used to support the “equity” theory were discussed in Chapter Two. 
Hyperides iii (Against Athenogenes) is probably the “flagship” case. The speaker’s 
claim in that speech to be released from his contract with Athenogenes has been labelled 
an equity plea by a fairly large number of scholars.147 As noted in Chapter Two, Meyer- 
Laurin refuted this view by pointing out that the speaker’s case is based on the claim 
that the contract was illegal, as evidenced by its incompatibility with a range of laws. 
The speaker is not claiming that it would be more “just” to revoke the contract, but that 
it would be lawful.149 Other cases, such as Demosthenes xxxii, which has been viewed 
as proving a contract could be overturned through a plea based on exceptio doli, were 
similarly discussed in Chapter Two. In this section I shall concentrate on four additional 
cases that are either viewed as being decided on the basis of justice in opposition to law, 
or that appear to contain a nonlegal, equity plea. It is important to note here that this 
thesis does not dispute that cases based on justice or equity could be made; 
Demosthenes xxxix, as discussed above, was clearly based on justice rather than law. 
The point is rather that such pleas are extremely rare in forensic oratory and certainly 
atypical.
The first speech to be considered is probably the weakest case - Demosthenes xviii (On 
the Crown). Recently, Christ has asserted that Demosthenes’ response to Aeschines’ 
legal claims was based on justice, claiming that at xviii. 111 Demosthenes said his case 
would be “based on what is right.” He argued that Demosthenes presented “his position 
in a way that is clearly more compatible than Aeschines’ with a popular audience’s 
sensibilities: what is simple and right should naturally be preferred over sykophantic 
(sic) legalities.”150 Demosthenes does not say, however, that his case will be “based on 
what is right”, but that he will “discuss the justice of the case in a straightforward and
147 Vinogradoff( 1922:68, 1928a:20-21); Stoffels (1954:33); Gemet (1955:80, n.3); Scafiiro (1997:61-63); 
Christ (1998:221-22); Whitehead (2000:306).
148 Meyer-Laurin (1965:17-19); and see also E. M. Harris (2000:51-54).
149 The speaker’s claim may have been legally invalid, but that does not automatically make it an equity 
plea, nor does it indicate that the jurors would have been willing to accept a legally invalid argument.
150 Christ (1998:208).
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direct manner.” 151 As Table 5.1 shows, the majority of the Crown speech contains legal 
argument, and Demosthenes spent most of the speech discussing the charges. 
Demosthenes’ comment at xviii.l 11 in fact led on to a discussion where he sought to 
refute Aeschines’ legal claims, so it is difficult to see xviii.l 11 as based on justice as 
opposed to law.
The next case is Isaeus i (On the Estate o f Cleonymus). In this case the speaker seeks to 
overturn the will through which his opponent has gained Cleonymus’ estate by claiming 
that attempts to revoke the will were subverted by the opponent and that he was more 
closely related to the deceased than the opponent (Isaeus i.13-14, 41-43). The speaker 
urged the jurors to decide on the grounds of closer affinity rather than an unjust will. 
Wyse interpreted the speech as a particularly weak legal case, but could see no evidence 
of equity arguments. Others, however, have seen the speech as an equity plea on the 
grounds that it appealed to affinity over the terms of the will. In response, Meyer-
Laurin claimed that, while the speaker’s case was weak, it was nonetheless 
“formaljuristich.” 154 The speaker does claim on several occasions that his case is lawful 
(Isaeus i.4, 26, 40, 43, 49, 50-51). More importantly, however, as a relative the speaker 
had a right to claim the inheritance. His suit was brought in accordance with Athenian 
laws which allowed relatives to make a claim for an estate, even if another claimant was 
named in a will.155 If such pleas were legally permissible it is difficult to see how the 
argument in Isaeus i could be an example of a nonlegal equity plea. In fact, the claim 
that challenges to wills based on a closer relationship were legally invalid is curious to 
say the least. Such challenges are not unknown in modem family law and it is odd that 
Vinogradoff should have ignored this.
The third case is Demosthenes lvi (Against Dionysodorus). The speaker in this case, 
Darius, offers a strong literal interpretation of the contract, arguing that as the contract 
required Dionysodorus to transfer goods in a single ship and send the same ship back to 
Athens, and as Dionysodorus had not done this, he should pay additional penalties. 
Vinogradoff pointed out that Dionysodorus was likely to offer an equity plea in reply, 
claiming that he had sent the goods back by another ship, and that as the ship had been
151 Demosthenes xviii.l 11: ariAcbs öe Tr)V Op0f|v nepi t&v öiKodoov öiaAe^opai. This statement is 
repeated by Demosthenes at xviii.322.
152 Wyse (1904:177-78).
153 Seeliger (1876:673-74); Vinogradoff (1922:67, 79-80); Wolf (1956:204, 218 n.8).
154 Meyer-Laurin (1965:20); see also Hitzig (1897:180-81).
155 Isaeus iii.30, iv.2-4, vi.3-4; see also Harrison (1968-71, 1:158-59).
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damaged it was not possible to send them back in the same ship.156 Meyer-Laurin 
argued that this was not clear and that both sides debated the precise interpretation of 
the contract clause. It is probably impossible to tell, as we do not have a copy of the 
contract. It is worth noting that, if the contract did indeed specify that the same ship had 
to return to Athens, without offering any other options in case of damage, then on a 
strict interpretation Darius was right, though it is always possible that Darius is 
suppressing something, as we know that other contracts did outline some options in the 
case of damage (Demosthenes xxxv.13). In any event, Vinogradoff may have been 
correct here in suggesting that Dionysodorus was going to make an equity plea, though 
in this case the plea would be based on the fact that the basic terms of the contract had 
been met, albeit using a different ship, rather than on the view that the contract was 
unconscionable and should be revoked. Darius’ case is sycophantic, and it would be 
interesting to know whether the jurors accepted his strict interpretation of the contract.
The final case to be considered is Lycurgus i (.Against Leocrates). Lycurgus charged 
Leocrates with treason, using an eisangelia. E. M. Harris has pointed out that the law 
listed some of the offences that could be considered treason, thus providing some 
guidance for the jurors. Lycurgus’ problem in this speech is that the particular crimes 
he alleged Leocrates had committed were not detailed in the law, as Lycurgus himself 
admits (i.9: öoa öe pq a(J)ööpa nepieiXqĉ ev, evi övöpom npoaaYopeuoas). As a result 
he has to ask the jurors to innovate with regard to the penalties (i.7-9). Lycurgus’ speech 
depended to a great deal on whether Leocrates had actually fled Athens or simply 
travelled as a merchant, and his arguments on this matter are not exactly convincing. He 
fleshed out his case by discussing Leocrates’ removal of his ancestral images from 
Attica (i.25-26), by introducing the irrelevant claim that Leocrates had shipped com to 
other cities (i.26-27), and by discussing a challenge he made to Leocrates demanding his 
slaves for torture (i.28-35). Lycurgus lost his case (albeit by one vote - Aeschines 
iii.252), and as Harris notes “the majority reasonably rejected his attempt to press the 
limits of the law’s open texture.” It might be added that they also considered the 
evidence poor.
In pressing the law to cover actions which may not obviously have appeared like
156 Vinogradoff (1922:78-79; 1928a:20).
157 E. M. Harris (2000:70).
158 E. M. Harris (2000:75).
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treason, Lycurgus could be seen to be appealing to a sense of justice in opposition to the 
law. Against this, he claims throughout his speech to be following the law (i.1-2, 4-6, 8, 
35, 37, 52, 55, 149-50). The very broadness of the eisangelia procedure also needs to be 
considered. The procedure could be used to try cases of alleged treason, and presumably 
the Assembly considered that there was enough legal basis to Lycurgus’ claim to permit 
the case to go ahead. Lycurgus was making a legal plea, rather than one based on equity.
These four cases, along with those discussed in Chapter Two such as Hyperides iii, do 
not support the claim that speakers frequently appealed for equity in opposition to law. 
Speakers generally claimed that law was on their side. Sometimes they pushed the law 
beyond what it actually allowed, but such cases are very rare in our corpus. The one 
speech that does contain a plea based on justice - Demosthenes xxxix - failed, as did 
another speech - Lycurgus i - which stretched the law. As a result, we should be wary of 
presuming that equity pleas were a normal feature of Athenian litigation. The fact that, 
when we know the results of the cases, the pleas were unsuccessful of itself explains 
their rarity in our corpus.
Summary
This has been a long chapter, but necessarily so as it dealt with central issues for this 
thesis and our interpretation of the application of relevance in Athenian courts. The 
following major points were made:
• many of the topics identified as ‘nonlegaT by modem authors are not;
• relevant topics in a speech can be defined as arguments that sought to prove the 
charge and the accusations outlined in the charge; both Aristotle and modem 
advocates have defined these parts of a speech as the statement and the proof;
• analysis of the speeches shows that the vast majority of the sections in Athenian 
speeches deal with legal arguments;
• in most speeches the proportion of legal arguments is greater than the proportion of 
nonlegal arguments;
• only a few speeches give any priority to nonlegal arguments, but legal arguments are 
generally given priority;
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• 85 of the 104 speeches considered contain a statement that the speaker’s case is 
lawful;
• the Heliastic oath is used regularly to support a vote in accordance with laws, and not 
for a nonlegal decision based on justice;
• when “justice” words are used they frequently have a legal meaning and are rarely 
used to support nonlegal claims;
• there is no good evidence for direct attacks on law;
• there is little good evidence from our speeches for equity claims, though one speech, 
Demosthenes xxxix, was based on such a claim; and
• significantly, where speakers did invoke concepts of justice that clashed with law, as 
far as we know their attempts failed.
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Chapter Six Evidence in Athenian Courts
Witnesses
In Chapter Three I noted that there has been a longstanding view that Athenian 
witnesses were habitual perjurers, appearing as partisan supporters of a speaker rather 
than to confirm facts through their testimony. Proponents of this view argue that it was 
the status and identity of a witness, rather than the content of his testimony, that was 
more crucial in determining the outcome of a case.1 2*Some suggest that the frequency of 
perjury led juries to judge speakers on their past character and services, since they could 
not determine the facts of the case because witnesses for each side would generally 
present contradictory evidence.
In developing this view modem scholars have relied upon a variety of evidence. The 
earliest scholars relied upon fragments of Middle and New Comedy such as Eubulus 
Olbia Fr. 74 [PCG] and Diphilus Emporos Fr 31 [PCG] which joked about buying 
witnesses. Cohen relied on a dozen or so claims in forensic oratory that opponents had 
suborned witnesses, and also curiously interpreted four speeches as proof that witnesses 
regularly competed with each other and provided contradictory evidence.4 Todd 
tabulated the relative frequency of testimonies in forensic speeches, but relied more on 
the contrasts between modem and Athenian court procedure to support his claim that 
witnesses were partisan.5 Humphreys alone carried out a detailed analysis, classifying 
testimonies by the type of witness and developing a hierarchy of testimonies from “more 
independent to less independent.”6
These analyses can all b* »rrvsed of some selectivity. There are indeed passages in 
which speakers claim that their opponents’ witnesses are lying, though as noted in 
Chapter Three a speaker’s accusation against his opponent’s witnesses need not imply 
that perjury was a regular feature of court procedure. When a speaker accuses his 
opponent of false witness, the clear thrust of the argument is that perjury is unjust. 
Indeed, speakers could point out that witnesses would feel it beneath them as kccXo'i 
KcxyaSoi to give false testimony, even for a friend (Demosthenes xlix.37-8). There is
1 Humphreys (1985:315, 322-4); Todd (1990b:27); Christ (1998:41).
2 Cohen (1995a: 106-7).
J Anon. (1826:345). The fact that the Emporos is set in Corinth did not seem to occur to the writer.
4 Cohen (1995a: 109-15).
5 Todd (1990a:23-4, 27-31, 1993:96-7).
6 Humphreys (1985:325).
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probably not a legal system in the world in which speakers have not at some time 
claimed that their opponents’ witnesses are lying.7 8If one were to take a sample of about 
100 speeches over about a hundred years from any legal system, one might well find as 
many or more claims as Cohen identified in Athenian speeches. In order to prove that 
perjury really was commonplace, one needs to prove that it occurred more frequently at 
Athens than at some “norm,” however that may be defined. By contrast, although 
scholars assert that actions for false witness were “common” in Athens, they do not 
quantify what proportion o f witness statements might have been false and the number 
that might prove that perjury was common.
The dozen or so references collected by Cohen are not exactly overwhelming evidence, 
especially when one considers the external evidence, presented in Chapter Three, that 
showed that Athenians commonly viewed perjury as unjust. Todd suggested that the 
rarity of attacks on opponents’ witnesses may indicate that witnesses were recognised as 
being in court to express support, rather than to confirm facts.9 However, attacks are not 
as rare as he claimed and are in fact as common in forensic oratory as claims that an 
opponent’s witnesses are lying.10 This is hardly surprising, as both are part of a single 
topos o f forensic oratory, in which a litigant attempted to attack and undermine his 
opponent’s witnesses.
It is this topos that may well explain the occurrence of accusations of perjury. Rhetorical 
handbooks recommended that speakers claim their opponents’ witnesses were perjurers, 
indicating that such accusations may have been a regular way of undermining the 
credibility of witnesses (Aristotle Rhet. 1376a20-40; Rhet. ad Alex. 1431b21-1432a3, 
1432a33-1432b4). The author of the Rhetc: La Alexandrum noted:
avnXeYOVTas papTupiQc öeT töv Tpönov tou pdpTupos öiaßäXXeiv äv q
novqpos, q to papTupoüpevov e êTd êiv äv änlGavov övTUYXävq, q Kal 
ouvapcJiOTepois toütois avTiXeyeiv, auväYOVTas Tä (JjauXoiaia tcov evavTicov 
eis TaÜTÖ. OKerrreov öe Kai ei cJjiXos ecrriv ö päpTus u) papmpeT, q ei peTserri 
TTO08V aÜTü) toü npäYpocros, q sxöpos ecrriv ou KaiapapTupeT, q nevqs-
7 In commenting on this claim some one himdred and seventy years before Cohen, Anon. (1827:251) 
pointed out: “wherever wine has been, there has been also a due proportion of drunkenness; wherever 
there are judicial proceedings, there is a fair sprinkling o f perjuries.”
8 Cohen (1995a: 109).
9 Todd (1990a:24).
10 Aeschines i.69; Demosthenes xxix.22, 28, xxx.38-39, xxxiii.37-8, xxxiv. 18-20, 28, xxxvii.48, xxxix.22, 
xl.28, 58-9, xli. 12-17, xlvii.39, lii.17, liv.31-6; Isaeus iii.22-5, viii.13. The speakers o f Antiphon vi.28-9, 
Demosthenes xxix.22-24, lvii.53-54, Isaeus xii.4-8 and Lysias i.41-2 anticipate that their opponents will 
attack their witnesses. These figures are rather higher than Todd’s (1990a:24) claim that “there are only 
three possible examples.”
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toütgov yäp oi pev öiä xäpiv, oi öe öiä Tipcopiav, ol öe öiä Kepöos 
ünoTTTeüovTai Tä qjeuön papnipeTv.
When attacking evidence we must slander the character of the witness if he is a 
rogue, or examine the evidence to see if it is improbable, or even attack both the 
witness and his evidence together, collecting together the weakest parts of the 
opponent’s case. And we must examine if the witness is a friend of the man for 
whom he is giving evidence, or if he has some stake in the matter, or if he is an 
enemy of the man against whom he is giving evidence, or if he is poor; for in 
these circumstances witnesses are suspected of giving false evidence, some out 
of favour, some out of revenge, and others out of profit (143 lb33-41).
Given this advice, attacks on witnesses may simply be an attempt to undermine an 
opponent’s case, rather than symptoms of a deeper malaise within the Athenian legal 
system. Accordingly, the simple occurrence of accusations of perjury is not sufficient 
evidence for traducing Athenian witnesses. A more systematic analysis is required. For 
example, we need to know whether the majority of witnesses in the corpus of Athenian 
forensic oratory did not testify to facts, or expressed support for speakers, or testified to 
irrelevant issues as a means of expressing support. Similarly, we need to know if most 
witnesses were partisan supporters rather than independent, and where speakers do 
appear to be partisan, whether this can be explained by specific circumstances or not.
The most detailed analysis of Athenian witnesses to date that purports to answer these 
questions is that carried out by Humphreys. Humphreys claims that Athenian witnesses 
were largely partisan supporters. There are, however, a number of flaws in her analysis. 
In the first place, it is not clear how Humphreys determined that particular categories of 
witness were more or less independent. Why, for example, is an official more 
independent than a bystander or a member of a phratry? Athenian speakers could 
suggest that members of their phratry and deme appearing as uieii witnesses were too 
numerous to have been suborned, which suggests that they could be viewed as 
independent (Demosthenes lvii.24). A member of a phratry or deme is not of necessity a 
supporter or a member of a speaker’s kin group. Witnesses will testify against fellow 
demesmen (Demosthenes lii.28). As a result, I do not agree with Humphreys’ contention 
that they fall into the “less independent” category.11
In relation to bystanders, speakers could clearly see these as offering proof of their 




regularly took acquaintances with them as witnesses to important matters, in unforeseen 
situations they relied on the testimony of people who they came upon by chance (tous 
npocrruxovTas - Isaeus iii. 19), which indicates that bystanders could be seen to be 
independent. Similarly, Ariston’s comments in Demosthenes liv.32 that his witnesses 
were not acquainted with him and would not therefore have borne false witness for him 
if they had not seen his suffering, indicates that these bystanders were viewed as 
independent. Humphreys’ claim that witnesses without personal ties to the litigant 
would be viewed as testifying for payment or to make trouble is not substantiated, and is 
contradicted by these very passages. Humphreys also hints that bystanders may not 
have been real bystanders as “members of the litigating class would probably be able to 
find an acquaintance of two in most urban gatherings”, which is a bold assumption.14 It 
is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Humphreys does not want bystanders to be 
independent as she is committed to seeing all witnesses as supporters of the litigant.
Another problem is that there is a contradiction between Humphreys’ claim that 
witnesses were largely partisan, and her own analysis, which delivers a fairly large 
number of apparently independent witnesses. Humphreys identifies, for example, eleven 
occasions when officials testified. Officials are her most “independent” category. It is 
not stated how we are to reconcile these issues, unless we assume that Humphreys’ 
thesis is that even the most independent category of witnesses is not to be viewed as 
independent, but simply less clearly partisan than, for example, members of a speaker’s 
family. In other words, she may be arguing that all witnesses are partisan, but some are 
more partisan than others.
If this is die case, then partiality needs to be demonstrated. Yet this is exactly whd. 
Humphreys does not do. Her sole proof of partiality appears to be the claim that 
sometimes witnesses are testifying to irrelevant matters, noting that what matters to the 
speakers “is to show that they are solidly supported by a large body of kin.”13 Yet her 
claims of irrelevance will not stand closer analysis. The following are worth noting:
1. “In [Demosthenes] 49 Timotheus 43 we learn that Timotheus had sent Phrasierides of 
Anaphlystos, who had been granted citizenship on his proposal and enrolled in his 





Apollodorus. In this case Apollodoms got Phrasierides to witness on his own behalf 
that he had been given full facilities, a testimony which had little strict bearing on the 
case but...was probably designed to give the jury the impression that all Timotheus’ 
supporters were deserting him and aiding his opponent.”16
• Leaving aside for the moment the fact that it is not clear that Phrasierides actually 
testified, Demosthenes xlix is a suit about loans made to Timotheus and not repaid. 
Timotheus was likely to cast doubt on the bank records, which is why it is relevant to 
have witnesses testify that one of his representatives checked the books.
2. “In [Demosthenes] 47 Euergus 48 fellow-trierarchs are called to testify that they, like 
the speaker, had seized property from men who had failed to hand over trireme gear: 
a clear example of the way in which members of the upper class call on their peers 
for testimony which has little direct bearing on the case, but indicates solidarity with
1 7the litigant and legitimizes his behaviour.”
• The speaker had experienced difficulty in getting equipment for his trierarchy from 
his predecessor and had seized it. His opponent was likely to argue that the speaker’s 
behaviour had been excessive and unwarranted, and therefore it was relevant to note 
that other trierarchs had experienced the same problem and acted in the same way.
3. “In [D.] Olymp. 34-5 witnesses who had initially put in a successful claim for the 
estate of Comon, which had subsequently been awarded to the speaker’s opponent, 
testified that the speaker had duly handed property over to them (a testimony of little 
relevance serving mainly to suggest that the speaker had the support of his 
kindred).”18
• The speaker was suing his kindred for the property and was claiming that his half- 
brother had broken an agreement to share it. It was therefore relevant to inform the 
jury of the history of the agreement and what had previously been handed over.
4. “Though understandably reluctant to commit themselves on the question of 
Euthycrates’ death, the demesmen were prepared to support the speaker (whose own 
deme is unknown) with testimony that they did not know of a will of his matrilateral 
half-brother, Astyphilus, in favour of his opponent, Cleon II (§§ 8-9) and that 




case where the content of the witnesses’ testimony is of little significance, but their 
presence in court is intended to convey to the jury that the speaker has the opinion of 
the local community on his side.”19
• The speaker was trying to overturn a will in favour of Cleon II and assert his own 
right to the estate on the grounds of relationship and his closer friendship with 
Astyphilus. It was relevant to prove that Astyphilus had not had a close relationship 
with Cleon II as this helped to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the will.
An alternative view of Athenian witnesses has been developed in response to claims that 
witnesses commonly perjured themselves. This view can be traced as far back as 1827, 
when claims in the Quarterly Review that perjury was common in Athens were derided 
in the Westminster Review.21 More recently, both Carey and Mirhady22 have argued that 
Athenian witnesses did generally testify to facts, and were not simply there to express 
support for a speaker. This picture certainly gains support from forensic oratory. A 
speaker in one of Demosthenes’ speeches claims that all the jurors know that a witness 
is someone who has no stake in the matter. Speakers frequently claim that their 
witnesses have proven that what they are saying is true,24 and that their opponents’ 
assertions, which are not proved by witnesses, should not be believed. " They state that
19 Humphreys (1985:344).
20 There are also methodological problems with Humphreys’ analysis. She often appears to confuse what 
is being testified with the identity of the witness. The identity of the witnesses is in many cases not stated 
in the speech. The following are all cases in which I believe Humphreys has assumed the identity of 
witnesses: Officials Dinarchus i.51-2; Demosthenes xviii.134; The ‘Professions’ and the World o f  
Business Relations Demosthenes xix.169-70, xxvii.27-8, 46, xxxvii.54, xl.52 (twice), xlix.43, 1.13, 56, 
liii.21; Isaeus ii.34, xi.40-3; Isocrates xvii.40-41; Bysiundc/o Demosthenes liii.17-18; Fellow-Voyagers 
and Fellow-Soldiers Aeschines ii. 19; Antiphon v.20, 22, 24, 28; Demosthenes xix.162, 163-5, xxxii.13, 
19, xxxiv.9-10, 37, liv.3-6; Lycurgus i. 19-20; Lysias xx.24-9; Politicians (Rhetores) Lysias xix.27; 
Demosthenes x lii.ll, 16; The Opponent’s ‘Enemies’ Demosthenes xxxvi.21, xxxix.19, xlii.23, xlviii.34-5, 
liii.20; Isocrates xviii.52-4; Lysias xiii.66, xxiii. 13-14; Neighbours Demosthenes xxx.26-30, xxxi.4, 
liii.16-18, 19-20; Cult Associates Demosthenes lvii.46; Clansmen - Phratry Demosthenes xxxix.4-5, 
xliv.44, lvii. 19, 46; Isaeus vi.26, xii.3, vii.13-17, ix.33; Clansmen - Deme Demosthenes xxxix.4-5; Isaeus 
ii.36-7; Lysias xvi.14; Friends Demosthenes xxvii. 19-22, xxviii.12, xxxvi.55, xlviii.3-4, 33, lvii. 14; Isaeus 
i.15-16, 31-2 (twice), viii. 15-17; Isocrates xvii.40-1 (twice); Lysias xvii.2, 3.
21 Anon. (1827:251).
22 Carey (1994a: 184); Mirhady (2002:256).
23 tis ydp üpcov oük oiöev, öti papTupes pev eioiv outoi, ol? pij person tou npaypaios
(Demosthenes xl.58).
24 Antiphon v.84, vi.28-9; Demosthenes xxii.22, xxix.7, 40, xxvii.47, xxxiii.29-31, 35, xxxiv.46, xxxvi.7, 
13, 25, 35, xxxvii.19, 21, 23, xl.19, 39, 54, xli.19, 25, xlii. 17, xliii.39, xlvii.3, xlix.33-4, 49, 65, 69, lii.8, 
liv.33, lv. 12, lvii. 17, 19,24-5, 29-30, 37, 44, 54, 62, 86; Isaeus iii.16, vi.15, viii.6, 29; Lysias vii.42, 
xiv.3. See also Mirhady (2002:257-8).
25 Antiphon vi.16-19, 28-9, 30-2, 47; Demosthenes xxviii.2, 5, 23, xxix.37, xxxiii.26, xxxiv.34, xl.20-1, 




jurors will reach their verdict based on the testimony of witnesses to the facts. These 
passages do not prove that perjury did not occur, but they indicate that it was by no 
means routinely to be expected that witnesses were partisan, or that they were expected 
to express support rather than testify to facts, or that jurors would be unwilling to decide 
based on testimony.
There is little evidence that the Athenians had a sophisticated concept of witness 
independence. They were aware that people could get their friends to testify for them, 
and that in such cases the witnesses might be lying, though they were also aware that 
friends may wish to avoid peijury and therefore were not automatically partisan. It is 
going too far, however, to claim that the “Athenians preferred witnesses who had had 
many dealings with the litigants, in the course of which they had developed feelings of 
loyalty or hostility, to impartial witnesses who had only encountered the litigants 
occasionally.” This assertion is contradicted by the importance Athenian speakers 
placed on witnesses as establishing the facts of the case, by their attacks on partisan 
witnesses and by the dearth of clear evidence that apparently independent witnesses 
were actually partisan.
The Athenians did have their own idea of who the best witnesses were. This was set out 
in a law on witnesses, cited by Apollodorus but generally overlooked in modem 
scholarship. Apollodorus claims that Stephanos had testified at Phormio’s bidding. 
“But the laws do not say this, but ordain that a man may testify to what he knows and to 
matters at which he was present.” Speakers regularly introduce witnesses as being 
either people who know about the matters, or people who were present. Lycurgus i.19 
introduces both types of witness together. The fact that witnesses were present was a key 
characteristic of the testimony at Demosthenes xix.130, xxxvi.24, xxxvii.17, xliii.70,
26 Demosthenes xlvii.3; lv.7; lvii.56.
27 Demosthenes xxix.15, 22-24, lii.17, 22, liv.35-6.
28 Demosthenes xlix.37.
29 Humphreys (1985:353-4).
301 can find no discussion of this law in such standard works as Christ (1998:25-43), Harrison (1968-71, 
11:136-47), Humphreys (1985), MacDowell (1978:242-7) or Todd (1993:96-7). It is mentioned by Meier 
and Schömann (1824:878) and Lipsius (1905-15,11:885, n.77).
31 oi öe ye vöpoi oü TaCrra Xeyouaiv, äXX’ ä äv eiöfj tis Kai ols äv rrapayevr|Tai npauopevois, 
TaÜTa papnipeiv KeXeüouoiv (Demosthenes xlvi.6). The law may also be referred to at Isaeus vi.53 
(ols pev yap tis napeyevsTO, öiKaiov, u) ävöp£9, papTUpeiv); see too Demosthenes lvii.4. The view 
that someone who knew the facts should testify can also be found in the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum
(1431 b20), which tells us that “evidence is an admission voluntarily made by someone who is privy [to 
knowledge] (papTUpia ö ’ ecrriv öpoXoyia öuvsiöötos eKÖVT09).”
32 Mirhady (2002:262).
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xlvii.40, xlviii.49, lvii.43, Isocrates xviii.8 and Lysias i.29, 43, while speakers stress that 
their cases are enhanced by witnesses who were present at Aeschines ii. 162,
Demosthenes xix.40, xli. 16, xlvi.6-7, lv.5, Isaeus iii. 19-21, v.20, viii. 14, Isocrates xx.l, 
Lysias iii. 16, 37 and vii.20. The testimony of people who knew facts was important in 
bolstering the speaker’s cases in Aeschines i.77-78, Demosthenes xxxiii.16, lvii, and 
Isaeus vii.10-11, viii.6, 14 and Lysias xvii.2. On some 26 occasions witnesses are 
identified only as those who were present, while on eight occasions they are identified 
only as those who know.34 Witnesses may also be identified as “those who saw” 
(Demosthenes xlvii.40) or “those who heard” (Demosthenes xlix.33, Lysias xii.47). 
Though not identified during the speech, these witnesses could be identified by their 
testimony. At Demosthenes xxxv.14 the speaker introduces the testimony of “those who 
were present”, and four men are then identified in the testimony preserved in the text.
A witness who was present or who had knowledge was not of necessity independent.
The Athenians would regularly take people with them as witnesses to important events, 
such as repayments or loans, in order to maximise their chances should a dispute arise.35 
On these occasions they would often take their “relatives and the people with whom 
they were most intimate” (toüs oiKeiOTÖrrous Kai oh äv TUYxavcopev xpoipevoi 
pdÄicrra - Isaeus iii. 19). Such witnesses may not be independent. Apollodorus, for 
example, presents a deposition witnessed by several of his cronies, including 
Demosthenes and Deinias, about the challenge he issued to Stephanus (Demosthenes 
lix. 123). Although the independence of the witnesses here is in doubt, it should be noted 
that the deposition is nonetheless factual and that the witnesses are not expressing 
support.
This evidence indicates that Athenians placed weight on witnesses who had been 
present or knew about issues, and that these may have been the key factors jurors 
examined in determining the value of witnesses. Clearly, speakers could try to 
undermine their opponent’s witnesses by claiming they were lying, though they could
JJ Demosthenes xix.162, 168, xxvii.41, 42, xxix.12, xxxiv.l 1, xxxvi.10, 16, 24, xxxvii.17, xli.6, xliii.31, 
xlviii.3, 49,1.56, Iii. 16, 31; Isaeus ii.34, v.6, 18-20, vi.7, 37; Lysias iii. 14, 20, xvi.14, xx.28.
34 Aeschines i.50; Demosthenes liii. 19; Isaeus ii.37, viii.42, ix.20, 29; Lycurgus i.20, 23.
35 Demosthenes xxx.20-1, xxxiv.28.
j6 oiKeTos has several overlapping meanings, including “relative,” “friend” or “intimate” (Goligher and 
Maguiness 1961:169). At times the choice of which word to use in translation is arbitrary. It is used 
several times in Isaeus iii, and clearly refers to relatives at iii.34, 73; elsewhere in the speech we cannot be 
sure whether we should translate as friends or relatives (iii. 13, 23, 24, 27). Given iii.34, 73 I have 
translated “relatives” here.
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also claim that their opponents simply did not have relevant witnesses. Issues such as a 
witness’s position or status may have been valuable in proving the respectability of a 
speaker’s witnesses, though if they were really that important one would expect them to 
be discussed frequently. This simply is not the case, and when speakers mention 
witnesses’ positions or status it is either because it is relevant to the discussion (for 
example, the witness was an official and the testimony is about matters in which they 
were involved) or it is presented incidentally. Table 6.1 shows that in the vast majority 
of cases speakers do not identify their witnesses, which is odd if their status was of such 
importance to the case. As Mirhady notes, Humphreys’ “hierarchy of 
credibility...seems a largely modem construct. The relative personal anonymity of the 
witnesses and the emphasis speakers put on their knowledge reflect a democratic view 
that Athens’ courts were blind to issues of status except to the extent that its witnesses
T Q
were, like the litigants who came before them, free men.”
The view that Athenian witnesses were not partisan but appeared to testify to facts does 
seem to have a lot of support from forensic oratory, but, like the opposing view that 
witnesses were partisan, it also needs to be tested against the full corpus of forensic 
oratory. In what follows I will re-examine the evidence for Athenian witnesses, trying to 
establish the identity of the witness (where possible) and the issues to which they 
testified. The latter allows us to evaluate whether witnesses testified to facts or simply 
expressed support. The former allows us to evaluate the degree to which speakers 
brought forward witnesses who were not independent and likely to lie for them. My test 
for independence is the presence of any indication that a witness may have had a stake 
in the outcome of the case, or a relationship with the speaker. If such an indication is 
present, the witness is not clearly independent.
Discussion o f the Evidence
Table 6.1 lists all the occurrences I have found of witness statements in our sample of 
forensic oratory. There are 404 statements in all, from all orators, and from 72
37 See for example Demosthenes xxviii.5, xxix.37, xxxiii.26. 
j8 This point is also made by Mirhady (2002:262-3).
39 Mirhady (2002:265).
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speeches.40 All of the speeches by Isaeus are represented in the sample, and most (37) of 
Demosthenes’ speeches; About half of Lysias’ speeches (16) are represented. The 
reasons for the variation are unclear, and may not be significant. The total number of 
witness statements would be higher if some of the speeches that we have only in 
fragments were preserved in their entirety, as in several fragments speakers mention 
earlier witness statements which have not been preserved (Isaeus xii.3, 8; Isocrates 
xvi.l, xx. 1; Lysias xxvi.8), while some of our speeches are synegoriai and witness 
statements were presented in speeches by other speakers on the same side in the trial 
(Demosthenes xxii.23).
I have not included notations for synegoroi in the table, nor occasions when speakers 
called on witnesses to testify or swear the exomosia (Aeschines i.68; Demosthenes 
xlv.60 and possibly xlix.20; Isaeus ix.18). On these occasions testimony may be read 
out, but it is unlikely that the speakers expect the witnesses to testify; indeed, they may 
simply be calling them to undermine their credibility (if they are testifying for their 
opponent) or to give an air of authenticity to spurious claims. Apollodorus, for example, 
raises the issue of an important deposition which he claims Stephanus stole during a 
hearing before an arbitrator, and challenges Stephanus’ friends to swear to the testimony 
he has drafted or swear the exomosia (Demosthenes xlv.60). As Apollodorus presents no 
other evidence for this missing deposition, and does not say what it was nor why it was 
important, his exomosia here may be purely tactical. Aeschines (i.67-9) used similar 
tactics to undermine Hegesandros, indicating that he was calling him to demonstrate 
what sort of man Timarchus’ way of life produces.
All o f the 404 depositions, as far as can be determined ft .>m the surrounding context, 
were made to attest to facts. The facts could at times be specious issues that were 
introduced to bolster a case, such as Demosthenes’ (xxix.53-4) use of witnesses to prove 
a challenge he made to Aphobus, which was designed to cast his opponent in a poor 
light. Speakers could also omit witnesses to crucial facts, especially if they were trying 
to conceal something. Apollodorus, for example, presents numerous witnesses in his 
suit against Polycles dealing with the various refusals and challenges made
40 My figures are somewhat different from Todd’s (1990a:39). Todd also found 404 statements, but I have 
rather different figures for some orators. The comparative figures are (Todd’s figures second): Antiphon 
10 (vs 8), Andocides 7 (vs 9), Lysias 47 (vs 49), Isaeus 67 (vs 69), Lycurgus 4 (vs 5), Hyperides 2 (vs 1), 
Aeschines 16 (vs 18) and Demosthenes 240 (vs 234). As Todd does not provide details on his figures I 
cannot determine why my data are different. Some guesses can be made; for example, I suspect that
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(Demosthenes li), but does not provide any witnesses to one of the key points of the 
case, which he tries to obscure - the fact that the general Timomachus appears to have 
ordered him to continue his trierarchy. Overall, there is not a single testimony that 
appears to have been a simple expression of support for the main speaker, which casts 
doubt on one of Todd’s and Humphreys’ main claims.
This does not mean that people did not appear in court simply to express support for a 
speaker. The synegoria of the Boeotians and Phocians at Aeschines ii. 143 has all the 
appearances of being such an expression of support. Rubinstein has suggested that one 
of the tasks of defence synegoroi may have been to display solidarity with the speaker, 
and that some synegoroi may have been little more than a presence in court, though she 
also argues that their verbal arguments were more important in court than their 
presence.41 Synegoroi were procedurally and legally distinct from witnesses, however, 
and it is significant that expressing support appears to have been limited to synegoroi 
who were not bound by legal restrictions such as suits for false witness or requirements 
to take oaths.
Of greater interest is the fact that 75 of the 404 depositions were about issues that I have 
argued could be deemed “nonlegal” or irrelevant in Athenian courts. Most of these (56) 
were witnesses to crimes or poor services which speakers claim were performed by the 
opponent or his associates42 and 19 were witnesses to the speakers’ liturgies or 
services.43 Nonlegal testimony could be included along with legal testimony in a single 
speech, for example in Aeschines i, Andocides i, Demosthenes xix, xxxiv, xxxvi, 
xxxvii, xl, xlii, xliii, xlvii, xlviii, 1, liv, lviii, lix, Isaeus ii, v, vii, viii, Isocrates xviii, and 
Lysias xxxi. In this regard it fits the pattern regularly observed in Chapter five, where 
nonlegal arguments supplemented the legal arguments presented in the speech.
In nine speeches nonlegal testimonies were dominant or, indeed, the only testimonies 
presented (Demosthenes xviii, xix, xxi, xxv; Lysias xii, xiii, xvi, xx, xxi). In 
Demosthenes xviii, xix and xxv there is comparatively little testimony, and issues
Todd’s figure for Aeschines is greater than mine because he included the exomosia at i.68 and the 
synegoria of the Boeotians and Phocians at ii. 143.
41 Rubinstein (2000:149-50).
42 Aeschines i.50, 66, 115, ii.68; Andocides i. 127; Demosthenes xviii. 135, 137, 146, xix.200, xxi.93, 107, 
121, 168, 174, xxv.58, 63, xxxiv.37, xxxvi.40, 48, 55, 56, xl.33, 35, xlii.25, xliii.70, xlvii.52, 61, 66, 67, 
77, 82, xlviii.55,1.68, liv.36, lviii.33, 35, 35, lix.34,48; Hyperides iii.33, 34; Isaeus iii.37, v.27, 38, 
viii.42, 46; Isocrates xviii.55; Lysias xii.42, 47, 61, xiii.64, 66, 68, 79, 81, xxxi. 19.
43 Aeschines ii. 170; Demosthenes xviii.267, xix. 168, 170, 236, xxxiv.39, xxxvi.56, 56, xxxvii.54; Isaeus 
ii.37, vii.36; Lysias xvi.13, 14, 17, xx.25, 26, 28, 29, xxi. 10.
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witnessed form a relatively small part of the overall speech. In Demosthenes xxi the 
testimony forms part of Demosthenes’ sustained attack on Meidias, including the story 
of Straton the arbitrator, all of which I have classified as irrelevant. Similarly, although 
much of the argument in Lysias xii and xiii is relevant, there are sections containing 
attacks on opponents which are classed as irrelevant, and witness testimony in the 
speeches is concentrated in those sections. Lysias xvi, xx and xxi are unusual speeches 
in that, while the speakers’ arguments do rely in part on their legal cases, they also rely 
to a large degree on their public services. Witnesses are used to prove the public 
services.
The occurrence of nonlegal testimonies backs up the comments made earlier that, 
although speakers might commonly label issues such as crimes or public services 
irrelevant, they could still be used in a speech and ultimately the only means to stop 
them being used was the displeasure of the jury. Athenian juries seem to have been 
generally willing to allow speakers to make their case, rather than to prevent particular 
arguments being made (leaving aside unusual cases such as Demosthenes xxxvi). The 
fact that witnesses could be presented to prove apparently irrelevant issues indicates that 
speakers could probably count on being able to discuss them, and that juries rarely 
intervened.
The majority of testimonies were about issues that were clearly relevant to the case. This 
does raise the issue whether the nonlegal testimonies were presented by supporters of 
the speakers, or by enemies of their opponents, and thus by partisan witnesses. 
Unfortunately, we have good evidence on the identity of the witnesses for only 16 of the 
nonlegal testimonies Aeschines i.66, 115, ii.68, 170, Demosthenes xxv.58, 63, xliii.70, 
xlvii.82, xlviii.55, lviii.33, 35, 35, lix.34, 48, Hyperides iii.34 and Isaeus vii.36. Some of 
the speakers appear to be independent. For example, Aeschines calls Glaucon of 
Cholargus to testify to Timarchus’ abuse of Pittalacus (i.66), and fellow soldiers and the 
strategus Phocion to testify to his own valour in combat (ii.170) and in a third case he 
calls Amyntor to testify to Demosthenes’ support for the Peace of Philocrates (ii.68).
The speaker of Demosthenes xliii.70 called neighbours to testify that Sositheus showed 
them that olive trees had been uprooted on Hagnias’ farm. The speaker of Isaeus vii.36 
calls tribesmen to witness his generosity as a gymnasiarch. These appear to be witnesses 
who knew about the matters in question, or were present. At other times, though the 
witnesses are named, we know nothing else about them and cannot judge whether or not
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they were independent (Demosthenes lviii.33, 35, lix.34, 48). The speaker of 
Demosthenes lviii.35 also calls Hyperides and Demosthenes to testify to Theocrines’ 
sycophancy, but alleges they are part of a cabal against him. They certainly do not 
appear to be independent witnesses. On three occasions speakers call witnesses who 
clearly were enemies of their opponent (Demosthenes xxv.58, 63, xlvii.82, and possibly 
also Aeschines i.l 15), while Demosthenes xlviii.55 and Hyperides iii.34 are depositions 
by relatives of the opponent (and of the speaker as well in Demosthenes xlviii.55). The 
enemies and relatives are clearly not independent, though they could also be viewed as 
witnesses who knew about the matters. Overall, though, there is little support even for 
the view that nonlegal issues will have been supported by witnesses who were partisan 
supporters of the speaker.
Generally, it is not possible to identify witnesses. Altogether, in 220 of the testimonies 
listed in Table 6.1 it is not clear who the witnesses were. A further 26 are identified only 
as “those who were present”, eight as “those who know”, two as “those who heard” and 
one as “those who saw”. On occasions we may make some reasonable guesses about the 
identity of these witnesses; Humphreys may be right, for example, in identifying the 
witnesses in Antiphon v.20-28 as probably fellow-voyagers, or the witnesses in Lysias 
xvi.14 as the men whose expenses the speaker had paid.44 It is methodologically 
unsound, however, to found an argument about the independence or partisanship of 
witnesses on cases where we do not know the facts for certain. Thus in the case of 
Lysias xvi, for example, the witnesses may be the lucky recipients of the speaker’s 
largesse, but they may also be friends whom the speaker took with him as witnesses, or 
bankers, or commanders, or bystanders.
Given this degree of uncertainty, I will restrict my analysis of the identity of witnesses to 
those cases where they are clearly identified in the speeches. As the resulting sample is 
much smaller, it should not be taken as representative of the entire sample of 404 
testimonies, or of the larger body of Athenian witnesses in general. It is always possible 
that the identities of the larger body of unknown witnesses may have been concealed for 
tactical reasons, so the data are suggestive, but no more.
In Table 6.1 there are 55 witnesses whom I would judge to have some stake in the 
matter, or to have a relationship with the speaker or his opponent. In 18 cases the
44 Humphreys (1985:330, 335).
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witnesses are relatives of the speaker, in five relatives of his opponent and in three 
relatives of both.45 Relatives of both parties testify in inheritance suits where the 
litigation is being conducted within a family. In 12 cases they are friends of the speaker 
and in three cases friends of his opponent (there is some overlap between relatives and 
friends as both may testify together at the one time).46 On 11 occasions those clearly 
enemies of the opponent testify, often men who have previously opposed him in court or 
who claim some wrong.47 On four occasions speakers claim they are calling their own 
enemies to testify; on these occasions the witnesses are not independent, but if their 
testimony supports the speaker’s case it has the effect of heightening its value as factual 
support. On two further occasions speakers call witnesses that they claim are friends of 
both themselves and their opponent;49 in this case, again, the witnesses are not 
independent but it seems that speakers expect the jury to believe that their mutual 
friendship makes their testimony more likely to be factual. Finally, there are two 
occurrences that I have not included in the 55; Apollodorus twice calls staff from his 
brother’s bank (Demosthenes xlix.33, 43) to testify about his father’s dealings with 
Timotheus. Although the Athenians may have viewed bankers as having a reputation for 
honesty (Isocrates xvii.2), Apollodorus makes it clear that he retained some control of 
the bank (xlix.43-7), so the staff could not really be classed as independent. Although a 
jury may have viewed them as such, I have excluded them.
Relatives could be called as witnesses in a variety of cases, including impiety cases 
(Andocides i.18, 69) or dikai blabes (Demosthenes xlviii.55), but they are most 
commonly called in cases involving inheritances, such as diadikasiai (or resulting dikai 
pseudomarturion) or dikai epitropes. Speakers call their relatives in such cases nine 
times.50 Relatives are also called in another case involving property, a diadikasia over
45 Relatives of the speaker: Andocides i.18, 68-9; Demosthenes xxvii.17, xlii.9, xliii.35-7, xlv.55, xlix.42, 
1.28, lvii.21, 22, 38, 39,43; Isaeus vi.l 1, viii. 13, ix.9, 19, 30. Relatives o f the opponent: Aeschines i. 104; 
Hyperides iii.34; Isaeus iii. 13, 56; Lycurgus i.24. Relatives of both: Demosthenes xlv.55, xlviii.55; Lysias 
xxxii.18.
46 Friends o f the speaker: Demosthenes x lii.9 ,1.28; Isaeus viii. 13, 17, ix.4, 9, 30; Lysias i.29, 43, xix.23, 
23, 59. Friends of the opponent: Aeschines i.50; Demosthenes xxx.9, xlv.19 and possibly xix.200 (if 
Diophantos was compelled to testify).
47 Enemies of the opponent: Demosthenes xxv.58, 63, xlvii.82, lii.21, lviii.9, 21, lix.54, 84, and possibly 
xlii.29; Lycurgus i.20; Lysias xxiii.4, 8 and possibly 14 (if Aristodicus testified) and Aeschines i.l 15 (it is 
not clear if Timarchus is an enemy o f the men who bribed him).
48 Enemies of speaker: Demosthenes xxvii.17 (co-guardians), lvii. 14 (the men who wronged him), lviii.35, 
43 (members of the plot against the speaker).
49 Demosthenes xli. 18; Isocrates xvii.31-2.
50 Demosthenes xxvii.17, xliii.35-7, xlv.55; Isaeus vi.l 1, viii. 13, ix.9, 19, 30; Lysias xxxii.18.
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an antidosis (Demosthenes xlii.4, 9).51 In addition, in one case involving citizenship the 
speaker calls relatives on five occasions (Demosthenes lvii.21, 22, 38, 39, 43). In such 
disputes, relatives are clearly amongst those in the best position to know the details, so 
although the witnesses are not independent it is difficult to see who else the speakers 
could have called. Significantly, in Demosthenes lvii the speaker backs up his relatives 
with friends and members of his phratry and deme, and is at pains to claim they are 
independent (Demosthenes lvii.24). Speakers in inheritance disputes similarly present 
members of their phratry and deme along with their relatives (Isaeus vi.l 1, viii. 13, 17, 
20, ix.9, 19, 21, 30, Demosthenes xliii.35-7). Even where relatives testify in cases that 
do not involve citizenship or property, they testify to intimate family details that they 
could be best expected to know (e.g. Andocides i.69). Accordingly, relatives fit the 
requirements of the law on witnesses in being people who knew the facts.
Speakers also presented friends in a variety of disputes, such as homicide cases (Lysias
i.23, 29, 41-3). They too often testify in cases involving property, including details on
loans and payments (Lysias xix.22-3, 59, Demosthenes xlii.9), along with inheritance
disputes (Isaeus viii. 13, 17, ix.4, 9, 30). Friends, like relatives, appear to testify to
intimate details that they could be expected to know and thus fit the requirements of the
law on witnesses. For example, the witnesses in Isaeus viii. 13, 17 and ix.4, 9, 30 testify
to details of family activities associated with inheritances, while the witnesses in Lysias
xix.23, 23, 59 testify to details of payments and loans made to them. It is always
possible that these witnesses are lying, and indeed we may be suspicious of the
testimonies in Lysias xix and Demosthenes 1.28 since they are relatively important for
the speakers’ cases. In all of the cases where relatives and friends testified, however,
*  -
they testified to facts relevant to the case and do not appear to have appeared simply to 
express support for the speaker.
There are 81 occasions listed in Table 6.1 when speakers presented apparently 
independent witnesses. These include 16 occasions when they presented members of 
their, or their family’s, phratry, deme or tribe, 14 when they presented current or
51 According to Demosthenes xxviii.17 and Isocrates xv.5, an antidosis was resolved by a diadikasia.
52 Demosthenes xliii.35-7, xliv.44, lvii.23, 23, 25, 40, 43, Iviii. 15; Isaeus ii. 16, iii.56, 76, 80, vi. 11, viii.20, 
ix.9, 21, and possibly vii.36 (the identification is not certain).
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former officials,53 nine when they presented military commanders,54 five when they 
called on groups of neighbours,55 three when they rolled out representatives from 
outside Athens, three when they summoned arbitrators, three when they called on 
follow-soldiers or voyagers,58 three when they used other men’s demesmen,59 a doctor 
who is called twice,60 bystanders (Demosthenes liv.9), tenants (Lysias vii.10), men who 
rented an estate (Lysias xvii.9), men who purchased property (Demosthenes xxxvii.17), 
teachers (Isaeus ix.28), members of the Company of Heracles (Isaeus ix.30), 
ambassadors (Demosthenes xix.176), a goldsmith (Demosthenes xxi.22), bankers 
(Demosthenes xxxvi.4), a man who lent money (Demosthenes xxxv.23), people who 
testified because they held contracts or wills (Demosthenes xxxv.14, xlviii.l 1, 47), and 
a range of people identified simply by name rather than occupation, such as the various 
people who testified for Apollodorus in the trial of Neaira (Demosthenes lix.23, 25, 28, 
32, 34, 48). These witnesses are identified as independent because, from the evidence of 
the speech, they cannot be seen clearly to have a stake in the case or a relationship with 
either party, and thus it is possible that the jury may have considered them independent.
The occupations of the witnesses are not a sound guide to their independence or 
partiality. The speaker of Isaeus ii.34, for example, suggests that the arbitrators in his 
previous case were friends of his opponent, which contrasts with the apparently 
independent arbitrators mentioned above. A jury may have considered the ambassadors 
summoned by Aeschines (ii.46, 55, 107, 127) friends of that speaker, whereas the 
ambassador presented in Demosthenes xix.176 appears independent. An Athenian’s 
friends and enemies were likely to include men who were currently, or had been, 
officials of some sort. As a result, it is rather misleading to focus on witnesses’ 
occupations.
5j Andocides i.46 {prytaneis), 112 (herald of Boule and Assembly); Demosthenes xix.32 (member of 
Boule), xxv.58 (poletai), xlvii.24 (magistrate), 27 (apostoleis and archon), 44 (member of Boule), 1.10 
(apostoleis and those who collected the stratiotika), lviii.8 (secretary of magistrate), 9 (port overseers); 
Isocrates xviii.8 (members of Boule); Lysias xvii.9 (the previous year’s magistrates and the current 
nautodikai), xxii.9 (magistrate), xxxi.16 (those appointed to arm the townsmen).
54 Aeschines ii.86 (strategoi), 170 (strategus); Demosthenes xxiii.168 (trierarchs), xlvii.24 (trierarch), 48 
(trierarchs), 1.28 (pentecontarch), lix.40 (polemarch); Lysias xiii.79 (taxiarch), xvi.13 (commander).
55 Demosthenes xliii.70, lv.21; Isaeus iii. 12; Lycurgus i.20; Lysias xvii.9.
56 Demosthenes xl.37 (Mytileneans); Lysias xxiii.4 (Deceleans), xxiii.8 (Plataeans).
57 Demosthenes xxv.58, xli.28, lix.47.
58 Demosthenes xxxv.20, 33-4; Lysias xxi.10.
59 Demosthenes xxxix.24, lix.61; Isaeus vii.28.
60 Demosthenes liv.10, 12; Pasiphon at Demosthenes xxx.34 has been identified as a doctor (Humphreys 
1985:327), though he is described simply as someone who cared for Aphobus’ wife.
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The evidence shows that, of clearly identifiable witnesses, rather more appear to have 
been independent than partisan. The data should not be pushed too far, however. As 
noted above, we cannot identify who witnessed most nonlegal testimonies, and as most 
such testimonies are about an opponent’s crimes or a speaker’s services it is always 
possible that some of these witnesses were enemies of the opponent or friends of the 
speaker (though as some of those whom we can identify appear to have been 
independent it should not be assumed that all of the unidentified witnesses would have 
been partisan). Similarly, in some cases it seems likely that the witnesses could have 
been people the speaker took with him, to witness a challenge, for example, or a request. 
Accordingly, it is probable that partisan witnesses are underrepresented in the sample.
It is also possible that witnesses were only identified because speakers wished to draw 
attention to some feature about them. As noted above, often speakers simply identify 
witnesses as those who were present or who know. When they identify relatives, friends, 
members of phratries or demes and officials, they seem to be identifying these witnesses 
because they are in a position to know the facts. As a result, it is always possible that 
many of the witnesses who are not identified may have been in less of a position to 
know the facts, or may not have been independent. It is impossible to be sure on the 
issue, however. What is clear is that there seem to be fairly strong grounds for 
identifying both partisan and independent witnesses in Athens. Significantly, partisan 
witnesses in general appear to be people who knew facts or were present. There is no 
real evidence that partisan witnesses appeared simply to express support, and as a result 
it would be difficult, on the basis of our available evidence, to claim that partisan 
supporters were more common at Athens than independent witnesses. Given this result, 
and the fact that all witnesses appear to have testified to facts, it is most unlikely that the 
majority of Athenian witnesses can be viewed as partisan supporters of a speaker. 
Accordingly, there is no clear evidence that perjury was likely to have been unusually 
common at Athens.
Other Evidence
Scholars have tended to concentrate on the witnesses who appeared in Athenian courts. 
As some have noted, however, witnesses were only one of the kinds of evidence that
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could be produced in court.61 As noted in Chapter Two, in his Rhetoric Aristotle 
(1355b35-56a4) identified witnesses, tortures, contracts, oaths and laws as “artless” or 
“inartificial” proofs. Artless proofs belonged explicitly to forensic oratory (Rhet. 
1375a23-4).
Forensic oratory, in fact, draws on a wide variety of evidence, though all forms are 
similar in that they might be called “documentary” proof - they are derived from written 
sources, such as laws, decrees, challenges, oaths, contracts or the like. Witness 
testimonies also began to be written down during the fourth century BC, but the 
distinction was that witnesses had to appear in court and signify that they accepted the 
written testimony.
The “documentary” proofs speakers could produce included the charges in the case, 
contracts,63 leases (Demosthenes xlv.31), letters,64 wills,65 challenges,66 oaths,67 
apophaseis,68 diallagai,69 diamarturiai,10 oracles,71 inscriptions,72 apokriseis,73 verses,74 
curses, grammata (Demosthenes xli. 10), gnoseis (Demosthenes xxxvi. 16), antilexeis 
(Demosthenes xxxix.38), claims at an anakrisis (Isaeus vi.16) and entries in customs . 
books (Demosthenes xxxiv.7). All of these were produced as evidence to support claims 
in the speakers’ cases. Most commonly, however, speakers produced decrees (Table 6.2) 
or laws (Table 6.3).
61 Allen (2000:175); Biscardi (1970:232); Gemet (1955:67); Scaftiro (1997:53); Todd (1993:59-60). See 
generally Harrison (1968-71,11:147-53).
62 Demosthenes xviii.53 (grapheparanomon), xxxii.23 (paragraphe), xxxiv.16, 17 (paragraphe), 
xxxvii.22, 25, 26, 28, 28, 32 (enklema), xxxviii.14, 16 (enklema), xxxix.38 (enklema), xlv.46
(antigraphe), lviii.7 (phasis), 36 (graphai), Isaeus v.2, 4 (antomosiai).
63 Aeschines i.l 15; Demosthenes xxxiv.7, xxxv.10-13, 37, xxxvi.4, hl.7, 36, 36, 38; Hyperides iii. 12; 
Lycurgus i.l 15.
64 Aeschines ii.90, 128; Demosthenes xviii.39, 77-8, 156-7, 212, 221, xix.38, 40, 51, 187, xxiii.115, 159, 
160, 161, 161, 161, 162, 174, 174, 178, 178, 183; Dinarchus i.27; Isocrates xvii.52.
65 Demosthenes xxxvi.7, xlv.28; Isaeus vi.7.
66 Aeschines ii.127; Demosthenes xxix.21, xxx.36, xxxvi.4, 7, 40, xxxvii.27, 43, xl.44, xlii.23, xlv.61, 
xlviii.34, liv.40, lv.27, 34, lvi.17, lix.124; Isaeus vi.16; Lycurgus i.28.
67 Andocides i.90-1; Demosthenes xix.130, xxiv.149-51, xlix.42, lix.78; Isaeus iii.7; Isocrates xviii.20; 
Lycurgus i.77.
68 Demosthenes xlii.25, 26, 27.
69 Demosthenes lix.47, 71.
70 Isaeus iii.7; Demosthenes xliv.45.
71 Aeschines iii. 112; Demosthenes xix.297, xxi.52, 53, xliii.66; Dinarchus i.78, 98.
72 Aeschines iii. 190, Demosthenes xviii.289, xix.270; Dinarchus ii.25. To avoid confusion, I am simply 
including here inscribed epigrams, epitaphs or judgements, rather than laws or decrees. Where a speaker 
was presenting a law or decree inscribed on a stele, they might indicate that at the time (e.g. Andocides 
i.96; Lysias i.30).
73 Demosthenes xviii. 166-7, 214.
74 Demosthenes xix.247, 255-6.
75 Demosthenes xix.70; Dinarchus i.47.
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Decrees are cited 100 times in 18 speeches from nine orators (no decrees are cited by 
Antiphon).76 They are naturally concentrated in graphai paranomon or graphai nomon 
me epitedeion thenai since such trials would not be possible without discussing decrees 
(Aeschines iii, Demosthenes xviii, xx, xxiii, xxiv), but occur in a variety of cases, 
including Lysias’ apagoge against Agoratus (xiii) and Demosthenes euthyna against 
Aeschines of parapresbeias (xix), a dike blabes (Demosthenes 1), a graphe xenias 
(Demosthenes lix), dikai pseudomarturion (Demosthenes xlvii, Isaeus vi), endeixeis 
(Andocides i, Demosthenes xxv, lviii), an eisangelia (Lycurgus i) and an apophasis 
(Dinarchus i). Given this diversity, it appears that the concentration of decrees in 
graphai paranomon may not be significant. The subject matter of the trial may be more 
significant, in that if it involved discussion of honours voted by the demos or allies, or 
resolutions condemning individuals, speakers would cite decrees. Similarly, if the trial 
occurred early in the fourth century and related to events under the Thirty speakers 
would cite the Amnesty decree (Andocides i, Isocrates xviii).
Laws are cited 135 times in our corpus, and come from 44 speeches by 7 orators (no 
laws are present in the preserved works of Antiphon, Dinarchus and Isocrates). A further 
law may have dropped out of the preserved text of Demosthenes 1.57, as the speaker 
states that he will produce laws but no notation for any laws is present. Laws are spread 
across a variety of procedures, including private and public actions. The majority of our 
sample (94) comes from the Demosthenic corpus, and Isaeus is a long way behind with 
15 speeches. Laws were produced in 27 (28 if we include Demosthenes 1.57) of the 
speeches attributed to Demosthenes, which is a comfortable majority of speeches 
attributed to him. Some 35 laws in the Demosthenic corpus come from four graphai 
paranomon or graphai nomon me epitedeion thenai (Demosthenes xviii, xx, xxiii, 
xxiv), confirming the importance of legal analysis in these procedures. Otherwise, laws 
are distributed across a wide variety of procedures in the Demosthenic corpus, including 
a euthyna (Demosthenes xxi), a dike epitropes (Demosthenes xxvii), dikai 
pseudomarturion (Demosthenes xxix, xlvi, xlvii and xliv), paragraphai in dikai 
emporike (Demosthenes xxxii, xxxiii, xxxiv, xxxv), paragraphai in dikai blabes 
(Demosthenes xxxvi, xxxviii), a paragraphe in a dike metallike (Demosthenes xxxvii), 
a dike proikos (Demosthenes xl), diadikasiai (Demosthenes xli, xlii, xliii), dikai blabes 
(Demosthenes xlviii, plus 1.57), a dike arguriou (Demosthenes Hi), a dike aikeias
76 The data include three decrees referred to in the text as dogmata (Demosthenes xviii. 154, 155, xxv.63).
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(Demosthenes liv), an ephesis arising out of an apospephisis (Demosthenes lvii), an 
endeixis (Demosthenes lviii) and a graphe xenias (Demosthenes lix). This indicates that 
speakers could regularly present laws in most types o f procedure.
Only four speeches by Lysias contain laws, which is unusual as he is the only orator 
other than Demosthenes to have a reasonably large sample of speeches attributed to him. 
It is possible that the relative scarcity of laws in the Corpus Lysiacum may reflect a 
variety of factors. In part, it may be due to the larger number o f speeches in that Corpus 
in which factual, rather than legal, issues appear to be most important, notably the 
several dokimasiai, apographai, euthynai and eisangeliai in the Corpus. It may also 
reflect the fact that some of the speeches are fragmentary (Lysias iv, v, vi, xviii, xxi, 
xxxii), or were synegoria following earlier speeches in which legal issues may already 
have been dealt with (Lysias xv, for example, which contains no laws as evidence, was 
delivered by another speaker in the same case as Lysias xiv, which does contain laws).
Laws were produced as evidence to support claims made by speakers. In presenting 
laws, speakers regularly link the law to their claims that their opponent has broken a . 
law. Taken together with witnesses and decrees, they show that the emphasis in 
presenting evidence was on proving facts, rather than simply expressing support for a 
speaker.
Both decrees and laws could be produced to support irrelevant arguments. Eight 
decrees were produced in such contexts, as were 11 laws. In the Crown case 
Demosthenes, for example, produces decrees to support his claims that disasters for 
Athens that could be laid at Aeschines’ door included the destruction of Phocis 
(xviii.37-8) and the Amphictyonic War (xviii. 154, 155 and see 143-4, 158-9). Aeschines 
(ii. 170) produced a decree about his martial deeds. The speaker of Hyperides iii.33 
produced both laws and a decree to illustrate Athenogenes’ crimes at Troezen, while the 
speaker of Isaeus vi.48, 50 produced both laws and a decree to illustrate his claim that 
his opponents were guilty of impiety. Laws were also produced to support irrelevant 
legal claims, such as opponents trading grain to cities other than Athens (Demosthenes
77 Foxhall and Lewis (1996:6); Scafliro (1997:53).
78 Decrees: Aeschines ii. 170, Demosthenes xviii.37-8, 154, 155, xx.44; Dinarchus i.27; Hyperides iii.33; 
Isaeus vi.50. Laws: Demosthenes xx.153, xxi.94, 113, xxxiv.37, xxxv.51, xliii.71, xlvii.73, 77. lix.87; 
Hyperides iii.33; Isaeus vi.48.
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Chapter Seven Pity in Athenian Courts
In Chapter Two, I noted that Plato and Xenophon, in their versions of Socrates’ defence, 
both made Socrates castigate the “normal” practice in Athenian courts, whereby 
defendants make appeals for pity (Plato Apol. 34c, 35a-c; Xenophon Apol. 22). Plato 
refers to people begging and supplicating the jurors with many tears, bringing up their 
children so that they may be greatly pitied, and many other friends and relatives.1 23He 
goes on to state that such acts are unjust, because the juror does not sit to dispense 
favours but to judge according to the laws (Apol. 35c). Plato’s comments were 
instrumental in convincing early modem scholars that Athenian juries judged on 
emotional grounds rather than facts and law. In this chapter I will consider how realistic 
this influential picture actually may be.
There are numerous references in ancient literature to appeals for pity in Athenian 
courts. The Old Oligarch (i. 18) claimed allies had to wait outside courts and seize 
jurors’ hands as a suppliant as they entered, while Aristophanes also joked about 
litigants supplicating jurors and begging for pity (Wasps 555-56). Later, in the mock 
trial scene in the Wasps, Bdelycleon delivers an appeal to pity the dog (967-70, 975-78) 
which includes bringing on his puppies. Phryne was also seen to have gained her 
acquittal through supplicating the jurors (Poseidippus Ephesia Fr. 13 [PCG]). In later 
times, Plutarch (Per. 32) would describe Pericles getting Aspasia acquitted by bursting 
into tears during her trial.
Pity has also received a fair degree of discussion in modem literature. Earlier scholars 
included appeals for pity among the battery of complaints that were brought against 
Athenian courts, claiming, after Piato, Xenophon and Aristophanes, that such appeals 
were nonlegal and designed to pervert the course of justice. More recent scholars still 
identify them as one of the nonlegal aspects of Athenian courts.
1 ö psv Kai eXccTTü) toutou! toü dycovos äytuva aycoviüpijevos eöenön tc Kai iKeTsuae toüs 
öiKaaTäs jjsTa noAAcov öaKpütuv, naiöia ts airroü ävaßißaadpevos, Tva ö n pdAicrra 
eXer|0sir|, Kai dAAous tcüv oiKsicov Kai cpiXcov noAAoüs.
2 Goldsmith (1784,1:379),Young (1786:196-8) and Gillies (1792,111:132-3) discussed pity in relation to 
the trial of Socrates, showing the influence of Plato’s depiction of events. Abbott (1891:261) and Bonner 
and Smith (1930-38,11:22-4) also highlighted the nonlegal nature of appeals for pity. Other early authors 
did not dwell on pity in particular, but generally condemned the Athenian populace and juries for being 
“impassioned” - Ralegh (1820:94); Swift (1701:93-8); Montagu (1760:85); Goguet (1775,111:36-7); 
Tucker (1781:224); Bisset (1796:83); de Mably (1796, IV:65, 79-80); Mitford (1818, V: 14, 88); 
Keightley (1839:166); Lytton (1874:450-1); Headlam (1891:37, 151 -2).
3 Bonner and Smith (1930-38,11:22-24); Wolff (1969:8); MacDowell (1971:258); Adkins (1972:122); 
Carey (1994c:33); Allen (2000:148-49).
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There have been some important studies by Dover, Brinton, Johnstone and Konstan. 
Brinton and Dover noted that there are two aspects to pity. It is an emotion, but also an 
act - one pities another and the action arising from the feeling is mercy or compassion.4 
Both aspects underlie the impact of an appeal for pity in forensic oratory; a speaker 
made an appeal “in the hope that pity for the predicament in which they would be left by 
his condemnation would induce the jury to acquit him or at least to reduce his penalty.” 5 678
Dover argued that appeals for pity could be phrased in a variety of ways, and at times 
pity could effectively mean a vote for justice or an expression of support. Both saw 
appeals for pity as nonlegal or irrelevant.
Johnstone distinguished between verbal appeals for pity in lawcourts and the more 
physical act of supplicating the jury. He stated that there were nineteen verbal appeals to 
be found in forensic oratory (noting that twelve were made by defendants and six were 
made by prosecutors, with one in a paragraphe), and nineteen acts of supplication 
(seven each by prosecutors and defendants, four in diadikasiai and one in a
o
paragraphe). Johnstone also stated that, rather than understanding such appeals as 
attempts to overturn law, they should be understood in their cognitive context. He 
suggests that “when litigants said “pity”, they often meant “acquit”; and as such, pity 
was the outcome of a process of reasoning.” 9 By making an appeal or a supplication, a 
litigant was submitting himself to the jury and admitting that his fate lay in their hands. 
Johnstone contends that this action helped to instil “a collective identity”, and the 
implication is that it is this process, rather than the more obvious emotive aspects, that 
constituted the power and potential success of an appeal for pity. 10
Konstan has provided another analysis of appeals fen pity that is in some ways similar 
to, but in other ways different from, those above. He takes as his starting point the 
disjunction between ancient and modem legal practice, noting that, whereas in modem 
courts appeals for pity are generally viewed as inappropriate, in ancient courts they were 
practically routine. In modem courts they are viewed as inappropriate because emotional 
appeals may move jurors to make a decision irrespective of the facts or the law . 11
4 Brinton (1994:29-30); Dover (1974:195-96).
5 Dover (1974:195).
6 Dover (1974:196, 198-99).
7 Brinton (1994:27-8).
8 Johnstone (1999:111, 118).
9 Johnstone (1999:122).
10 Johnstone (1999:122-25; the quote is on p. 125).
11 Konstan (2000b: 126-33).
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Konstan notes that in modem legal practice pity is commonly discussed in relation to 
appeals for mitigation, and is therefore often invoked by people who have admitted their 
guilt. In ancient Athens, by contrast, pity was felt for someone who suffered an 
“undeserved misfortune” and an appeal presupposed the innocence of the party 
making it. Appeals were not, therefore, accompanied by contrition or remorse, or a 
request for forgiveness, but were “designed rather to make vivid to the jury the
1 o
consequences of condemning an innocent person.”
All four authors have noted that there is a variety of meanings in appeals for pity. 
Konstan and Johnstone, in particular, have highlighted that an appeal need not be 
viewed as nonlegal, but could be seen as being based on the justice of one’s case. Both 
authors’ arguments require further scrutiny, however. Johnstone’s view that an appeal 
for pity enforced a sense of collective identity may have some merit, but seems too 
subtle. Supplication may have reinforced civic identity, but there were better ways of 
doing that like discussing one’s liturgies and character. As a result, his analysis 
downplays the emotional and rhetorical impact of appeals. It also ignores the fact that, in 
making attacks upon their opponents’ use of appeals, litigants frequently claim that such 
actions are unjust, which in itself is to make a stronger appeal to a principle of collective 
identity - that of judging in accordance with the laws and the oath (Antiphon i.26; Lysias 
xxviii.14, xxix.8; Isocrates xviii.37; Isaeus v.35, x.22; Demosthenes xxi.99-101, 188, 
xxv.81-84, xxxvii.49, xxxviii.27, xxxix.35; Lycurgus i.33, 141-45, 150; Hyperides ii.9, 
v.40; Aeschines iii.209-10; Dinarchus i.22, 103, 108, 111, iii.13, 20). Konstan’s analysis 
may be closer to the mark in noting that an appeal was based on the injustice of one’s 
plight, but his analysis was not comprehensive and some aspects require modification.
Defining Pity
Although many scholars have noted the existence of appeals for pity in Athenian courts, 
few have studied them in detail, and even fewer have attempted to define what is 
characteristic about such appeals - what, in a sense, the component parts of an appeal 
are. The most detailed work is by Cortes Gabaudän, who defined the appeals by the 
occurrence of verbs denoting some kind of supplication or pleading (ösopai, ävnßoXtü, 
iK£Teüü), aiTOÜpai, napaKaXto, ä̂ icb) . 14 A similar approach appears to have been
12 Konstan (2000b: 133).
13 Konstan (2000b: 144).
14 Cortes Gabaudän (1986:108).
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adopted by Dover and Johnstone, though they do not discuss how they defined appeals 
for pity or supplication.15
öeopai, ävTißoXci), iKETeüü) and e^aiTOupai may be used singly or in combination by 
speakers making appeals.16 Outside forensic oratory these combinations are rare, as we 
have only öeopai and IKeieua) together in Plato’s Apology (34c) and Euthydemus 
(282b), and iKeieua) with e^aiTOupai in Euripides’ Medea (971) and Sophocles’
Oedipus at Colonus (1326), though IKeieua) appears with oiKTeipo) in Aristophanes’ 
Wasps (555-56) and Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus (237). Possibly the repetition of 
verbs with similar meanings was felt to add to the impact of an appeal, which would 
explain the doubling or trebling of similar verbs for begging or imploring in forensic 
oratory.
There is no doubt that these verbs help to identify appeals for pity. ävnßoÄcb and 
iKETeüü) are the verbs Euphiletus uses to describe Eratosthenes’ appeal not to be killed 
(Lysias i.29). The problem with Cortes Gabaudän’s approach is that it may mix up 
different types of appeals. Verbs such as napaKaXch and afycb, for example, can have a 
wide range of meanings and need not always denote an appeal for pity, so the analysis 
may confuse simple requests with appeals for pity.17 In forensic oratory, speakers can 
make a wide variety of appeals using verbs like öeopai, ävTißoXco, iKeieuco and 
efyxrroüpai. They can appeal for a favourable hearing (Demosthenes xxi.5-7, Isaeus ii.2) 
or a fair hearing (Demosthenes xl.4, Hyperides i.19), for favour (Demosthenes xxiii.4, 
19, xxvi.57, xliii.83-84, xlv.l, 85, Lysias xxi.21), for justice (Demosthenes xxxv.5, 
lviii.57, 61; Lysias x.21, 31) for help against injustice (Demosthenes xlii.32, xlvi.28, 
lvi.4; Dinarehus 112.21; Lysias xviii.27), for goodwill (Demosthenes lvii.l, lviii.3) and 
for the jurors’ vote (Isaeus ii.44, v.34, ix.37; Lysias xv.3, xxi.21).
The variety of appeals may explain why Dover and Johnstone have sought to downplay 
the emotional aspects of appeals. If a speaker is asking for justice in accordance with the 
oath and the laws, there is little real emotion in this appeal other than in the verbs the 
speaker is using. Appeals for pity, however, are explicitly described by contemporary
15 See Dover (1974:195-96) and Johnstone (1999:117, 172, n.41).
16 Cortes Gabaudän (1986:195) lists öeopai and iKeieuco together eight times, öeopai and dvTißoÄU) 
together three times, öeopai, iKeieua) and cxvTlßoXu) together ten times, these three verbs together with 
ä îa) once and iKeieuco and ävnßoÄcb together three times.
17 Cortes Gabaudän (1986:151-52) does isolate appeals for pardon and compassion, but the attempt is not 
systematic.
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handbooks as being used to arouse jurors’ emotions (Aristotle Rhet. 1419b; Rhetorica 
adAlexandrum  1443bl5-18, 1444b26-29, 1445al-10). It is difficult to agree that all 
appeals containing verbs such as öeopai, ävnßoAu), and iKSTeuco are appeals for pity if 
they do not contain any actual reference to pity as the object of the appeal. The verbs 
used are beseeching ones, but the speaker is not asking to be pitied but rather to win 
support. Consider, for example, Isaeus ii.2:
öeopai ö’ üpajv ändvTcov Kai avnßoAü) Kai ik£tsü(jü peT’ eüvoias änoöexeoGai 
pou toüs Adyous.
I beg and beseech and implore you all to receive my words with favour.
Or the ending of Lysias xviii.27:
eyw pev ouv Kai öeopai Kai avnßoAu) Kai iKeTeuw, Kai toütgov nap’ up&v 
TUYX v̂eiv d îu).
So I beg and beseech and implore you, and think it right to obtain from you what 
I claim.
In a similar vein, Johnstone identifies Dinarchus iii.21 as an example of a public 
prosecutor supplicating the jury. Although the prosecutor does use the participle 
iK£Teucov here, it follows an appeal to the jury not to pity his opponents (iii.20) and he 
uses the term here in relation to his claim that he is making a more just plea, rather than 
in an act of supplication or an appeal for pity.
iKeTeüu) is certainly commonly used for appeals for pity in forensic oratory, and indeed 
in tragedy and comedy (Euripides Electra 302-36, Iph. in Aulis 1240-51, Medea 853, 
Orestes 255, 1326-45, Suppl. 43; Sophocles Ant. 236-50, OC 237-53; Aristophanes 
Wasps 555-57) as well as Plato s Apology (34c). However, in other contexts it seems to 
be better translated “implore” or “adjure” rather than “perform the act of supplication.” 
The act of supplication in ancient Greece not only involved verbal appeals, but also 
physical acts like grovelling and grasping the knees or the right hand of the person to 
whom the appeal was addressed.19 The word was widely used in a looser sense. It is 
used by Plato (Euthyd. 282b) to describe begging for wisdom and elsewhere is the
18 Johnstone (1999:174, n.60).
19 Gould (1973:77). Johnstone (1999:116) claims that “corporate” acts of supplication were a regular 
feature in Ancient Athens, though it is worth noting that such acts appear to have been fairly stylised, and 
it is not clear whether they also involved appeals for pity. It is possible that one could perform an act of 
supplication to a group of jurors, though clearly not in the most physical sense of the term. This rather 
contradicts the distinction between supplications and appeals for pity that Johnstone wishes to make.
20 öeöpevov Kai  iKSTSüovTa ao4>ia9 peiaöiöövai.
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verb in a heartfelt appeal to buy property (Demosthenes xxxvii.14, 30). In the Clouds 
(696) Strepsiades uses the phrase pf] örj0\ 1k£T£Ügo, to implore Socrates not to make him 
work out his own solutions. In Philoctetes (1181) Sophocles uses iketeüü) to beg 
someone not to go, while in the Knights (1100) Aristophanes uses it to adjure someone 
to wait. In Ecclesiazusae (915) Aristophanes uses it to implore someone to call 
Orthagoras. The word clearly carries an overall meaning of debasing oneself and 
imploring, but often the speaker is appealing for something very different from pity.
When we meet Iketeuoo we should not immediately assume we have an appeal for pity
22or a physical act of supplication.
It could be that by using these verbs a speaker was indicating respect, and that he was in 
the jurors’ hands. In situations where people were at the mercy of others, in particular 
people in a position of authority, and were in danger of losing their case if they did not 
convince the jurors, it was probably natural that they should use words calculated to 
mollify their hearers.
Verbs are simply one part of an appeal. They indicate that the speaker is asking for 
something, sometimes using a particularly debasing or beseeching term. Before the 
request becomes an appeal for pity, however, we need to know who is being asked and 
what the speaker is seeking. Rather than concentrating on the verb alone, perhaps we 
should examine both the verbs used and the object of the appeal. I will therefore define 
appeals for pity, in the first place, as an appeal for eXeos or oiKTpös.
Some appeals for pity need not include these words, but will clearly be appeals through 
the use of other words or descriptions. Passages about crying, tears, weeping or wailing 
may be associated with appeals for pity, while producing one’s children in court is also 
commonly viewed as associated with such appeals due to being derided by Plato (Apol. 
34c) and Isocrates (Ant. 321) and satirised by Aristophanes (Wasps 568-74).24 
Rhetorical handbooks help to define further aspects of appeals for pity. The handbooks 
concentrate on the sorts of misfortunes speakers could raise to evoke pity. The
21 The same phrase appears at Frogs 168 with the meaning “don’t make me do it”; it is also used in a clear 
appeal for pity at Thesm. 751.
22 Johnstone (1999:116, 172, n.43) notes that the language of supplication was sometimes “attenuated and 
metaphorical” but claims that the use of iKeTEUU) was always meaningful because of the social practices it 
evoked. The varied contexts in which the verb was used, however, and the frequent absence o f “pity” as 
an object of an appeal, may indicate that the verb sometimes evokes little more than begging.
2j Cortes Gabaudän (1986:108).
24 See Bonner (1927:78); MacDowell (1990:321); Todd (2000b:226 n.23).
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Rhetorica ad Alexandrian (1445a3-l 1) outlines the sort of issues fourth-century appeals 
for pity should contain:
touto öe noirioopev erriöeiKVÜvTes cbs npös toüs cxKOÜovTas oiKeicos exopev 
Kai ava^cos öucrruxoöpev, KaKtos npÖTepov nenovGÖTes r) vüv näaxovTes, n 
neioöpevoi eäv pp ßonBcoaiv tjpiv outoi, eäv öe pp TOiaÜTa ürräpxn, öiefyövTes 
tivcüv äyaBcüv ecrrepppeBa p crrepiOKÖpeBa, p crreppaöpeBa öXiYwppBevTes 
ünö tü)v KpivövTcnv, p cbs dyaBou ppöencrre TeTUKpxapev p pp TUYXävopev, p 
pp Teu^öpeSa pp toütcüv ppTv oupßopBpodvTOüv ck ydp toütüjv eXeeivoüs 
KaTacrrpoopev ppds aÜTOÜs, Kai npös toüs dKOÜovTas eu öiaBpoopev.
We will do this by demonstrating that we have a friendly relationship with the 
audience and that we are undeservedly unfortunate, having suffered evil before 
or suffering now, or shall suffer if they do not help us; and if such pleas are 
impossible, by detailing what good things we have been deprived of or are being 
deprived of, or shall be deprived of if we are denigrated by the judges, or how 
we never had any luck or don’t have any, or shall not have any if they don’t join 
in helping us. With these pleas we shall make ourselves pitiable, and put 
ourselves on good terms with our audience.
Aristotle (Rhetoric 1386a) and Antiphon’s Tetralogies (iiß. 13, iiö.4, iiia.2, iiiß.2, iiiö.3) 
also tie appeals for pity to discussions of misfortune, as apparently did Thrasymachus 
(Fr. 6 D-K). Similar connections occur in later handbooks (Cicero De Inventione i.106- 
9; Rhetorica ad Herennium ii.50; Quintilian Inst, vi.i.18-19; Anonymous Seguerianus 
Tech. 225; Apsines Tech, x.15-47). Handbooks will note that speakers could, for 
example, remind the jurors of their deceased relatives as a means of evoking pity 
(Cicero De Inventione i. 108; Apsines Tech, x.37-42; and see Antiphon iiia.2) or by 
bewailing reversals of fortune (Apsines x.18, 21-22; Cicero De Inventione i. 107-8; 
Quintilian Inst, vi.i.19). Accordingly, sometimes an appeal for pity may be made 
through a speaker’s discussion of their misfortunes, without any direct mention of eXeos 
or oiKTpös.
A distinction must be made here between general narratives of sad events which evoke 
pity and a direct appeal to be pitied. The former are found (for example, Lysias xxxii.l 1, 
18). I have not attempted to catalogue these here as it would, in practice, involve making 
decisions about the degree to which an event was pitiable - something that is all but 
impossible to do. The task may also be unnecessary for the task of testing whether 
Athenian litigants could rely on making an appeal for pity to overturn the law and win 
their case. When claiming that a speaker could include an appeal for pity along with
25 See Dover (1974:197) on this point, with examples from outside forensic oratory.
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other nonlegal claims and win a case on this basis, modem scholars are discussing
9 Adirect, rather than subtle, appeals and consequently I have concentrated on these.
Appeals for Pity in Forensic Oratory
Table 7.1 outlines the appeals for pity that I have discovered in Athenian forensic 
oratory using the definition offered above. Most of the references include an appeal to 
the jurors for eXeos or oiKTpos, but six do not (Andocides i. 148-49; Demosthenes 
xliii.83-84, lvii.70; Lysias vii.41, xix.33, xxiv.23). These six all discuss misfortunes or 
the speakers’ children or deceased relatives. Andocides i. 148-49, for example, is 
commonly viewed as an appeal to pity27 because of the speaker uses the verbs ävTißoXtü 
and iKeTeüü), discussesdead relatives and brings his children up to the platform to plead 
for him. Demosthenes lvii.70 is identified as an appeal for pity because the speaker uses
98the same verbs, lists his misfortunes and ends by threatening suicide.
I have not relied on Cortes Gabaudän’s and Johnstone’s data. As noted above, Cortes 
Gabaudän mixes together a wide variety of appeals. Johnstone’s analysis is impossible 
to replicate as one sometimes cannot correlate the data in his tables with actual locations 
in the speeches. On the occasions he does indicate the locations in his tables, I am 
sometimes unable to agree with his analysis. There are also inconsistencies in his data. 
He appears to have treated any occurrence of iK£Teüu) as a physical act of supplication 
(whether direct or “attenuated”) yet six of his references to verbal appeals for pity
T 1contain the verb.
There are 30 clear appeals for pity in all, derived from 23 speeches. Most of the 
speeches were delivered by defendants, though one was delivered in a diadikasia and
26 Bonner (1927:78); Dover (1974:195).
27 For example, by MacDowell (1990:321) and Johnstone (1999:172, n.37).
28 Johnstone (1999:112).
29 It is possible to identify the verbal appeals for pity in his Table 4 (1999:111) by reference to the 
footnote (1999:170, n.7). The acts of supplication are not fully identified.
30 For example, in his note on his Table 4 covering verbal appeals to pity, Johnstone (1999:170, n.7) 
includes Isaeus ii.2, which I would view as an appeal for goodwill rather than pity.
31 Johnstone (1999:116 [on supplication] and 170, n.7 [on verbal appeals]). The references are: Aeschines 
ii. 179-82;, Demosthenes xxvii.66-69, xxviii.20-22, lviii.69-70; Isaeus ii.2; Lysias iv.20.
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four were delivered by prosecutors.32 There do not appear to be any major differences 
between private and public cases. One of the four prosecutions was a public 
prosecution, and ten of the eighteen defence speeches were public cases. The eighteen 
defence speeches containing appeals for pity constitute half of the 36 defence speeches 
known from our corpus of forensic oratory (Appendix One). This indicates that an 
appeal for pity, at least in one’s defence, was not a rare or desperate strategy. Appeals 
made by the prosecution, by contrast, amount to about seven per cent of the 54 extant 
prosecution speeches (Appendix One), which indicates that it was unusual for a 
prosecutor to make an appeal for pity.
It is not clear why appeals are so rare in prosecutions. Rubinstein has suggested that 
speakers in public prosecutions, at least, would have had less use for wailing relatives 
than defendants as they “defined [themselves] rhetorically as the mouthpiece or 
instrument of the entire community.” We need to look more closely at the four 
speeches delivered by prosecutors which contain appeals for pity. Two were presented 
in the same case, Demosthenes’ (xxvii-xxviii) dike epitropes. The prosecution penned 
by Lysias was also a dike epitropes, while the public prosecution (Demosthenes lviii) is 
based on the procedure known as endeixis, in which a man could lodge information 
against another man for an offence (in this case, not paying public debts). It is notable 
that three speeches come from two cases where prosecutors were seeking to recover 
their inheritances, and were ostensibly in a weaker position than the men they were 
prosecuting. The public prosecution is also delivered by a man who finds himself in a 
parlous state; he labels himself a peipdKiov, and claims that he is the victim of a cabal 
involving his opponent and his own sundikoi (Demosthenes lviii.41-43). This may 
indicate that prosecutors delivered appeals for pity if they felt that they were in a weaker 
position than their opponent.
The other striking thing about the prosecution cases is that in all of them the prosecutor 
was claiming they were being unjustly deprived of something. In the dikai epitropes the 
speakers were claiming their guardians had unjustly deprived them of their inheritances.
32 The list includes all the defence speeches identified by Johnstone (1999:170 n.7) as containing verbal 
appeals for pity with the exception of Isaeus ii.2, which I consider an appeal for goodwill. Johnstone’s list 
also includes six prosecution speeches. Two of these (Demosthenes xlv.88 and liv.43) I have classified as 
appeals against pitying one’s opponent in Table 7.3. Demosthenes liv.43 is a borderline case, as the 
speaker there attacks Conon’s likely appeal for pity but also claims that he deserves pity more. I have 
classified it as an appeal against pity because it ends, not by concentrating on the speaker’s own 
misfortune, but by concentrating on the benefits to the polis from punishing Conon.
3j Rubinstein (2000:158).
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In the endeixis the prosecutor was not only claiming a cabal against him, but was 
claiming that Theocrines had already treated his father with rank injustice. Konstan has 
noted that one of the key aspects of pity in Greek rhetoric was that speakers claimed 
they merited it for undeserved suffering.34 His comments are borne out by rhetorical 
handbooks, and by the data in Table 7.1. Aristotle (Rhet. 1385M0) defined pity as pain 
excited by the sight of evil, deadly or painful, for those who do not deserve it (tou 
ava^iou tuyxowsiv). The Rhetorica ad Alexandrum (1445a4) similarly includes 
undeserved misfortune (cxva îcos öucmixou|jev) amongst the arguments that excite 
pity. Similar use of the words ä^ios and avd^ios, to indicate undeserved misfortune, 
occurs in Antiphon v.73; Lysias iv.20, xxi.25, xxxii.19; Isocrates xvi.48; Demosthenes 
xxviii.22 and xxxvi.59.
The speakers in Table 7.1 raised examples of their misfortunes. Dead relatives are 
mentioned four times, poverty six times and the need to support one’s remaining 
family members four times. Seven speakers bewail their potential atimia if they lose 
the case. Aeschines (ii.179) produced his children in court, as possibly did the speaker 
of Lysias xxi.25. In another speech the speaker concludes by saying that nothing 
remains for Euxenippus but to summon his friends and bring on the children (kcxi toljs 
(JjiAous napaKaAeTv Kai Tä naiöia ävaßißä^eaSai, Hyperides iv.41). I have not 
included this speech in Table 7.1 as it does not actually include an appeal, although one 
certainly seems to be on the cards. Speakers without children would mention the fact 
and produce their father instead (Lysias xx.34-36) or ask the jurors to be their family 
(Andocides i. 148).
Fifteen of the references include a claim that the speaker should justly be pitied.40 Four 
speakers discuss the evidence they have presented, suggesting that they deserve pity for 
their misfortune and acquittal for the justice of their cause (Lysias iv.20, Isaeus ii.44-45, 
Demosthenes xxxvi.59, lvii.70). Demosthenes (lvii.66-70), for example, recites the main 
points of his case, including his claims, evidence, and the laws, and suggests that if the
34 Konstan (2000b: 136-37).
35 The view that pity was appropriate for undeserved misfortune is less common in later handbooks, but 
appears in Cicero’s De Inventione i. 108 and Anonymous Seguerianus Tech. 225.
j6 Andocides i. 148-49; Demosthenes xliii.83-84, lvii.70; Isaeus ii.44-45.
j7 Demosthenes xxvii.66-69, xxviii. 18-22; Isocrates xvi.45-48, xviii.62-65; Lysias xix.33, xxi.15.
j8 Demosthenes xxvii.66-69, xxviii. 18-22, lvii.70; Lysias xix.33.
’9 Demosthenes xxvii.66-69, xxviii.21-22, lvii.70; Lysias iv.20, vii.41, xviii.l, xx.35.
40 Andocides i.67; Antiphon v.73; Demosthenes xxvii.66-69, xxviii. 18-22, xliii.83-84, lvii.3, 70, lviii.69- 
70; Isaeus ii.44-45; Isocrates xvi.45-48, xviii.62-65; Lysias vii.41, xviii.l, xx.15, 34-36.
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jurors vote for him they will vote in accordance with their oath and with justice and 
what is right. The claim that jurors will vote in accordance with their oath if they vote 
for the speaker, as part of an appeal for pity, is also made in Demosthenes xxxvi.59 and 
xliii.83-84, while Isaeus ii.44-45 and Demosthenes xliii.83-84 also stress that their cases 
are founded upon law while making an appeal for pity. These data corroborate 
Konstan’s view that an appeal for pity could be framed within a legal argument.
Frequently, however, speakers will make a nonlegal claim in conjunction with an appeal 
for pity. For example, the speaker of Lysias iii.48 briefly raises his previous liturgies and 
services, and argues that as a result he would justly be pitied by the jurors and others. 
Twelve speakers raised their own or their families’ services and liturgies, sometimes 
including the claim that if they won they would perform such services in the future.41
An appeal for pity was made for tactical reasons, and the arguments that were associated 
with the appeal reflected the basis of a speaker’s case. At times speakers can make an 
appeal that rests on a basis of law and evidence, indicating that the appeal itself should 
be considered part of a legal plea. At other times, speakers would base the appeal on 
their services or character, and these arguments were identified above as nonlegal. That 
being said, one of the twelve contexts where speakers tied their appeals for pity to their 
services appears to be a legal plea. The speaker of Lysias xx.l 1-15 answers his 
opponent’s criticisms of his father and his discussion of his father’s deeds is actually 
part of a narrative designed to prove that his father was not an oligarch, but a supporter 
of the democracy.
Although appeals for pity were relatively common in defence speeches, their importance 
should not be overestimated. In all the speeches where an appeal was made, the appeal 
was generally a fairly minor part of any speech, and was designed to supplement, rather 
than replace, evidence and legal argument. Table 7.2 shows where appeals were located 
in a speech and relative proportions of the appeal, legal argument and nonlegal argument 
in a speech. Only in two speeches did the appeal to pity comprise more than a minor 
percentage of any speech. In Lysias xx and xxiv the appeals to pity make up eleven per 
cent of the speech. In remaining complete speeches the appeal is far outweighed by legal 
argument. Even in the few complete speeches which had a relatively large component of
41 Aeschines ii. 179-82; Andocides i. 148-49; Demosthenes xxviii.22, xxxvi.59, lviii.69-70; Isocrates 
xviii.62-65; Lysias iii.48, iv.20, vii.41, xviii.l, xx.l 1-15, 34-36, xxi.20-25. Andocides i. 148-49, 
Demosthenes xxviii.22 and Lysias xxi.25 raise the prospect of future liturgies.
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nonlegal argument (Andocides i; Lysias xix, xx; Isocrates xviii; Demosthenes xxxvi, 
lviii; Aeschines ii) the appeal is a minor component, with the exception of Lysias xx, 
where the appeal at xx.34-36 culminates an extended discussion of the speaker’s family 
services and character.
Appeals are commonly located at the end of a speech. In this regard speakers matched 
the advice of rhetorical handbooks to locate the appeal in the peroration (Aristotle Rhet. 
1419b, Rhetorica a d Alexandrum 1443M5-18, 1444b26-29, 1445al-2), but the location 
of an appeal at the end of a speech also had a tactical basis. Speakers would usually lay 
out their legal and factual arguments first, and then follow those up with nonlegal 
arguments and appeals. All of the complete speeches in Table 7.2 follow this pattern. 
Appeals did sometimes come in the body of a speech, and these appear to have been 
located there for strategic reasons. For example, Andocides (i.67) follows up his 
narrative of the profanation of the Mysteries with his claim that he was an unwilling 
accomplice, and then summarises the misfortunes that resulted and makes an appeal. 
The appeal here is calculated to highlight his claim that his misfortune was undeserved. 
Demosthenes (xxvii.57, xxix.49) and Lysias (xxi.15) appear to be following a similar 
strategy when they locate appeals in the body of a speech to undercut opponents’ 
arguments.
An appeal was also located at the end of the speech to highlight the speaker’s plight. 
Jurors might not remember all that was said during a speech, so speakers would 
concentrate on leaving a strong message at the end of their speech. A convincing appeal 
in the peroration could have been essential in winning over some more jurors, and also 
in whipping up anUgorisui against opponents. The logical opposite to pity, as Aristotle 
(Rhet. 13 86b 10-11) states, is indignation, and speakers would build on this contrast to 
suggest that while they deserved pity for their unmerited suffering, their opponent 
deserved indignation for his unjust gains (Lysias xxxii.19; Aeschines ii. 182) or his 
hybris, which in these contexts, carries a meaning of unjustly taking advantage of 
someone in a weaker position (Isocrates xvi.48; Demosthenes xxvii.68, xliii.84).42 An  
unusual peroration, but one whose emotional impact can be felt today, is Demosthenes 
lvii.70, where the speaker summarises his case and notes that he has proved all his
42 On anger see Carey (1994c:29-31) and Allen (2000:148-49), who points out that “pitying one party 
required being angry at the other.” For reasons of space, I have not considered appeals to feel anger 
towards an opponent; in any event, such appeals are not labelled irrelevant by forensic orators.
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claims with witnesses. The speaker then launches an impassioned appeal for the jurors’ 
vote, asking not to lose his rights as a citizen, so that he can continue to care for his 
family and bury his mother in their ancestral tomb. At the very last, he proclaims that if 
he loses, he will kill himself, so that he may then be buried in his country.
The preponderance of legal argument, and the priority given to it in speeches, indicates 
that a speaker did not expect to win a case on the basis of an appeal for pity alone. In 
addition, the appeals identified in Table 7.1 are based on both legal and nonlegal factors, 
but overall the speakers expect to win on the merits of their case, rather than through 
compassion. As noted above, an appeal could be a useful aid, but we have no example 
of a speech such as that envisaged by Plato in his Apology which solely comprises 
appeals and flattery. The eighteenth-century authors who condemned Athenian juries on 
this evidence appear to have been gravely misled. In addition, Plato and those authors 
were inaccurate about another factor. None of the appeals includes any admission of 
guilt. There is only one hint that such an appeal might have been made in Athenian 
courts, and this is of doubtful value. Aeschines (i.l 13) claims that, in a previous trial, 
Timarchus admitted his guilt and did not defend himself on the issue, but immediately 
began imploring the jury about the penalty. As Aeschines did not supply any 
supporting evidence his claim is probably not to be accepted at face value.
Appeals against Pity in Forensic Oratory
Surviving rhetorical handbooks emphasise how to make an appeal for pity. Only one 
discusses the opposite, and then only briefly. Quintilian (Inst, vi.i.20) notes that 
prosecutors will need to divert the judges from the temptation to pity their opponent and 
invite them to deliver a strong and dispassionate verdict.44 In forensic oratory we have 
many more examples of this kind of plea than we have appeals for pity, though the 
relative frequencies of the two are almost the same. In all, 50 per cent of defence 
speeches contain an appeal for pity, and 52 per cent, or 28 of the 54 prosecution
43 ou nepi toü npaypaios äneÄOYeito, aAA’ eü0üs nepi tou TipnpaTOS iKCTeuev opoXoycov 
äöiKsiv. Apollodorus’ claim that Theogenes begged and beseeched the Areopagus at their scrutiny of his 
marriage (Demosthenes lix.81-83) is a similar case, but the procedure being followed is unclear and may 
not have been judicial. The speaker of Demosthenes xlvii.43 makes a different claim, stating that after 
Theophemus was sentenced in a previous trial his supporters began begging and imploring the jurors over 
the penalty (öeopevcov toütgov andvTWV Kai iKeieuovTWV). In this case, however, Theophemus had 
been found guilty by the court, and then began appealing; Aeschines is suggesting that Timarchus 
immediately admitted his guilt, which is a different matter altogether.
44 Sed saepius id est accusatoris, avertere iudicem a miseratione, qua reus sit usurus, atque ad fortiter 
iudicandum concitare.
180
speeches, contain appeals against pitying the speaker’s opponent. Table 7.3 lists the 
relevant contexts. There are 53 appeals against pity in all, derived from 36 speeches - 28 
prosecutions, four speeches by defendants in paragraphs, two diadikasiai and two 
defence speeches (one public, one private).
There are more appeals against pity in public (21) than private (seven) prosecutions.
This may be significant, as the 21 public prosecutions represent two-thirds of our total 
public prosecutions, whereas the private prosecutions represent a quarter of our 24 
private prosecutions (Appendix One). It may be that prosecutors in public cases felt it 
was more likely that the defendants would appeal for pity, though as the analysis in the 
previous section showed this was not actually the case. The simplest solution may be 
that the penalties in public cases were generally more severe than in private cases, so a 
prosecutor may have felt it more likely that, when his livelihood or life was under threat, 
his opponent would appeal for pity.
Only one scholar has previously identified appeals against pity. Johnstone argued that 
fifteen speakers suggested that their opponent would weep, identifying eleven 
prosecution speeches, four paragraphai and no defence speeches.45 The larger list here 
may reflect a broader definition. I developed the list using the definitions of pity 
outlined above, which include references to eAeos or oiKTpos as well as weeping and 
discussion of misfortunes. Eight contexts (from seven speeches) do not contain these 
words, but contain other words associated with pity, such as ööupeTa0ai, kAcciü), 
oxeTÄid̂ co or ödKpuov.46
Many of the arguments advanced by these speakers were the reverse image of those 
encountered in appeals for pity. Four speakers deride their opponents’ likely claims for 
pity on account of their poverty47 and four also deplore the possibility that their 
opponents will bring on their children. Four predict that their opponent will appeal for
45 Johnstone (1999:115). Allen (2000:378, n.8) appears aware o f the distinction but mixes appeals against 
pity with appeals for pity.
46 Aeschines iii.207, 209; Demosthenes xxxviii. 19-20, xxxix.35, xl.53, 61; Hyperides v.40.
47 Demosthenes xxxvi.36; Isaeus v.35, xi.38; Isocrates xviii.35.
48 Demosthenes xix.281, 283, 310, xxi.99, 186-88, 195, xxv.84; Hyperides ii.9.
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pity on the basis of their past services and belittle those achievements.49 One speaker 
criticizes his opponent’s claim for pity on account o f the need to support his mother.50 
Another denigrates his opponent’s claim for pity on account of the likelihood that he 
will lose his citizenship through not being able to pay the epobelia if he loses the case.51 
Two undercut their opponents’ claims for pity because they were orphans. The most 
common argument, however, is that it is unjust to pity the opponent, occurring in 21
n
speeches. Commonly, these speakers claim that their opponents’ previous lack of pity 
for others, or the magnitude of their crimes, should ensure that they now do not deserve 
pity. Ten suggest that, rather than indulge their opponent, the jurors should uphold the 
laws.54 Three claim that it would be impious to pity their opponent, or provoke the 
gods.55 Four claim that an appeal for pity is irrelevant.56 Several agree that people 
deserve pity for undeserved misfortunes, but suggest that their opponents’ crimes were 
entered into willingly and therefore they deserve no pity.57 Four go further, exhorting the
• • SRjurors to hate their opponent for his crimes.
Isocrates (xviii.35-36) lists several of the misfortunes his opponent is likely to recount in 
his possible appeal:
oTpai ö’ aÜTÖv 65upeTo0ai Tf)v napouoav rreviav Kai Tf]v YeŶ vripevnv auTO) 
aup4>opdv, Kai kê eiv cbs öeivä Kai aysTkia Tteiaerat, ei twv &v enl
Tfjs öXiyapxia? äcfrnpeöiT toütcov ev önpoKpaTiQC Tf)v encoßeXiav 04>Xf|oei, Kai 
ei tots pev öid Tqv oüoiav Tf)v aÜTOÜ (JjuyeTv rjvaYKäaSn, vuvi ö’ ev a) xpbva) 
npoopKev airröv öiKqv XaßeTv, ömpos Y£vn°eTai- KairiYOpnaei öe Kai tujv ev 
Th peTacrraaei yevopevcav, cbs sk toütojv pdXia0’ üpäs eis öpynv KaTaoTrjacov 
Tocos y«P Tivos äKrjKoev, cos üpeTs, ÖTav pp toüs äöiKoüvTas XäßriTe, toüs 
evTUYXdwovTas KoXd êie.
49 Dinarchus i .l l  1, ii.l 1; Isaeus v.35-36; Lysias xxviii.14. The speaker of Demosthenes xxxviii.27 does 
not belittle his opponent’s services, but slips in the comment that he has shamelessly and foully 
squandered his fortune in gluttony and drunkenness with Aristocrates and Diognetus and others of that 
sort. Demosthenes (xxv.76) notes that some men, being convicted by the facts and unable to prove their 
innocence, will take refuge in their public service or those of their ancestors, or in similar pleas by which 
they succeed in evoking pity and goodwill. This leads into the plea against pity (xxv.81-84), in which 
Demosthenes assassinates Aristogeiton’s character.
50 Demosthenes liii.29.
51 Isocrates xviii.37.
52 Demosthenes xxxviii.20, liii.29.
5j Aeschines iii.209-10; Antiphon i.26-27; Isocrates xviii.37; Demosthenes xxi.99-101, 188, 195-96, 
xxv.81-84, xxxvii.49, xxxviii.27, xxxix.35, xl.61; Dinarchus i.22, 103, 108, 111, iii. 13, 20; Hyperides ii.9, 
v.40; Isaeus v.35, x.22; Lycurgus i.33, 141-45, 150; Lysias vi.55, xxii.21, xxvii.12-13, xxviii.14, xxix.8.
54 Demosthenes xix.281, 283, xxi.188, xxv.81, xxxviii.19, 27; Dinarchus iii.20 Isaeus x.22; Lycurgus i.33, 
150; Lysias x.26, xv.9, xxii. 17-21.
55 Antiphon i.29; Demosthenes xxv.81; Lysias vi.3.
56 Aeschines iii.207; Demosthenes xxxviii. 19-20, xxxix.35; Lysias xxviii.14.
57 Antiphon i.26; Demosthenes xix.310; xxi.99, 186, 206, xlv.88, liv.43; Lysias vi.55, xxvii.13.
58 Demosthenes xxi.186, 195-96, xxiv. 196-97, xxxvii.49; Isocrates xviii.38.
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I suppose he will bewail his present poverty and the misfortune which has 
befallen him, and he will say that he will suffer terrible cruelty if his money, 
which he was robbed of under the oligarchy, he will now owe under the 
democracy as the epobelia, and if then he was forced into exile because of his 
property, and now at a time when he ought to obtain justice, he will lose his 
citizen rights. And he will also make accusations about the events of the 
revolution, so that in this way especially he will arouse your anger; for perhaps 
he has heard from someone, that, whenever you fail to catch the real villains, you 
punish any who fall into your way.
He goes on to state that it is right to help those whose statements about the facts which 
they have sworn in the antomosia are manifestly more just, rather than those who try to 
show that they are the most unfortunate.59
Another example comes from Demosthenes’ speech Against Meidias. Demosthenes 
alludes in that speech on a number of occasions to Meidias producing his children in the 
hope of evoking pity (xxi.99, 186-99, 195). He remarks (xxi.188):
cxAA’ ÖTav outos exoav Tä naiöia toütois ä̂ ioT öouvai Tf)v njfj4>ov üpäs, töts 
üpeTs toüs vöpous exovra ps nXnolov qyeTaSe rrapeaiävai [Kai töv öpKOv öv 
opcopÖKaie] toütois ä îouvTa Kai ävTißoXoüvTa eKacrrov üptbv ijjr|(j)iaaa0ai.
But when he with his children asks you to give your vote to them, then you 
consider me to be standing alongside with the laws [and the oath which you have 
sworn]60 asking and beseeching each of you to vote for them.
Several of the speakers in Table 7.3 also mention auyyvobpn along with their appeals 
against pity, and the author of the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum also recommended that 
speakers should use arguments about the laws to deprive their opponents of pleas for 
sungnome (1443M1-14). Konstan has argued that defendants who asked for sungnome 
were not seeking “mercy, or undeserved pardon...but rather a favorable disposition 
toward a just case.”61 He notes that in some contexts it is preferable to render sungnome 
as indulgence or even forgiveness, but this does not mean that in these contexts the plea 
is an admission of guilt. Konstan cites Lysias xxxi.10-12, whose speaker draws a 
contrast between unwitting misfortunes deserving sungnome and intentional crimes 
which do not merit it. A similar contrast also appears at Demosthenes xviii.274, 
xxiv.49, 67 and lviii.24.
59 npös pev ouv toüs ööuppoüs, öti npoonKei ßor|0£iv upas, oüx oTnves äv öucrruxeoTÖrrous 
o4)ds airroüs anoöei^woiv, äXA’ oi'nves äv nepi wv ävnnpöaavTO öiKaiÖTSpa XeyovTss 
4)aivü)VTai.
60 These lines are sometimes considered a gloss; see MacDowell (1990:410).
61 Konstan (2000b: 138).
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Konstan does not actually mention any appeals for pity that contain an appeal for 
sungnome, and I have not found any. The word is fairly rare in defence speeches, 
occurring for example at Lysias i.3, 18, iii.4, 13, 19, ix.22, xviii.20, xix.56, xxiv.17, 
xxv.l, 35; Isaeus x.l; Demosthenes xviii.274 and liii.3. In several of these contexts it 
may carry some meaning of forgiveness, but none of these contexts are appeals. I know 
of three occasions only when a speaker appeals for sungnome, and none of these are 
appeals for pity. Isaeus (vi.2) uses the term to appeal for a favourable hearing and to 
listen with goodwill, and also uses it to beg favour for prosecuting at such a young age 
(Fr. 8 [Forster]). Demosthenes (xl.4) similarly uses it to appeal for a favourable 
hearing, and his speaker adds that if he should seem to the jurors to have suffered 
cruelly, they should “forgive” him for seeking to recover his property.64
Those speakers in Table 7.3 who mention sungnome were all prosecutors, and in these 
contexts the word could be translated as “showing favour” or “forgiving.”65 The speaker 
of Lysias x, for example, argues that the jurors should not pity Theomnestus for the 
harsh things that they have heard about him, nor show him favour for his hybris and 
speaking contrary to the laws.66 Later in the speech (x.30) the speaker twice uses the 
word when he instructs the jurors not to forgive Theomnestus for breaking the laws. It 
seems that the word can allude to the possibility that the jurors will show compassion 
and forgive a man’s crimes, an event that prosecutors would seek to forestall. If 
sungnome does at times mean “forgive,” this may explain why it does not occur in 
appeals for pity. A speaker who appealed for it might have been seen as undermining his 
case by admitting guilt.
The large number of appeals against pity pro ride z. crucial insight into the legal concept 
of relevance in Athenian courts. Scholars have generally highlighted appeals for pity 
but, as noted above, only one has mentioned that the opposite might be the case. As a 
result, we have only had one side of the picture. If speakers only appealed for pity, and 
never appealed against it, then there would appear to be a strong case for presuming that
62 ösopai oüv üpwv ouYYvebprjv ts exsiv koi met’ eiivoias cxKpoaaaaBai.
63 ösopai oüv upwv ouYYVwpnv ex '̂v, ei Kai vedrrepos tov Asyeiv sni öiKaarripiou TEToApriKa.
64 öeopai oüv ändvTcov üpcov, d) ävöpss öiKaaiai, psT’ süvoias ts pou cxKOÜaai oütws önws äv 
öüvoopai Aeyovtos, köcv üpTv öeivä öokü> nsnovGsvai, auYYvd)pr|v £X£'v poi Oitoüvti 
KopiaaaBai TäpauToü.
63 The contexts are: Lysias x.26, xii.79, xiv.40; Demosthenes xix.281, 283, xxi.100, 198, xxv.81, 83, 84; 
Lycurgus i. 148; Hyperides ii.7.
66 pf) Toivuv cxKOÜoavTd [te] 0EÖpvncrrov KaKcns Tä npoopKovTa eAeeTte, Kai üßpi^ovri Kai 
AeyovTi napä toüs vöpous ouYYvchpnv ex t̂e.
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Athenian juries could, on occasion, feel compassion and overturn the laws. The fact that 
appeals against pity were just as common as appeals for pity indicates that Athenians 
were aware that pity could be used to divert jurors from the law and the facts of the case. 
Appeals against pity show that Athenian juries were expected to reach decisions largely 
on legal grounds. Speakers could try to subvert that expectation through appeals for pity; 
but their opponent could suggest that such a procedure was unjust and appeal instead to 
the jurors not to forgive his opponent’s crimes.
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Chapter Eight Conclusions
In Chapter One I set out as an objective of this thesis to test the three prevailing theories 
on relevance in Athenian courts. I also set out to present a picture of relevance based on 
forensic oratory as a whole, rather than on selected highlights from it.
O f the three theories, the “equity” theory must be considered severely damaged, if not 
untenable. There is no evidence that speakers regularly appealed for fairness or a 
concept of justice that was opposed to law. Generally, when discussing justice, speakers 
went to some length to argue that their more just case was also legally sound. Nonlegal 
appeals based solely on justice could indeed be made - Demosthenes xxxix is the sole 
example, although there are also some examples of legal pleas where the meaning of the 
law was clearly being stretched, such as Hyperides iii and Lycurgus i. Such appeals are 
very rare and, when we know the results of the case, unsuccessful (e.g. Demosthenes 
xxxix and Lycurgus i). The more technical aspects of “equity” theory, such as appeals 
for Yvcopn Tfi öiKOdOTcrrn, have also been shown to be rare and, when founded upon 
nonlegal pleas, fruitless.
The “social competition” theory is also untenable. There is no evidence that jurors 
placed speakers’ status and honour above the law and the facts of the case. Speakers do 
discuss their services, though not as frequently as Adkins, Gamer and Cohen would 
have us believe. They also regularly attack their opponents’ characters and services.
Such discussions are, however, essentially supplementary to legal cases. Legal pleas 
generally occupy a larger proportion of any speech than nonlegal pleas, and also are 
given priority by being dealt with first, and are often linked to the Heliastic oath. Of 
complete speeches, only in two by Lysias do we find any attempt to give services and 
character greater weight than legal pleas, and only one, Lysias xxxi, gives priority to 
attacks on the opponent. As that speech was presented in a dokimasia, where it is 
possible that a discussion of general character and services was permitted, we should not 
place undue emphasis on it.
The “positivistic” theory of Athenian juries has proven to have the most solid 
foundations, although Wolff, Meyer-Laurin and others have drastically underestimated 
the occurrence of nonlegal pleading. The evidence presented in Chapters Five to Seven 
shows that speakers did generally make a legal case and gave legal pleas priority. They 
supported the legal case with witnesses and other evidence, and witnesses usually
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testified about facts that were relevant to the legal case. There is no clear evidence that 
witnesses appeared simply as supporters, or that perjury was more common at Athens 
than anywhere else. Where the theory falls down is in underestimating the importance of 
nonlegal pleas; it is therefore a limited description of Athenian legal procedure.
The only way to fill out that picture is to understand the legal concept of relevance as it 
was determined in Athenian courts. In the past, our understanding of relevance has been 
hampered by a number of things - by methodologies that have been based on a selective, 
rather than a holistic, approach to oratory; by an over-reliance on Aristotle and later 
authors of the Roman period; and indeed by the pernicious influence that Plato’s 
Apology and Aristophanes’ Wasps have had on modem scholars by prejudicing them 
against Athenian juries. These barriers to a clearer understanding were laid in the 
eighteenth century, and have structured modem theories ever since.
In order to obtain a better understanding we need to evaluate Plato, Aristophanes and 
Aristotle against forensic oratory, rather than the other way round. The major, and most 
relevant, evidence about the practices of Athenian lawcourts is contained in these 104 
forensic speeches. That evidence shows that speakers would identify as irrelevant 
discussions of character and services, slanders and unrelated accusations. Relevant 
arguments were defined in relation to the charge under which the case was brought, and 
the specific allegations contained in the charge. There was probably a law against 
irrelevance on the Areopagus, and possibly at the Palladion, though there does not 
appear to have been any law against irrelevance in dikasteria. Instead, the jurors swore 
in their Heliastic oath to judge on the actual matter and speakers also probably swore to 
speak to the matter in their preliminary oaths at the trial.
When these definitions are applied to forensic oratory as a whole we find that the vast 
majority of that oratory, and in most cases of each speech, was relevant pleading. Such 
pleading should usually be considered “legal” and irrelevant discussion “nonlegal,” 
though some care is necessary in this area as we need to bear in mind contexts and the 
legal cases being made. In some cases, pleas that would be irrelevant in one context 
could be relevant in another.
A key issue is working out how speakers could make irrelevant pleas. Such pleas, we are 
led to believe, would be stifled at once by a judge in a modem court. Adkins, Gamer 
and Cohen claimed that character discussion was really relevant and in fact the main
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issue of the trial. As we have seen, this is a very selective view of forensic speeches.
Most modem scholars have focussed on “weaknesses” in the Athenian legal system 
which they claim inevitably led to irrelevant pleading. The speeches actually present a 
rather more subtle picture. Speakers clearly wanted to win the goodwill of the jurors, 
and we can only interpret the speeches as proving that they tried to do that, 
fundamentally, by focussing on legal discussions and evidence. This is the best 
interpretation of the dominance of legal discussion and the prominence it is given by 
speakers. Those speakers also, however, generally expected to raise nonlegal issues and 
to get away with it. If nonlegal pleading was so risky (because speakers could lose the 
goodwill of the jurors) it is difficult to believe that it would be so common, or that 
speakers could plan to present witnesses and laws about nonlegal issues unless they felt 
that they had a good chance of raising those issues.
The key is, as Meyer-Laurin realised, that nonlegal arguments are usually supplementary 
to the legal pleas. If there was a weakness in the Athenian legal system, it was that a 
large body of 501 or so jurors was likely to have divergent views about what sort of 
pleas were irrelevant. Speakers could probably count themselves unlucky if a majority 
o f jurors shouted them down on a particular point. They could probably also count on 
the fact that jurors had to hear the plea first to decide whether it was relevant or not. 
Nonetheless, they appreciated that there was a risk in raising irrelevant arguments, 
which is why they often tried to justify them as relevant. It is also why they usually 
presented their legal case first. If the jurors shouted down their irrelevant points, they 
could still hope to win the trial on the basis of their legal case. If they had not yet 
presented that case when the nonlegal pleas were shouted down, they ran the risk of not 
being allowed to present the legal case at all - or of having lost the good opinion of the 
jury.
The risks were there, though it also seems that the Athenians, by and large, were 
prepared to let speakers have their day in court. Athens, as has frequently been 
remarked, did not have jurists or jurisprudence, so we should expect speakers to have 
some freedom to make their case, even if it involved stretching the law. Where we do 
have evidence of speakers being shouted down, it appears that their claims were 
especially outrageous, such as Demosthenes’ slander about Aeschines and the Olynthian 
woman.
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Relevance, then, could be characterised as a flexible concept within the parameters o f a 
general respect for law and evidence. This characterisation helps us resolve one of the 
key dilemmas of Athenian legal procedure. Scholars have presented apparently solid, yet 
mutually contradictory, cases to prove that jurors commonly voted in favour of equity, 
or character and services, or on the basis of facts and the laws alone. Each theory has 
been supported by a range of citations from oratory. Clearly, as all three theories 
generally contradict each other they cannot all be right. For two hundred years, however, 
we have not been able to move beyond this point, so that discussion has been reduced to 
a kind of sniping from deep-dug trenches across the No-Man’s-Land of the data.
The key to understanding these apparent contradictions lies in understanding that the 
general concept was that speakers should stick to the laws and facts, but speakers 
enjoyed great freedom to make their case.
A final point is that forensic orations need to be analysed as a statistical population. In 
order to understand relevance, we need to characterise the variance amongst the 
speeches and know the range and the mean. Without this background, we may be misled 
into characterising extremes as typical of the population. This is clearly what happened 
with “equity” theory. Its insistence on yvoopn Tfj öiKaiOTÖrrn and pleas based on justice 
was based on very few speeches, and has considerably obscured the general character of 
forensic oratory. A similar charge could be laid against the “positivistic” theory. This 
theory correctly saw that the general trend in forensic oratory was towards legal 
discussion, but its failure to examine variance has meant that the trend has been isolated 
from other trends almost as common, notably the use of nonlegal pleas. This thesis has 
shown that forensic cr^tcry .vas generally characterised by legal discussion, and that 
nonlegal discussion was usually presented to supplement the legal discussion. It has 
shown that stand-alone nonlegal pleas were rare; they are part of the overall presentation 
o f a case, but certainly do not characterise the genre.
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Appendix One Forensic Orations Analysed in the Thesis
Antiphon i Against the Stepmother dike phonou 
(bouleusis)
420-411 Not known
Antiphon v On the Murder of 
Herodes
apagoge c.417 Not known
Antiphon vi On the Choreutes dike phonou 
(bouleusis)
419/18 Not known
Andocides i On the Mysteries endeixis 400 Successful1 23
Lysias i On the Murder of 
Eratosthenes
dike phonou 403-380 Not known
Lysias iii Against Simon traumatos ek pronoias 394-380 Not known
Lysias iv On a Wound by 
Premeditation
traumatos ek pronoias 403-380 Not known
Lysias v For Callias graphe hierosulias? 403-380 Not known
Lysias vi Against Andocides endeixis 400 Unsuccessful"
Lysias vii On the Olive Stump graphe asebeias? 397/6-
380
Not known
Lysias ix For the Soldier apographe 395-87 Not known
Lysias x Against Theomnestus dike kakegorias 384/3 Not known
Lysias xii Against Eratosthenes euthuna 403 Not known
Lysias xiii Against Agoratus apagoge c.399 Not known
Lysias xiv Against Alcibiades I graphe astrateias 395 Not known
Lysias xv Against Alcibiades II graphe astrateias 395 Not known
Lysias xvi For Mantitheus dokimasia 394-80 Not known
Lysias xvii On the Property of 
Eraton
diadikasia mid-390s Not known
Lysias xviii On the Property of 
Nicias ’ Brother
apographe m id- 
3903?
Not known
Lysias xix On the Property of 
Aristophanes
apographe 388/7 Not known
Lysias xx For Polystratus euthuna 410/9 Not known
Lysias xxi Defence Against a 
Charge o f Taking 
Bribes
euthuna 403/2 Not known
Lysias xxii Against the Corn 
Dealers
eisangelia 387/6 Not known
Lysias xxiii Against Pancleon antigraphe in dike 400/399? Not known
Lysias xxiv On the Refusal o f a 
Pension to an Invalid
dokimasia 403/2 Not known
Lysias xxv Defence Against a 
Charge o f Subverting 
the Democracy
dokimasia 401-399 Not known





Lysias xxvii Against Epicrates euthyna? 395-87 Not known
Lysias xxviii Against Ergocles eisangelia 388? Successful4
Lysias xxix Against Philocrates apographe 388 Not known
Lysias xxx Against Nicomachus eisangelia?5 399 Not known
1 Vit. Dec. Oral. 834B-C.
2 Vit. Dec. Oral. 834B-C.
3 Todd (1993:285-86, 2000b:272-73).
4 Lysias xxix.2.
5 The precise procedure is not known; Harrison (1968-71,1:50) and Todd (1996:104-6) suggested an 
eisangelia.
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Lysias xxxi Against Philon dokimasia 398? Not known
Lysias xxxii Against Diogeiton dike epitropes 400 Not known
Isocrates xvi Concerning the Team 
o f  Horses
dike blabes 397 Not known
Isocrates xvii Trapeziticus dike parakathetes c.393 Not known
Isocrates xviii Against Callimachus paragraphe in dike 402 Not known
Isocrates xx Against Lochites dike aikeias 402-400 Not known
Isocrates xxi Against Euthynus dike parakathetes 403/2 Not known
Isaeus i On the Estate o f 
Cleonymus
diadikasia 390-43 Not known
Isaeus ii On the Estate o f  
Menecles
dike pseudomarturion c.355 Not known





Isaeus iv On the Estate o f  
Nicostratus
diadikasia 374? Not known
Isaeus v On the Estate o f 
Dicaeogenes
dike engues 389 Not known
Isaeus vi On the Estate o f  
Philoctemon
dike pseudomarturion 364 Not known
Isaeus vii On the Estate o f 
Apollodorus
diadikasia 355? Not known
Isaeus viii On the Estate o f Ciron diadikasia 383-63 Not known
Isaeus ix On the Estate o f  
Astyphilus
diadikasia 371-43 Not known
Isaeus x On the Estate o f 
Aristarchus
diadikasia 378-71 Not known
Isaeus xi On the Estate o f  
Hagnias
eisangelia 359 Successful6 789
Isaeus xn On Behalf o f 
Euphiletus
ephesis 344/3 Not known
Demosthenes xviii On the Crown graphe paranomon 330 7Successful
Demosthenes xix On the False Embassy euthuna 343 Unsuccessful




7 Plutarch Dem. xxiv; Philostratus Vit. Soph. 509; Vit. Dec. Orat. 840C, 846A.
8 Plutarch Dem. xv; Vit. Dec. Orat. 840B-C.
9 Dio Chrysostom xxxi.128. Despite Dio’s testimony, Pickard-Cambridge (1914:118) asserted that the 
result of the case was uncertain, while Sealey (1993:127) claimed that there is no reason to suppose that 
Demosthenes was successful. Neither discusses the matter in any detail or even mentions Dio. Schaefer 
(1858-85,1:413-14) argued on the basis of an inscription found in the south wall of the Acropolis 
recording that Ctesippus, son of Chabrias, was choregus for the Cecropidae, that Leptines’ law was 
actually upheld, as Ctesippus must have lost his immunity from liturgies. Vince (1930:491) responded that 
the inscription may record a voluntary liturgy, and added that it may even pre-date Demosthenes’ speech. 
Dio was writing in the first century A.D., and therefore some considerable time after Demosthenes 
delivered his speech, but he was clearly familiar with it (C. P. Jones 1978:35), taking up some eleven 
sections in discussing it (xxxi. 128-39). He makes no erroneous comments on the speech and we should 
not assume, therefore, that he had no good authority that the speech was successful.
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Demosthenes xxi Against Meidias probole 347/6 Possibly
successful10
Demosthenes xxii Against Androtion graphe paranomon 355 Not known
Demosthenes xxiii Against Aristocrates graphe paranomon 352 Not known
Demosthenes xxiv Against Timocrates graphe nomon me 
epitedeion thenai
353 Not known
Demosthenes xxv Against Androtion I endeixis 338-24 Successful* 11
Demosthenes xxvi Against Androtion II endeixis 338-24 Successful
Demosthenes xxvii Against Aphobus I dike epitropes 364 Successful
Demosthenes xxviii Against Aphobus II dike epitropes 364 Successful14
Demosthenes xxix Against Aphobus III dike pseudomarturion 364 Not known
Demosthenes xxx Against Onetor I dike exoules c.364 Not known
Demosthenes xxxi Against Onetor II dike exoules c.364 Not known
Demosthenes xxxii Against Zenothemis paragraphe in dike 
emporike
344-40? Not known





Demosthenes xxxiv Against Phormio paragraphe in dike 
emporike
327/6 Not known
Demosthenes xxxv Against Lacritus paragraphe in dike 350s- Not known
emporike 40s?










Against Nausimachus paragraphe (in dike 
blabes?)
340s? Not known
Demosthenes xxxix Against Boeotus I diadikasia16 348 Unsuccessful17
10 Plutarch Dem. xii and Vit. Dec. Orat. 844D claim that Demosthenes dropped his suit for money, but this 
is probably an interpretation of Aeschines’ claim (iii.51-52) that Demosthenes sold the hybris and the 
people’s vote against Meidias in the precinct of Dionysios for 30 mnai. Several authors believe that 
Demosthenes dropped his case, but as MacDowell (1990:24) notes, this is inconsistent with the speech 
and is stretching what Aeschines actually says. Grote (1853[1848], XI:343-44, n.2 [chapter lxxxviii]) 
suggested that Demosthenes won his case but proposed a fine of 30 mnai as a penalty. This eminently 
sensible suggestion has won little recent support, though see MacDowell (1990:24-25).
11 Dinarchus ii. 13.
12 Dinarchus ii. 13. Demosthenes xxvi Wuo second speech delivered by Demosthenes in the same trial 
as Demosthenes xxv.
13 Demosthenes xxix.1-3, xxx.8; Plutarch Dem. vi.
14 Demosthenes xxix.1-3, xxx.8. Demosthenes xxviii was the second speech delivered by Demosthenes in 
the same trial as Demosthenes xxvii.
15 Demosthenes xlv.6.
16 Modem scholars generally believe that Demosthenes xxxix was a dike blabes (Blass 1893,111.1:473; 
Lipsius 1905-15,11:660, n.89; Carey and Reid 1985:166; Todd 1993:281; E. M. Harris 2000:57-59). 
There is another view, now largely discounted, that the case was a diadikasia (Leist 1886:14-15; Beauchet 
1897:45; Vinogradoff 1922:195; Meyer-Laurin 1965:30-31). The view that the case was a dike blabes 
rests largely on the occurrence of ßAarrreiv at xxxix.5, and on the reference to the case at Demosthenes 
xl.35 where Mantitheus used the verb ßÄdiTrea0ai. This argument can be faulted on two grounds. In the 
first place, at Demosthenes xl.35 Mantitheus notes that he did not bring the case to obtain money, but to 
secure the right to the name Mantitheus. This is precisely the opposite of what is usually argued by those 
who consider Demosthenes xxxix a dike blabes, as speakers would use that procedure to obtain some sort 
of redress (presumably financial) rather than to secure an exclusive right to something (E. M. Harris 
2000:57-59). In the second place, ßAarrreiv and its cognates are not always found in cases which we have 
good grounds for considering dikai blabes (e.g. Demosthenes xlviii). They occur in cases which we know 
were not dikai blabes (e.g. Demosthenes xviii.293, xix.7, 180, 228, xx.28, 35, 49, xxii.3, xxv. 18, xxvi.2,
3, xxviii. 18, xxxiii.190). Leist (1886:15) argued that Demosthenes xxxix was a diadikasia because of the
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Demosthenes xl Against Boeotus II dike proikos 347? Not known
Demosthenes xli Against Spudias diadikasia 350s-
30s?
Not known
Demosthenes xlii Against Phaenippus diadikasia18 350s? Not known
Demosthenes xliii Against Macartatus diadikasia c.345 19Unsuccessful?





Demosthenes xlv Against Stephanus I dike pseudomarturion 349 Not known
Demosthenes xlvi Against Stephanus II dike pseudomarturion 349 Not known
Demosthenes xlvii Against Evergus and 
Mnesibulus
dike pseudomarturion after 356 Not known
Demosthenes xlviii Against Olympiodorus dike blabes 343/2 Not known
Demosthenes xlix Against Timotheus dike chreos 2136221 Successful 2
Demosthenes 1 Against Polycles dike blabes c.358 Not known
Demosthenes li On the Trier archie 
Crown
diadikasia c.359 Not known
occurrence of the word ocpcfnoßnTCO at xxxix.l 1, 18, 28. This is certainly the word used regularly to refer 
to claims in property disputes (Harpokration s.v. äp^iößnTeiv k c x i  napaKaTaßdXXeiv; Lex. Rhet. s.v. 
ä|j(J)iaßnTeTv Kai napaKaTaßdXXeiv [Bekker 1814,1:197]; Lex. Sabb. s.v. öiaöiKaaia [Papadopulos- 
Kerameus 1965[1892-93]:48,1.20]; Demosthenes xl.18, xli.7, 23, 25, xliii.3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 16, 31, 55, 
xlviii.10, 22, 41; Isaeus i.l, 5, 8, iii.l, 3, 44, 61, 66, iv.3, 5, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 25, v.l, 7, 14, 18,
20, 21, vi.3, 12, 59, vii.l, 2, viii.l, 14, 25, 37, 38, 44, ix.2, 10, 24, 35; Lysias xvii.5, 7, 8, 9). The word is 
not automatically used for all types of diadikasiai, being absent from Demosthenes xlii. As a result we 
should be cautious; its presence does not automatically mean we have a diadikasia. In this case, I consider 
the case is a diadikasia because Mantitheus makes it clear that he wants sole rights to the name - which 
(contra Todd 1993:282) he could get with a diadikasia, but not a dike blabes.
17 Demosthenes xl.17; IG II2 1622; see discussion by Carey and Reid (1985:167).
18 Disputes over trierarchies were resolved by diadikasiai (AP lxi.l; Demosthenes xxviii.17; Isocrates 
xv.5; Old Oligarch iii.4; see also Lipsius 1905-15,11:775).
19 Broadbent (1968:62) pointed out that an inscription dated 324/3 B.C. records Hagnias son of 
Macartatus of Oion, and concluded that, as Macartatus’ son was named Hagnias, this indicated continued 
possession by his family of Hagnias’ estate. For the inscription see Leonardos (1918:75-76).
20 This speech is usually considered a dike pseudomarturion arising out of a diamarturia presented by 
Leochares himself (Gemet 1955:89, n.3; Isagerand Hansen 1974:132, n .ll;T odd  1993:138, n.19; 
Rubinstein 2000:34). The matter is complicated by the fact that the speaker claims that the case is a 
diadikasia (Demosthenes xliv.7). It is possible that he is simply referring to the dispute in general.
21 Two dates have been proposed for this speech - 369/8 or 362 B.C. (Blass 1893:522-23). The higher 
date has recently been supported by E. M. Harris (1988). Schaefer (1858-85, IV: 139-43) preferred 362 
B.C., primarily on the grounds that Apollodorus’ brother Pasicles was a minor until 364 B.C. and could 
not have testified before then, and Apollodorus was away from Athens performing a trierarchy between 
364 and 362 B.C. His date has recently been upheld by Trevett (1992:35-36). Harris’ date relies on the 
assertion that a minor could testify in court, and also on the claim that Timotheus was unlikely to have 
been able to conquer 20 cities in northern Greece in only a few years, so was unlikely to have been back in 
Athens in 362 B.C. Harris is correct to note that there is no direct evidence that minors could not testify in 
court, but the weight of negative evidence (we never hear of one testifying) surely must count against his 
argument. Harris notes that an inscription (IG II2 110) records honours for Menelaus proposed by Satyrus 
(probably on behalf of Timotheus) in the sixth prytany of 363/2 B.C. Tod (1948:134) viewed this 
inscription as proving that Timotheus must still have been on campaign in early 362. Even if this 
assumption is correct, there was still time for Timotheus to return to Athens that year and be sued by 
Apollodorus.
22 Plutarch Dem. xv.
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Demosthenes Hi Against Callippus dike arguriou 369/8? Not known
Demosthenes liii Against Nicostratus apographe c.350 Not known
Demosthenes liv Against Conon dike aikeias 355 or 
341
Not known
Demosthenes lv Against Callicles dike blabes 350s- Not known
30s?
Demosthenes lvi Against Dionysodorus dike emporike 330-
2326t
Not known
Demosthenes lvii Against Eubulides ephesis 345? Not known
Demosthenes lviii Against Theocrines endeixis 344/3? Not known
Demosthenes lix Against Neaera graphe xenias 343-40 Not known
Aeschines i Against Timarchus dokimasia rhetoron 346/5 Successful 4
Aeschines ii On the Embassy euthuna 343 Successful25
Aeschines iii Against Ctesiphon graphe paranomon 330 Unsuccessful26
Lycurgus i Against Leocrates eisangelia 330 Unsuccessful27
Hyperides i For Lycophron eisangelia 333? Not known
Hyperides ii Against Philippides graphe paranomon 338-36 Not known
Hyperides iii Against Athenogenes dike blabes? 330-24 Not known
Hyperides iv For Euxenippus eisangelia 330-24? Not known
Hyperides v Against Demosthenes apophasis 323 Successful28
Dinarchus i Against Demosthenes apophasis 323 Successful29
Dinarchus ii Against Aristogeiton apophasis 323 Successful30
Dinarchus iii Against Philocles apophasis 323 Successful31
23 Schaefer (1858-85,1V:312-14) originally dated the speech to 322 B.C., holding that the aorist participle 
äp^avTOS proved that Cleomenes’ period of office was over. His argument was recently upheld by Carey 
and Reid (1985:201-2), who argued that the speech should be dated to 323 B.C. Paley and Sandys
(1874:214-15) argued, on historical grounds, that the reference to high com prices in lvi.8 would indicate 
a date between 330-26 B.C., and noted further that the aorist äp^avros “need only imply that Cleomenes 
was in power at the time of the transactions described” (1874:215, emphasis in original). Their date is 
possible if ap^avTOS in lvi.7 is taken to be an inceptive aorist - “ever since Cleomenes took power in 
Egypt.” A higher date counters the possible difficulty presented by the fact that the speaker calls 
Demosthenes to speak for him (lvi.50), which could have been of dubious benefit after the Harpalus affair.
24 Demosthenes xix.2, 257, 283-84; it is not clear whether the claim in Vit. Dec. Orat. 840F that 
Timarchus hanged himself is based on any source.
25 Plutarch Dem. xv; Vit. Dec. Orat. 840B-C.
26 Philostratos Vit. Soph. 509; Plutarch Dem. xxiv; POxy 1800.52-60; Vit. Dec. Orat. 840C, 846A.
27 Aeschines iii.252.
28 Dinarchus ii. 14; Vit. Dec. Orat. 846C.
29 Dinarchus ii. 14; Vit. Dec. Orat. 846C.
30 Demosthenes Ep. iii.37-38, 42.
31 Demosthenes Ep. iii.31. Burtt (1954:288) concluded from an inscription that Philocles was acquitted, 
but Worthington (1989) has argued that the Philocles in the inscription is a different man.
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Appendix Two Revision of Forensic Speeches
The idea that forensic speeches could be revised for publication is as old at least as the 
eighteenth century, when Taylor proposed that the published version of a speech could 
have differed from the version delivered in court. 1 2The possibility of revision is a crucial 
methodological question for this thesis. As Dover pointed out in one of his discussions 
on the issue,
The relevance of this to our present enquiry is that it would have been open 
to the orator to adopt in the written version, which would have been of 
interest chiefly to educated people, a standpoint different from that which
'y
he adopted in addressing the jury.
For example, an orator could have carried out such a thorough revision of his speech 
that the sort of evidence he presented, the sort of arguments he used, even the number of 
witnesses and the points to which they testified, could be utterly spurious in a published 
speech. In such a case the speeches of Attic orators would tell us very little about the 
concept of relevance in Athenian courts. It is obvious therefore that we need to gain 
some kind of view of whether speeches were revised, how often they were revised and 
how deep the changes were to the version delivered in court. These issues resolve 
themselves into a series of questions about each speech:
• Who wrote the speech, and when?
• Do we have the version prepared before delivery?
• If so, was this actually delivered in court?
• Was the speech revised after delivery in court?
• Why was it revised, and for whom?
• How was the version disseminated in antiquity?
Most of these questions cannot be answered in any systematic manner. At times the 
answer to one is linked to our ability to answer another. For example, our views on who 
wrote a speech may depend upon how it was disseminated. As Todd has argued, 
revisions could be made for a variety of reasons, and we are presented with “a series of
1 Cited by Dorjahn (1935:293).
2 Dover (1974:9).
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imponderables” in trying to determine these reasons. The best we can do is grope 
towards some kind of general view.
It is generally assumed that speeches came into circulation because the logographer 
distributed the written copy of the speech.3 4 This is sometimes obvious; Antiphon, for 
example, became famous in antiquity for being the first to release his speeches to the 
public (Vit. Dec. Or at. 832C-D; Quintilian Inst, iii.1.11). Ancient scholars accepted that 
Aeschines, Demosthenes, Hyperides and Lycurgus wrote the speeches they delivered 
themselves (Dionysios of Halicarnassus Demosthenes xv, xlv, li; Philostratus Vit. Soph. 
509-10; Plutarch Dem. xv, xxiv). Modem scholars have spent considerable amounts of 
time debating whether Demosthenes wrote all the speeches attributed to him. Some at 
least were probably written by Apoilodorus and others by other orators.5 It is also 
possible that a friend of the litigant sometimes composed a speech and distributed it.6 78
Dover has claimed that a logographer may have prepared an initial speech, and then he 
or his client may have revised the original draft after the trial. Dover's arguments are 
generally not accepted, perhaps because, as Usher pointed out, ancient authors 
considered that orators had distinctive styles, which surely vitiates any suggestion of
o
mixed authorship. The question cannot be resolved satisfactorily without knowing the 
answers to another question - how the speech was disseminated. It is sometimes 
assumed that speeches were disseminated by the logographer as samples of his skill,9 
but Dover is correct to point out that this is not certain.
It is unclear whether differences in authorship might be correlated with differences in 
accuracy. The answer to the question depends on whether the author revised the speech 
or not, and whether the purpose of the revision WuS to exclude matters raised in court or 
to include new material. This separate issue will be discussed further below.
3 Todd (1990b: 167).
4 For example, Usher (1976:37-8).
5 Sigg (1873:430-31); Demosthenes lviii is unlikely to have been written by Demosthenes as the speaker 
accused Demosthenes of being part of a conspiracy against him (lviii.42-44).
6 A possibility raised by Dover (1968:159).
7 Dover (1968:160-63).
8 Usher (1976:34); see also Winter (1973:35-37) for criticisms of Dover’s stylometric methodology.
9 Usher (1976:37). Early rhetoricians became famous for their handbooks or for their speeches in defence 
o f  mythical characters (for example, Gorgias’ Helen). Antiphon appears to have recognised that there was 
a greater market amongst prospective litigants for real speeches from actual trials. These authors 
published only a few speeches. Lysias was the first to publish a large number o f his speeches (Vit. Dec. 
Orat. 836A records that 425 speeches were attributed to Lysias, of which scholars regarded 233 as 
genuine). It is unclear why this change took place; a market seems to have arisen for forensic speeches, 
but we do not know why, although it is possible that the innovation of publishing real speeches took a few 
years to establish a market amongst prospective litigants and orators as well as the public.
196
Identifying whether we have the version of a speech prepared before delivery is seldom 
easy. MacDowell has argued that we have the pre-trial version of Demosthenes’ (xxi) 
Against Meidias as a result of some word-for-word repetitions (xxi. 101, 184-85), and 
sections that have the air of being intended to be clarified later (xxi.94, 113, 208-12, 
213-18). He concluded that Demosthenes intended to use the bulk of the speech, but 
simply to dip into other parts and expand on some points.10 In dealing with 
Demosthenes’ (xix) On the False Embassy MacDowell suggested that we again have the 
pre-trial version, claiming that several passages show that Philocrates had not yet been 
condemned (even though the trial was held after he fled).* 11
MacDowell’s arguments are plausible, but there is a risk in pushing them too far. It is 
difficult to judge how Demosthenes felt he should organise his speeches (as MacDowell 
notes), and we cannot therefore be sure that the repetitions in Against Meidias were 
not intended, or that Demosthenes chose not to elaborate some arguments because he 
thought that they were not crucial to his case. The passages in On the False Embassy do 
not explicitly state that Philocrates was still in Athens and are actually rather vague on 
this point. Accordingly, I would not agree that we can identify these two orations as pre­
trial versions.
It is sometimes suggested that Demosthenes did not publish many of his deliberative 
speeches, but they were discovered after his death and published then, though it is 
generally believed that Demosthenes circulated his forensic speeches.14 MacDowell’s 
arguments rely on the unlikely proposition that Demosthenes did not circulate Against 
Meidias and On the False Embassy, even though he probably published others. 
Demosthenes’ reputation amongst his contemporaries as a log^grapker15 can only be 
explained if he was known for writing speeches, and this may indicate that he also 
published his speeches to advertise his wares. Aeschines’ (i. 173-76) jibe that 
Demosthenes has brought his students into court and that he will discuss his speech in 






15 Aeschines ii. 165; Dinarchus i . l l l .
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such small groups of friends and students.16 As a result, it is unclear why we should 
single out Demosthenes xix and xxi and argue that they were never circulated, but admit 
that other forensic speeches probably were circulated.
Modem scholars generally agree that we can identify comments made in speeches that 
could not possibly have been inserted prior to the trial. Speakers sometimes refer to 
claims made by their opponents in their speeches, and these cannot have been included 
in a version prepared prior to trial. For example, the speakers of Demosthenes
1 8xxxvii.45-47 and Lysias vii.3 claim that their opponents have introduced new charges, 
Aeschines (ii.4) notes Demosthenes attempt to discuss the Olynthian woman, and the 
speaker of Hyperides iv.9-10 discusses his opponent’s attempt to stop him from using 
the laws. The eroteseis in Lysias xii.25 and xxii.5 and the interrogation of the witness in 
Andocides i.14 could have been added after delivery (though it is possible that Lysias 
and Andocides had a pretty good idea of what the answers were likely to be). There are 
also a number of passages in speeches which appear to have been extemporized.19
Dover claimed that the speeches delivered on both sides in the Embassy and Crown 
trials indicated the speeches had been revised to take account of the other side’s 
arguments. Aeschines and Demosthenes discuss allegations that cannot be found in the 
opponent’s speech.29 Dover suggested21 that these passages could either refer to 
arguments which were used in court but excised from the published version, or 
arguments which were written in the original speech in anticipation of their use, and
16 If Demosthenes did discuss his forensic speeches with students and friends, then he could also have 
circulated Ids deliberative speeches to them. This could explain how Aesion came to view such speedier 
(Plutarch Dem. xi.4).
17 It was once argued that any form of anticipation of an opponent’s argument must have been a later 
revision, leading scholars to bracket large portions of speeches. Dorjahn (1935:276-85) demonstrated that 
speakers could have gained information on their opponents’ cases before the hearing through a variety of 
means, such as gossip, preliminary hearings and arbitrations and friends and family. Nevertheless, some 
scholars have since suggested that “some, and perhaps most” of the passages anticipating arguments were 
composed after the trial (Dover 1974:9). It is often simply impossible to be sure. Specific comments such 
as Aeschines’ complaint about the slander over the Olynthian woman must surely have been added in the 
trial since Aeschines also notes that the jury would not listen to Demosthenes’ accusations. But many 
comments are far more general. Demosthenes (xviii.9-17), for example, makes some claims about 
Aeschines’ charges which could easily have been written beforehand on the basis of his overall knowledge 
of Aeschines’ case. In the case of Demosthenes xix, where Demosthenes was the prosecutor and thus 
spoke first, his comments on Aeschines’ defence could have been made out of knowledge or as guesses; 
see MacDowell (2000:25-26). The ambiguity of many passages means that it is difficult to attempt a 
precise classification of the number of possible occurrences of revision.
18 As pointed out by Dover (1968:167).
19 Dorjahn and Fairchild (1972:10).
20 Dover (1968:168-9), referring to Aeschines ii.10, 86, 124, 156, and Demosthenes xviii.95, 238.
21 Dover (1968:169); see also Buckler (2000:149); MacDowell (2000:25); Milns (2000:207-9).
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then not uttered in the court. “In either case, a substantial gulf is opened between what 
was uttered and what was put in writing. ”
Dover did not conclude that the passages were definitive evidence for revision. He 
argued that it may have been profitable for a speaker to refer to an argument that he 
knew the other side was unlikely to use. When the other speaker did not use the 
argument, the jury might view the omission as suspicious, or view the original speaker’s 
arguments in a more favourable light. If the other speaker did use the argument, they
9^
might use up time that could have been spent on more vital issues.
Dover did not suggest that revision occurred on a large scale. On the contrary, he 
suggested that revision must have been a fairly minor occurrence, as other ancient 
sources, and in particular Aristophanes’ plays, satirise the lawcourts using material 
which is familiar from lawcourt speeches.24 Dover’s arguments here are a trifle forced.
It is true that appeals for pity are familiar from Aristophanes and Plato (see Chapters 
Two and Seven), but these sources actually tell us very little about Athenian lawcourts 
and even less that we could consider accurate. It is true, however, that the amount of 
material in any speech that we can be sure was added after the trial appears to be very 
small.
E. M. Harris has argued that speakers might also seek to obscure what their opponent 
has said, in the hope that jurors might not clearly remember the opponent’s argument, 
and thereby seek to strengthen their own case. This could explain discrepancies in 
matching texts. Harris suggests that we could look for statements that jurors would have 
remembered because they were striking or important, and if this is not found in the 
opponent’s speech then we should have clear evidence for revision. He accepted only 
two of the passages identified by Dover as possible instances of revision (Aeschines 
ii.10, 86), neither of which could be labelled crucial to the case. His method can only 
be applied to matching speeches, but if those speeches are any guide to the remainder of
22 Ibid. Lämmli (1938:17-57) similarly attempted to show, from a comparison of arguments in Lysias vi 
and Andocides i that the speeches were altered after delivery. Todd (1990b: 167) found Lämmli’s thesis 
unconvincing, as Lysias vi is only one of the prosecution speeches delivered in the case, and we should 
not expect too close a match between it and Andocides’ defence.
2j Dover (1968:170). Speakers do complain about opponents who introduce irrelevant arguments to 
distract them from the main charge (Dem. xli. 13, xlv.47, 50; cf. Bonner 1905:15, Wolff 1969:9).
24 Dover (1974:9-10), since followed by Edwards and Usher (1985:10), and E. M. Harris (1995:9-10).
25 Harris (1995:10-11, 178-9, nn.6-8).
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the forensic corpus, and taking Dover’s arguments into account as well, revision does 
not appear to have been a major factor.
Overall, there are some relatively clear examples of material that must have been 
inserted into a speech after the trial, and a few ambiguous instances of revision. The 
material inserted after the trial does not undercut attempts to define relevance; in fact, it 
supports it. The passages cited above show that speeches appear to have been revised to 
capture what was actually said in a lawcourt. In such cases, it does not matter for the 
purpose of analysing relevance whether the speech was written by the logographer or his 
client, or whether it was released to the public by the logographer or his client.
The information just discussed is not the limit of modem views on revision. Some 
modem scholars have argued that revision could be more intrusive, and that any speech 
might include a substantial proportion of new material. Worthington has suggested that 
the speeches of Attic orators may have undergone wholesale revision prior to 
publication, and that the delivered and published versions of a speech may have little in 
common.26 He argues that many speeches are far too long to have been delivered in the 
restricted time allocated to speakers in lawcourts, even in cases where (he claims) a trial 
might have taken two or three days. He suggests that the speeches of Dinarchus and
- i o
Aeschines’ speech Against Ctesiphotf show evidence of complex ring composition, 
and maintains that ring composition is a feature of most Athenian literature, and is 
found in works that were written to be performed orally, such as tragedies. He claims 
that Dinarchus and Aeschines exhibit more complex structures than are found in the 
work of poets, and, interpreting Aristotle (Rhetoric 1413b3-5) as proof that different 
styles were used for oral and written composition,-suggests that a very complex ring 
composition is evidence for revision. The original speech would also have utilised ring
9 Qcomposition, but at a much simpler level:"
It is possible that some of the complex levels of ring structuring we find in 
speeches, with their deliberate echoes of subject matter and theme uniting
26 See in particular Worthington (1991:62-8, 1994b: 115-8, 1996:166-7).
27 Worthington (1991:57). A similar position is argued by Buckler (2000:149) and MacDowell (2000:23), 
though the latter disagrees with Worthington’s premise that public trials could last several days. This 
particular claim seems unlikely, since Harpocration (s.v. öiap£|J£Tpr||J£vr| £|j£pa; abridged in Lex. 
Sabb. s.v. öia|J£p£Tpr|Mevr| £|J£pa) states that the day was divided into three portions, one for the 
prosecutor, one for the defendant and one for the giving of verdicts, and that this procedure was used n£pi 
TU)V (J£YiOT(UV ay(i)V£5. Aeschines (ii. 126) notes that he 11 amphorae were allocated to the trial £V 
öiap£jJ£Tpnpevr| Trj £p£pa. These sources are unequivocal; public trials were heard in a day.
28 Worthington ({991:59-62, 1994b: 122-6).
29 Worthington (1991:62).
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them, and thus the overall work, in a stylistic symmetry, would be lost on a 
listening audience, especially one hearing the work only the one time - in a 
law court, for example. If this were the case, that is, if it were thought that 
certain subtleties would be lost on the listening audience, then perhaps we 
might say that orations were revised after oral delivery with a different 
audience in mind, a non-listening one, or at least one not subject to 
distractions from noisy neighbours in a law court or with more time to
T rv
listen and appreciate subtleties of style and composition.
Worthington suggests, on the basis of his examination of Dinarchus’ and Aeschines’ 
speeches, that “ring composition was common to all the orators.” He noted that it is 
difficult to identify precisely what may have been in the original speech, and what was 
added later, but proposed that the slanders hurled at each other by Demosthenes and 
Aeschines, and complex passages of historical narrative designed to denigrate an 
opponent, would have been added later.
This thesis has so far attracted little comment. There are a number of arguments 
against it, including the attitude of ancient authors, differences in the interpretation of 
ring^-composition and uncertainties in our knowledge of the length of Athenian trials.
Ancient authors always treat forensic orations as if the written speech before them was 
the speech as delivered in court. Dionysios of Halicarnassus, for example, discusses the 
styles of orators and whether they were suited to the lawcourts (Isocrates 12, 
Demosthenes 15, 45, 51). The implication is that the written record is faithful to the 
speech as delivered. A similar attitude is conveyed by Alcidamas On Sophists 13,34 
Plutarch {Demosthenes 15, 19, 24) and Aristotle {Rhetoric 1397b32-5, 1413M9-26). 
This could indicate that logographers’ works were generally viewed as being available 
as delivered. This evidence probably should not be pushed too.-far it would not 
exclude the possibility that logographers made revisions in an oral style. It may show, 
however, that orators’ works (even when they did contain ring composition) were still
30 Worthington (1996:166); see also Worthington (1994b: 116).
31 Worthington (1991:64).
32 Worthington (1991:65-8, 1994b:126).
3j Gagarin (1997:7, n.21) dismissed it out of hand as a “doubtful analysis,” while Johnstone (1999:142, 
n.63) noted that Worthington has not actually demonstrated that a complex overall structure has to be 
characteristic of written work. For similar terse remarks see Todd (1993:132) and E. M. Harris (1995:178, 
n.5).
,4 Alcidamas noted that those who write speeches for lawcourts avoid great precision o f expression and 
imitate the style of extemporaneous speakers, and that they appear to write best when they produce 
speeches that are least like those that are written (oi yap sis to öiKacrrf|pia tous Aoyous YPd(J)OVT85 
^eüyouai Täs cxKpißeias Kai pipouvrai Täs twv aÜToaxsöia^övTcov eppnveias, Kai töts 
KOcAAicrra ypä(j)eiv öokoüöiv, ÖTav nKicrra yeypappevois öpoiou? nopiacovTai Aöyous).
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viewed as oral in style, and this surely undercuts Worthington’s point that their style is 
not oral.
Harris noted that the presence of ring-composition in Homer and Pindar need not 
indicate that their manuscripts differed from their oral presentations. Although 
Worthington noted that ring composition occurs in Homer, he did not demonstrate that 
it is less complex in Homer than in forensic oratory. It might be expected, as the Iliad 
and the Odyssey were composed during oral delivery, that such composition would be 
fairly simple. Yet several authors have shown that ring composition occurs within the 
Homeric works at a variety of levels and that it can be very complex. Recently 
Worthington has slightly revised his views to take account of this issue, noting that the 
main difference between oratory and Homer is that forensic speeches were designed to 
be heard once, and as Homeric poems “are meant to be recited/heard time and time 
again” we should expect them to be complex.
This reasoning contradicts the earlier argument on why a complex structure must 
indicate revision. It is not clear how complex ring structuring “would be lost on a 
listening audience,” and yet people listening to Homer would understand complex 
structures because they can turn up and listen to the poems “time and time again.” It is 
also unclear why such complexity would be beyond the comprehension of the audience 
in the first place. In a society that was still only partially functionally literate, and in 
which oral evidence and communication were widely used, we might expect that people
- JO
could cope with complex forms of oral literature.
If ring composition in oral work may be as complex as in written work, what does this 
tell us about ring composition? It may indicate that the belief that ring composition 
requires careful planning may be a misnomer. Minchin has shown, by comparing 
modem storytellers’ methods of composition to episodes in the Iliad, that patterns 
similar to ring composition can be produced simply because they fall into a natural 
pattem for telling a story, and need not indicate any complex planning or revision
35 Harris (1995:178, n.5).
j6 In particular Gaisser (1969:3-5, 37-41). For further discussions of ring composition in Homer see 
Edwards (1991:44-8); Miller (1982:84-5); Schein (1984:33).
37 Worthington (1996:166-7).
38 For information on literacy in ancient Greece, including the use o f oral evidence and gradual 
developments in literacy, see Davison (1962:220); Fantuzzi (1980:608); Nieddu (1984:214-6); Thomas 
(1989:15-23, 35, 39-43) and Green (1994:2-5).
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process. The sort of narrative structures that she outlines could easily describe the 
rings identified by Worthington in the speeches of Dinarchus and Aeschines. In a genre 
that was devoted to telling stories to convey a message we should not be surprised that 
such methods occur.
Finally, we have very little good knowledge of the length of an ancient trial. Speeches 
were timed by a KÄetpüöpa, and a fragmentary late fifth-century B.C. example has been 
recovered from the Agora.40 Measures of the amount of time it takes for water to pass 
through this single clepsydra have been given considerable authority as proving how 
long a trial could last,41 and these measures are used by Worthington to “prove” that 
speeches were too long to be delivered in the time available and therefore must have 
been revised to include new material 42
There are two grounds for doubting these measures - it is not clear that the Agora 
clepsydra was for dikastic use, and it may have been constituted differently enough in 
antiquity to release water at a slower rate than when it was tested in the 1930s.
The clepsydra has a name painted on it which Young reconstructed as ’ AvnoxÖöos] 43 
This indicates some kind of tribal function, which seems incompatible with our 
knowledge of Athenian dikasteria.44 Young suggested that the clepsydra could have 
been used by the Boule in carrying out one of its judicial activities, or by the thirty deme 
judges.4'̂ It is worth noting that there were different types of clepsydras in Athens, 
including a closed, perforated model described by Aristotle {Prob. 914b9-915a24). 
There is evidence that clepsydras could have been used outside lawcourts. Aeneas 
Tacticus described the use of clepsydras for measuring night watches, and they are also
39 Minchin (1995:27).
40 For a description and date see Young (1939:275). The excavators did not find a complete clepsydra, but 
enough sherds to reassemble the profile; the vessel was reconstructed with plaster.
41 Rhodes (1993:726-27); MacDowell (2000:23). Young (1939:281) stated that water poured through this 
clepsydra at a mean rate of six minutes. Rhodes (1993:720) noted that “it is of course possible that by the 
time of the A.P. more sophisticated KÄeipüöpai were used, and (independently of that possibility), that 
the time taken by that quantity of water to pass through the KÄeipüöpai then used was different,” but 






mentioned in Athenian comedies in non-forensic contexts.46
Even if we accept that the Agora example was basically the same as clepsydras used in 
dikasteria, this does not mean that we should accept Young’s measurement of a mean 
rate of six minutes. As Lang notes, AP 67.4 tells us that the days of Poseidon 
(December/January) were used as a standard. As the the approximate length of daylight 
in Athens at this time is 570 minutes, this should be the length of the average court day. 
If we use the clepsydra, however, this gives us an average day of only 396 minutes. 
Lang suggests that the days may have been measured differently, or included some 
periods when the clepsydra was not used, or that the bronze tube in the clepsydra may 
no longer be accurate as it may have lost some width from corrosion.47
•  The first suggestion is refuted by Harpocration s.v. öiapepeTpnpevn epepa, which 
clearly places trial procedures within a single “measured” day.
•  The second suggestion is possible as Harpocration tells us that “trials sometimes took 
place without water in the divided day, sometimes in accordance with water,” but 
the evidence is ambiguous at best and we have no real idea what activities were not 
measured by water and how long they may have taken, or even whether they were 
included within the period of the “measured” day. It is difficult to accept suggestions 
that empanelling procedures were included within the “measured” day49 as 
Harpocration explicitly states that the day was divided into three parts reserved for 
the speeches by the prosecutor and the defendant and the giving of verdicts.
•  Lang’s last suggestion is also difficult to test as there is no adequate description of 
the tube in the Agora publications.
There is another possibility: Aeneas Tacticus (Poliorch. xxii.25) tells us that the insides 
of clepsydras used for timing night watches should be coated with wax, which could be
46 Aeneas Tacticus Poliorch. xxii.24-25; see too chapter xlviii from Julius Africanus Kestoi. Eubulus 
{Clepsydra Fr. 54 [PCG]) described a prostitute who timed her clients with a clepsydra, and Epinicus 
{Hypoball. Fr. 2 [PCG]) had characters discuss drinking in time with a clepsydra. Pattenden (1987:170) 
argued that Aeneas was discussing the closed clepsydras described by Aristotle, but this must be wrong.
As Pattenden himself notes, Aeneas’ discussion of adding and removing wax does not fit a closed 
clepsydra. An open clepsydra of the judicial type, however, fits Aeneas’ discussion as it is easy to see how 
layers of wax could be added and removed to alter the flow of water.
47 Lang (1995:77-78).
48 eniOKemeov öe to nap’ "laaia) ev tco kot’ "EAnayopou Kai Aripo^avous, nebs pepeTpripevrys 
Tfjs epepas otc pev 4>r|Oi xwpis üöaTos yiveoBai toüs äyebvas, ots öe npös üöwp.
49 Rhodes (1993:726-27).
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reduced or increased as desired to change the amount of time. We do not know that 
judicial clepsydras were also coated with wax, so it is unclear how direct the parallel 
may be, but Aeneas’ comment shows that we should not place too much reliance on 
experiments carried out on a single pot.
In summary, the claims of extensive revision are based on a dubious methodology, 
though there is good evidence that some parts of speeches, at least, were written after 
trials. It is difficult to know what might have motivated authors to make such changes. It 
is possible that the mode of dissemination of a speech may have had some influence. 
Isocrates (xii.200-233) discusses how he revised some of his deliberative speeches after 
discussions with students and feedback from his audience.50 If Isocrates, one of the ten 
Attic orators, revised deliberative speeches it is difficult to deny that he could have 
revised forensic speeches (though the matter is clouded by Isocrates’ denial [xv.36] that 
he ever wrote such speeches), and it is also possible that other forensic orators could 
have adopted the same approach as Isocrates and revised their forensic speeches after 
discussions with friends. As argued above, Demosthenes may have done so. This need 
not have been the case all the time; professional logographers like Antiphon, Lysias and 
Isaeus would probably have welcomed publicity and may therefore have issued their 
speeches to booksellers.51 Authors could have adopted both methods, circulating a 
speech amongst friends before publishing it more generally. Ultimately, we can never 
know the precise relationship between what was said in court and what was published. If 
speeches were substantially revised, without external evidence we could not tell whether 
the balance of arguments and evidence had been dramatically altered. Where we can 
identify clear changes made after the trial, however, the revision does not dramatically 
change the balance of the speech. Consequently, we can accept that the speeches provide 
a reasonably accurate view of the sorts of arguments and evidence that speakers thought 
would convince a jury.52
50 Kelly (1996:153-4).
51 Usher (1976:37-38). We know that Antiphon’s speeches circulated shortly after his death, at least, since 
Thucydides (viii.68.1-2), who had been exiled from Athens in 424 B.C., could comment on Antiphon’s 
speech in his defence delivered in 411 B.C.. He could not have been present to hear the speech so must 
have read a copy.
52 Pelling (2000:301 n.89) argues that, even if speeches were substantially revised, they may still be 
viewed as the sort of speech that could have been delivered in a court as the author would be trying to 
retain verisimilitude. The argument is reasonable, but difficult to sustain. We have no idea what revisions 
an author may have made, and why he made them, so we do not know for sure that in revising a speech an 
orator did not alter it to include a large amount of discussion that would have been considered unusual in 
court. That being said, any single forensic speech often covers the same sort of issues as a number of other 
speeches, so Pelling’s point can probably be accepted.
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Table 4.1. Terminology of Relevance in Athenian Forensic Oratory.
1 A n t ip h o n  v . l  1 •  rj p e v  pin dXXa K crrriY opnasiv  e p o ü  n e is  aÜTÖv ti^v 
4>ovov, (bs SKTeiva, ev  to o u t ’ d v  kokcx noXXa 
e ip y a a p e v o 9  nXioKÖpnv dXXto n aÜTto Tto n p a y p a T i
2 A n t ip h o n  v .9 0 •  n e p i  a i iT o u  to ü  n p a y g a T 0 9  ä n o X o y r io e o ü a i
3 A n t ip h o n  v i .7 -1 0 •  n e p i a u T o ü  to ü  n p a y p a T 0 9  K piveoO ai
•  e is aÜTÖ t o  n p a y p a  K a in y o p eT v
•  eis  aX X a K aT nvope? n ä  öitbKei ev  n p a y p a T i  toioütco
4 L y s ia s  i i i .4 4 -6 •  o u  v o p ip o v  eoTiv e£co t o ü  n p a y p a T 0 9  Xeyeiv
5 L y s ia s  v i i .4 2 •  T aÜ T a p e v  e v ö a ö e  o ü k  oTö ’ ö  ti öe? Xeyeiv
6 L y s ia s  ix .1 -3 •  to ü  p ev  npaypcxT O s n a p n p e X r |K a a i
•  n e p i to ü  n p a y p a T O S  n p o a q K e i Xeyeiv
•  n y o ü p e v o i ö e  X paeiv  n e p i  [t o ü ] n av T Ö s nXeico Xoyov ri 
to ü  npoaoKOVTOs n o io u v T a i
•  o ü k  e p o ü  K crra (j)p o v n aav T e9  äX X ä t o ü  n p ä y p a T O S  to ü s  
Xö y o u s  n o io u v T a i
•  n e p i to ü  eyKXripaTOs, o ü  n e p i to ü  T p ö n o u  töv  ä y to v d  
po i npO K eioG ai
7 L y s ia s  x i i .3 7 -4 0 •  n p ö s  p ev  T ä  K a T n y o p r ip e v a  p p ö e v  a n o X o y e T aü a i
8 L y s ia s  x iv .1 6 -1 9 •  n e p i p ev  to ü  v ö p o u  K ai aÜTOÜ to ü  n p d y p a T o s  o ü x  eE;eiv 
aÜ TO us ö  ti X e^ouoiv
9 L y s ia s  x v i .9 « n e p i aÜTtov pöv tov  tcov K aT n y o p p p ev co v  n p o o p K e iv  
cxnoX oyeiaQ ai
10 L y s ia s  x x v i.3 -5 •  ü n e p  p ev  t<ov aÜTOÜ K aT p y o p o u p e v to v  ö i ä  ß p ax e co v  
ä n o X o y n o e o O a i,  e m a ü p o v T a  tcx n p d y p a T a  Kai 
ö iaK X errrovT a Tfi d n o X o y ia  thv  K a T n y o p ia v
11 L y s ia s  x x v i i i .12 -14 •  n e p i p ev  ‘A X iK a p v a a a o ü  K ai n e p i Tfjs d p x n s  K ai n e p i 
tcov aÜTW n e n p a y p e v c o v  o ü k  e n ix e ip p a e iv  d noX oyeT oüa i
12 L y s ia s  x x x ii .2 1 •  o ü k  c tT onov  y ä p  po i ö o k cT K ai n e p i  to ü t o u  p v n o O n v a i
13 I s o c r a te s  x v i.2 -3 •  n e p i tov d v T tb p o a a v  öiödoK O V Tes
14 I s o c r a te s  x v ii i .3 6 •  K aT n y o p r,o o . ö ü  ^ a i  tw v  ev  Tp p e T a o T d o e i yevo p ev to v , 
tos eK TOÜTtov pdX ioO ’ ü p d 9  ei9 o p y p v  K a T a c n n a to v  
Iaco9 y d p  tiv o9 Ö K iiK oev, W9 üpe?9, ö t o v  p n  t o ü 9 
äöiKOÜVTa9 X dßrp-e, t o ü 9 ev T u y x d v o v T a 9  KoXd^eTe.
•
15 I s o c r a te s  x v ii i .4 0 •  n e p i o ü n e p  ü p d 9  öeT lun^ iC eoB ai
16 I s a e u s  iv .5 -6 •  nXeiovi Xöyto eineTv
•  o ü  pöv tov  n e p i t <öv ö iaB qK tov  dX X ä K ai n e p i to ü  y evou9  
X öyov ep ß eß X riK aaiv
17 Isaeus v i.5 9 •  oi'eTai e ^ a p K e o e iv  üpTv n a p e K ß d o e i9 ,  e d v  ö e  t o ü t o  p ev  
p p ö ’ e y x s ip n o n  em ö e iK v ü v a i fi K ai k o t o  p iK pöv ti 
e n ip v p a B n , pp iv  ö e  X oiyoprioriT pi p ey a X p  Tfj cjjtovp
18 Isaeus x i.4 7 •  to?9 y d p  p p ö e v  ö ik o io v  e x o u o i n e p i  tw v  n p ay p Ö T to v  
Xeyeiv d v d y K n  n o p iC eo B a i t o io ü t o u 9 X öyou9
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19 Isaeus Fr. 1 [F o rs te r] •  n e p i d)v 8YK8KXr|Ke Kai e^a) toü  npdY porros 
öiaßeßX qK ev
20 D em o sth en es  x v iii.9 - 
11
• ei pev  o u v  nep i d)v eöiwKe pövov K aTqY opqaev A ioxivqs, 
kcxyw n ep i o ü to ü  toü n p o ß o u X eü p aT o s eüB üs a v  
aneX oY O upqv
• OÜK eXdTTO) Xoyov TÖXXa öie^iwv dvqXwKe
• toTs e^o)08v Xoyois
• toüs nep i twv n en paY pevw v  Kai nenoX ueupevw v 
A övous ä(|)evTa
21 D em o sth en es  x v iii.3 4 •  öti pq  KaTqYOpqaavTOS A iaxivou p q ö ev  e^w Tqs 
Ypacfeqs, o ü ö ’ d v  eYcb Xoyov o ü ö e v ’ e n o io u p q v  d re p o v
22 D em o sth en es  x v iii.5 9 • Kai p e  p n ö e is  ä n a p T d v  ünoA dßn töv Xöyov ths Y p e r n s
23 D em o sth en es  x ix .8 8 • o lö a  Toivuv o n  toüs pev ü n e p  tcov KaTqYOpqpevtov 
a u T o u  Xoyous A ioxivqs 4>eüE;eTai, ßouA öpevos ö ’ ü p ä s  
t is  noppcüTdTco to)v n en p avpevcov  d n a v e iv
24 D em o sth en es  x ix .9 2 • e a v  pn  n d v 0 ’ d p a  e a i e  T a p d ire iv  aÜTOv
• n ep i Y&p Ttiv apcj)iaßqToupevGov Kai toüs p d p T u p a s  
n a p e x e a O a i  Kai Td TeK pqpia 5eT Aeyeiv töv ^eÜYOvra, 
oü  T a  öpoXoYOÜpeva dnoX ovoupevov  e ^ a n a i d v
25 D em o sth en es  x ix .9 7 • eis ö e  toüs ü n e p  Ttiv nenpavpevcov  epß ißa^eT e
26 D em o sth en es  x ix .1 9 2 • piK pöv cxKoüaaTe p o u  e£co n  Tqs n p e a ß e ia s  T aüTqs
27 D em o sth en es  x ix .2 0 2 • e o n  ö ’ ü n e p  pev  Ttiv nenpavpevcov  oütc ö iK a ia  oÜTe 
n p o o n K o u o a  q ToiaÜTn dnoX ovia
28 D em o sth en es  x ix .2 4 2 • “e rr’, e a v  ü p d s  d naY dY n  Tti XÖYti v e a v ie ü a eT a i Kai 
n e p n tiv  epeT “neos n  toüs ö ik o o tö s  ä n a Y a v t iv  d n ö  Tqs 
ü no0eaecos tix ö p q v  tö n p a y p ’ aÜ Ttiv ü^eX o p ev o s;’” pn 
o ü  YO, dXX’ ü n e p  tiv  aveovi^n, nep i toütcov dnoXoYOÜ.”
29 D em o sth en es  x ix .3 3 5 - 
6
• d v  toivuv TaÜTa pev  4>eÜYn, nXavgt öe  Kai n d v T a  
pdXXov Aevn, eKeivcos aÜTÖv Ö exeo0e
30 D em o sth en es  x x .1 -2 •  öti A errrivns, k ö v  tis dXXos ü n e p  toü v ö p o u  XeYn, 
ö iK aiov  pev  o ü ö e v  epeT nepi aÜTOÜ
31 D em o sth en es  x x .9 8 • ä  ö e  n p ö s  Tois 0 eo p o 0 eT a is  eXrve t o ü t ’ i'oeos Acycov 
n a p a v e iv  ü p d s  ^qTqaei
32 D em o sth en es x x ii.4 • e ^ a n a T d v  ö ’ ü p d s  n e ip d o e T a i nA drrcov Kai n a p a y c o v  
n p ö s  eK aoT a toütcov k o k o u py o u s  Xöyous
33 D em o sth en es  xx ii.21 • (hevaKi^eiv a i n a s  Kai X oiöopias K evds n o io u p e v o s , Kai 
evoxXeTv oü  ö ik o o t o Ts toütwv oüo iv  üpTv
34 D em o sth en es x x ii.4 2 - 
6
• T p önov  ü p d s  dnaY O Y ^v d n ö  toü v ö p o u  
n a p a K p o ü e o 0 a i  d iT qaei
35 D em o sth en es  x x iii.1 9 -  
21
• öie^io) töv T pönov  öv necj)evdvio0’ ü n ’ öu to ü
36 D em o sth en es  x x iii.9 0 •  t o ü 0 ’ ü(J)aipeTa0ai n e ip d o e T a i
37 D em o sth en es  x x iii.9 5 -  
7
•  änaYWYÖes ö e  T oiaÜ T as n v ä s  epeT
• npo<J)öoeis eioi ö f  d s  noXXdKis üpeTs e£;qnÖTqa0e
38 D em o sth en es
xxiii.191
• e o n v  TOIVUV tis aÜTois toioütos Xöyos, ö i’ oü  





•  T ds pev  n a p a y w y d s ,  a s  outoi n o iq ao v T a i, x a ip e iv  edTe 
x a i  pq  en u p e n e T e  Aeyeiv aÜToTs
40 Dem osthenes xxiv.6 •  eoT ai ö e  oük d n o  toü  npaypaT O S
41 Dem osthenes xxv.5 • ou  TOÜ9 ü n e p  a ir ro u  toü  npaypaT O S  Aöyous ö iK aious
42 Dem osthenes xxv.36 •  o iö a  toivuv o n  Tqv pev  ö p ü q v  Kai ö iK a ia v  ö ö ö v  Tqs 
ä n o A o y ia s  oütos 4 )eu ^e ia i, e£;w0ev ö e  kükAw nepieio i 
A o iöopoüpevos Kai öiaßaA A w v Kai ün io x v o ü p ev o s 
KpiveTv, e io ä^e iv , n a p a ö w o iv
43 Dem osthenes xxv.38 • toü n a p a K p o ü o a o O a i  Kai cfrevaKiaai ü p d s  t o u t ’ epeT
44 Dem osthenes xxvii.53 • TaÜTa ö ’ elneiv, i'v’ ei pev  Kai vüv n p o o ö o K q a a ip ’ aÜTÖv 
epeTv, än o A o y o ü p e v o s  nep i aÜTWV ö iaT pißoip i, öeov  
e i e p a  p ’ aÜToO K ainyopeTv n p ö s  u p a s
45 Dem osthenes xxix.13- 
14
•  nep i o ü  p ä A ia ia  n p o aq K ev  o ütw  töv Aöyov noieToBai
46 Dem osthenes xxxv.41 • Kai pqcöiws Aöyous n o p ie io B a i n ep i ööikw v  n p a y p d ic o v , 
oi'eTai n a p d ^ e iv  ü p d s  önoi d v  ß o ü A n ia i
47 Dem osthenes
xxxvi.54-5
• q y o ü p a i toiVuv, w d v ö p e s  ’ABnvaToi, ndvTcov pdAiOT’ eis 
i o  n p d y p ’ e lvai toutwv p d p T u p a s  n a p a o x s o G a i
• TaÜT’ eis tö n p d y p ’ e lva i n p ö s  ü p d s  eineTv
48 Dem osthenes xxxvi.61 • e ä v  ö ’ ä n o p w v  a m a s  Kai ß A aa4 )qp ias  Aeyq Kai 
KaKoAoyfj, pq  n p o aex o T e  töv voüv , p q ö ’ ü p d s  q toütou 
Kp a u y q  Kai d v a iö e r  e ^ a n a T q o q
49 Dem osthenes
xxxviii.9
• toüto  y d p  n A a rro u a iv  outoi Kai n a p d y o u o i
50 Demosthenes 
xxxviii. 19-20
• ö k o ü w  Toivuv aÜTOÜs Td pev  n ep i twv n p a y p d T w v  
aÜTwv Kai twv vöpw v ö iK a ia  ^ e ü ^ e a O a i
• ö i’ wv ü p d s  e ^ a n a T q a e iv  oTovtoi
51 Demosthenes xxxix.35 • ä v  ö e  (J)fi ö e iv d  n d o x e iv  Kai KAdq Kai ö ö ü p q T a i Kai 
K aT qyopq pou , d  pev  d v  Aeyq, pq  n icneüeT e (o ü  y d p  
ö iK aiov pq nep i toutwv övtos toü Aöyou vuvi)
52 Dem osthenes xl.20-21 •  ly euööpevos ö e  Kai n a p a y w y ä s  Aeywv q ö q  tis ÖiKqv 
oük eöwKev
53 Dem osthenes xl.61 • e ä v  ö e  pq exw v nep i d )V  4>eüyei Tqv öiKqv piyre 
p d p T u p a s  ä fy ö x p ew s n a p a o x e o B a i  pqT’ dAAo niOTÖv 
p q ö ev , eT epous n apepßdA A q A öyous K aK oupyw v, Kai 
ß o d  Kai oxeTAidCn p q ö ev  n p ö s  tö n p d y p a
54 Dem osthenes xli. 12- 
14
•  n p ö s  pev  TaÜT’ o ü ö e v  ävTepe?
• nptOTOv pev  o ü x  q y o ü p a i ö iK a ia v  e lva i Tqv d noA oy iav  
TOiaÜTqv, o ü ö e  npooqK eiv , ÖTav tis ^ a v e p w s  
e^eAeyxqTai, peT acrrpeijjavT a T ds a m a s  eyKaAeTv Kai 
öiaßöAAeiv
55 Dem osthenes xlv.47- 
50
•  ü n e p  ö e  twv äAAwv oük d v  o lo s t ’ ei'qv Aeyeiv d p a  Kai 
toütous eAeyxeiv n ep i Tqs p a p T u p ia s
• oÜTe vüv e o n v  x aA en ö v  nep i wv pq  K aT qyöpqT ai Aeyeiv
•  pq  ö e  to ü t’ dc(J)eis n e p i wv oük äyw vi^eT ai AeyeTw p q ö ’ 
üpeTs edT ’, d v  d p ’ oütos d v a ia x u v T q
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56 D e m o s th e n e s  x lv .87 • e d v  n a p a y e iv  em xeipw oiv  u p a s
57 D e m o s th e n e s  x lv i .l •  n a p d y c o v  tco Aoyco, cos o u  n a v T a  pepapT Ü pqK e T ä ev tco 
ypappaT eico  y e y p a p p e v a , Kai e ^ a n a iw v  ü p ä s
58 D e m o s th e n e s  x lv iii.3 6 • i'va pq aÜTiK’ eE ianaTqocoaiv u p a s  oi pqTOpes
59 D e m o s th e n e s  li.3 •  XPHV pev  ouv, d> d v ö p e s  ’A 0 qva ib i, Kai ö k a io v  qv, toüs 
tov crre4>avov o io p e v o u s  öelv n a p ’ upcov AaßeTv, aÜTOus 
ä ^ io u s  em öeiK vüvai to u to u , pn  ’p e  kokgos Aeyeiv
60 D e m o s th e n e s  lii.1 -2 •  pr)K8Ti nep i tou n p a y p a T o s  povov  Aeyeiv, dAAd Kai nep i 
Tou AeyovTOs, cbs oük eiKÖs aÜTCo ö id  Tqv ö ö ^ a v  
nicrreueiv
61 D e m o s th e n e s  liv. 13 • d n ö  th? üßpecos Kai tcov n en p ay p ev co v  to  n p a y p ’ 
ay o v T ’ eis yeAcoTa Kai OKcbppaT’ epßaAeTv n e ip d a e o 0 a i
62 D e m o s th e n e s  liv .26 • o ü ö e v  n p o s  to n p a y p a ,  dAA’ eE; E T aip as e lva i n a iö io v  
aÜTCp TOÜTO Kai n e n o v 0 e v a i Tä Kai Ta
63 D e m o s th e n e s  lv ii.7 •  to  y a p  eis cxütö to n p a y p a  n a v T a  Aeyeiv to u t’ eycoy’ 
ünoA apßdvo), ö o a  tis n a p a  to ly n ^ io p a  n e n o v 0 ’ 
döiKcos K aT ao T ao iaaO eis  eniöE i^ai
64 D e m o s th e n e s  lv ii.33 -4 •  clkjte touto) pev  e^ecrriv et;co tou n p a y p a T o s  
ß A a a ^ q p e iv  Kai n a v T a  noieTv
65 D e m o s th e n e s  lv ii.59 • vopi^co y a p  üpTv Tqv toütwv n o v rip ia v  eis aÜTÖ to 
n p a y p a  Aeyeiv to yevopevov  poi
66 D e m o s th e n e s  lv ii.60 • epw  ö ’ eis aÜTÖ to  n p a y p ’, w d v ö p e s  ’A0nvaToi
67 D e m o s th e n e s  lv ii.63 • dAA’ i'ocos eE;co tou  n p a y p a T o s  unoA q^eaB e TaÜT’ e lvai
68 D e m o s th e n e s  lv ii.66 • en e iö q  Ö’ eEco t o Q n p a y p a T o s  vopi^ET’ e lv a i, eaoco
69 D e m o s th e n e s  lv iii.2 2 - 
5
•  a m a s  Kai n p o 4 )d a e is  eupioK eiv, a rriv es  tou n a p o v r o s  
u p a s  n o iq o o u a i n p a y p a T o s  en iA aB opevous toTs e^co Tqs 
K aT nyop ias  A oyas n p o o ex e iv
70 D e m o s th e n e s  lv iii.4 • ü n e p  aÜTou tou n p a y p a T o s  O K eiyapevous, ei pev 
ö iK a ia  Aeyco Kai K aT ä toüs v ö p o u s
•  öacpnep  d v  q r ro v  eE ian aT q o eiav  u p a s
71 D e m o s th e n e s  lv iii.48 •  n ep i Ths evöeiEiecos o ü ö e v  e^ei ö k a io v  Aeyeiv
72 D e m o s th e n e s  lv iii.52 dAA’ ou  K a 0 ’ öv eioeA qA u0as, toutov anoA oyfi;
73 D e m o s th e n e s  lv iii.69 • ü n e p  auT fis Ths evöeiSecos dnoA oyeTo0ai
74 D e m o s th e n e s  lix .6 • e£co ths y p a d q s  noAAa KaTqyopcov
75 H y p e rid e s  i.F r.2 • Kai p qöeis  üpcbv d n a v T a n o  poi peT a^ü  A eyovn, “ti 
TOÜ0 ’ npiv Aeyeis;” p q ö e  n p o o ri0 eT e  Tfj KaTqyopic? n a p ’ 
upcov aÜTcbv pqöev , dAAd [pdlAAovTq anoA oyigi...
76 H y p e rid e s  i.F r.3 • i'va öe  pq n p o  tou n p a y p a T o s  no[AA]o[us] Aoyous 
dvaAfcoocol, e n ’ aÜ TqvTqv fan o A o y liav  n o p e u o o p a i
77 H y p e rid e s  i .9 -1 1 • o u  pövov  d  exouo iv  aÜToi ö k a i a  nep i tou n p a y p a T o s  
Aeyouoiv, dAAd ouoK euodvT es A oiöop ias ijjeuöeis KaTd 
tcov Kpivopevcov e^icrraoiv  Tqs d n o A o y ias
•  n e p i twv e^co0ev öiaßaA cov Tqs [nepi toü n p a y p a T o s  
a n o A o y ia ]s  dnoAeA[eT4>0ai]
• n e p i cov pq e a v  Aeyeiv
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7 8 H y p e r i d e s  iv .4 •  n p iv  [ ö v ]  aÜTÖ t ö  K 8(J)dX aiov  t o ü  a v w v o s  K a i t q v  
d v T iY P a(J)nv  e ^ B T d o w o iv  ei e o n v  8K tcüv v ö p w v  h PH
7 9 H y p e r id e s  iv .1 0 •  8CXV 8^0) TOÜ v ö p o u  Ä8YOOOIV
8 0 H y p e r id e s  iv . 19 •  TOUTO y « P  ü n o X a p ß ö v e i s ,  e< |)öö iov  eau T U ) e is  t ö v  Ö Y tova 
t ö  8 K eiv r|s  ö v o p a  n a p a 4 ) e p u ) v  K a i K o X a K e ia v  ly e u ö q  
KOTriYOpcbv E u ^ e v in n o u ,  pT oos K a i ö p v n v  aÜTU) 
ouX X e^eiv  n a p ä  tcüv ö iK a c r rw v
81 H y p e r id e s  iv .3 1 -2 •  Tv’ s ä v  p e v  ä 4 ) e p e v o i  T fjs e i o a w e X i a s  n e p i  t ö v  e ^ w  t o ü  
n p d Y p a T O S  KaTriYOpnÖevTCüv an o X o Y Ö V T a i, ö n a v r c o o iv  
aÜToTs o i ö iK a o T a i*  t i T a ü 0 ’ npTv X eyet s ;
•  ö  e is  p e v  t ö v  a y w v a  t o ü t o v  o ü ö e v  ö p n o u  e a r iv
•  d)S dXXoBi n o u  o ü t o i  T f|v  Y v w p n v  ö v  a x o i r i a a v  n  e n ’ 
aÜTOÜ t o ü  n p a v p o r r o s
8 2 L y c u r g u s  i . l  1 -1 3 •  oÜ Te i j j e u ö ö p e v o s  o ü ö e v ,  o u t ’ e^co t o ü  n p d v p a T O s  
X evw v
•  n d v T a  pdX X ov  n n e p i  o ü  peXXeTe T pv  ip n ^ o v  c})epeiv
•  ü n e p  u)v p p  ß o u X e ü e o 0 e
•  t o Ts e£ w  t o ü  n p d v p o c T o s  X e v o u o iv
8 3 L y c u r g u s  i .9 0 -1 •  o ü  Y ö p  t o ü  n p d v p a T O s  e a r i
•  o ü  v ö (p  t o ü t o  öeT X eve iv
8 4  ' L y c u r g u s  i. 1 4 9 •  ä n o ö e ö w K a  t ö v  Ö Y Ö v a  ö p 0 c o s  K a i ö iK a iw s ,  o ü t c  t ö v  
öX X ov t o ü t o u  ß io v  ö i a ß a X ö v  o u t ’ e^a ) t o ü  n p Ö Y p aT O S  
o ü ö e v  K a T r iY o p n o a s
8 5 A e s c h i n e s  i . l  13 •  o ü  n e p i  t o ü  n p d Y p a T O S  öneX oY eiT O , a XX’ e ü 0 ü s  n e p i  
t o ü  T ip n p aT O S  iK Ö Teuev ö p o X o v ö v  ocöikcTv
8 6 A e s c h i n e s  i. 1 6 6 -7 0 •  noX X ai n a p e p ß o X a i  Xöycüv ü n ö  A n p o o 0 e v o u s  
e ü p e 0 n ö o v T a i ,  K a i t o Ts p e v  ü n e p  t o ü  n p Ö Y p a T o s  
K a K o n 0 e ia is  X e y o p e v a is  n r r o v  ö v t i s  Ö Y c c v a K T n o e ia v  ä  
ö e  e ^ a )0 e v  e n e io d ^ e T a i  X u p a iv ö p e v o s  t ö  Tfjs nöX ecos 
ö iK a i a ,  e n i  t o ü t o is  a ^ i ö v  e a n v  ö p Y io 0 n v a i
•  ö Xcüs ö e ,  u) ö v ö p e s  ’ A 0 r |v a T o i, t ö s  e ^ w 0 e v  t o ü  
n p a v p a T O S  ö n o X o v ia s  p h  n p o a ö e x e o 0 e
8 7 A e s c h i n e s  i . l 7 4 •  X p o e iv  p e T a X X a ^ a s  t ö v  a y w v a  K a i T f|v  ü p e T e p a v  
Ö K p o a a iv
8 8 A e s c h i n e s  i . l 7 5 - 6 •  änaYcxYW V y a p  aÜ T O Ü s ö n ö  t ö v  n e p i  T i p a p x o v  a m ö v
•  navTaxn n a p a K o X o u 0 o ü v T a s  p q ö a p n  n a p e K K X iv e iv  
aÜ TÖ v e a v ,  p p ö e  t o ü  n p a v p o r r o s  ei;aY C üviois Xö y o is  
ö n o x u p i^ e o 0 a i .  ÖXX’ ö o n e p  e v  T a ls  i n n o ö p o p i a i s  e is  t ö v  
t o ü  n p a v p o r r o s  aÜ T Ö v e io e X a ü v e T e
8 9 A e s c h i n e s  i . l 7 7 - 9 •  noXXÖKis ö ( j)e p e v o i t ö v  e is  aÜ TÖ  t ö  n p a y p o c  Xöycüv
•  e n e i ö a v  ö ’ a n ö  T p s  ö n o X o v ia s  a n o a n a o O r y T e  K ai t ö s  
ip u x a s  et})’ ö rep o o v  Y s v e o 0 e , e is  X q 0 n v  e p n e o ö v T e s  t q s  
Ka T n y o p i a s
•  T a is  y ö p  ö X X o T p ia is  a i n a i s  ä n o T p i i iJ Ö p e v o s  t ö  
ü n ö p x o v T a  aÜ T Ö  e y K X n p a T a  e K n e ^ e u y e v  eK t o ü  
ö iK a o T n p io u
9 0 A e s c h i n e s  i i i .7 6 •  Tva ö ’ e n i  T q s  ü n o 0 e o e c o s  peivcü
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91 A esch in es  iii.176 •  iv a  ö e  gn  änonX avu» ü g ä s  ä n ö  Tn? unoG eoew s
92 A esch in es  iii.190 • iv a  ö e  gn  än o n X av u ) ü g ä s  ä n ö  Tri9 ünoQ eaew s
93 A e sch in es  iii.193 • ge ievnvsK T ai y a p  ügTv tcx Tqs nöAecos ö iK a ia
•  u v  ö ’ OÜK eiai ö iK a a ra i  nep i toutgjv ä v a y K ä ^ o v T a i Tqv 
4jfi4>ov (J)epeiv
• ä v  ä p a  noG ’ ä ty n T ai toü n p a y g a T o s
94 A e sch in es  iii.197 •  tois eis aÜTÖ to  n p a y g a  Aeyouoiv
95 A esch in es  iii.201 -8 •  o u  y a p  twv <J)euyövTcov T äs  ö iK a ia s  än o A o y ia s  
eioeA nA üG aie ä K p o a o ö g e v o i, äAAä tcov eQeXövTwv 
öikoicos änoXoyeTaGai
•  eiepcov  n a p e g ß o A q  npaygönrcov eis AqGqv ü g ä s  
ß o ü X e ia i Tfis K aT riyop ias egßaXeTv. cöonep o ü v  ev toTs 
yugviKoTs ä y a jo iv  ö p ä i e  toüs nÜKTas n ep i Tfjs crrdoew s 
äXXnXois ö iaycovi^ogevous, outgo Kai ügeTs öXriv Tqv 
n g e p a v  ü n e p  Tqs nöAecos nep i Tqs OTäoecos aÜTci) toü 
Xö y o u  gdxeoG e, Kai gn  e o a e  aÜTÖv e^co toü  n a p a v ö g o u  
n ep iic rrao G ai, äAA’ eyK aG qgevoi Kai eveöpeüovT es ev Tq 
d K p o d o e i, eioeX aüveTe aÜTÖv eis toüs toü  n a p a v ö g o u  
Xöyous, Kai T äs eK T ponäs au T o ü  tcov Aöycov enrrqpeiT e
96 D in a rch u s  i . l  13 •  gn  ä n o ö e x e o Q ’ aÜTCov, äXXä KeXeüeT’ änoXoyeTaGai 
n e p i tcov K aTnyopngevo)v
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Table 5.1. Legal and nonlegal arguments in Athenian forensic speeches.
A ntiphon  i 31 1-31
(to ta l 31)
— — — —
A n tip h o n  v 96 1-76, 78-96 
(to tal 95)





A ntip h o n  vi 51 1-51




A n d o cid es i 150 1-91, 103- 
23, 132-40 
(to ta l 121)
71-79, 83- 




92-102 , 124- 
31, 141-50 
(to ta l 29)




(to ta l 4)
25-50  
(to ta l 26)
5-24
(total 20)
Iso cra tes  xvii 58 1 -3 2 ,3 5 -5 7  
(to tal 55)
— 33-34 , 57-58 
(to ta l 4)
57
(to ta l 1)
—
Isocra tes xv iii 68 1-47, 68 
(to ta l 48)
2 -3 ,4 , 19, 
20
(to tal 5)
16, 47-68  
(to ta l 23)
1 6 ,4 7 ,
68
(to ta l 3)





Iso cra tes  xxi 21 (end 
lost)
1-21
(to ta l 21)
— — — —
L ysias i 50 1-50
(to ta l 50)
4, 26, 27, 29, 
3 0 ,3 1 ,3 2 -  
3 3 ,3 4  
(to tal 9)
L ysias iii 48 1 -4 3 ,4 6  
(to tal 44)
2 8 ,4 1 -4 3  
(to tal 4)
44-48  
(to ta l 5)
46
(to ta l 1)
—








(to ta l 2)
20
(to ta l 1)





(to ta l 4)
— —
L ysias vi 55 1-6, 8-10, 9, 2 4 ,3 7 , 6-7, 1 1 -1 2 ,2 6 - 6 46-49
(beg inning
lost)




(to ta l 9) +  
(1)
32, 33-34 
(to ta l 13)
(to ta l 1) (total 4)
L ysias v ii 43 1-30, 34-43 
(to ta l 40 )
— 3 0 -3 3 ,4 1  
(to ta l 5)
3 0 ,4 1  
(to ta l 2)
—
L ysias ix 22 1-22
(to tal 22 )
— — — —




(to ta l 11)
9, 23, 24, 26- 
2 9 ,3 1  
(to ta l 8)
9, 23, 24, 
2 6 ,3 1  
(to ta l 5)
L ysias xii 100 1-37, 79-98 , 
100
(to tal 58)
6, 30, 34 
(to ta l 3)
20 , 99 
(to ta l 2)
20




L ysias x iii 96 1-61, 83-97 2, 4, 85-87, 18, 62-69 18 70-82
(exclud ing
§ 9 1 )
(to tal 75) 88-90 
(to tal 8)
(to ta l 9) (to ta l 1) (total 13)
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L ysias x iv 47 3-22, 32-34, 
40 , 47 
(to tal 25)
5 ,6 -8  
(to ta l 4)





(to ta l 3)
23-31 , 
43-45 
(to ta l 12)
L ysias xv 12 1-12
(to tal 12)
— — — —
L ysias xvi 21 3-8
(to ta l 6)
6-8
(to ta l 3)
1 -3 ,9-21  
(to tal 16)
3
(to ta l 1)
—
L ysias xv ii 10 1-10
(to ta l 10)
— — — —




(to ta l 5)
1 -1 5 ,2 0 -2 7  
(to ta l 23)
15
(to ta l 1)
L ysias  x ix 64 1-54
(to tal 54)
2, 9-10, 14-17, 
19, 55-64 
(to ta l 18)
2, 9-10, 
14-17, 19 
(to ta l 8)
L ysias  xx 36 1-5, 7-22, 27 
(to ta l 22)
2, 4, 5-6, 22- 
2 5 ,2 6 ,2 8 -3 6  
(to ta l 18)
2, 4, 5, 
22
(to ta l 4)




(to ta l 25)
L ysias xxii 22 1-13, 17-22 
(total 19)
5 ,6 ,  7, 9, 17 
(to ta l 5)
14-16 
(to ta l 3)
— —
L ysias xx iii 16 1-16
(to tal 16)
— 4, 11, M  
(to ta l 3)
4 ,1 1 ,1 4  
(to ta l 3)
—
L ysias xxiv 27 1 -2 3 ,2 6 , 27 
(to ta l 25)
— 24-25 
(to ta l 2)
—




— 12-13, 17 
(to tal 3)
12-13, 17 
(to ta l 3)
—
L ysias xxvi 24
(beg inn ing
lost)
1 -3 ,6 -1 3 , 
15-20 
(to ta l 17)




(to ta l 2)
4-5
(to ta l 2)
L ysias xxvii 16 1-8, 12-16 
(to tal 13)
— 9-12 
(to ta l 4)
12
(to ta l 1)
—
L ysias xxviii 17 1-11
(to tal 11)
— — — 12-17 
(to ta l 6)
L ysias xx ix 14 1-14
(to tal 14)
5
(to ta l 1)
— — —
L ysias xxx 35 1-9, 15-25, 
35
(to tal 21)
2 ,6 ,  9-14, 26- 
35
(to ta l 18)
2, 6, 9, 
35
(to ta l 4)
L ysias xxxi 34 — — 1-34
(to ta l 34)
— —




3 ,2 3 ,2 4 ,2 5  
(to ta l 4)
— — —
Isaeu s i 51 1-51
(to tal 51)
- —
Isaeus ii 47 1-34, 38-47 
(to tal 44)
1 3 -1 5 ,1 7  
(to ta l 3)
35-37, 42 
(to ta l 4)
42
(to ta l 1)
—
Isaeus iii 80 1-80
(total 80)
3 5 ,4 2 ,5 8 ,  
64, 67-68, 
69
(to ta l 7)
37, 40 
(to ta l 2)
37, 40 
(to ta l 2)
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Isaeus iv 31 1 -26 ,31  
(to ta l 27)
14, 16 
(to ta l 2)
27-28 , 28-30  
(to ta l 4)
— —
Isaeus v 47 1-9, 12-26, 
28-34 
(to ta l 31)
1 0 -1 1 ,2 6 -2 7 , 
39-45 
(to ta l 11)
2 6 ,4 5  




Isaeus v i 65 1-37, 43-46 , 
51-59, 62-65 
(to ta l 54)
9, 44 
(to tal 2)
38-42, 47-50 , 
55, 5 9 ,6 1  
(to ta l 13)
55, 59 
(to ta l 2)
Isaeus v ii 44 1-35, 43-44  
(to ta l 37)
19-22 
(to tal 4)
34, 35-36, 37- 
42
(to ta l 9)
3 5 ,3 5  
(to ta l 2)
Isaeus v iii 46 1-37, 43 -46  
(to ta l 43)
31-32 
(to tal 2)
40-42 , 44 , 46 
(to ta l 5)
44 , 46 
(to ta l 2)
—
Isaeus ix 37 1-37
(to ta l 37)
— — — —
Isaeus x 26 1-24, 26 
(to ta l 25)
2, 9-10, 12 
(to ta l 4)
25
(to ta l 1)
— —
Isaeus x i 50 (end 
lost)
1-50
(to ta l 50)
1 -3 ,5 , lO- 
l l ,  12-13,




(to ta l 1)
50
(to ta l 1)















1 -3 1 ,4 2 -  
126, 160- 
2 5 1 ,2 6 7 , 
270-324  
(to ta l 244)
36-39, HO- 
25
(to ta l 19)
1 0 ,3 5 -4 2 , 
1 2 6 -5 9 ,2 5 2 - 
66, 268-69  
(to ta l 59)
10, 42, 
126
(to ta l 3)
32-34  
(to ta l 3)
D em osthenes
xix
338 (no §§ 
105-9)
1-168, 174-
9 1 ,2 0 2 -5 ,
215-40 , 263-




(to ta l 285)
4 8 -5 1 ,6 3 , 
86-87, 131, 
275 , 279 
(to ta l 10)
169-73, 192- 
2 0 1 ,2 0 6 -1 4 , 
229-30 , 237- 
:C , 241-62 , 
281-82 , 287 , 
3 1 4 ,3 3 1 ,3 3 7 -  
40
(to ta l 59)
229-30 , 
237-38 , 
2 8 1 ,3 1 4  
(to ta l 6)
D em osthenes
xx
167 1-13, 15- 
142, 145, 
154-67 
(to ta l 156)
27, 28 , 29, 




(to ta l 14)
13-14, 143-44, 
146-53 
(to ta l 12)
13











(to ta l 124)
9 -1 1 ,3 0 , 32- 
35, 43-46 
(to ta l 12)
19-23, 83-125, 
128-42, 160- 
68 , 171-74, 
184-85, 189, 
197-212 
(to ta l 93)
97, 189, 
211-12  
(to ta l 4)
143-59 












21-24 , 47-78 




(to ta l 220)
16, 18, 19- 
2 1 ,2 2 -2 8 , 
28-36, 37- 




86, 87, 143, 
215-18, 219- 
20
(to ta l 57)
D em osthenes
xxiv
218 1-122, 131- 
57, 187-99, 
204-18 
(to ta l 177)
24-27, 27- 
32, 3 4 ,4 1 , 
43-44, 46- 








(to ta l 41)
123-30, 158- 
87, 197-203 
(to ta l 45)
187, 197- 
99
(to ta l 4)
D em osthenes 101 1-38, 69-75, - 35, 38-68, 74 3 5 ,3 8 , 76-80
XXV 81-101 
(total 66)
(to ta l 33) 74




27 1-15, 19-27 
(to tal 24)













— 22, 24 
(to ta l 2)
22
(to ta l 1)
—
■ D em osthenes 
xxix
60 1-60
(to ta l 60)





















(to ta l 32)
1 -2 ,2 4  





(to ta l 38)
1 -3 ,4 ,2 7  




52 1-35, 40-52 
(total 48)





(to ta l 5)
40
(to ta l 1)
D em osthenes
XXXV
56 3-40, 43-49, 
55-56 
(to tal 47)
8, 10-13, 18- 
1 9 ,2 1 -2 3 , 
24-25 , 27,
37
(to ta l 13)
1 -2 ,4 1 -4 2 ,4 4 , 
50-54 





D em osthenes 62 1-35, 60-62 23-24, 25, 43-59 — 36-42
xxxv i (to ta l 38) 26-27 
(total 5)
(to tal 17) (to tal 7)
D em osthenes 60 1-60 1, 1 8 -1 9 ,2 1 , 48, 54 48 , 54 —
x xxv ii (to ta l 60) 3 3 ,3 5 -3 8  
(total 9)
(to tal 2) (to ta l 2)
D em osthenes 28 1-24, 27-28 1 -3 ,4 , 5, 16, 28 28 25-26
xxxv iii (to ta l 26) 1 7 -1 8 ,2 7  
(total 9)
(to ta l 1) (to ta l 1) (to tal 2)
D em osthenes 41 — — 1-41 — —
x xx ix (to ta l 41)
D em osthenes 61 1 -3 1 ,3 6 -5 6 , 19 32-35, 57 — —
x l 58-61 
(to ta l 56)
(to tal 1) (to ta l 5)
D em osthenes 30 1-30 7, 10 — — —
x li (to ta l 30) (to tal 2)
D em osthenes 32 1 -2 0 ,2 6 -3 2 1 ,4 , 5, 7, 9, — — 21-25
xlii (to ta l 27) 10-14, 17, 
26, 27, 28 
(to ta l 14)
(to tal 5)
D em osthenes 84 1-67, 73-84 16, 17, 27, 68-72 — —
xliii (to ta l 79) 51-52, 54- 
55, 57-58 
(+71-72) 
(to tal 9) + 
(2)
(total 5)
D em o sth en es 68 (end 1 -3 0 ,4 1 -5 6 , 2, 7, 12, 14, 3 1 -4 0 ,5 7 -5 9 — —
x liv lost) 60-68 2 5 ,4 5 -5 1 , (total 13)
(to ta l 55) 60-68 
(total 21)
D em osthenes 88 1-52, 57-62, — 53-56, 63-84, — -
xlv 86-88 85
(to ta l 61) (to tal 27)
D em osthenes 28 1-28 6-8, 9-10, — — —
x lv i (to ta l 28) 12-13, 14-
17, 18-23, 
24-25, 25- 
2 6 ,2 7  
(to tal 21)
D em osthenes 82 1-48 8 ,2 1 ,2 3 ,2 5 , 49-82 — —
xlvii (to ta l 48) 29, 3 0 ,3 3 , 
40, 44 (+70 , 
72, 77)
(total 9) + 
(3)
(total 34)
D em osthenes 58 1-51, 57-58 11, 30 (+56- 52-57 57 —
xlv iii (to tal 53) 57)
(total 2) + 
(2)
(total 6) (to ta l 1)
D em o sth en es 69 1-69 20, 56 9, 14, 46, 65, 9, 14, 46, —
x lix (to tal 69) (to tal 2) 66 65, 66
(total 5) (to ta l 5)
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D em osthenes 68 1-58, 65-67 57-58 58-59, 60-62, 58 —
1 (to tal 61) (to tal 2) 63, 64, 68 
(to tal 8)
(to ta l 1)
D em o sth en es 22 1-22 1 ,4 — — —
li (total 22) (to ta l 2)
D em o sth en es 33 1-33 - 26, 29 26, 29 —
Hi (to tal 33) (to tal 2) (to ta l 2)
D em o sth en es 28 1-28 1 1 ,2 7 — — —
liii (total 28) (to tal 2)
D em osthenes 44 1 -3 6 ,3 8 , 40- 17 -2 1 ,2 4 -2 5 1 6 -17 ,36 -37 , 16-17, —
liv 44 (to tal 7) 39-40, 44 36, 40
(to tal 41) (to tal 7) (to ta l 4)
D em o sth en es 35 1-35 — — — —
lv (to tal 35)
D em osthenes 50 1-7, 9-50 2, 10 7-8, 10 7, 10 —
lvi (total 49) (to ta l 2) (total 3) (to ta l 2)
D em o sth en es 70 1 -5 7 ,6 1 -6 2 , 4, 29 , 30-32 58-61, 62-65, 6 1 ,6 2 , —
lv ii 66-70 (to ta l 5) 66 66
(to tal 64) (to tal 9) (to ta l 3)
D em o sth en es 70 1-26, 36-65, 6-7, 11-13, 27-35, 66-68, 68, 69-70 —
Iviii 68-70 14-15, 17, 69-70 (to ta l 3)
(total 59) 21-22, 48- 
49, 50-52 
(to ta l 15)
(total 14)
D em o sth en es 126 1-32, 35-44, 4, 16-17, 52- 2 7 -2 8 ,3 3 -3 4 , 27-28, —
lix 49-63, 72- 53, 75-79, 3 6 ,4 1 -4 3 ,4 5 - 3 6 ,4 1 -
84, 88-107, 89-90, 92- 48 , 64-71, 85- 43 , 107
110-26 93, 105-6 87, 107-9 (to ta l 7)
(to tal 107) (+66-67 , 85- 
87)
(to ta l 16) + 
(5)
(total 26)
L y c u rg u s i 150 1-24, 28-150 37, 113-16, 25-27 - -
(to tal 147) i n - 1 9 ,  no- 
21 , 122-23, 
125-26, 146 
(to ta l 15)
(to tal 3)
H y p erid e s  i 20  +  4 1-13, 19-20, 12, Fr. iii 14-15, 16-18 - —
(fragm ent- Frr. i-iv (to ta l 1 +  1) (total 5)
ary) (to tal 1 5 + 4 )
H y p erid e s  ii 13 1-13 - 9, 10 9, 10 —
(beg inn ing
lost)
(total 13) (to tal 2) (to ta l 2)
H y p erid e s  iii 36 1-28 13, 14-18, 3, 29-36 3 -
(beg inn ing (to tal 28) 22 (+33) (to tal 9) (to ta l 1)
and  end (to ta l 7) +
lost) (1)
H y p erid e s  iv 41 1 -27 ,30-41 3 ,4 -1 0 23, 28-30 2 3 ,3 0 —
(to tal 39) (to ta l 8) (to tal 4) (to ta l 2)
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H yperides v 36 1-15, 19, 22, 24 17-18, 20-21, 29 -
(fragm ent- 24-26 , 29, (to tal 1) 28-29 , 30 (to ta l 1)
ary; no  §§ 31-32, 34-40 (to ta l 7)
16, 2 3 ,2 7 ,  
3 3 )
(to ta l 30)
A esch ines i 190 (§§ 1-42, 44 -57 , 1 ,3 ,9 -1 1 , 26, 3 9 ,4 3 ,5 8 - 26, 39, -
12, 1 6 ,2 1 , 65-106 , 117- 13-14, 15- 64, 107-16, 189
35, 66, 68 69 , 174-96 17, 18-20, 170-73, 189 (to ta l 3)
bogus) (to ta l 168) 22-25 , 27, 
28-32 , 33- 
34, 73, 119, 
138-40, 160 
(to ta l 30) + 
(1)
(to ta l 25)
A esch ines ii 184 1 -2 1 ,2 4 -3 3 , 54-55, 60- 3, 22-23 , 34- 3, 54, 55, -
36-39, 44- 62, 65-66, 35, 40 -43 , 54, 62, 78,
107, 113-45, 91-92 55, 62, 78, 79, 79, 88,
153-65, 171- (to tal 9) 88, 93, 99, 93, 99,
78, 183-84 108-12, 113, 113, 121,
(to ta l 155) 121, 146-52, 153, 165
153, 165, 166, 
167-70, 179- 
82
(to ta l 42)
(to tal 13)
A esch ines iii 260 1-50, 54-75, 2, 11-12, 14- 5 1 -5 3 ,7 6 -7 8 , 207 , 209- -
79-170 , 177- 16, 18-22, 171-76, 207, 10, 230
2 1 2 ,2 1 5 -3 0 , 26 , 27-28, 2 0 9 -1 0 ,2 1 3 - (to ta l 4)
232 , 233 , 2 9 -3 0 ,3 1 , 14, 230-31 ,
234-40 , 254- 32-34 , 35- 241-53
60 40, 45, 47, (to ta l 32)
(to ta l 232) 48, 49-50 , 
204
(to ta l 32)
D inarchus i 114 1 -1 7 ,3 7 -7 7 , 16, 82-84 17, 18-36, 46, 15, 17, -
82-90, 103- (+ 78-82) 7 8 -8 2 ,9 1 -9 8 , 46, 82
14 (to ta l 3) + 99-102 (to tal 4)
(to ta l 79) (5) ( t m  13Q)
D inarchus ii 26 1-4, 5-7, 14- — 1 ,2 , 3, 4, 14, 1 ,2 , 3, 4, 8-13
1 8 ,2 0 -2 6 15, 18-19, 20 14, 15, (to tal 6)
(to ta l 19) (to ta l 9) 18, 20 
(to tal 8)
D inarchus iii 22 1-5, 11-14, 4 1 ,6 -1 0 , 15-16 1 —
17-22 
(to ta l 15)
(to ta l 1) (to ta l 8) (to tal 1)
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Table 5.2. Relative Proportions of Legal and Nonlegal Argument
A nd o cid es i Public D efendant 150 80.7 19.3
A ntiphon  v Public D efendant 96 99 1
Isocra tes  xvi Private defendant 50
(incom plete)
— —
Iso cra tes  xvii Private p rosecu tor 58 94.8 6.9
Isocra tes  xviii Private defendant 
(paragraphe)
68 70.6 33.8
L ysias iii P rivate defendant 48 91.7 10.4
L ysias iv Private defendant 20
(incom plete)
-- —
L ysias v Private defendant 5
(incom plete)
— —
L ysias vi Public p rosecu to r 55
(incom plete)
— —
L ysias vii Public defendant 43 93 11.6
L ysias x Private p rosecu to r 32 90.6 25
L ysias xii Public p rosecu tor 100 61 40
L ysias x iii Private p rosecu to r 96 78.1 22 .9
L ysias x iv Private p rosecu to r 47 53.2 53.2
L ysias xvi Public defendant 21 28.6 76.2
L ysias xviii Public defendant 27
(incom plete)
— —
L ysias x ix Public defendant 64 84.4 25
L ysias xx Public defendant 36 61.1 50
L ysias xxi Public defendant 25 - —
L ysias xxii Public p rosecu tor 22 86.4 13.6
L ysias xxiii Private p rosecu to r 
(antigraphe)
16 100 18.75
L ysias xxiv Public defendant 27 92.6 7.4
L ysias xxv Public defendant 35
(incom plete)
— —
L ysias xxvi Public defendant 24
(incom plete)
— --
L ysias xxvii Public p rosecu to r 16 81.3 25
L ysias xxviii Public p rosecu to r 17 64.7 35.3
L ysias xxx Public p rosecu to r 35 60 51.4
L ysias xxxi Public p rosecu to r 34 0 100
Isaeus ii Private defendant 47 93.6 8.5
Isaeus iii Private p rosecu to r 80 100 2.5
Isaeus iv D iadikasia 31 87.1 12.9
Isaeus v Private p rosecu to r 47 66 36.2
Isaeus vi Private p rosecu to r 65 83.1 20
Isaeus vii D iadikasia 44 84.1 20.5
Isaeus viii D iadikasia 46 93.5 10.9
Isaeus x D iadikasia 26 96.2 3.8
Isaeus xi Public defendan t 50
(incom plete)
-- —
D em osthenes xviii Public defendant 303 80.2 20.8
D em osthenes xix Public p rosecu to r 338 94.1 17.5
D em osthenes xx Public p rosecu to r 167 93.4 7.2
D em osthenes xxi Public p rosecu to r 225 52.9 48 .9
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Table 5.2 (Cont.).
D em osthenes xx ii Public p rosecu tor 77 59.7 40.3
D em osthenes xx iv Public p rosecu tor 218 81.2 20 .6
D em osthenes xxv Public p rosecu tor 101 65.3 37.6
D em osthenes xxvi Public p rosecu tor 27 88.9 11.1
D em osthenes xxviii P rivate p rosecu to r 24 95 .8 8.3
D em osthenes xx ix Private defendant 60 100 1.7
D em osthenes xxx iv Private p rosecu tor 
(paragraphe)
52 93.3 9.6
D em osthenes xxxv Private p rosecu tor 
(paragraphe)
56 83.9 17.9
D em osthenes xxxvi P rivate defendant 
(paragraphe)
62 61.3 38.7




Private defendant 28 92 .9 10.7
D em osthenes xxx ix D iadikasia 41 0 100
D em osthenes xl P rivate p rosecu tor 61 91.8 8.2
D em osthenes x lii D iadikasia 32 84.4 15.6
D em osthenes xliii D iadikasia 84 94 6
D em osthenes x liv Private p rosecu tor 68 80.9 19.1
D em osthenes xlv Private p rosecu tor 88 69.3 30.7
D em osthenes x lvii P rivate p rosecu tor 82 58.5 41.5
D em osthenes xlv iii P rivate p rosecu tor 58 91 .4 10.3
D em osthenes x lix P rivate p rosecu tor 69 100 7.2
D em osthenes 1 Private p rosecu tor 68 89.7 11.8
D em osthenes lii Private defendant 33 100 6
D em osthenes liv P rivate p rosecu tor 44 93 .2 15.9
D em osthenes lvi P rivate p rosecu tor 50 98 6
D em osthenes lvii Private defendant 70 91 .4 12.9
D em osthenes Iviii Public p rosecu tor 70 84.3 20
D em osthenes lix Public p rosecu tor 126 84.9 20 .6
L y c u rg u s i Public p rosecu tor 150 98 2
H yperides i Public defendant 20 + 4 
(incom plete)
— —
H yp erid es ii Public p rosecu tor 13
(incom plete)
— —
H yperides iii P rivate p rosecu tor 36
(incom plete)
— —
H yperides iv Public defendant 41 95.1 9.8
H yperides v P rivate p rosecu tor 36
(incom plete)
— —
A esch ines i Public p rosecu tor 190 88.4 13.2
A esch ines ii Public defendant 184 84.2 22.8
A esch ines iii Public p rosecu tor 260 89.2 13.3
D inarchus i Public p rosecu tor 114 69.3 34.2
D inarchus ii Public p rosecu tor 26 73.1 57.7
D inarchus iii Public p rosecu tor 22 68.2 36.4
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Table 5.3. The Heliastic Oath in Athenian Forensic Oratory
A n tip h o n  v .8, 85, 96 Private
defendant
96 1-96 — 3%










L ysias x .32 Private
p rosecutor





L ysias x iv .22 , 40 , 47 Public
p rosecu tor
47 3-34, 40 , 
43-45 , 47
1-2, 10, 
23-31 , 35- 
47
6%
L ysias x v .8 -1 1 Public
prosecu tor
12 1-12 — 25%
L ysias xviii. 13 Public
defendant
27
(beg inn ing  
o f  speech  
lost)
13-19 1-12, 20- 
27
L ysias x ix. 11 Public
defendant




L ysias xx ii.7 Public
prosecu tor
22 1-13, 17- 
22
14-16 6%
Iso cra tes  xv iii.34 P rivate
defendant
(paragraphe)
68 1-47, 68 16, 47-68 1%
Isaeus ii.47 Private
defendant
47 1 -3 4 ,3 8 -
47
•35-37, 42 2%
Isaeus iv .3 1 D iadikasia 31 1-26, 31 27-30 3%
Isaeus v i.2 , 65 Private
p rosecutor




50, 55, 59- 
61
3%





Isaeus x i.6 , 18 Public
defendant




D em osthenes xviii.2 , 
6 -7 , 121, 126, 249
Public
defendant
3 0 3 (2 1  
sections 
bogus)
1-34, 42 - 
126, 160- 






D em osthenes x ix .l ,  
132, 161, 1 7 9 ,2 1 2 , 





















2 8 7 ,3 1 4 ,
3 3 1 ,3 3 7 -
40
3%













D em osthenes xxi.4, Public 225 (2 1-18, 24- 19-23, 83- 4%
24, 34 , 4 2 , 177, 188, p rosecu to r sections 82, 97 , 125, 128-







D em osthenes xxii.4 , Public 7 7 (1 1-46 47-78 9%
20, 39, 43 -46 prosecu to r bogus)
D em osthenes P ublic 220 1-220 — 2%
xx iii.19 , 96-97 , 101, 
194
prosecu to r
D em osthenes xxiv.2, Public 218 1-122, 123-30, 6%
34-35 , 58 , 78, 90, prosecu to r 131-57, 158-87,
148-51, 175, 188 187-99,
204 -218
197-203
D em osthenes xxv. 11, Public 101 1-38, 69- 35, 38-68, 2%
99 prosecu to r 101 74, 76-80
D em osthenes P rivate 69 1-69 — 1%
xxvii.68 prosecu to r
D em osthenes xxix.4, P rivate 60 1-60 4 5%
13, 53 defendan t
D em osthenes P rivate 52 1 -3 5 ,4 0 - 36-40 2%
xxxiv .45 prosecu to r
(parag raphe)
52
D em osthenes x x x v i.l, P riva te 62 1-42, 60- 36-59 5%
2 6 ,6 1 defendan t
(parag raphe)
62
D em osthenes D iad ikasia? 41 — 1-41 (bu t 10%
xxx ix .37 -38 , 40-41 relevant)
D em osthenes xliii.84 D iad ikasia 84 1-67, 73- 
84
68-72 1%
D em osthenes xliv .14 P rivate 68 1 -3 0 ,4 1 - 31-40, 57- 1%
prosecu to r? 56, 60-68 59
D em osthenes x lv.50, P rivate 88 1-52, 57- 53-56, 63- 5%
86-88 prosecu to r 62, 86-88 85
D em osthenes xlv i.27 Private
p rosecu to r
28 1-28 — 4%
D em osthenes lv.35 Private
defendan t
35 1-35 — 3%
D em osthenes lvii. 17, P rivate 70 1 -5 7 ,6 1 - 58-66 3%
68 defendan t 62, 66 -70
D em osthenes lviii. 17, Public 70 1-26, 36- 27-35, 66- 6%
2 5 ,3 6 ,6 1 prosecu to r 65, 68 -70 69
D em osthenes lix .l 15 Public 126 1 -3 2 ,3 5 - 27-28, 33- 1%
prosecu to r 40, 43 -44 , 
4 9 -63 , 72-
3 4 ,3 6 ,4 1 -  
43, 45-48,
84, 88- 64-71, 86-
107, H O - 
26
87, 107-9
H yperides i. Fr.i Public
defendan t








H yperides ii.5 Public
p rosecu tor
13
(beg inn ing  
o f  speech  
lost)
1-13 9-10
H yp erid es iv.40 Public
defendant
41 1-27, 30- 
41
23 , 28-30 2%
H yperides v. 1 Public
p rosecu tor
36 (m uch 
m issing)
1-15, 19, 
22 -26 , 29, 
31-40
1 7 -1 8 ,2 0 -
2 1 ,2 8 -3 0




150 1-24, 28- 
150
25-27 2%













A esch ines ii.l Public
defendant







22-23 , 34- 
35, 40 -43 , 
54-55, 62, 






A esch ines iii.6, 8, 31, 









207 , 209- 
1 0 ,2 1 3 - 
14, 230- 
3 1 ,2 4 1 -4 9
2%
D inarchus ii.20 Public
prosecu tor
26 1, 5-7, 14- 
26
2-4, 8-13 4%
D inarchus iii. 17 Public
prosecu tor
22 1-5, 11-14, 
17-22




Table 5.4. Occurrences in Forensic Oratory where “Justice” is clearly linked to laws.
Aeschines i.13 , 36, 91, 161, 176, 177, 178 (ö iK aio i9 , äöiKO U , t o  Ö iK aiov), 196, 
196; ii.6 (oÜK äöiKeT), ii i .l ,  3, 7 (äöiK r]|JäTU )v, t ö  ö k a i o v ) ,  12 
(ä ö iK r if ia ,  ä ö iK e r ra i) ,  16, 5 0 ,1 9 9 , 200 (t o ü  ö iK a io u , Tijv ö iK a ia v ) , 
201 (T ä s  ö iK a ia s ,  öiK aiu)9), 202, 260 ( ä ö iK r |p ä T 0 9 ) .1
Andocides i.2 (Ttp ö iK aitp , T ä  ö iK a ia , äöiKU)9, ö iK a iw s), 33, 110.
Antiphon i.24 (rjöiK r|K e, f|öiKr|K£), 31; v .7 , 9, 15, 19, 85, 87, 95, 96; vi.6, 9 
(ijöiKOUV, äöiKOÜVTa, ä ö iK e r ra i ,  äö lK eT oB ai), 21, 25, 36.
Demosthenes xviii.6 , 13 (äöiK O Ö VTa, T äö iK q iJa T a ) , 58, 102 (T ä ö iK a ia , 
ä ö iK o u p e v o s ) ,  1 1 3 ,1 1 7 , 121 (äöiK riM äT 09, ö iK a io v ), 123 (ä ö iK r jp a T ’, 
nöiKHKU)?), 124 (rjöiKOUV), 125, 1 7 0 ,2 5 0  (ö iK ai(09); x ix.131, 133, 179 
(toTs ö iK a io is , rjöiKei), 283; x x .l ,  12 (toTs ijöiKr|KÖoiv, T ä  ö iK a ia ) ,  18, 
36, 63 ( ä ö iK f | | j a a i ) ,  67, 93, 94 (Ö iK a ia , ö iK a iu w ), 96, 97 (ö iK a ia , 
äöiKOÖVTCüv), 98 (äöiKU)?, Ö iK aiov, ö iK a iw s), 99 , 109 (T ä ö iK a ia ) ,
155 (äöiK eT, äö iK oüvT w v), 158 (to ü  ö ik o io u , ö iK aiu)9, ö iK aiw s), 164; 
x x i .9 ,1 1 ,2 0 , 30  (tcov äö iK oüvT w v, äö iK q B n , tgov äöiKriM äTcov, toTs 
ä ö iK i ja o u a iv ,  t o ?9 ä ö iK r ia o p e v o i? , äö iK n 0 (j) , 34 (rjöiKnKev, ö iK a iö s), 
35 (ö iK a ia ,  öiK aico?), 40  (ö iK aiw ?), 45 ( ä ö iK ij |ja T a ,  äöiKsTv), 6 6 ,8 2 , 
96, 102, 126 (n ö iK n iJa a i, ä ö iK i ip a o iv ) ,  127, 177, 179, 1 8 8 ,2 1 1 ,2 2 4 ,
225 (äöiK O Ü O evtp , ä ö iK ijp a T a ) ;  xxii.7 , 11, 18, 25 (tw v  äöiKHMOTUV, 
Tcov äö iK O uvT w v), 2 6 ,3 3  (äöiK eTs), 43 (äöiK O Ü oi, äöiKeT, äöiK riM a), 
62; xxiii.2 , 20 , 38, 48 (äöiKW S, ö iK aiw s , Ö iK a ia ), 50 (äöiKCüV, äöiKeT, 
äöiKü)<3, ö iK aicos), 51, 54, 55, 59, 60 (äöiKU)9, ö iK aiu)9), 61 (äö'iKU)9, 
äöiK cav), 64  (öiK aiu)9, ö iK a ia ) ,  69, 74 (ö iK a io v , ö iK a ia ) ,  75 (öiK aiu)9, 
ö iK a io u , äöiK O U , ö iK a i’, äöiKOV, Tijv ö iK a ia v ) ,  82, 83, 84, 88, 101,
217 , 219  (ö iK aiü)9 , äöiKU)9, ijöiKei), 220 ; x x iv .l ,  2, 5, 10, 29  (äöiKeTv, 
äöiK cov), 31 ( ijö iK r |ö 0 a i, ijö iK naev ), 32, 34 (ö iK aiu)9 , T ä  ö iK a ia ) ,  37, 
38 (Ttbv äöiK npäT W V , öiK aiu)9), 43, 47 , 48 , 52 (ö iK a ia ) ,  55, 58 
( ä ö iK f ip a T a ,  äöiKeTv, öiK aiu)9), 65 (ö iK a io v , äöiKeTv), 69 (tcov 
äöiKOÜVTCov, äöiKU)9), 73 (Ö iK aiov, qöiK ei), 74 (rjöiKei9, ö iK aio v , 
ä ö iK n p a a iv ,  äöiK O 0vT e9), 76, 81, 84, 85, 87 (äöiKeT, toT9 
äö iK O u p ev o i9 ), 89, 95, 99, 102, 104, 109, 110 (äöiKeT, rjö iK niJevou,
TÜ)V f|ÖIKqKÖTU)V, äÖlKqOÖVTCOV), 113, 116 (ljÖIKriKU)9, toT9 
ä ö iK f ip a o iv ,  TOÜ9 äö iK o ü v T a 9 ), 118 (tö  ä ö iK r ip a ,  to ü  rjöiKriKÖT09), 
122 (ä ö iK ijo e iv ) , 152, 156, 178 (ö iK ai0 9 , ö iK a io v ), 179, 187, 1 9 4 ,2 0 4 , 
205 (äöiK eTv, äöiKeT), 207 (T ä ö iK a ia ,  T äöiK riM a), 211 (öiK aiu)9, 
ö iK a io v ), 212 , 214  (TäöiK riM «, ö iK aiu)9), 215 , 217  (toT9 äöiK O Ü oiv, 
äöiKeTv), 218 ; xxv.3, 11 (Ö iK a ia ), 14, 16, 17 (ö iK a io v ) , 18, 70 (äöiKeT), 
72, 74, 76, 81, 92 ; xxvi.2 , 5, 7, 12, 14 (Ö iK a iav , äöiKOV, öiK aiu)9, 
ö iK a ia ) ,  '  ::-::/l:.28; xxx iii.l (äö iK Ä V T ai, to T9 äöiK O Ü ai, ä ö iK q ), 2
(ä ö iK o u p e v o ie , äöiKW 9), 38 (T ä  Ö iK a ia ); xxxv.45 (ö ik o io v , t ö  aÜTÖ 
ö iK a io v ), 49  (ö iK a io v  t i, ö ik o io v ), 54 (äö iK eT o0e , oü k  äöiK eT o0e, 
äöiKeT); xxxvi.25  (ö iK aio v , ö iK aiÖ T epov), 27 (äö iK O u p ev o i9 , toü  
ö iK a io u ) , 32 ; x x x v ii.l (to ü  ö iK a io u , qö iK riK a), 18, 19, 20 (öiK aiu)9, 
ö iK aio i9 ), 21 , 33 , 34, 36 (äö iK rj, ö iK a io v ), 39 (rjö iK r|K a, ö ik o io v ), 46 
(qöiKriKÖTi, äö iK O Ü \rra9 ), 4 7 ,4 9  (T ä ö iK a ia ,  f|öiK ei9), 57; xxxviii.17 , 
18, 19, 27 (Ö iK aiov); xxxix .33, 40 (ö iK aiO T äT fi), 41 (t Tjv ö iK aiO T äT qv); 
x l.20 , 39, 40 ; x l i .7 ,26; x li i .l ,  2, 4, 8 ,1 0 , 11 (ö iK aiu)9 , T ä  ö iK a ia ) ,  15 
(t o ü  ö iK a io u , ö iK aiw v , tw v  rjöiKripevcüv, rjöiKr|KÖTU)v), 17, 1 8 ,2 7 , 30 
(äöiKU)9, öiK aiu)9); xliii. 17, 52, 60 (Ö iK aiov, t ö  ö ik o io v ); xliv.3 
(äöiK O U ), 6, 7, 25, 29, 36, 45 , 63, 66; x lv .45 ; x lv i.9  (äöiKrilJäTCüV, 
äö iK O Ü p ai), 23 , 27, 28; x lv ii .l ,  2, 3 (ö iK aiu)9 , äöiKW VTai, nöiK fj0nv), 
7, 8, 15, 25 , 26 , 37, 39, 40 , 42 (äölKOÜVTl, äöiKeTv), 45 , 47 (äöiKOJV), 
48;
1 Where “justice” words occur more than once in a section, the brackets indicate which of the words I 






xlv iii.9 , 17, 19, 30, 32, 36 (tcov öikoicov, äö iK Ö s); 1.65, 66; li.12; lii.32,
33 (T ä  ö k a i a ,  ä ö k c o s ) ;  liii.3 , 17; liv.2 (n ö iK fjo 0 a i, tcx ö k a i a ) ,  16; 
lvi. 12; lvii.4, 5, 7, 27  (ö lK aicos), 46, 51 ( ö k a i o v ) ;  lv i i i . l l ,  12 (äöiK sT, 
ÖlKaicos, ÖlKaicos), 13, 16, 17, 21, 22 (ö lK aicos, ÖlKaicos), 26 , 36, 41 , 45, 
61 (tcov öikoicov, tcx ö k a i a ) ,  65; lix .12, 15 (to ü  ö ik o io u ), 66 ( ä ö k c o s ,  
ä ö k c o s ) ,  74, 77, 105, 117, 126 (T ä ö k a i a ) .
Dinarchus i . l ,  3 ,4 ,4 7 ,  54 (T ä  ö k a i a ,  äö iK siv ), 60  ( ä ö iK n p a o i ,  äö iK qiJäT cov), 
63, 71; ii. 12, 15, 1 7 ,2 1 ,2 2 ;  iii.4, 5, 1 1 ,2 0 ,2 1 ,2 2 .
H yperides ii. 13; iii.16 (ö iK a io is , ö iK a ia s ,  ö iK a ia s ) ,  17, 20, 21, 22 ( ö k a i o v ,  T ä  
ä ö iK n p a T a ,  ÖlKaicos, ä ö k o u s ) ;  iv.5, 6, 8, 1 4 ,2 9 ; v .24 (äö iK O Ü aiv), 38 
(t o Ts ö iK aio is) .
Isaeus i.6, 26 , 3 5 ,4 0  ( ö k a i o v ,  ö k a i a ) ;  ii.26, 39 , 47 ; iv .22, 31 (T ä  ö k a i a ) ;  
vi.8 , 42 , 65; v ii.4  (ÖlKaicos); v iii .l ,  46; ix .35 t o ü  ö lK a io u ); x .2 , 3, 6, 8 
(t o  ö iK a io v , ÖlKaicos), 1 4 ,1 5  ( ä ö k c o s ,  ö lK aicos, ö lK aicos), 21 
(ö iK a io v , ö lK aicos), 22 ; x i.15 , 18, 30, 32, 33 , 34, 36 (ö iK a io v , tö  
ö iK a io v ); xii. 12 (äöiK eTv, ä ö k c o s ) .
Isocrates xvi.2 ; x v iii .3 4 ,45 ; x x . l ,  2 (tcov äö iK n p ä T to v , to ü s  äölK O Ü V Tas), 6, 9, 
21; xx i.16  ( ö k a i o s ) ,  17 ( ä ö iK n a a v T a s ,  ö iK a io u s ) .
Lycurgus i . l  (ÖlKaicos), 2, 3 , 4  ( T ä ö i K r j p a T a ,  t o ü s  ä ö iK o ü v r a s ) ,  6 (tw v  
äöiKriM ocrwv), 8 ( ä ö k n M a ,  äöiKriM äTcov), 9 (ä ö iK ru ja T o s , 
äöiK rilJäT cav), 26 , 33, 66 (tö  ä ö iK r iü a , ö lK aicos), 93 (ÖlKaicos, 
nöiKr|KÖoi, tois n ö iK im ev o is) , 119, 122, 124, 125, 126 (äöiKOUVTCOV, 
tcov äö iK O upevcov), 128 (tcov öiKaicov, Tfjv ö iK a ia v ) ,  129.
L ysias i.29 (äöiKeTv, ö iK aiO T äT riv), 31, 34, 35; vi. 15 (to u  äöiK r|0evTO S, 
ä ö i K n o n ) ;  ix.8, 9 ( ä ö k c o s ,  ö k a i ö s ) ,  10 (r|öiKr|Kcbs, r|öiKr|KÖT£S), 19 
(ö lK aicos, nöiKriKÖTes, t o ü  ö lK a io u ); x .13 , 14; x iii .5 1; x iv .4 , 7, 8 
( n ö k e i ,  ÖlKaicos), 47 ; xv.8 (ÖlKaicos), 9 , 11; xvii.3; xv iii.2 ; xx ii.2  (T ä  
ö iK a ia ,  äöiK O Ü aiv), 6; xxviii.13 (toü  ö ik o io u , to ü s  äöiK O Ü V Tas); 
xxx i.27  ( ä ö k p u a ,  äöiKquäTCO v, to ü  ä ö iK ru ja T o s ) ,  28 ; xxx ii.2 , 3 ,2 3 .
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Table 6.1. Witness Testimonies in Athenian Forensic Oratory.
1 A ntiphon v.20 N o t c lear P urpose o f  voyage
2 A ntiphon v .22 N ot clear W hy they changed  ships at M ethym na
3 A ntiphon v.24 N ot clear Search for H erodes
4 A ntiphon v.28 N o t clear A bsence o f  boat
5 A ntiphon v.30 N o t clear S heep ’s b lood  and tortures; second  m an 
to rtu red  m any days la ter (§31)
6 A ntiphon v.35 N o t clear S lave’s changed  testim ony and killing
7 A ntiphon v .56 N o t c lear C onflic t be tw een  no te  and ev idence from  
torture
8 A ntiphon v.61 N o t clear L ycinus’ absence o f  m otive
9 A ntiphon  v.83 N o t clear V oyage and  sacrifices prove no m alice 
from  gods
10 A ntiphon vi. 15 N o t c lear Speaker w as no t present, d id  no t give 
d rink  to boy , d id  no t o rder him  to drink  it 
o r  force h im  to  drink
11 A ndocides i. 18 C allias, S tephanus, Philippus 
and A lex ippus. C allias is 
A nd o cid es’ brother-in-law , 
Philippus and  A lex ippus are 
rela tives o f  tw o m en w ho fled 
because o f  the inform ation laid 
by L ydos. F irs t no t 
independent
A ndo cid es’ accoun t o f  the denunciations
12 A ndocides i.28 N o t clear R ew ards for inform ants
13 A ndocides i.46 T he P ry taneis w ho w ere in 
office at tha t tim e, Philocrates 
and  the rest. A pparen tly  
independent
M utilation  o f  the H erm s
14 A ndocides i.69 “ T he actual m en w ho w ere 
released  because  o f  m e.” 
A ndocides’ re la tives (§68). 
N o t independent
W hy A ndocides inform ed and w hat 
happened  as a result
15 A ndocides i .l  12 E ucles (hera ld  o f  C ouncil and 
A ssem bly). A pparen tly  
independent
T hat A ndocides is te lling  the tru th  about 
the supplian t branch
16 A ndocides i. 123 N o t clear C onfirm  A n d o cid es’ sta tem ent about 
C a llias’ m otives. L egal issue
17 A ndocides i. 127 N ot clear C allias’ son. N on lega l issue
18 Lysias i.29 P robably  E up h ile to s’ friends 
(§23). N o t independent
K illing  o f  E ra tosthenes
19 Lysias i.43 P robably  E uph ile to s’ friends 
(§41-42). N o t independent
H ow  E uphile tos gathered  his friends as 
w itnesses
20 Lysias iii. 14 TOÖ9 n a p a y e v o p e v o u ?  
(§ 1 6 ,3 7 )
F igh t did not take p lace w here S im on said 
it d id , and nobody  had  his head  broken 
there  or w as hurt
21 Lysias iii.20 TOÜ5 n a p a y e v o p e v o u s S im on’s friends’ apo log ies and S im on’s 
silence fo r four years
22 Lysias vii.10 Previous tenan ts o f  the p lo t o f  
land (§11). Independent
P rev ious leases and  absence o f  an olive 
stum p on the p lo t (§11, 18)
23 Lysias x.5 N o t c lear S p eak er’s non-involvem ent in his fa ther’s 
deeds and his b ro th e r’s guardianship
24 Lysias xii.42 N o t c lear E ra to sthenes’ ac tions under the 400. 
N on lega l issue
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25 L ysias x ii.47 T hose  w ho heard  it from E ra to sthenes’ ac tions as one o f  the five
E ratosthenes h im self (§46) ephors. N on lega l issue
26 L ysias x ii .6 1 N o t clear E ra to sthenes’ ro le  in P h e id o n ’s deal w ith 
Sparta. N on lega l issue
27 L ysias x iii.28 N o t c lear A gora tu s’ p lo t in re la tion  to  B o u le ’s 
decree
28 L ysias x iii.42 N o t c lear - possib ly  speaker’s 
fam ily  m em bers as the 
testim ony refers to  speaker’s 
fa th e r’s statem ents on his
D ionysodorus charged  speaker to take 
vengeance on  A goratus
deathbed . I f  so, not 
independent
29 L ysias x iii.64 N o t c lear A gora tu s’ fa ther w as a  slave. N on lega l 
issue
30 L ysias x iii.66 N o t c lear T he crim es o f  A g o ra tu s’ bro thers. 
N on legal issue
31 L ysias xiii.68 N o t c lear A gora tu s’ conv ic tion  for adultery . 
N on legal issue
32 L ysias x iii.79 T he taxiarch . A pparen tly  
independent
A gora tu s’ deeds at Phyle. N o n lega l issue
33 L ysias xiii.81 N o t c lear H ow  A goratus w as driven  o f f  by A esim us 
from  the p rocession  from  the P eiraeus to 
the city. N on lega l issue
34 L ysias xvi.8 N o t c lear S peaker’s cavalry  service
35 L ysias xvi.13 O rthobulus (previous 
com m ander). A pparently  
independent
H ow  speaker asked  O rthobulus to strike 
him  o f f  the cavalry  roll so he m ight face 
g rea ter danger. N on lega l issue
36 L ysias xv i.14 N o t c lear H ow  he funded the  serv ice expenses o f  
tw o m en. N on lega l issue
37 L ysias xvi.17 N o t c lear H is courage in battle . N on lega l issue
38 L ysias xvii.2 T hose  before whom  the m oney 
w as paid
T hat E raton received  2 ta len ts from  the 
speaker’s g randfather, and the use he 
m ade o f  it
39 L ysias xvii.3 N o t c lear S peaker’s fa th e r’s successfu l suit for the 
p roperty  against E risistra tus
40 L ysias xv ii.9 T hose w ho rented the estate 
from  speaker at Sphettus, the 
neighbours at C icynna, last 
y ea r’s m agistrates and the 
cu rren t nautodi/cai. 
Independent
D etails o f  p rev ious tria ls and ac tions in 
rela tion  to  the tw o properties
41 L ysias xix.23 E unom us. Probably  friend  
(§22 ) and not independent
Paym ent for expenses for cam paign  in 
support o f  E vagoras
42 L ysias xix.23 N o t clear. P robably  friends 
(§22 ) and not independent
T hat they lent m oney and  have been 
repa id  (§24)
43 L ysias xix.27 N o t c lear D em us’ p roposed  gift o f  a go ld  cup to 
A ristophanes
44 L ysias xix.41 N o t clear C on o n ’s p roperty  and  bequests
45 L ysias xix.58 N o t clear F a th e r’s liturgies. P ossib ly  nonlegal, but 
also  relevan t to p rov ing  the fam ily have 
no m oney left
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46 L ysias xix.59 F ath e r’s friends and thus not 
independent
P aym en t’s fo r needy  c itizens’ dow ries, 
ransom s and  funerals. Possib ly  nonlegal, 
bu t also  re levan t to  p rov ing  the fam ily 
have no m oney  left
47 L ysias xx.25 N o t c lear S p eak er’s ac tions on  cam paign  in Sicily. 
N on lega l issue
48 L ysias xx.26 N o t clear S p eak er’s speech  against the Syracusan 
p eace  p roposal. N o n lega l issue
49 L ysias xx.28 Tous napaY evopevous B ro th e r’s actions against oligarchs. 
N on lega l issue
50 L ysias xx.29 N o t clear E ldest b ro th er’s deeds on cam paign. 
N on lega l issue
51 L ysias xxi.10 N ausim achus (fellow  sea- 
cap ta in  at A egospotam i); 
apparen tly  independent
S p eak er’s good  serv ice in the navy. 
N on lega l issue
52 L ysias xxii.9 A nytus (m agistrate). 
Independen t
A ny tus’ adv ice to  the com dealers
53 L ysias xxiii.4 D eceleans and people w ho 
have convicted  Pancleon 
befo re  the Polem arch. 
D eceleans independent
Pancleon  is n o t a  P lataean
54 L ysias xxiii.8 E uthycritus, o ther P lataeans 
and  N icom edes w ho said  he 
w as P ancleon ’s m aster. 
Independent, w ith exception  o f  
N icom edes
P ancleon  is no t a  P lataean
•55 L ysias xx iii.l 1 N o t c lear S ecurities taken  fo r P ancleon  and  then he 
w as carried  o f f  by force
56 L ysias x x ii i .l4 N o t clear. M ay include 
A ristod icus (§13)
A ristod icus’ p rev ious suit against 
P ancleon  show ed he w as no t a P lataean
and the d iam arturia
57 L ysias x x ii i .l5 N o t clear P ancleon  lived for a long tim e in T hebes
58 L ysias xxx.20 N o t c lear A ncestral sacrifices no t funded  due to 
new  sacrifices using up the funds
59 L ysias xxxi.14 N o t clear T h at Philon  lived  at O ropus under the 
p ro tec tion  o f  a  p ro sta tes , tha t he 
possessed  suffic ien t p roperty  and  than he 
neither took  up arm s in the P eiraeus nor 
in tow n
60 L ysias xxxi.16 D io tim us o f  A cham ae and 
those appoin ted  to arm 
tow nsm en from  funds 
contribu ted . Independent
T h at Philon  d id  no t con tribu te  funds
61 L ysias xxxi.19 N o t clear P h ilo n ’s p rofiteering . N on lega l issue
62 L ysias xxxi.23 N o t clear P h ilo n ’s m o the r’s refusal to let h im  bury 
her
63 L ysias xxxii.18 Includes relatives o f  both  
parties. N o t independent
M o th e r’s com plain t to  D iogeiton
64 L ysias xxxii.27 N o t clear. Perhaps the 
w itnesses speaker took w ith 
him  to  see A ristodicus (§26). 
I f  so, p robably  not 
independent
D io g e ito n ’s dup lic itous accounting  for 
fitting-out a w arship
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65 Isocrates xvii.12 Not clear Speaker taken before Polemarch and 
made to pay bond; possibly also Cittus 
and the initial deposit and testimonies of 
Philomelus and Menexenus
66 Isocrates xvii.14 Not clear Cittus found, Pasion claimed he was a 
ffeedman although he had paid a bond for 
him
67 Isocrates xvii.16 Not clear Pasion’s actions over the torture of Cittus
68 Isocrates xvii.32 Agyrrhius, a friend of both 
Pasion and the speaker (§31), 
though we only have the 
speaker’s word for it. Possibly 
not independent
Pasion was at first eager to annul the 
agreement
69 Isocrates xvii.37 Not clear Dealings with Stratocles, Pasion stood as 
guarantor
70 Isocrates xvii.41 Those who knew the speaker 
had received much money 
from Pontus; those who saw 
him as a patron of Pasion’s 
bank, and the people from 
whom at the time he bought 
more than a thousand gold 
staters (§40). Not clear if 
independent. May also include 
other epigrapheis (§41); if so, 
they are independent
Speaker’s wealth and liturgies. Prove 
speaker didn’t need to borrow Pasion’s 
money, so legal issue.
71 Isocrates xviii.8 Those who were present from 
the beginning; Rhinon and his 
colleagues; members of the 
Boule. The second and third 
groups are apparently 
independent; the first group 
could include friends
That speaker did not arrest Callimachus 
nor touch his money; that he did not make 
an accusation against him but Patrocles; 
that that fellow was the accuser
72 Isocrates
xviii.10
Not clear. Possibly 
Nicomachus of Bate, in which 





Not clear Callimachus’ suit against Cratinus. 
Noi.legal issue
74 Isaeus i. 16 Not clear Cleonymus’ motive in making the will 
was not any grievance against the speaker 
but hatred for Deinias; after Deinias’ 
death he looked after speaker and took 
him into his house and brought him up; 
and he sent Poseidippus for the 
magistrate, but Poseidippus failed to 
summon him and then sent him away 
when he came to the door (§15)
75 Isaeus i. 16 Not clear Friends of opponents including 
Cephisander believed that the parties 
should share the estate and that speaker 
should have one third of Cleonymus’ 
property
76 Isaeus i.32 Not clear Cleonymus’ enmity for Pherenicus
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77 Isaeus ii.5 N ot c lear M enecles received  a dow ry o f  20 m inae 
w ith sp eak er’s sister
78 Isaeus ii.16 t o u s  ( f c p d r o p a s  K ai t o ü s  
o p y e w v a s  K ai t o ü s  
öripÖ T a?. A pparen tly  
independent
Speaker legally  adopted
79 Isaeus ii.34 A rb itra to rs i f  w illing  (for they 
are o p p o n en t’s friends), bu t i f  
not, TOÜ5 n a p a y e v o p e v o u s
M enecles’ arb itra tion  w ith sp eak er’s 
b ro ther and  the ir oath, opponents have  
m uch o f  M enec les’ property , and th e ir  
aim  is to m ake M enecles child less
80 Isaeus ii.34 N o t c lear L and sold  fo r 70 m inae
81 Isaeus ii.37 tw v  eiöoTW V Speaker d id  the rites for M enecles; 
nonlegal issue
82 Isaeus iii.7 N icodem us (p resen t opponent) N icodem us’ testim ony at the p rev ious 
trial (the testim ony that is the sub jec t o f  
this d ike pseudom arturiori)
83 Isaeus iii. 12 Tcov dXXwv o iK eiw v W om an w as a hetaira . E vidence from
K ai...T w v ye ito vw v  (§13). 
A pparen tly  independen t
previous case
84 Isaeus iii. 14 Sam e deposition  as Isaeus 
iii. 12
R evelries and  ribaldry  at w om an’s house . 
E vidence from  prev ious case
85 Isaeus iii. 15 N ot c lear Those w ho associa ted  w ith the w om an to 
prove that she w as a hetaira . E v idence 
from  prev ious case
86 Isaeus iii.37 N o t c lear N icodem us indicted  for usurp ing  the 
rights o f  c itizenship . N onlegal issue
•87 Isaeus iii.43 N o t c lear S peaker’s b ro ther claim ed estate and  
nobody con tested  his claim
88 Isaeus iii.53 N o t c lear Sam e depositions as Isaeus iii.43 and  
iii. 12
89 Isaeus iii.53 N icodem us’ deposition Sam e deposition  as Isaeus iii.7
90 Isaeus iii.56 H usband  o f  defen d an t’s n iece 
(against speaker so not 
independent, bu t used  as it 
supports the sp eak er’s case)
H usband’s testim ony at a p rev ious tria l 
involving claim s for E nd ius’ estate
91 Isaeus iii.76 M em bers o f  E n d iu s’ phratry. 
A pparen tly  independen t
E ndius never held  a m arriage feast fo r 
Phile, nor in troduced  her to  the ph ra try
92 Isaeus iii.76 N o t c lear Pyrrhus adop ted  speaker’s b ro ther
93 Isaeus iii.80 P yrrhus’ fellow  dem esm en. 
A pparen tly  independen t
Pyrrhus never en tertained  w ives o f  h is 
fellow  dem esm en at the T hesm ophoria
94 Isaeus v.2 N o t c lear D icaiogenes gave speaker tw o-th irds o f  
his estate and  L eochares becam e his
surety
95 Isaeus v.6 TOÜ9 to te  n a p o v T a s W ill p roduced  by P roxenus and its te rm s
96 Isaeus v. 13 N ot c lear M enexenus’ agreem ent w ith D ica iogenes
97 Isaeus v. 18 TOÜ? n a p o v T a s  (§20) A greem ent w ith D icaiogenes and the 
sureties
98 Isaeus v.24 N ot c lear D ica iogenes’ claim s and sp eak er’s su it 
against M icion
99 Isaeus v.27 N ot c lear D icaiogenes deceived  P ro tarch ides. 
N onlegal issue
100 Isaeus v.33 N o t c lear A rbitra tion
101 Isaeus v.38 N ot c lear D ica iogenes’ poor record  on perfo rm ing  
liturgies. N on legal issue
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102 Isaeus vi.7 oi n a p a y e v o p e v o i  
p a p T u p n o o u a i
P hiloctem on’s w ill and its term s
103 Isaeus vi. 11 R elatives and m em bers o f  
ph ratry  and dem e. R elatives 
no t independent
A ndrocles is n o t E uctem on’s legitim ate 
son
104 Isaeus vi.16 S peakers’ depositions at 
p revious anakrisis
Claim s in rep ly  to  challenge. E vidence 
from a p rev ious anakrisis
105 Isaeus v i.26 N o t clear A ndrocles th e  ch ild  o f  A lee, E uctem on 
introduced A ndroc les  to  ph ratry  b u t never 
m arried  A lee
106 Isaeus vi.34 N o t clear E uctem on’s w ill, revocation  and  la ter sale 
o f  p roperties fo r A ndrocles
107 Isaeus v i.37 TOÜ5 n a p a y e v o p e v o u ? Plot to gain  E u c tem o n ’s estate by  deceit 
and the unsuccessfu l case
108 Isaeus vi.42 N o t clear O pponents refuse to  allow  house search  
after E uctem on’s death
109 Isaeus vi.46 O pponen t’s testim ony from  
prev ious trial
C onflic t in cla im s m ade by opponen t over 
the estate in p rev ious tria l and th is trial
110 Isaeus v ii.10 N o t clear Previous enm ity  and  law suits involving 
E upolis and  A po llodorus, and good  
relationship  betw een  A rchedam us and 
A pollodorus
111 Isaeus vii.17 N o t clear Speaker’s ad op tion  by A po llodorus
112 Isaeus vii.25 N ot clear T hrasybulus o b ta ined  h a lf  o f  
A po llodo rus’ estate
113 Isaeus v ii.28 A po llodo rus’ dem esm en (§28- 
29 )? A pparently  independent
Speaker’s ad op tion  and  reg istra tion  in the 
dem e as the son o f  A po llodorus
114 Isaeus vii.32 N o t clear O pponen t’s ind ifference to the ir b ro th e r’s 
ch ild lessness an d  p ossession  o f  h is 
fortune and allow ing  a fam ily to die out
115 Isaeus v ii.36 N ot clear. Possib ly  h is fellow  
tribesm en (§36). I f  so, 
apparen tly  independent
S peaker’s generosity  as a gym nasiarch . 
N onlegal issue
116 Isaeus viii. 11 N o t clear, but possib ly  the 
w itnesses the speaker took 
w ith  him  w hen he m ade the 
challenge
O pponent re fu sed  basanos
117 Isaeus v iii. 13 R elatives and friends (§14) o f  
g randfather and m other. N ot 
independent
M other’s be tro thal and leg itim acy (§14)
118 Isaeus viii. 17 Intim ate friends o f  
grandfather. N o t independent
S peaker’s fam ily  v iew ed as fam ily by 
grandfather and  inc luded  in rites and 
sacrifices
119 Isaeus v iii.20 M em bers o f  phratry  and dem e. 
A pparen tly  independent
Father gave w edd ing  banquet w hen he 
m arried  sp eak er’s m other and held  a 
w edding b anque t for phratry; m o the r’s 
role in the T hesm ophoria; sp eak er’s 
reg istra tion  w ith ph ratry  as legitim ate.
120 Isaeus v iii.24 N o t clear D io d e s ’ instructions about C iro n ’s 
funeral
121 Isaeus v iii.27 N o t clear. Possib ly  evidence 
from  torture o f  slaves (§28, 
45)
R equests fo r paym ents for funeral and 
dispute w ith  D io d e s  at the tom b
122 Isaeus v iii.42 TOÜ5 eiöÖ Tas. N ot c lear if  
independent
D io d e s ’ crim es. N on legal issue
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123 Isaeus viii.46 N o t c lear D io d e s ’ adultery. N onlegal issue
124 Isaeus ix.4 A styph ilus’ friends w ho w ere 
am ong those present. N ot 
independent as speaker claim s 
a  close friendsh ip  w ith 
A styphilus (§30)
S peaker perfo rm ed  rites for A styphilus
125 Isaeus ix.6 N o t clear H ierocles sa id  he had  the w ill from  
A styphilus w hen A styphilus w as abou t to 
sail to M ytilene
126 Isaeus ix.9 A styph ilus’ friends, rela tives 
and m em bers o f  phratry  and 
dem e. N o t independent w ith 
p robab le  excep tion  o f  
m em bers o f  phratry  and dem e
T hey  have no know ledge tha t A styphilus 
m ade the  w ill (§10)
127 Isaeus ix. 19 H usband  o f  A styph ilus’ aun t 
(and  aunt o f  the speaker and 
his opponent). N o t 
independent
E uthycra tes d irec ted  his rela tives never to 
a llow  any o f  T hud ippus’ fam ily to  com e 
n ea r his tom b
128 Isaeus ix.20 Tous auveiöÖTas. A styphilus never spoke to C leon 
th roughou t h is life
129 Isaeus ix .2 1 A styphilus’ dem esm en. 
Possib ly  independent
A styphilus never a ttended  the sacrifices 
accom pan ied  by C leon
130 Isaeus ix.25 T he actual people to  w hom  
H ierocles w ent p roposing  a 
schem e o f  faking a w ill. 
A pparen tly  independent
H ieroc les’ schem e fo r faking a w ill
• 131 Isaeus ix .28 Includes teachers (apparen tly  
independent) testify ing  to jo in t 
education ; first w itness not 
c lear
A styphilus lived w ith speaker from  
ch ildhood  and w as brought up by 
sp eak er’s father, and they w ere educated  
together
132 Isaeus ix.28 N o t clear S p eak er’s father m anaged A styph ilus’ 
paternal estate and doubled  its value
133 Isaeus ix.29 oi eiöÖTes A styph ilus’ s is te r’s betro thal by  speaker’s 
father
134 Isaeus ix.30 M em bers o f  the C om pany  o f  
H eracles. Independent
S peaker’s father took  him  and A styphilus 
to  relig ious cerem onies and en ro lled  them  
in the C om pany o f  H eracles
135 Isaeus ix.30 S peaker’s and A styph ilu s’ 
fam ily and m cn as . N ot 
independent
F riendsh ip  and affec tion  betw een speaker 
and  A styphilus
136 Isaeus ix.33 N o t clear C leo n ’s claim s abou t degree o f  
rela tionsh ip
137 Isaeus x.7 N o t clear C yronides w as adop ted  into X enaene tus’ 
fam ily and w as in tha t fam ily w hen he 
d ied; A ristarchus d ied  before his son 
D em ochares; D em ochares d ied  w hile he 
w as a  child , as d id  the o ther sister, so that 
the estate becam e the speaker’s m o ther’s.
138 Isaeus xi.43 N o t c lear S tra to c les’ property'
139 Isaeus xi.46 N o t clear A m ount o f  sp eak er’s property, and his 
so n ’s, w ho has been  adopted  into another 
fam ily; and speaker has brought suits for 
perju ry  abou t H agn ias’ estate
140 Isaeus xii. 11 N ot clear A rbitra tion
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141 D em osthenes
xviii.135
N o t c lear C ouncil o f  A reopagus rem oved  A eschines 
as speaker. N on lega l issue
142 D em osthenes
xviii.137
N o t c lear A eschines caugh t w ith  the spy A naxinus 
at T h aso n ’s house. N on lega l issue
143 D em osthenes
xv iii.267
N o t c lear D em osthenes’ pub lic  services. N onlegal 
issue
144 D em osthenes M an w ho p roposed  the decree D ecree o f  B ou le  in response to
x ix .32 - apparen tly  independent D em osthenes’ repo rt
145 D em osthenes oi oupnpeaßeüovT e? Kai A eschines a ttended  the banque t w hich the
x ix .130 n ap övT es T hebans and  P hilip  held  to ce leb ra te  their 
v ictory , and  w ore a garland  and sang the 
paean  w ith  P hilip  and  d rank  his health
146 D em osthenes
xix .145
W itnesses from  O lynthus. 
A pparen tly  independent
T he loss o f  O lynthus. N on lega l issue
147 D em osthenes Tous s k s T n apovT a? T o show  tha t w e w ou ld  have caugh t up
xix .162 papT upa? w ith P hilip , i f  anyone had  taken  m y 
advice and  had  carried  out your 
instructions in accordance w ith  the 
decrees
148 D em osthenes
x ix .162
N o t clear; possib ly  E ucleides 
(ano ther am bassador); i f  so, 
apparen tly  independent
T he answ er P hilip  gave to E ucleides
149 D em osthenes
xix.165
N ot c lear O ther am bassadors d id n ’t hurry  on the 
second  E m bassy
150 D em osthenes A pollophanes and Tnv twv H ow  D em osthenes subverted  P h ilip ’s
x ix .168 äXXoov Ttov napövTcov bribery  o f  the am bassadors. N onlegal 
issue
151 D em osthenes
x ix .170
N o t c lear H ow  D em osthenes ransom ed  prisoners. 
N on legal issue
152 D em osthenes D em osthenes’ ow n w ritten A eschines suborned  by Philip  on the
x ix .176 testim ony and  o ther 
am bassadors ca lled  on to 
testify  o r take the exom osia. 
H ere the w itnesses’ apparent 
lack o f  independence is used 
to  p rove the po in t
E m bassy
153 D em osthenes
x ix .200
N o t c lear, bu t one m ay include 
D iophan tos i f  he w as 
com pelled  to testify  (§198); i f  
so, no t independent
A esch ines’ past crim es. N on lega l issue
154 D em osthenes
x ix .214
N o t c lear A eschines p reven ted  D em osthenes from  
rendering  his accounts tw ice
155 D em osthenes
xix.233
N o t c lear H ow  Phrynon  sen t h is son to  Philip
156 D em osthenes
x ix .236
N o t c lear H ow  D em osthenes d ined  P h ilip ’s 
am bassadors befo re  any offence against 
the city had  been  com m itted . N on lega l 
issue
157 D em osthenes
xxi.22
G oldsm ith . A pparen tly  
independent
M eid ias’ a ttack  on the crow ns
158 D em osthenes
xxi.82
N ot c lear D em osthenes’ p rev ious problem s w ith 
M eidias
159 D em osthenes
xxi.93
N ot c lear A rb itra tion  w ith M eid ias and the 
consequences for S traton. N on lega l issue
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160 D em osthenes
xxi.107
N o t c lear M e id ia s’ recen t a ttacks on D em osthenes. 
N on lega l issue
161 D em osthenes
xxi.121
N o t c lear M eid ias’ dealings w ith  A ristarchus. 
N on lega l issue
162 D em osthenes
xxi.168
N ot c lear M e id ia s’ conduc t on  voyage hom e from  
Styra, show ing  how  he w as p ro fitee ring  
ra ther than  perfo rm ing  a  liturgy. N on lega l 
issue
163 D em osthenes
xxi.174
N o t clear M eid ias’ inadequate  liturgies. N on lega l 
issue
164 D em osthenes
xxiii.151
N o t c lear C haridem us’ ac tions against A thens at the 
ou tse t o f  h is m ercenary  ca reer - he sold  
h is serv ices to  A th en s’ enem y, sa iled  to a 
p lace w here he had  a chance o f  opera ting  
against A thens, and  w as the m ain  reason  
w hy A thens failed  to  take A m phipolis
165 D em osthenes
xxiii.168
T rierarchs. Independen t Events at P erin thus and  A lopeconnesus
166 D em osthenes 
xxv. 5 8
T he m an w ho buried  
A ristogeiton ’s father w ithout 
paym ent, the a rb itra to r in the 
suit w hich his b ro ther b rough t 
against him . Z o b ia ’s p ro sta tes , 
and the p o le ta i  before  w hom  
A ristogeiton  brough t her. T he 
p o le ta i  and  arb itra to r are 
independent, bu t the o ther tw o 
w ould ap p ear to have enm ity 
tow ards A ristogeiton
A ristoge iton ’s past crim es. N on lega l issue
167 D em osthenes
xxv.63
T he m an w hose nose 
A ristogeiton  b it o f f  and ate. 
He w ould  appear to have a 
grudge aga inst A ristogeiton  
and therefo re  no t to  be 
independent
M ore o f  A ris to g e ito n ’s past crim es. 





N o t clear T hat D em osthenes’ guard ians ag reed  to 
the 20 per cen t tax fo r the sum phoria, and 
tha t D em osthenes’ fa ther d id  not leave 
h im  a poo r m an n o r o n ,  /. ill. a a  es ta te  o f  
only  70 m inae
169 D em osthenes
xxvii.17
D em ophon and  T heripp ides; 
D em ochares o f  L euconion  
(§14), and  others. D em ophon 
and T heripp ides are co ­
guard ians and  also being  sued 
by D em osthenes, so no t 
independent. D em ochares is 
the husband  o f  D em osthenes’ 
aunt, so no t independen t
A phobus received  the dow ry  and  lived in 
the house and  is lying. D em ochares’ 
argum ent w ith  A phobus over caring  for 
D em osthenes’ m o ther
170 D em osthenes
xxvii.22
N ot c lear A p h o b u s’ incom e from  the w orkshop
171 D em osthenes
xxvii.26
N o t clear A phobus has lied ab o u t the couch-m akers 
and  has not handed  them  over
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172 D em osthenes
xxvii.28
N o t clear M o eriad es’ loans
173 D em osthenes
xxvii.33
N ot clear T he ivory and  the iron
174 D em osthenes
xxvii.39
N ot clear E ach  o f  the guard ians adm its receiv ing 
m oney b u t c laim s he has spent it all
175 D em osthenes
xxvii.41
T he w itnesses to  the questions 
D em osthenes asked  about the 
w ill - p robab ly  w itnesses that 
D em osthenes took  w ith h im  so 
possib ly  n o t independent
T he guard ians ac tions over the w ill
176 D em osthenes
xxvii.42
W itnesses to  the apokrisis - 
possib ly  w itnesses that 
D em osthenes took  w ith him  
and therefo re  no t independent
T he apokrisis
177 D em osthenes
xxvii.46
N o t c lear A ph o b u s’ d ea ling  and  lying over the w ill
178 D em osthenes
xxviii.10
N o t clear G u ard ian s’ possession  o f  D em osthenes’ 
p roperty  and  the assessm en t for the 
sum p h o ria
179 D em osthenes 
xxv iii.l 1
N ot clear A phobus had  the dow ry  and never repaid  
it, not p rov ided  food  for D em osthenes’ 
m other
180 D em osthenes 
xxv iii.l 1
N ot c lear A phobus never repa id  profits from  
w orkshop  to D em osthenes
181 D em osthenes
xxviii.12
N ot c lear A p h o b u s’ lies abo u t the slaves
182 D em osthenes
xxviii.12
N ot clear T he iron and  ivory  w hich A phobus sold 
(§13)
183 D em osthenes 
x x v iii.l 3
N ot clear T he ex tra  m oney  - A phobus has five 
ta len ts p lus in terest
184 D em osthenes 
xxv iii.l 3
N o t c lear A dd itional p roperty  held  by guard ians as 
ou tlined  in the w ill, and received by them  
as p roved  by the ir testim ony against each 
o ther
185 D em osthenes
xxix.12
e v r n  ay o p Q t p eo n  noXAwv 
napovTW v
A phobus refu sed  the B asanos
186 D em osthenes 
xxix. 18
N ot clear A esios d id n ’t deny  his testim ony in the 
first tria l and re fu sed  the B asanos
187 D em osthenes 
x x ix .2 1
N ot c lear C hallenge to A phobus and his adm ission 
before the arb itra to r that M ilyas was a 
freedm an (§31)
188 D em osthenes
xxix.26
N ot c lear - possib ly  not 
independen t as testify ing  to 
D em osthenes’ and  his 
m o ther’s in tentions rather than 
actions
“T hat w e w ere ready  to  do these th ings” - 
hand  o ver fem ale slaves for torture to 
show  th a t M ilyas h ad  been freed, and 
D em osthenes’ m o th e r was ready to sw ear 
an  oath  tha t M ilyas had  been freed
189 D em osthenes
xxix.39
N ot clear D epositions abo u t the dow ry, the fraud 
and  “all the rest” - ie, the rest o f  
D em osthenes’ p roperty
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190 D em osthenes
xxix .53
N o t clear D em osthenes’ challenge to  A phobus to 
adm it he p rev iously  agreed the testim ony  
about M ilyas w as true and  that A phobus 
prev iously  only w anted  M ilyas to  be 
exam ined over a  d ispute about 30 m inae
191 D em osthenes
xxix .54
N o t clear Probably  the sam e issue as xxix.53
192 D em osthenes F irst T im ocra tes (O n e to r’s O neto r agreed to  ho ld  the dow ry as a loan
xxx.9 friend) and  then o thers w ho 
m ay be the w itnesses 
D em osthenes b rough t w ith 
him . T im ocra tes is not 
independent; if  o thers are 
D em osthenes’ w itnesses, not 
independent
and  continued to  pay in terest on  tha t loan 
to A phobus accord ing  to  the contract; 
then  A phobus h im se lf  adm itted  he had  
received  the in terest from  T im ocrates
193 D em osthenes
xxx .17
N o t clear O neto r’s sister m arried  before 
D em osthenes la id  his charges
194 D em osthenes
xxx .17
N o t clear A fter the m arriage D em osthenes b rough t 
his suit
195 D em osthenes 
xxx. 18
N o t clear O neto r’s sister w as d ivorced  after 
D em osthenes b rough t his suit
196 D em osthenes N o t clear, but p robab ly  the D em osthenes’ question ing  o f  O neto r and
xxx .24 w itnesses D em osthenes took 
w ith him  (§19) and hence not 
independent
T im ocrates about the dow ry paid  to 
A phobus
197 D em osthenes
xxx .30
N o t clear A phobus w orked the farm  until 
D em osthenes brough t his action; he w as 
unw illing to agree to the torture because 
he w as still liv ing w ith O neto r’s sister, 
and after A phobus lost he s tripped  the 
farm  o f  everything except T U )V  e Y Y £ * w v
198 D em osthenes
xxx .32
N o t clear O neto r supported  A phobus in h is su it and 
p leaded  for him
199 D em osthenes Pasiphon  - w ho cared  for H e saw A phobus sitting  next to his w ife
xxx .34 A phobus’ w ife w hen she was 
ill. A pparen tly  independent
th is year, w hen D em osthenes’ su it against 
O netor had already  been  institu ted
200 D em osthenes
xxxi.4
N o t clear O netor first set up horo i around  the house 
then  rem oved them  after D em osthenes 
w on his trial aga inst A phobus
201 D em osthenes
xxxii.13
N o t c lear H egestratos’ death  and Z enothem is 
w anted to go to  M assalia
202 D em osthenes
xxx ii.19
N o t clear Zenothem is refused  to  be d ispossessed  by 
anyone except D em on, refused  the 
challenge to  sail back  to Sicily and 
deposited  the con trac t during the voyage
203 D em osthenes N o t clear, but possib ly L oan o f  30 m inae to  A paturios and
xxx iii.8 including H erac le ides the 
B anker (§7); if  so apparently  
independent
speaker taking over P arm eno’s loan for 
10 m inae; possib ly  also  P arm eno’s and 
A paturios’ falling  ou t
204 D em osthenes
xxxiii.12
N o t clear Sale o f  ship, repaym ent o f  loan, end o f  
contract and release from  ob ligations
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205 D em osthenes
xxxiii.13
N o t c lear P arm eno  cha llenged  A paturios to  sw ear 
an  oath  abo u t the charges and  A paturios 
accep ted
206 D em osthenes
xxxiii.15
N o t clear T he term s o f  the arb itra tion  - there  w ere 
th ree  a rb itra to rs  (§29), and perhaps the 
sureties and  the peop le  w ith w hom  they 
d eposited  the agreem ent
207 D em osthenes
xxx iii.18
N o t clear A ristocles p re tended  tha t he had  lost the 
ag reem en t
208 D em osthenes
xxx iii.26
N o t clear A patu rios w as in tow n  last year w hen the 
courts w ere  o pen  (and  is therefore  lying 
abou t the speaker being  his surety)
209 D em osthenes
xxxiv .7
N o t clear P robab ly  the th ree loans and P ho rm io ’s 
ob liga tions u nder the contract
210 D em osthenes
xxx iv .9
N o t clear. P ossib ly  the sh ip ’s 
captain ; i f  so, apparen tly  
independent
Phorm io  d id n ’t  sail on  the ship w ith  the 
goods he shou ld  have bough t w ith  the 
sp eak e r’s m oney
211 D em osthenes
xxxiv .10
N o t clear L am pis’ sh ipw reck
212 D em osthenes 
xxxiv . 11
Triv (japTupiavTcov 
napavevopevov. P robably  
the w itnesses b rought by  the 
speaker (§20) and therefore 
not independent
T hose w ho heard  L am pis say afte r the 
sh ipw reck  tha t P horm io  put no goods on 
the ship  no r gave L am pis any gold
213 D em osthenes 
xxxiv . 15
Triv papTupiav t w v  
KÄnTnpwv. T he sum m ons was 
sent by the speaker (§ 13) so 
perhaps not independent
L am pis’ and  P h o rm io ’s reaction  to the 
sum m ons
214 D em osthenes
xxx iv .20
N o t clear P ossib ly  L am pis’ sta tem ents at the 
arb itra tion
215 D em osthenes
xxx iv .37
N o t clear L am pis so ld  grain  ou tside A thens, 
a lthough  he lived there. N on legal issue
216 D em osthenes
xxx iv .39
N o t clear S p eak er’s g ifts to  the city  and  liturgies. 
N on lega l issue
217 D em osthenes 
xxxv. 14
A rchem onides - apparen tly  
independent
A ndrocles, N ausicra tes and A rtem on and 
A po llodorus deposited  the con trac t w ith 
him
218 D em osthenes 
xxxv. 14
Tcuv n a p a y e v o p e v c o v .  
T heodo tus ioOTeXrjs, C harius, 
P horm io, C ephisodo tus and 
H eliodorus. Possib ly  the 
w itnesses b rough t by 
A ndrocles and  thus not 
independent
T hey  w ere p resen t w hen  A ndrocles lent 
Artfcnioii th ree ta len ts o f  silver, and they 
know  tha t A ndrocles deposited  the 
con trac t w ith A rchem onides
219 D em osthenes
xxxv .20
E rasicles, p ilo t o f  the ship; 
H ipp ias, w ho sailed  on the 
ship ; w ritten  ekm artu ria i by 
A rchiades, Sostratus, 
E um arichus, P h iltiades and 
D ionysius. Independen t
A po llodorus only  carried  450  ja rs  o f  
M endean  w ine on  the ship, no  m ore, and 
no o th e r cargo
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220 D em osthenes A ratus o f  H alicarnassus - He lent eleven m inae in silver to
xxxv.23 another lender to  A pollodorus, A pollodorus on the cargo he w as carry ing
but apparen tly  independent in in H yblesius’ ship to  Pontus, and on the
this case goods to be bough t there  for the return 
voyage; he w as unaw are tha t the speaker 
had lent m oney  to A po llodorus, as he 
w ould no t o therw ise have lent the m oney
221 D em osthenes A pollon ides, E rasic les (the A pollonides testifies tha t A ntipater lent
xxxv .33-34 sh ip ’s p ilo t), H ipp ias plus m oney to H yblesius for a  voyage to
w ritten ekm artu ria i by Pontus and tha t the ship w as w recked  (as
E uphiletus, H ippias, Sostratus, his slaves repo rted  to him ). E rasicles
A rchenom ides and  Philtades. testifies tha t the ship  had  no cargo on
Independent board, and A po llodorus had  no w ine on 
board, bu t 80 ja rs  o f  C oan w ine w ere 
being carried  for a m an o f  T heodosia. 
H ippias testifies tha t A pollodorus only 
put in som e w ool, sa lt fish and  goat skins
222 D em osthenes B ank m anager (§7); H ow  the lease w as m ade
xxxvi.4 independent
223 D em osthenes T hose w ith  w hom  the w ill is W ill deposited  w ith the speakers
xxxvi.7 deposited . O pen  to 
in terpre tation  i f  independent - 
i f  the w ill w as fake, then 
P horm io’s accom plices; if  
genuine, then  apparen tly  
independent
224 D em osthenes T hose w ho w ere p resen t (§24) A pollodorus d iv ided  the property  with
xxxvi.10 Pasicles, w ho w as a  child , and they 
released Phorm io from  the lease and all 
other ob ligations
225 D em osthenes N ot clear A pollodorus chose the sh ie ld  factory in
xxxvi.13 the division, and subsequently  leased the 
bank to  four m en, bu t delivered  no private 
capital to them , bu t they  leased only the 
deposits and  the righ t to  the profits on 
those
226 D em osthenes t u ) v  napayevopevcuv A fter arb itra tion  P horm io  w as gran ted  a
xxxvi.16 release from  all claim s by A pollodorus
'>"•7 D em osthenes N ot clear A pollodorus w on suits on th" b a d s  o f  his
xxxvi.21 father’s papers, w hich he now  claim s are 
lost
228 D em osthenes N o t clear Pasicles is no t b ring ing  any suit against
xxxvi.22 Phorm io
229 D em osthenes t w v  napovTtov The release from  the lease and  all o ther
xxxvi.24 obligations (repea ted  from  §10 for 
em phasis)
230 D em osthenes N o t clear A pollodorus took  the lodging-house
xxxvi.35 under the term s o f  the w ill and  m ade no 
claim s against P horm io
231 D em osthenes N ot c lear A po llodo rus’ m oney  and paltry  liturgies.
xxxvi.40 N onlegal issue
232 D em osthenes N ot c lear Pasion w as A chestra tu s’ slave and was




233 D em osthenes
xxxvi.55
N o t clear A po llodo rus’ litig iousness and 
sycophancy  (§54). N on legal issue
234 D em osthenes
xxxvi.56
N o t clear A po llo d o ru s’ w ickedness. N on legal issue
235 D em osthenes
xxxvi.56
N o t clear P ho rm io ’s cha rac te r (§55). N on lega l issue
236 D em osthenes
xxxvi.56
N o t clear P ho rm io ’s liturgies. N on legal issue
237 D em osthenes
xxxvi.62
N o t clear N o t c lear - perhaps the releases, as 
sum m arizing  the legal case
238 D em osthenes
xxxvii.8
N o t clear Pantaenetus so ld  speaker the property , 
ren ted  the w orkshop  and  the slaves 
accord ing  to the con tract, speaker w as no t 
p resen t at the subsequen t transactions or 
even in A thens, Pan taenetus sued E vergus 
and  never b rough t a charge against the 
speaker
239 D em osthenes
xxxvii.13
N o t clear D ealings w ith  ex tra  deb tors, challenge to 
take m oney o r settle , speaker ag reed  to 
take his m oney b u t opponents w ou ld  no t 
pay unless he becam e the se ller to  them  o f  
trie property
240 D em osthenes T hose p resen t w hen speaker S peaker’s re lease from  obligations by
xxxvii.17 w as released  o f  his obligations 
by Pantaenetus
Pantaenetus
241 D em osthenes Purchasers; apparently S peaker so ld  the p roperty  at P an taene tu s’
xxxvii.17 independent b idding, and to the peop le  to w hom  he 
w as to ld  to sell it
24 2 D em osthenes
xxxvii.30
N o t clear S peaker so ld  the p roperty  w hen 
Pantaenetus requested  it and on the sam e 
term s as those upon w hich he bough t it
243 D em osthenes 
x x x v ii.3 1
N o t clear Pantaenetus h im se lf  la ter so ld  the 
p roperty  for th ree ta len ts and 2600 
drachm ae
244 D em osthenes
xxxvii.54
N o t clear S peaker’s ch a racter in lending m oney and 
g iv ing  aid. N o n lega l issue
245 D em osthenes
xxxviii.3
N ot clear O pponents b rough t a d ike ep itropes  abou t 
the inheritance, d ro p p ed  the ir ac tion  and
• have the m oney ag reed  upon (§4)
2 4 6 D em osthenes
xxxviii.13
N o t c lear F ather d ied  afte r the  agreem ent, 
opponents never sued  D em aretus and  he 
d id n ’t go to sea no r to the B osporus
247 D em osthenes
xxxix.5
N o t clear H ow  M antitheus w as enro lled  in the 
ph ratry  and the dem e
248 D em osthenes
xxxix.19
N ot c lear B oeo tu s’ past co u rt cases and  his ac tions 
in claim ing M an tith eu s’ m agistracy  (legal 
issue as dealing  w ith  confusion  caused  by 
possessing  the sam e nam e, but also 
p rovides an opportun ity  to slur opponen t)
249 D em osthenes
xxxix.20
N o t clear S peaker has been ca lled  M antitheus since 
he w as ten  days o ld
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250 D em osthenes T hose  w ho w ent w ith  B oeotus B oeotus w as sen t to  dance in ano ther
xxxix.24 to  dance in the b o y s ’ chorus. 
Independent?
dem e
251 D em osthenes
xxxix.36
N o t clear S p eak er’s father n am ed  him  M antitheus 
and the o p ponen t B oeotus
252 D em osthenes
xl.7
N o t clear Speaker is ‘te lling  the tru th ’ abo u t his 
m o ther’s m arriages and  his sis te r’s dow ry
253 D em osthenes
xl.15
N o t clear S peaker and  opp o n en t d iv ided  the 
inheritance bu t k ep t apart the house and 
the ir fa th e r’s slaves, in o rder tha t w hoever 
estab lished  a r igh t to  the dow ry could  
gain  it from  the value o f  the house, and  so 
tha t the slaves cou ld  be to rtu red  in any 
search  fo r fa th e r’s p roperty
254 D em osthenes
xl.18
N o t clear A rb itra tions and  judgem en ts; B oeotus 
ca lled  h im se lf  M antitheus
255 D em osthenes
xl.33
N o t c lear B oeotus and  M enec les b rought speaker 
before the A reopagus on a charge o f  
in ten tional w ound ing  bu t lost the case. 
N on lega l issue
256 D em osthenes
xl.35
N o t c lear S peaker’s litiga tion  w ith  B oeotus and 
B oeo tu s’ attem pts to  aim ex sp eak er’s 
taxiarchy. N on lega l issue
257 D em osthenes
xl.37
M ytileneans. Independen t Father received  the g ift in person  from  the 
M ytileneans and no  deb t w as ow ed to him  
in M ytilene
258 D em osthenes
xl.44
N o t c lear B oeotus refu sed  a  challenge, and  w ould 
not allow  the arb itra to r to decide the suit 
about the nam e
259 D em osthenes
xl.52
N o t c lear S peaker’s deb ts to  B lepaeus the banker 
and L ysistra tus o f  T horicus and how  he 
repaid  them  - legal issue as refuting  
opp o n en t’s c laim s tha t speaker has w asted  
father’s inheritance
260 D em osthenes TOÜ9 napayevoijevous (for Polyeuctus betro thed  his daugh ter to
xli.6 betro thal). N o t c lea r w ho 
testified  to  o ther issues
Spudias w ith  a  dow ry  o f  40  m inae; he 
received  less than  1000 drachm ae; 
Polyeuctus alw ays adm itted  the deb t and 
at his dea th  d irec ted  tha t horo i shou ld  be 
set up on the house fo r 1000 drachm ae for 
the deb t o f  h is w ife ’s dow ry
261 D em osthenes A ristogenes - no t c lear if Polyeuctus, w hen abo u t to die, sta ted  that
x li.10 independent Spudias ow ed  h im  tw o m inae w ith 
in terest (fo r the p rice  o f  a slave) and also 
1800 drachm ae
262 D em osthenes 
x li .l  1
N o t clear T hree o ther deb ts incurred  by Spudias 
w hich he refuses to  repay
263 D em osthenes M utual friends o f  speaker and Speaker d id  no t induce Polyeuctus to
x li.l  8 Spudias - defended  as te lling  
the tru th  at §14-16. It is 
possib le  tha t they are not 
really  S pud ias’ friends, but 
only the sp eak er’s friends, in 
w hich case they w ould  not be 
independent
favour him  o ver Spudias
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264 D em osthenes
xli.24
N o t clear P apers on the  20  m inae w ere sealed , the 
seals w ere acknow ledged  by S pud ias’ 
w ife and  sp e ak e r’s, they broke the seals 
and to o k  cop ies , resealed  the papers and 
deposited  them  w ith  A ristogenes
265 D em osthenes
xli.26
N o t clear T he d ow ry  S pudias received  w hen he 
m arried  P o ly eu c tu s’ o ther daughter
266 D em osthenes
xli.28
A rbitra tors - independen t R ela tive value o f  dow ries, L eocrates 
b rough t a  su it abou t S pudias’ receiv ing  
far m ore th an  the speaker; verd ic t o f  the 
arb itra to rs
267 D em osthenes Includes friends and  relatives O rig inal sta te  o f  farm  and m ine and
xlii.9 (§4); no t independent subsequen t sta te  (§26)
268 D em osthenes 
xlii. 16
N o t clear P h aen ip p u s’ delays, including putting  
speaker off, n o t tu rn ing  up to  conferences 
and hand ing  o ver the inventory late
269 D em osthenes
xlii.23
N o t clear Phaen ippus inherited  tw o estates tha t 
supplied  litu rg ies
270 D em osthenes
xlii.25
N o t clear P ossib ly  ab o u t P haen ippus’ chario t; i f  so, 
nonlegal issue
271 D em osthenes A eantides and T heo te les - Phaen ippus dec la res he ow es them  4000
xlii.29 previous cred ito rs o f  
Phaenippus. A pparen tly  
independent o f  th is  case, 
though it is possib le  they  bear 
som e enm ity tow ard  
Phaenippus
drachm ae, b u t he long ago paid  the debt, 
unw illing ly , b u t after losing a  suit.
272 D em osthenes 
x lii i.3 1
People present befo re  the 
arb itra tor
P hylom ache w on H agn ias’ estate
273 D em osthenes 1. Fellow  dem esm en 1. P hy lom ache is P o lem on’s sister by  the
x liii.35-37 (independent)
2. g randchildren  o f  
S tratonides (fam ily , so not 
independent)
3. rela tive (no t independent)
4. relative (not independent)
5. husband o f  re la tive  (not 
independent)
sam e fa th e r and  m other
2. H eard  from  the ir father that Polem on 
never had  a  b ro ther but had a sister, 
P hy lom ache
3. H eard  from  his father and other 
re la tives th a t Polem on never had a 
b ro th e r b u t had  a sister, Phylom ache
4. H eard  from  A rchim achus and his
other that P o lem on never had
a b ro th e r bu t had  a sister, P hylom ache
5. H is m o th e r often  to ld  them  that 
P hy lom ache, the m other o f  Eubulides, 
w as s is te r  o f  Polem on and that 
P o lem on  never had a b ro ther
274 D em osthenes N eighbours and the w itnesses Sositheus show ed  them  that the  o live trees
xliii.70 w e sum m oned (first 
independent; second  not 
independent)
had been  u p ro o ted  at H agn ias’ farm. 
N on legal issue
275 D em osthenes
xliv .14
N o t clear Fam ily re la tio n sh ip  is w a n e p  Kai 
X eyogev
276 D em osthenes
xliv .30
N o t clear L eochares’ fam ily  background and the 
adoptions, an d  A rch iades’ tom b has a 
lou trophoros prov ing  he d ied  ch ild less
241
Table 6.1 (Cont.).
277 D em osthenes M em bers o f  phratry  and  dem e. L eostra tus re tu rned  to  his dem e, leaving a
x liv .44 Independent son in A rch iad es’ fam ily; his fa ther had 
done the sam e thing; L eostra tus’ son  d ied  
ch ild less, and L eochares w as en ro lled  in 
the dem e before  he w as en ro lled  in the 
phratry
278 D em osthenes
xlv .8
S tephanus (the opponen t) S tephanus’ testim ony from  the first trial
279 D em osthenes C ephisophon  - apparen tly  on C eph isophon ’s orig inal testim ony that his
x lv .19 opponen t’s side so n o t 
independent
father le ft h im  a docum ent en titled  “ the 
w ill o f  P asion”
280 D em osthenes
x lv .24
Stephanus S tephanus’ orig inal testim ony (repea ted  
for fu rther exam ination)
281 D em osthenes
xlv .25
S tephanus S tephanus’ orig inal testim ony (parts  read  
ou t th ree  tim es w ith com m ents - a  c loser 
exam ination)
282 D em osthenes D einias - rela tive o f  bo th S tephanus’ m other is the sister o f
xlv.55 A pollodorus and S tephanus; 
not independent
A p o llodo rus’ father; and he d id n ’t know  
that A po llodorus released  S tephanus from  
his c laim s
283 D em osthenes
xlv.61
N ot clear A po llodorus challenged  S tephanus to give 
up a slave for torture concern ing  the theft 
o f  the w ritten  docum ent and S tephanus 
refused
284 D em osthenes
xlvi.21
N ot clear A po llodorus challenged  Phorm io  about 
co rrup ting  h is m other before m arriage; 
Phorm io  refused  to hand  over fem ale 
slaves
285 D em osthenes
x lvii.10
N ot clear E vergus and M nesibu lus w on’t g ive up 
the w om an, though  they said T heophem us 
w as ready  to  give her up
286 D em osthenes
xlvii.17
N ot clear Sam e deposition  as before; repeated  for 
em phasis
287 D em osthenes M agistrate w ho gave the Law  o f  P eriander and decree com pelled
xlvii.24 nam es to  the speaker and  
brought the case into court 
(independent); m em bers o f  the 
sym m ory  w hen speaker w as
speaker to  recover debts from  opponents
epim eletes  and trie ra rch  
(independent)
288 D em osthenes
x lvii.27
Those w ho served  the 
sum m ons on T heophem us - 
not c lear i f  independen t
S peaker sum m oned T heophem us to  court
289 D em osthenes
xlvii.27
T he aposto leis  and  the archon  
- independent
T heophem us w as b rought into court
290 D em osthenes
xlvii.32
N ot clear T heophem us d id  not pay the deb t but 
tried  to  sh ift it to  A phareus and then 
D em ochares
291 D em osthenes T hose w ho saw  T heophem us T heophem us struck  the speaker first, and
xlvii.40 strike the speaker first - not 
clear i f  independent
thus com m itted  aikeia
292 D em osthenes
xlvii.44
All those speaker cou ld  find 
w ho w ere m em bers o f  the 
B oule  w hen T heophem us was 
im peached - independen t
T heophem us w as im peached  and  fined
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293 D em osthenes
xlvii.48
O ther trierarchs - independent S peaker w as one o f  several w ho took  such 
ac tions against deb to rs
294 D em osthenes
xlvii.52
N o t clear S peaker’s agreem ent w ith  T heophem us to 
delay  pay ing  the fm e. N on lega l issue
295 D em osthenes N ot clear. Possibly O pponen ts p lunder sp eak er’s house.
xlvii.61 H agnophilus and the 
neighbours (as d iscussed  at 
§60-61) - i f  so, independent
N on legal issue
296 D em osthenes
xlvii.66
N o t c lear S peaker pays fm e; fu rther p lunder. 
N on lega l issue
297 D em osthenes N ot clear, but could  include D eath  o f  nurse and  speaker’s dem and the
xlvii.67 the w itnesses he took  w hen he 
dem anded  the opponents take 
care o f  the nurse; so probably  
not independent
opponen ts take care  o f  her. N onlegal 
issue
298 D em osthenes
xlvii.77
N ot clear Possib ly  abou t ex tend ing  the tim e for 
pay ing  the fm e (§78). N on legal issue
299 D em osthenes T hose w ronged by  Evergus E vergus and  M nesibu lu s’ prev ious
xlvii.82 and M nesibulus - not involved 
in this d ispute, bu t not 
independent
crim es. N on legal issue
300 D em osthenes
xlviii.3
tcov n ap a y ev o ijev w v S peaker o ffered  reasonab le  and 
appropria te  term s to  O lym piodorus
301 D em osthenes 
x lv iii.l 1
A ndrocleides - independent A greem en t betw een  speaker and 
O lym piodorus
302 D em osthenes
xlviii.33
N o t c lear Speaker and O lym piodorus, having 
settled  the ir dispute, each took an equal 
share o f  the p roperty  left by C om on that 
they knew  abou t
303 D em osthenes
xlviii.34
N ot c lear W hen opponents p u t in an ep id ikasia  they 
took  every th ing  from  the speaker except 
the m oney  w hich O lym piodorus go t from  
the m an w ho w as to rtu red
304 D em osthenes
xlviii.47
A ndrocleides - independent O lym piodorus never asked him  for the 
agreem ent
305 D em osthenes The people in front o f  w hom O lym piodorus refu sed  challenge to copy
xlviii.49 the speaker m ade the 
challenge - p robably  the 
w itnesses he took  w ith him  so 
no t independent
and  subm it the ag reem en t as evidence
306 D em osthenes
xlviii.55
O lym piodorus’ rela tives and 
speaker’s rela tives - not 
independent
O lym piodo rus’ m istress - nonlegal issue
307 D em osthenes B ank s ta ff  including Phorm io B ankers paid  m oney  to  people w hom
xlix.33 (§18) and apparently  
independent, and T im osthenes 
(friend  and partner o f  Phorm io 
- §31 - so apparently  
independent). A lthough 
A pollodorus d id  not ow n his 
fa ther’s bank, he clearly  had 
som e contro l (§43) so the 
w itnesses m ay be on his side
T im otheus to ld  them  to pay it, and Pasion 
paid  T im osthenes the value o f  tw o bow ls 
and  en tered  the deb t on  his books as 
ow ing to T im otheus
308 D em osthenes T hose w ho heard  T im otheus T im o theus’ testim ony before the
xlix.33 before the arb itra to r (§34) arb itra to r on P h ilo n d as’ tim ber
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309 D em osthenes Pasicles (A p o llo d o ru s’ b rother P asion’s reco rd  o f  all debts ow ed; Pasion
xlix .42 but in charge o f  the bank). N ot 
independent
told A pollodorus and P asicles du ring  his 
illness o f  all the deb ts and w ho ow ed 
them  and for w hat purpose they received  
the m oney
310 D em osthenes N ot clear. P robab ly  bank  sta ff A pollodorus a llow ed  Phrasierides to
xlix .43 Phorm io and  E uphraeus as 
m entioned  at §44. A pparently  
independent, b u t g iven 
A po llodo rus’ partia l contro l o f  
bank  m ay be on  his side
inspect the b an k ’s books and to  copy  out 
all the entries on deb ts ow ed by 
T im otheus
311 D em osthenes
xlix .61
N o t clear T im otheus b o rro w ed  m oney from  o ther 
citizens w ithou t security , since he had  no 
security  to o ffer
312 D em osthenes T hose w ho co llec ted  the H ow  m uch A po llodorus paid  each  m onth,
1.10 stra tio tika  and the apostoleis. 
Independent
and the sailo rs and  how  m uch w as paid  to 
each one, as p ro o f  o f  A p o llodo rus’ zeal 
and o f  P o ly c les’ re luctance to take  over 
the trie rarchy  because o f  the expense
313 D em osthenes
1.13
N o t clear A po llodorus’ add itiona l expenses and 
m ortgages and  borrow ings to  pay them
314 D em osthenes N o t clear, bu t possib ly V arious peop le  to ld  Polycles abou t the
1.28 E uctem on, D einias, 
P y thodoros o f  A cham ae and 
A po llodoros o f  L euconoe 
(§§26-27). E uctem on is the 
pen tecon tarch  so independent; 
D einias is A po llo d o ru s’ father 
in law so no t in d e p e n d e n t,
costs o f  the equ ipm en t and tha t none o f  it 
was from  the pub lic  stores, and  abou t the 
pay given to  crew  and the add itiona l sum s 
paid  after the trie ra rchy  had exp ired , and 
urged him to  take o ver the ship. T hey 
w ere w illing to  negotia te  an agreem ent 
w ith Polycles o ver the w ear and  tear on
and the o ther tw o  are friends 
o f  A po llodo rus’ (§27) so not 
independent
the equipm ent bu t Polycles refused
315 D em osthenes The scene in the agora is Polycles refused  to  take over the ship and
1.37 w itnessed by “as m any o f  the 
citizens as I cou ld  [take] and 
the m arines and  row ers” (§29) 
- the w itnesses A pollodorus 
took  w ith him  so not clearly  
independent. H ow ever, 
A pollodorus says he w ent by 
h im se lf  to the house w here 
T im om achus w as staying 
(§32) so it is no t clear w ho 
w itnesses these rem arks
repay A po llo d o ru s’ ex tra  expenses w hen 
requested  in the agora, and his second  
refusal in the house w here T im om achus 
was staying to  take  over the ship  and crew  
due to A p o llo d o ru s’ ex travagance , or to 
take over the tr ie ra rchy  as his fellow  
trierarch  had  no t ye t tu rned  up
316 D em osthenes
1.40
N o t clear C om prom ise o ffe r and P o lycles’ further 
refusal
317 D em osthenes
1.42
N ot c lear M nesilochus and  H agnias reached  a 
com prom ise o ver a sim ilar d ispute
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318 D em osthenes tgov n ap a y ev o M ev co v  (§57). A pollodorus asked  Polycles to  lend  him
1.56 T he request for a loan from  
Polycles m ay be w itnessed  by 
those A po llodorus took  w ith 
him  (§55) so m ay not be 
independent; the actual loan 
m ay be w itnessed  by C leanax  
and E peratus as m entioned  at 
§56; as friends o f  his father 
they m ay no t be independent
one but P o lycles refused ; he b o rrow ed  
from  C leanax  and  E peratus, friends o f  his 
father
319 D em osthenes
1.68
N o t c lear P olycles’ p rev ious m alfeasance in no t 
perform ing  a h ie ra rch y . N on leg a l issue
320 D em osthenes Som e no t know n, but include C allippus v isited  bank  and w as show n
lii.7 A rcheb iades o f  L am ptrae 
(§28), w ho w as know n to 
C ephisiades, and possib ly  too  
Phorm io  as identified  at §7 as 
oÜ T O O i. B oth independent
L ycon’s ledger, and  did  no t c la im  any 
m oney. L ater P horm io  paid  the m oney  to 
C ephisiades in  the presence o f  
A rchebiades and  P hrasias and  o ther 
w itnesses
321 D em osthenes T he peop le  w ho w ere p resen t C allippus’ c la im  that he challenged
lii.16 at the arb itra tion Pasion befo re  the arb itra to r
322 D em osthenes
lii.19
N o t c lear A pollodorus and Phorm io w ere ready  to 
sw ear oaths ab o u t L ycon ’s acts and  the 
paym ent to  C ephisiades
323 D em osthenes M egacleides (prev ious T hroughout th e  long law suit w ith
lii.21 opponen t o f  Lycon in a  
law suit) - not independent
M egacleides L ycon  never ca lled  in 
C allippus, b u t A rchebiades and  his 
friends
324 D em osthenes T hose w ho w ere presen t at the L ysitheides m ade his aw ard w ithout
lii.31 arb itra tion sw earing an oath
325 D em osthenes
liii.18
N ot clear A po llodorus’ su it against A rethusius and 
that m an’s a ttack  on his farm ;
N icostra tu s’ assau lt on A po llodorus; 
A pollodorus conv icts A rethusius for false 
sum m ons
326 D em osthenes 
liii. 19
t o u s  e iöÖ T as, bu t no t c lear 
w ho they are
C erdon w as A re th u siu s’ slave
327 D em osthenes
1ÜL20
N ot clear A rethusius rece ived  w ages from  the 
people for w hom  C erdon  w orked , and 
paid or rece iv ed  com pensation  w henever 
any dam age w as done
328 D em osthenes
liii.20
N o t clear A rchepolis gave M anes to  A rethusius in 
paym ent o f  a deb t
329 D em osthenes
1ÜL21
N ot clear W henever C erdon  and M anes bough t up 
the produce from  an orchard , o r h ired  
them selves o u t to  reap  a harvest, o r  did 
any o ther farm ing  w ork, A rethusius m ade 
the purchase o r pa id  w ages fo r them
330 D em osthenes
liii.25
N ot c lear A rethusius’ cha llenge and A po llo d o ru s’ 
counter-challenge
331 D em osthenes
liv.6
N o t c lear C onon’s so n s’ ac tions on cam paign  (the 
origin o f  the d ispu te)
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332 D em osthenes
liv.9
L ysistratus, Paseas, N icera to s 
and D idodorus (§32 ) - m en 
w ho did  not know  the speaker 
and cam e upon the figh t by 
chance - so independen t
T hey  saw  speaker be ing  beaten  by  C onon 
and stripped  o f  his c loak  and TäÄÄ’ ÖO’ 
e n a o x o v  u ß p i^ öp evov
333 D em osthenes
liv.10
N o t clear. Possib ly  E uxitheus 
(speaker’s re la tive) an d  his 
friend M eidias, so no t 
independent
S p eak er’s cond ition  afte r the fight; doctor 
called , speaker kep t at M eid ias’ house
334 D em osthenes
liv.10
D octo r - independent Severity  o f  assau lt
335 D em osthenes
liv.12
D octo r (independent) and  
those w ho visited  the speaker 
(no t clear w ho they  are )
A fter assault speaker w as at po in t o f  death
336 D em osthenes
liv.29
N o t clear C on o n ’s challenge and  its tim ing
337 D em osthenes
liv.36
N o t clear C o n o n ’s w itnesses and  the ir character. 
N on legal issue? A ttack  on opp o n en t’s 
w itnesses
338 D em osthenes
lv.14
N o t clear L and is private land and no w atercourse; 
it contains trees, v ines, figs and tom bs, 
there since before sp eak er’s father built 
the w all w hile tom bs w ere there before 
his fam ily acqu ired  the land; this p roves 
that the land w as w alled  during  the 
lifetim e o f  C a llic le s’ fa ther w ithout any 
opposition  from  them  or any other 
neighbours
339 D em osthenes 
lv .2 1
N eighbours - independen t T hey have also suffered  from  floods and 
d o n ’t blam e it on  the sp eak er’s fam ily
340 D em osthenes
lv.27
N o t clear C allicles threw  rubb ish  into the road  and 
m ade it narrow er
341 D em osthenes
lv.34
N o t clear C allicles m ade false charges and go t his 
cousin  to  b ring  suits against C allarus to 
get the speaker’s p roperty
342 D em osthenes
lv.34
N o t clear “T he rem ain ing  depositions” - perhaps to 
p rove speaker’s w illingness to subm it to 
arb itra tion  by “ fair and  im partial m en” 
and to  sw ear the law ful oath
343 D em osthenes
lvii.14
T he very m en w ho w ronged  
m e - opponents, u sed  here  to 
p rove the point.
V otes w ere not g iven out w hen everybody  
w as presen t and  the num ber o f  votes w as 
grea ter than the num ber o f  peop le  present. 
N o reference to exom osia  so it appears 
they do testify
344 D em osthenes
lvii.19
N o t clear E ux itheus’ fa ther w as taken  p risoner and 
ransom ed, w hen  he reached  hom e he 
received  from  his uncles his share o f  the 
inheritance and  no m em ber o f  the phratry  
o r dem e ever accused  him  o f  being  a 
foreigner
345 D em osthenes
lvii.21
T hucritides, C harisiades, 
N ic iades and N ico stra tu s - 
re la tives o f  E uxitheus on  his 
fa the r’s side. N o t independen t
E uxitheus’ fa the r’s citizensh ip
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3 4 6 D em o sth en es
lv ii.2 2
T h ose  related  to E u xith eu s’ 
father o n  the fem ale  side. N o t  
independent
E u x ith eu s’ father’s c itizensh ip
3 4 7 D em o sth en es
lv ii.2 3
M em bers o f  phratry and tribe - 
independent
E u x ith eu s’ father’s c itizensh ip
3 4 8 D em o sth en es M em bers o f  d em e and E u xith eu s e lec ted  Phratriarch
lv ii.2 3 m em bers o f  tribe - 
independent
3 4 9 D em o sth en es M em bers o f  d em e - E u x ith eu s’ father e lec ted  to dem e
lv ii.2 5 independent m agistrac ies and passed  d o k im a sia
3 5 0 D em o sth en es
lv i i.2 7
N o t c lear D em e reg ister  lo st during A n tip h ilu s’ 
tim e as dem arch and subsequent 
d ia p se p h is is \  n ob od y  brought any charge  
against E u x ith eu s’ father
351 D em o sth en es N o t c lear E u x ith eu s’ brothers w ere buried  in the
lv ii.2 8 fam ily  tom b
3 5 2 D em o sth en es M other’s relatives - not E u x ith eu s’ m oth er’s c itizen  status
lv ii.3 8 independent
35 3 D em o sth en es E u xith eu s’ m other’s nephew E u x ith eu s’ m other’s citizen  status
lv ii.3 9 and h is three so n s - not 
independent
3 5 4 D em o sth en es M em bers o f  m other’s tribe, E u x ith eu s’ m oth er’s c itizen  status
lv ii.4 0 phratry and dem e - 
independent
35 5 D em o sth en es S on s o f  P rotom achus E u x ith eu s’ m other’s c itizen  status
lv ii.4 3 (E u x ith eu s’ m other’s first 
husband and her ch ildren) and 
those w h o  w ere present w hen  
she w as en g a g ed  to h is father; 
m em bers o f  phratry and fam ily  
w ho w ere present w hen  
E u xith eu s’ father ga v e  a 
m arriage feast; E un icus o f  
C holargus, w ho rece iv ed  
E u xith eu s’ sister in m arriage 
from  C holargus, and her son. 
M ost n ot independent; 
m em bers o f  phratry apparently  
indepc.»Jei»v
3 5 6 D em o sth en es C le in ias and h is rela tives - E u x ith eu s’ m other w as o n ce  their nurse
lv ii.4 5 independent
3 5 7 D em osth en es
lv ii.4 6
N o t c lear E uxitheus w as inducted into phratry and  
d em e, w as nom inated  to draw lots for the 
p riesth ood  o f  H eracles and served  on  
d em e m agistracies S o K ip a o B e te
3 5 8 D em o sth en es
lv iii.8
E uthyphem us, the secretary o f  
the m agistrate - independent
P h asis aga in st T h eocrin es for d en o u n cin g  
M ico n  o f  C h o lle id a e  and then accep tin g  
m o n ey  to  g iv e  up the case
3 5 9 D em o sth en es
lv iii.9
N o t clear T h o se  w h o  saw  the phasis put up in  
public
3 6 0 D em o sth en es T he port overseers and M icon. P r o o f  o f  T h eo cr in es’ denunciation
lv iii.9 First independent; seco n d  not 
independent (T h eo crin es  
lod ged  the denunciation  
against h im )
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361 D em osthenes 
lviii. 15
M em bers o f  T heo crin es’ tribe 
- independent
T heocrines ow es 700 drachm ae after 
being condem ned  in h is eu thyne  b u t has 
no t paid
362 D em osthenes 
lv iii.2 1
C ephisodorus - p reviously  
sub ject to a  w rongful 
accusation  by  T heocrines, so 
likely to  be  an enem y o f  his
T heocrines w rongfu lly  claim ed 
C eph iso d o ru s’ slave w as free
363 D em osthenes
lviii.33
N ot clear T heocrines brough t an e isangelia  against 
P o lyeuctus fo r m istreating  an orphan , bu t 
w ithdrew  the case afte r receiv ing  200 
d rachm ae from  Polyeuctus
364 D em osthenes
lviii.33
P hilipp ides o f  P aeania - not 
clear i f  he is independent
T h eo c rin es’ sta tem en t tha t he w ou ld  have 
let sp eak er’s fa ther o f f  for 1000 
drachm ae. N on lega l issue
365 D em osthenes
lviii.35
A ristom achus - the bribe w as 
paid  in his house, but no t clear 
i f  he is independent
T heocrines received  a m ina and  a  h a lf  to 
d rop  the g ra p h e  p a ra n o m o n  against 
A ntim edon. N on lega l issue
366 D em osthenes
lviii.35
“O ther depositions o f  the sam e 
sort” and the deposition  by 
H yperides and  D em osthenes. 
A pparen tly  involved  in o ther 
cases and thus not 
independent; D em osthenes is 
allegedly  in co llusion  w ith 
T heocrines
T h eo c rin es’ o th e r attem pts to  ex to rt 
m oney th rough  sycophancy. N on legal 
issue
367 D em osthenes
lviii.43
C leinom achus and Eubulides, 
apparen tly  involved  in the 
cabal w ith T heocrines and 
D em osthenes. S peaker’s 
enem ies; ca lled  here  to  p rove 
the point. N o t c lear if  they do 
testify  but speaker says he w ill 
com pel them  (§42)
T heocrines and  D em osthenes have com e 
to term s and T heocrines has w ithdraw n 
his g ra p h e  against D em osthenes
368 D em osthenes
lix.23
Philostratus - independent N ea ira  w as N ica re te ’s slave and  they w ere 
residen ts o f  C orin th ; they stayed a t his 
house w hen they cam e to  A thens for the 
m ysteries and  L ysias p laced them  there
369 D em osthenes
lix.25
E uphiletos and  A ristom achus - 
independent
S im us the T hessalian  cam e to  A thens w ith 
N lcure te  and  N ea ira; they lodged w ith 
C tesippus and N ea ira  drank w ith  them  
like a  courtesan  w hile m any o thers w ere 
p resen t and  jo in e d  in the d rink ing  at 
C tes ip p u s’ house
370 D em osthenes
lix.28
H ipparchus - apparen tly  
independent
X enocle ides and he h ired  N ea ira  in 
C o rin th  as a courtesan  for hire and they 
d rank  toge ther w ith  her in C orin th
371 D em osthenes
lix.32
Philagros o f  M elite  - 
independent
H e w as p resen t in C orin th  w hen Phrynion  
paid  20  m inae fo r N ea ira  to  T im anoridas 
and  E ucrates; and  after paying he took  
N ea ira  to A thens w ith  him
372 D em osthenes
lix.34
C hionides and  E uthetion  - 
independent
T hey  w ere at C h ab rias’ banquet a t C olias, 
as w ere Phrynion  and  N eaira; they all laid 
dow n to sleep  and  during the n igh t several 
m en w ent to  N ea ira , including C hab rias’ 
slaves. N on legal issue
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373 D em osthenes
lix.40
A ietes, P o lem arch  w hen 
N eaira  w as com pelled  to  post 
securities by  P hrynion - 
independent
N eaira  w as com pelled  to post securities; 
S tephanus, G laucetes and A ristocrates 
w ere the securities
374 D em osthenes
lix.47
Satyrus, S aurias and  D iogeiton 
- a rb itra to rs in dispute 
betw een Phryn ion  and 
S tephanus over N eaira. 
Independen t
A rb itra tion  betw een  Phrynion  and 
S tephanus over N ea ira; the term s o f  the 
arb itra tion  w ere as A po llodo rus’ states
375 D em osthenes
lix.48
E ubulus, D iopeithes and 
C teson - independent
T hey often  d ined  w ith  S tephanus and 
Phrynion a fte r the arb itra tion  and  drank  in 
the com pany  o f  N ea ira  a t bo th  m e n ’s 
houses. N on lega l issue
376 D em osthenes
lix.54
P hrasto r - no t independent as 
apparen tly  an  enem y o f  
S tephanus
H e m arried  and  Phano  and d ivo rced  her 
because she w as N ea ira ’s daughter; 
S tephanus ind ic ted  him  fo r the dow ry, 
P hrasto r rep lied  w ith  a su it for o ffering  
him  a non-A then ian  in m arriage. T heir 
reconcilia tion
377 D em osthenes
lix.61
T im ostra tus, X anth ippus, 
E valces, A nytus, E uphranor 
and N icippus - m em bers o f  
P h rasto r’s tribe and apparently  
independent
T hey p reven ted  P hrasto r from  reg istering  
his son w ith  the tribe as he w as the son o f  
N ea ira ’s daugh ter
378 D em osthenes
lix.71
N ausiph ilus, A ristom achus - 
securities fo r E paenetus and 
thus not independen t
T hey becam e sureties for E paenetus w hen 
S tephanus c laim ed  he had caugh t h im  in 
adultery; w hen  E paenetus had  go t aw ay 
from  S tephanus he ind icted  S tephanus for 
w rongful im prisonm ent; they w ere 
appo in ted  arb itra to rs and brough t about a 
reconcilia tion  betw een  the tw o, and the 
term s o f  the  reconcilia tion  w ere as 





T heogenes - no t independent 
g iven his pas t rela tionsh ip  
w ith  P hano  and S tephanus
W hen he w as B asileus  he m arried  Phano 
believ ing  she w as S tephanus’ daughter, 
and  w hen he found  out he had  been 
deceived  he th rew  the w om an ou t no 
longer lived  w ith  her, and sacked  
S tephanus from  h r  pos* m  pa red ro s
380 D em osthenes
lix.123
H ippocra tes, D em osthenes, 
D iophanes, D einom enes, 
D einias and  L ysim achus - 
p robab ly  the w itnesses 
A po llodorus took  w ith him  so 
not independent
T hey  w ere p resen t in the agora w hen 
A po llodorus challenged  S tephanus to 
hand  over fem ale slaves for to rtu re  in 
regard  to  the m atters w hich he had 
accused  S tephanus and N ea ira ; S tephanus 
refused; the challenge w as the one that 
A po llodorus p roduces
381 H yperides iii.33 T he T roezen ians; not c lear if  
independent
A thenogenes’ p rev ious w rongdo ing  in 
T roezen ; non legal issue
382 H yperides iii.34 A thenogenes’ father-in-law ; 
no t independent
N o t clear, bu t apparen tly  ano ther item  




383 L ycurgus i.20 T he neighbours and the m en 
living in th is p lace w ho know  
L eocrates ran aw ay during  the 
w ar and sailed  from  A thens; 
the m en presen t at R hodes 
w hen L eocrates de livered  his 
new s, and Phrynicus w ho 
accused  L eocrates in the 
A ssem bly as hav ing  harm ed 
the tw o per cent tax  (§19). 
A pparen tly  independent w ith 
the exception  o f  Phrynicus, 
w ho w ould  seem  to be an 
enem y o f  L eocra tes’
L eo c ra te s’ flight from  A thens and claim  
at R hodes tha t A thens had  fallen, the 
P eiraeus had  b een  b lockaded  and he was 
the on ly  one w ho had  escaped, and the 
R h o d ian s’ subsequen t actions
384 L ycurgus i.23 T O Ü 5 auvsiöÖTas; no t c lear if  
independent
L eocra tes so ld  his house and slaves to  
A m yntas; A m yntas then reso ld  the slaves 
to T im ochares
385 Lycurgus i.24 N o t clear; perhaps Philom elus 
and  M enelaus? I f  so, 
apparen tly  independent
Ph ilom elus o f  C holargus and M enelaus 
received  from  A m yntas 40 m inae ow ed to 
them
386 L ycurgus i.24 T im ochares (husband  o f  
L eocra tes’ younger sister so 
no t independent)
T im ochares bough t slaves from  A m yntas, 
using a loan from  L ysicles to pay and 
paid  A m yntas in terest o f  one m ina
387 A eschines i.50 T hose w ho know  that 
T im archus lived in M isgo las’ 
house; Phaedrus; and 
M isgolas. F riends o f  
T im archus so not independent
T im arch u s’ p rostitu tion  w ith M isgolas; 
and his crim e against the foreigners a t the 
inn. T he second  issue is a nonlegal issue
388 A eschines i.66 G laucon  o f  C holargus and 
others. G laucon is apparen tly  
independent
C rim es against P itta lacus - nonlegal issue
389 A eschines i.100 N ausicrates; M etagenes o f  
Shpettus; and others (possib ly  
includ ing  C leanetus the 
choregus  and M nesitheus o f  
M yrrinoussa as m en tioned  at 
§ 9 8 . Independent
T im archus sold  his fa ther’s city  house and 
suburban  house and the estate at A lopeke; 
he so ld  h is fa the r’s slaves; and also 
co llec ted  and spent loans due to his father 
(p rov ing  T im archus squandered  his 
inheritance)
390 A eschines i. 104 A rignotus o f  Sphettus 
(T im archus’ uncle, so no t 
independent)
T im arch u s’ neg lec t o f  his uncle - d id  not 
suppo rt h im  bu t allow ed  him  to  receive a  
pension  for d isab led  m en. D id  not speak 
for h im  a t his dokim asia
391 A eschines i. 115 Philem on and L euconides - 
prev ious cronies o f  
T im archus.
T im archus b ribed  to  abandon  his case 
against P h ilo tades. N onlegal issue
392 A eschines ii. 19 W itnesses to the deposition  
m ade by A ristodem us (a 
fellow  am bassador and 
apparen tly  a friend o f  
D em osthenes’). N o t c lear who 
they are
D em osthenes’ ac tions to ensure 
A ristodem us could  jo in  the E m bassy
393 A eschines ii.46 C olleagues on the E m bassy  - 
also  abused  by D em osthenes 
(§44), so m ay not be 
independent
A esch in es’ actions on the E m bassy and 
D em osthenes’ ow n praise o f  his actions
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394 A eschines ii.55 C olleagues on  the E m bassy  - 
also  abused  by D em osthenes 
(§44), so m ay n o t be 
independent
A esch ines’ and D em osthenes’ repo rts  to 
the A ssem bly
395 A eschines ii.68 A m yntor - independen t W hen  the peop le  w ere delibera ting  on  the 
sub jec t o f  the a lliance  w ith  Philip , 
accord ing  to D em osthenes’ decree, a t the 
second  m eeting  o f  the A ssem bly, w hen  
there  w as no opportun ity  to  add ress the 
peop le  bu t w hen the decrees w ere being  
vo ted  on, D em osthenes w as sitting  nex t to  
h im  and show ed h im  a decree he had  
w ritten  and asked  him  i f  shou ld  g ive it to  
the p ro ed ro i to  p u t to  the vote; th is  decree  
con tained  the term s on  w hich 
D em osthenes cla im ed  the peace and  the 
alliance should  b e  m ade, and the term s 
w ere the sam e as P h ilocra tes had  m oved . 
N on lega l issue
396 A esch ines ii.85 A lexim achus - independent D em osthenes’ unw illingness to allow  the 
represen tative o f  C ersob lep tes to  jo in  the 
o ther allies in g iv ing  the oath  to Ph ilip
397 A esch ines ii.86 T he stra tego i and  the synedro i 
o f  the allies - independent
D em osthenes’ c la im  that A eschines d rove  
C ritobulus, C e rso b lep tes’ am bassador, 
from  the oath -g iv ing  cerem ony
398 A eschines ii. 107 F ellow -am bassadors on  the 
second  E m bassy - enem ies o f  
D em osthenes (§97 ) so not 
independent
D em osthenes’ com m ents befo re  m eeting  
Philip , and the vo te  tha t each  shou ld  say 
w hat they though t w as in the ir in terests
399 A esch ines ii. 127 F ellow -am bassadors on  the 
second  E m bassy - enem ies o f  
D em osthenes (§97 ) so not 
independent
A eschines w as n ever aw ay from  
A glaocreon  and Ia trocles at n igh t du ring  
the E m bassy and  so cou ld  no t be m eeting  
Philip  in secret
400 A esch ines ii. 134 T he bearers o f  the truce o f  the 
M ysteries, and  the 
am bassadors C allicrates and 
M etagenes, w hom  Proxenus 
the stra tegus  sen t to  the 
Phocians. "p ru d en t
A ctions by the P hocians and the ir b ea ring  
on the peace w ith  Ph ilip
401 A esch ines ii. 155 A ristophanes the O lynthian, 
and those w ho hea rd  his story 
and reported  it to  A eschines - 
D ercylus and  A riste ides. The 
first is independent; the last 
tw o m ay be friends o f  
A eschines’ and not 
independent
D em osthenes’ a ttem p t to fake the  sto ry  
abou t A eschines and  the O lynthian  
w om an
402 A eschines ii. 170 T em enides and those  w ho 
fought w ith A eschines at 
Tam ynae; P hocion  the 
strategus. Independen t
A esch ines’ m artia l deeds. N on lega l issue
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403 D inarchus i.27 N o t c lear D ow nfall o f  T hebes and  D em osthenes’ 
ro le th rough  avarice
404 D inarchus i.52 N o t clear D eposition  from  a p rev ious eisangelia  
abou t charges m ade against speaker. 
S p eak er’s innocence o f  any charges by 
the A reopagus
252
Table 6.2. Number of Decrees Cited in Athenian Courts.
A ndocides 2 i.77-9 , 83-4
A eschines 22 ii. 19, 46 , 55, 55, 60, 61, 65, 73, 91, 170
iii. 27 , 32 , 68, 70, 75, 76, 93, 102, 105, 124, 187, 188
D em osthenes 49 xviii. 29 , 37 , 73-4 , 75, 84, 9 0 -1 ,9 2 , 105, 115, 116, 118, 154, 155, 164, 
165, 1 8 1 -7 ,2 1 8 , 222
xix . 3 1, 47 , 61, 63, 80, 154, 161, 267 , 276 , 286
xx. 3 5 ,4 4 ,  54, 6 3 ,7 0 ,  86, 115
xx iii. 88, 151, 177
xxiv . 27
xxv . 63
xlv ii.20 , 24 , 33, 40, 44 
1.6, 13 
lviii. 18, 57 
lix .104
D inarchus 6 i. 16, 27 , 79 , 80, 82, 83
H yperides 1 iii.33
Isaeus 1 vi.50
Isocrates 1 xviii.19
L ycurgus 7 i.36, 114, 118, 120, 122, 125, 146
L ysias 9 x iii.22 , 28 , 33, 35, 51, 55, 59, 71, 72
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Table 6.3. Number of Laws Cited in Athenian Courts.
A esch ines 10 i. 12, 1 6 ,2 1 ,3 5  
iii .1 5 ,2 2 , 30, 3 2 ,3 9 , 47
A n d o cid es 4 i.85, 87, 87, 96-8
D em osthenes 94 xviii.120
xx. 27 , 92, 95, 96, 97, 127, 128, 153
x x i. 8, 10, 47, 94, 113
xxiii. 22, 28, 37, 44 , 51, 53, 60, 62 , 82 , 86, 87





xxxiv . 37, 42
xxxv. 51
xxxvi. 24 , 26, 62




x lii.16 , 23
xliii. 16, 51, 54 , 57-8 , 6 2 ,7 1 ,7 5  
x liv .14
xlvi.8 , 10, 10, 14, 1 8 ,2 0 , 22, 24, 26
xlvii.24 , 73, 77
x lv iii.l 1, 30
lii.19
liv.24
lv ii.3 1 ,3 2
lviii.5 , 11, 1 4 ,2 1 ,2 1 ,4 9 ,  51 
lix .16, 52, 87
H yperides 1 iii.33
Isaeus 15 ii .  16
iii. 38, 42, 53
v i. 8, 48
vii. 21 , 22, 22
viii. 34
x .  10
x i .  1 ,4 , 1 1 ,2 2
L ycurgus 1 i. 129
L ysias 10 i.28, 3 0 ,3 1
ix . 8
x .  14, 15, 16 
xiv.5, 8, 47
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Table 7.1. Appeals for Pity in Athenian Courts
1 A ntiphon  v .73 Public
defendant
•  £u ö s  To t s  ö t i  eA er|0nvai ü<}>’ üpw v ä ^ iö s  sipi 
päAAov n öiKnv ö o u v a i-  öiKpv psv  y ä p  eiKÖs 
s o n  ö iö ö v a i t o ü s  äöiKOÜvTas, eAeeTo0ai ö s
TOÜ9 äÖlKWS KlVÖUVeÜOVTaS
2 A n d o c id es i.67 Public
defendant
•  Trjs psv  Tuxn? fi e x p n o a p n v  öiK aiw s ä v  ü n ö  
nävTwv eXenÖeinv
3 A n d o c id es  i. 148 -4 9 P ublic
defendant
•  Tiva y a p  Kai ä v a ß i ß ä a o p a i  ö s n o ö p sv o v  ü n s p  
spauTOÜ; t ö v  n a T s p a ;  äAAä t e O v h k e v . äAAä 
TOÜ9 ä ö sA ^ o ü s ; äAA’ o ü k  sia i. äAAä t o ü s  
n a iö a s ;  äAA’ oünu) \s\evr\vroL\. ü p s f t  t o i v u v  
Kai ä v ri rraTpö? sp o i Kai c x v t i  äösAtfcwv Kai 
ä v r i n a iö w v  y£V£ö0£- ste ü p ä s  KaTa<])£ÜYW Kai 
ävnßoA w  Kai i k e t s ü w  üpsT? p£ n a p ’ üpw v 
aÜTWv a im a ä p e v o i  a w a a T s
4 L y sias iii.48 Private
defendant?
•  w o t e  öiKaicüs ä v  ixj)’ üpw v Kai ü n ö  t w v  äAAwv 
£A£ri0eiriv
5 L ysias iv .2 0 Private
defendant?
•  npö<3 oüv  n a iö w v  Kai yuvaiK w v Kai 0sw v  t w v  
T Ö Ö £  T Ö  XWpiOV 8 X Ö V T C 0 V  IKETSÜW Üpä<3 Kai 
ävnßoA w , sA sqaaTE p£, Kai pf| nw piiöryrs Eni
TOÜTCi) VeVÖpEVOV
6 L y sias v ii.41 Public
defendant
•  nävTtov y ä p  ä0AiwTaTO9 ä v  yevoipriv, si ^ i iy a ?  
äöiK w s K aT ao T fiao p ai, ä n a i s  p sv  wv Kai 
pövos, Epfipou ö£ t o ü  o Tk o u  Y evopsvou, 
pryrpös ö s  nävT w v e v ö s o ü s  [o ü o n s], n a T p iö o s  
ÖEToiaÜT'rys s n ’ a ia x iö T a is  c n £ p r |0 d 9  a i n a i s
7 L ysias x v iii. 1 Public
defendant
•  oToi T i v E s  ö v t e ?  noATiai Kai aÜToi Kai wv 
n p o o r i K O V T E S  äö iK o u p sv o i ä^ io ü p E v  sAssTaOai 
ü<$>' üpw v Kai t G)v  ötK aiw v t u y x ö v e i v
8 L ysias x ix .3 3 Public
defendant
• nw9 ä v  oüv  e Te v  ä v 0 p w n o i ä0AiwT£poi, f j  d  Tä 
o4>£T£p’ aÜTCüV änoAwASKÖTE9 ÖOKOIEV 
t ö k e i v w v  sxeiv; ö  Ö E  nävT tüv ösivÖTaTov, Tr)v 
äösA önv  ü n o ö £ ^ a o 0 a i  n a iö i a  s x o u a a v  noAAä, 
Kai TaÜTa Tpdj)siv, p q ö ’ aÜTOÜ9 e x o v t o s  
pnöEV, s ä v  üps?9 Tä ö v t ’ ä4>EArio0£
9 L y sias x ix .5 3 Public
defendant
•  si oüv öoKoOpsv siKÖTa Asyeiv Kai iK av ä  
T E K p fp a  n a p £ x e ö 0 a i ,  w äv ö p £ 9  ö iK acrra i, 
n ä o n  TExvn Kai p n x a v fi sA sn aaT s
10 L ysias x x .1 5 Public
defendant
•  Kai oü  cj)0ovd)v TOÜTOI9 Asyw, äAA’ n p ä s  sA sw v 
oi psv  y ä p  ÖOKOÜVTE9 ö ö i k e Tv  sExpripsvoi sioiv 
ü n ö  t w v  üpTv n p o 0 ü p w v  sv  t ö i 9  n p ä y p a o i  
yevopsvw v, oi ö ’ nöiKriKÖTES E K npiäpsvoi TOÜ9 
KaTriYÖpous o ü ö ’ s ö o ^ a v  ö ö i k e Tv . nw9 [äv ] 
oüv o ü k  ä v  ÖEivä n ä a x o ip s v ;
11 L ysias x x .3 4 -3 6 Public
defendant
•  ö s ö p £ 0 a  oüv  üpw v n p ö s  t w v  ü napxövT w v  
ä y a ü w v  SKäcnw, ö t w  p sv  sia iv  üsTs, t o ü t w v  
e v e k o  sA srjoai, öcm s [ö ’] qpiv  nAiKiwTrvs 
TUYXOtvEi n TW n aT p i, E A snaavT a? 
ä n o iy n Ö io a a 0 a i
12 L ysias x x i.1 5 Public
defendant




13 L y sia s x x i.2 5 Public
defendant
•  a^ itb , £v to Ts KIVÖÜVOI9 s p o ü  TOiaÜTnv n e p i  
ü p w v  y v w p n v  e x o v ro s ,  u p a s  vuvi ev  Tip 
6 a p p a A e u )  ö v T a s  s p s  K ai t o ü 9 n a T ö a s  t o u t o u s  
n s p i  noAAoü n o i f |a a a 0 a i ,  n y o u p e v o u s  r p v  p e v  
Ö8IVÖV üpTv ö e  a i o x p ö v  e iv a i ,  ei 
ä v a y K a o 0 r |a ö p s 0 a  s n i  T o ia i r r a i s  a m a i s  
ä n p o i  y ev £ O 0 a i, n aT£p0£VT£9 twv  
ü n ap x ö v T c o v  n£vr|TS9 d v a i  K ai noAAwv s v ö s eT9 
ÖVTE9 n s p n s v a i ,  c x v a ^ ia  p s v  n p tbv  aÜ Tw v 
n£nov0Ö T £9, c x v ä ^ ia  ö e  tw v  £i9 ü p ä 9  
ü n n p Y P ev w v
14 L y sia s x x iv .6 -7 Public
defendant
•  s p o i  y a p  ö  p s v  n a T r ip  K aT sX m sv o ü ö s v ,  Tr)v ö e  
p rjT E pa T E X E U T naaaav  n s n a u p a i  Tp£(|)wv 
TpiTov ET09 t o u t i, naTÖ£9 ö s  po i o ü n w  Eioiv of 
p £  0 £ p a n £ u a o u a i .  T sxvrjv  ö e  k e k t h p o i ß p a x e a  
ö u v a p s v n v  w ^ eXeTv , q v  aÜTÖ9 p s v  n ö n  
X aX snw 9 s p y a ^ o p a i ,  tö v  ö ia ö s ^ ö p s v o v  ö ’ 
aÜTf]v o ü n w  ö ü v a p a i  K T fio a a 0 a i. n p ö a o ö o 9  ö s  
p o i o ü k  EOTiv äXXri nX qv TaÜTr|9, nv  ä v  
ä(j)£A £a0£ p s ,  K iv ö u v E Ü aa ip ’ ä v  ü n ö  tq  
ö u a x e p e c rrä T r i  y e v s a ü a i  t ü x h - PH to iv u v , 
s n s iö n  Y£ ecrriv, w ßouA n, o w o a i  p s  ö iK aiw 9, 
än o X so riT e  äöiKW 9- p n ö s  ä  v sw T sp w  K ai 
päXXOV EppwpEVW ÖVTI EÖOTE, npEOßÜTEpOV 
K ai äo0£(})£O T£pov y iy v o p sv o v  ä(J)sAr|O0£- p n ö s  
npÖ T E pov K ai n s p i  t o ü 9 o ü ö e v  sx o v T a9  k o k ö v  
EXEn p ovE crraT o i ö o k o Gv t e9 s lv a i  vuvi ö i ä  
TOÜTOV TOÜ9 K ai TO?9 £X0pO?9 eAs IVOÜ9 ÖVT09 
ä y p iw 9  ä n o Ö £ ^ n o 0 £ -  p q ö ’ s p s  ToA pf|oavT £9 
ä ö iK f jo a i  K ai t o Ü9 äX X ou9 t o Ü9 ö p o iw 9  s p o i 
öiaK £ip£V 0U 9 ä 0 u p n o a i  n o in o ir r s
15 L ysias x x iv .2 3 Public
defendant
•  nw 9  o ü v  o ü k  ä v  ö£iX aiÖ TaT09 s iq v , si tw v  p s v  
KaXXioTwv K ai pEyicrrw v ö i ä  Tfjv o u p 4 )O p ä v  
an £ O T £ p n p e v o 9  sTnv, ä  ö ’ n nöXi9 s ö w k e  
n p o v o n 0 e T o a  tw v  o ü t w 9 ö iaK E ipsvw v , ö i ä  töv  
KaT H Y opov ä n a ip £ 0 s i n v ;  p q ö a p w 9 , w ßouA f|, 
T aü T n  0 n a S e  Tfiv w n n o v
16 L ysias x x x ii .1 9 Private
prosecutor
•  äE;iw t o iv u v , ävöp£9 ö iK a c rra i, tw  X oyiöpw  
n p o o E x e iv  tö v  v o ü v , i v a  t o ü 9 p sv  vsavioK O U 9 
ö iä  to  PEYE0O9 tw v  aupcfeopw v sX srianTE, 
t o ü t o v  ö ’ ä n a o i  to ?9 n o X rra i9  ä fy o v  ö p y n 's  
n v n a a o 0 £
17 Isocrates x v i.4 5 -4 8 Private
defendant
•  ö s o p a i  ö ’ o ü v  ü p w v  ß o n 0 n o a i  poi K ai pf) 
n s p i iö s iv  ü n ö  tw v  s x 0 p w v  ü ß p io 0 s v T a  p r jö s  
Tf)9 n a T p iö o 9  a r£ p r |0 e v T a  p n ö ’ sn i T o iaÜ T ai9  
T Ü xai9 nE p iß X srrro v  y e v ö p s v o v . ö iK aiw 9  ö ’ ä v  
Ü4)’ ü p w v  e ^ aÜTWv tw v  E pyw v EXsriÜEinv, si K ai 
tw  Xöyw T u y x av w  p n  ö u v ä p s v o 9  s n i t o G0 ’ 
ü p ä 9  ä y e iv , s in s p  XPH t o ü t o u 9 eXeeTv , t o ü 9 
äöiKW 9 p s v  K ivöuv£Ü ovT a9, n s p i  ÖE TWV 
psYiOTWv äY w v i^o p £ v o u 9 , ä v a ^ iw 9  ö ’ aÜ T w v 
K ai tw v  n p o y ö v w v  n p a i r o v T a 9 ,  nXsicjTWV ö e  
XPHM«tw v  ä n £ O T £ p n p e v o u 9  K ai pe y iö t h  
PETa ß o X n  to ü  ß io u  K sx p n p e v o u s
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•  n e v r ] T a s  y e v o p e v o u s  eXeeTv o ü  t o ü s
än o X w X eK Ö T as Tf)v o ü o i a v  äX X ä  t o ü s  e is  u p a s  
äv n X o jK Ö T a? . w v  e ls  e y w  4 ) a v f |a o p a i  
y e y e v r ip e v o s ,  5 s  n av T o o v  d v  eTriv 
öuCTTUxecrraTOs, e i n o X X a  tujv  e p a i n r o ü  
ö e ö a n a v r i p e v o s  e is  T fjv nö X iv  e r r a  ö ö ^ a i p i  t o Ts 
äX X o T p io is  e n iß o u X e ü e iv  K a i n e p i  p n ö e v ö s  
n o ie T a B a i T ä s  n a p ’ üpTv ö i a ß o X ä s ,  ö s  o ü  p ö v o v  
Tr)v o ü o i a v  äX X ä  K a i t q v  ip u x n v  T q v  e p a i r r o ü  
n e p i  e X ä n r o v o s  4 > a iv o p a i  n o i o ü p e v o s  t o ü  n a p ’ 
üp?v  eü ö o K ip eT v
19 Isaeus ii .4 4 -4 5 Private
defendant
•  eyd) o ü v  ö e o p a i  ü p w v  n a v T w v , co ä v ö p e s ,  K a i 
cxvTißoXd) K a i iK eT euw  e X e q a a i  p e  K a i 
d n o iy n < t ) i a a a 0 a i  t o ü  p d p T U p o s  t o u t o u i
2 0 D em osth en es
x x v ii.5 7
Private
prosecutor
•  K a i Tis d v  n iO T e ü o e ie v ; o ü k  e o n  T aÜ T ’, d) 
d v ö p e s  ö iK a o T a i ,  o ü k  e a n v ,  dX X d T ä  p e v  
X p f |p a 0 ’, ö a a  K aT eX m ev  ö  n a T f iP ,  n d v T a  
t o ü t o is  n a p e ö c o K e v ,  o ü t o s  ö \  Tv ’ h t t o v  eXeriBd) 
n a p ’ üpTv, t o ü t o is  t o Ts  X ö y o is  x p n o e T a i
21 D em osth en es
x x v ii.6 6 -6 9
Private
prosecutor
•  ö e o p a i  o ü v  ü p to v , w  d v ö p e s  Ö iK a o T a i, K a i 
iK eTeüu) K a i d v riß o X co , p v r |o 0 e v T a s  K a i tgüv 
v ö p w v  K a i tgov ö p K w v , o ü s  ö p o a a v T e s  
ö iK d ^ eT e , ß o r |0 n o a i  n p i v T d  ö k a i a ,  K a i p q  
n e p i  n X e io v o s  T d s  t o ü t o u  ö e q a e i s  q  T d s  
q p e T e p a s  n o i n o a o 0 a i .  ö iK a io i  ö ’ c o t ’ eXeeTv o ü  
t o ü s  ä ö iK O u s  tcov a v 0 p a m a ) v ,  äX X ä  t o ü s  n a p d  
X ö y o v  ö u C T T u x o ü v T as, o ü ö e  t o ü s  w p w s  oütgos 
TdXXÖTpi’ d n o o T e p o ü v T a s ,  äX X ’ q p d s  t o ü s  
n o X ü v  x p ö v o v  ü)v ö  n a T q p  qpTv K aT eX m e 
o r e p o p e v o u s  K a i n p ö s  ü n ö  toütcuv  
ü ß p i^ o p e v o u s  K a i v ü v  n e p i  d T ip ia s  
K iv ö u v e ü o v T a s
2 2 D em osth en es  
x x v iii. 18-22
Private
prosecutor
•  Tis ö ’ o ü k  d v  üpci)v TOÜTcp p e v  4 > 0 o v q o e ie  
ö iK a ico s , q p d s  ö ’ e X e q o e ie v
•  p q ö a p w s ,  u) d v ö p e s  Ö iK a o T a i, y e v q o 0 ’ qpTv 
t o o o ü t w v  a n i o i  K a K Ö v  p q ö e T q v  p r y r e p a  K d p e  
K a i T qv  ä ö e X ( |)q v  ä v ö f y a  n a 0 ö v T a s  n e p i iö q T e
•  ß o q 0 q a a T ’ o ü v  qpTv, ß o q 0 q o a T e ,  r a i  t q ”  
ö iK a io u  K a i ü p w v  aÜ T W v e v e K a  K a i qpciov K a i 
t o ü  n a T p ö s  t o ü  T e T e X e in q k ö t o s . o c o o a T ’, 
e X e q a a T e , e n e iö q  p ’ o Üt o i o u y y ev e T s  ö v t c s  o ü k  
q X e q a a v .  e is  ü p d s  K a T a n e ^ e ü y a p e v .  iK eT eüm , 
dvT ißoX u) n p ö s  n a iö c ü v ,  n p ö s  y u v a iK w v , n p ö s  
t ü )v  övTcov d y a 0 ü ) v  üpTv.
23 D em osth en es




•  Tv’ e ü n o p o s  e lv a i  ö o k w v  p q ö e v ö s  t ü x w  n a p ’ 
üpcov  e X e o u , t o ü t o is  x p q T a i  t o Ts X ö y o is
2 4 D em osth en es




•  o ü k o u v  d ^ io v ,  u) d v ö p e s  ’ A 0 r)v aT o i, t ö v  
t o io ü t o v  d v ö p a  n p o e a 0 a i  t o ü t w , o ü ö e  
T nv iK aÜ T ’ eXeeTv ö t ’ o ü ö e v  e c n a i  TOUTwi n X e o v , 
dX X d v ü v  ÖTe K Ü pioi K a 0 e o T a T e  o t u o a r  o ü  y d p  
e y w y ’ ö p w  K a ip ö v ,  e v  to tivi pd X X o v  d v  
ß o q 0 q o e i e T i s  aÜ T to .
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25 D em o sth en es
x li ii .8 3 -8 4
D iad ikasia •  vopi^eTe öq  t ö v  n a T ö a  t o u t o v i , w  ä v ö p e s  
ö iK acrra i, iKCTqpiav üpiv  npoK eio 0 a i ü n e p  t w v  
a n o  t o ü  ' Ayviou, Kai iKeTeüeiv aÜT0Ü9 u p a s  
t o u 9  ö iK aoT äe, onw 9 pq  e£;epqpw 0qoeTai 
a ö rw v  ö  o k o 9  ü n ö  t w v  piapwvTOÜTWv Oqpiwv
• ö e o p a i ö e  Kai üvwv, w ä v ö p e s  öiK acrrai, Kai 
iKeieüü) Kai äv n ß o X w , pq  nepiiöqTe piyre t ö v  
n aT ö a  t o u t o v i  üßpiaO evT a ü n ö  t o ü t w v , pqTe 
TOÜ8 n p o y o v o u s  t o Ü 9  t o u t o u i  e n  päXXov 
K aT a(j)povoupevou5 q vüv K aTanecj)pövqvTai, 
e a v  ö ia n p a ^ w v T a i o u t o i  ä  ßoüX ovTar äXXä 
t o Ts  t s  v ö p o is  ßoqO erre Kai t w v  
TeTeXetnqKÖTWv enipeXe?o0e, önw9 pf) 
e£epqpw 0fi aÜTWV ö  o Tk o 9
2 6 D em o sth en es lv ii.3 Private
defendant
•  eyw y ö p  oTpai öeTv ü p ä 9  t o ?9 pev
e^eX8YXopsvoi9 ^evoi9 o ü a iv  xaX enaive iv , ei 
piyre neiöavT 89 pfpre öeq0evTe9 üpw v X a 0 p p  
Kai ß ip  twv üpsT epw v lepw v Kai koivwv
P8T8IX0V, TO?9 Ö’ flTUXnKÖai Kai Ö8IKVÜOUÖI
noX rra9 övTa9 aÜTOÜ9 ß oq0eiv  Kai ow^eiv, 
8V0ÜpOUpeVOU9 ÖTI näVTGOV oiKTpÖTOTOV 
na0O 9 qpiv ä v  a u p ß a in  t o ?9  qöiKqpevoi9, ei 
t w v  X apßavövT w v ö k q v  ö v t 8 9  ä v  öiKaiw9 p e 0 ’ 
üpw v, ev t o ?9 ö iö o ü a i y e v o ip e 0 a  Kai 
o u v aö iK q 0 e iq p ev  ö iä  Tqv t o ü  n p ä y p a T o e  
öpyqv .




• eyw Öe t o ü  pev  n a T p ö 9  öp(})avÖ9 KaTeXei([)0qv, 
Tqv öe  p qT ep’ iKeTeüw Ü pä9 Kai ävnßoX w  ö iä  
t o ü t o v  t ö v  ä y w v ’ ä n ö ö o T e  poi 0 ä ip a i ei9 t ö  
n a T p w a  p v q p a T a  Kai pq  p e  KwXüariTe, p q ö e  
änoX iv no iqoqT e, p q ö e  t w v  oiKeiwv 
änoG T epqaqT e t o g o ü t w v  ö v t w v  t ö  nXq0o9, Kai 
öX w9 änoX eaqT e. npÖ Tepov y ö p  q npoXmeTv 
TOÜTOU9, ei pq  öuvaTÖ v ü n ’ aÜTWV eTq 
o w 0 q v a i, än o K T e iv a ip ’ ä v  e p a in ö v , w o t’ evT q 
naT p iö i Y’ ü n ö  t o ü t w v  Ta<J)qvai.
2 8 D em osth en es
lv iii .6 9 -7 0
Public
p -osecu tor
•  IV  oüv , ei p q ö ev  äXXo, TaÜTqv y ’ exw pev  
n a p a q ju x q v , t ö  Kai t o ü t o v  ö p ä v  q a u x ia v  
ä y o v T a , ß o q 0 q o a o 0 ’ qpTv, eXeqoaTeTOÜ9 
ü n e p  Tqe n aT p iö 0 9  qpw v TeTeXeirrqKÖTae, 
ä v a y K ä o a T ’ aÜTÖv ü n e p  aÜTq9 Tq9 evöei^ew 9 
änoXoyeToOai, Kai t o i o ü t o i  y e v e a 0 ’ aÜTW 
öiK aoT ai t w v  Xeyopevwv, oIo9 o u t o 9  e y e v e o 0 ’ 
qpw v K aT qyopoe, Ö9 e ^ a n a T q o a 9  Toüe 
ö iK acrrä9  o ü k  q0eX qoe n p q o a a 0 a i  peTpiou 
TIVÖ9 TW n aT p i, nöXX’ e p o ü  öeq0evTO9 Kai 
t o ü t o v  iKeTeüoavT09 npÖ9 t w v  yoväTw v, äXX’ 
w o n e p  Tqv nöXiv npoöeöw K Ö n t w  naT p i öeK a 
TaXävTwv e n p q o aav T O . ö e ö p e 0 ’ oüv  üpw v Kai 
ävT ißoX oüpev, t ö  ö iK a ia  ipq4)ioao0e.
2 9 H yperides iii.3 6 Public
defendant
•  K[ai eyw, w ä v ö p e 9  ö i]K aoT ai, ö e o p a i üpw v 
[Kai ävnßoX w  eX eqoai] pe, eKeTvo 
O K 8i|jape[vou8, ö t i  npooqK ei evTa]ÜTq Tq 
öiKq................. iv eXeeTv o ü  t ö v  (J)..............
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Aeschines ii. 179-82 Public
defendant
KÖpoi ouvöenoöpevoi napeioiv uptuv naifip  
pev, ou Tex? Tou Ynpws eXniöas pn a(J)eXna0e, 
cxöeXnoi öe, oT öia^UYevTes epoü £nv oük av 
npoeXoivTO, Knöecrrai öe Kai Tami tcx piKpä 
naiöia Kai toüs pev kivöüvous ounco auvievTa, 
eXeivä öe, ei n  aupßnaeTai npTv na0eTv. ünep 
wv eY(i) öeopai Kai iKeieua) noXXnv npövoiav 
noinaaaBai, Kai pf) toTs exBpois airroüs pnö’ 
ävävöpco Kai YUvaiKeitp Tf]v öpYnv ävSpchnto 
napaöouvai.
napaKaXu) öe Kai iKeTeuw awaai pe npwTOv 
pev toüs 0eoüs, öeüiepov ö’ üpäs toüs Tfjs 
Hjn4)ou Kupious, oTs eyu) npös eKaoTOv twv 
KairiYOpnpevcüv eis pvnpqv elvai Tr)v epqv 
cmoXeXÖYniJai, Kai öeopai owaai pe Kai pr) tĉ  
XoyoYPäcfrcp Kai iKÜBn napaöoüvai_______ __
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Table 7.2. Relative proportions of appeals for pity, legal and nonlegal argument.
A ntiphon  v.73 96 1-96 — 1%
A ndocides i.67, 148-49 150 1-91, 103-23, 
132-40
92-102 , 124-31, 
141-50
2%
Lysias iii.48 48 1 -4 3 ,4 5 ,4 8 44-47 2%
L ysias iv.20 20  (beg inn ing  
o f  speech lost)
1-18, 20 19 —
L ysias v ii .4 1 43 1-30, 34-43 3 0 -3 3 ,4 1 2%
L ysias xviii. 1 27  (beg inn ing  
o f  speech lost)
15-19 1-14, 20-27 —
L ysias x ix .33 , 53 64 1-54 2 ,9 -1 0 , 14-17, 
19, 55-64
3%
L ysias xx .15, 34-36 36 1-5, 7-22, 27 2, 5-6, 22-26, 
28-36
11%
L ysias xxi.15 , 25 25 (beg inn ing  
o f  speech  lost)
— 25 —
Lysias xxiv .6-7 , 23 27 1-23, 26-27 24-25 11%
L ysias xxxii.19 29 (end o f  
speech lost)
29 — —
Isocrates xvi.45-48 50 (beg inn ing  
o f  speech lost)
1-4 (5-24), 25-50 —
Isocrates xv iii.62-65 68 1-47, 68 16, 47-68 6%
Isaeus ii.44-45 47 1-34, 38-47 35-37, 42 4%
D em osthenes xxvii.57 , 
66-69
69 1-69 — 7%
D em osthenes xxviii.18- 
22
24 1-23 22, 24 8%
D em osthenes xxix.49 60 1-60 4 2%
D em osthenes xxxvi.59 62 1 -3 5 ,6 0 -6 2 (36-42), 43-59 2%
D em osthenes x liii.83-84 84 1-67, 73-84 68-72 2%
D em osthenes lvii.3, 70 70 1 -5 7 ,6 1 -6 2 , 66- 
70
58-66 3%
D em osthenes Iviii.69-70 70 1-26, 3 6 -6 5 ,6 8 -  
70
27-35, 66-69 3%
H yperides iii.36 36 (B eginning  
and end lost)
1-28 3, 29-36 —
A eschines ii. 179-82 184 1 -2 1 ,2 4 -3 3 , 36- 
39 , 44-107 , 113- 
45 , 153-65, 171- 
78 , 183-84
22-23, 34-35, 
4 0 - 5 C, 
62, 76, 79, 88, 
9 3 ,9 9 , 108-12, 
113, 121, 146- 




Table 7.3. Appeals against Pity in Athenian Forensic Oratory
1 A ntiphon i.2 6 -2 7 Private
prosecutor?
•  nti)9 o u v  T a in rp v  eXeeTv a fy o v  ecrnv  p a i ö o ü s  
TUYxaveiv n a p ’ ü p w v  p  äX A ou t o u , ryri9 aC rrp 
OÜK n^icoaev e A e p a a i tö v  e a u T p 9  ä v ö p a ,  aXA’ 
äv o ö io )9  K ai a i o x p w s  ä m n X e a e v ; oütü) ö e  toi 
Ka i  eXeeTv en i toT9 cxK ouoioi? n a B p p a o i  päX X ov 
n p o o p K e i p toTs eK O uoiois K ai £ k n p o v o ia s  
ä ö iK p p a a i  K ai a p a p T p p a a i .
2 L ysias v i.3 Public
prosecutor
•  ä ö ü v a T O v  ö e  K ai üpTv e o n ,  n e p i  t o io ü t o u  
n p ä Y p a T 0 9  4>epouai Tpv tpptjxDV, p K O TeX epaai 
p K a T a x a p ia a a O a i  ’ Av ö o k iö p , en iO T apevo i9  
öti ev ap Y w ? to) 9e(i) toutoj TipcnpeTrov t o ü s  
äö iK O uvT as
3 L ysias v i.5 5 Public
prosecutor
•  ä v n ß o A p a e i  K ai k e T e u a e i  ü p ä 9 -  p p  eA eerre . o ü  
Y ä p  oi ö iK aiw s ä n o 0 v p a K o v T £ 9  a XX’ o i äö iK w s 
ä f to i  e ia iv  eXeeToBai
4 L ysias x .2 6 Private
prosecutor
•  p p  Toivuv Ö K O u aav T a  [t s ] G e ö p v p a io v  KaKO)9 
T ä  n p o o p K O v ra  eA eerre, K ai ü ß p i^ o v n  K ai 
XeYOVTi n a p ä  t o ü s  v ö p o u 9  auYYVcnppv ex£Te
5 L ysias x ii.7 9 -8 0 Public
prosecutor
•  pK£i ö ’ üpTv £Ke?vo9 ö  K a ip ö s , ev  w öeT 
auY Y vw ppv K ai eX eov p p  e lv a i  e v ia T s  
ü p eT £ p a i9  Yvo)vai9, äX X ä n a p ä  
’ E p a T o o 0 e v o u 9  K ai tw v  tolitou  auvapxövT W V  
öiK pv XaßeTv
6 L ysias x iii.3 3 Public
prosecutor
•  0)9 toivuv  ä n ä v T ü w  toiv k o k w v  alT i09 Tp nöXei 
£Y£V£TO K ai o ü ö ’ Ü4)’ £VÖ9 aÜTÖv n p o o p K e i 
eXeeTaBai, eyü) o lp a i  üpTv ev  K£(J)aXaioi9 
ä n o ö e i^ e iv
7 L ysias x iii.4 4 Public
prosecutor
•  ä v ic h p a i p e v  o u v  üno p ip v p o K cn v  T ä9
Y £Y evppeva9 a u p c j)0 p ä 9  Tp nöX ei, äv ä Y K p  ö ’ 
eoTiv, o) ä v ö p e 9  ö iK acjT ai, ev  t ä  n a p o v r i  
K aip tp , Yv’ eiö rp re  0)9 o c jjö ö p a  üpTv eXeeTv 
n p o o p K e i ’ Ay ö p o t o v
8 L ysias x iv .4 0 Public
prosecutor
•  w crre v ü v  XPP P Y P o a p e v o u 9  naT piK Ö v ex B p ö v  
TOUTOv e iv a i Tp nöX ei K a T a ij jp ^ io a o B a i ,  K ai 
pryre eX eov pryre ouYYVtbppv ppT e x ä p iv  
p p ö e p ia v  n e p i nX eiovo9 n o ip o a o B a i  tcüv vöpo )v  
t ö v  K eipevü)v K ai t ö v  öpK tnv oÜ9 w p ö o a T e
9  _ i xv 9 Public
prosecutor
•  eT TO) ö o k cT p ey a A p  p ^ p p ia  e lv a i  K ai A fcv 
ia x u p 0 9  ö  v ö p o 9 , p e p v p o B a i  XPP öti oü  
v o p o 0 e T p o o \rre 9  n e p i aÜ TÖ v pK£T£, äX X ä K aT ä  
TOÜ9 K£ipeVOU9 VÖp09 IJjp^lOÜpeVOI, OÜÖe TOÜ9 
äöiK O Ü vT ae eX epoovT£9, äX X ä noX ü päX X ov 
aÜToT9 ö p Y io ü p ev o i K ai öXp Tp nöXei 
ß o p 0 p o a v T £ 9
10 L ysias x x ii.2 1 Public
prosecutor
•  K ai p ev  ö p  o ü ö ’ e ä v  ä v n ß o A ö a iv  ü p ä 9  K ai 
iK£T£Üü)ai, ö iK aio)9 ä v  aÜTOÜ9 e A e p o a rre , äX X ä 
päX X ov t ö v  Te n o A rrö v  oT ö iä  Tpv toütcov 
n o v p p ia v  ä n e 0 v p o K o v
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11 L ysias x x v ii .1 2 -1 3 Public
prosecutor?
•  t o  ö e  n d v T w v  ü n e p 4 )ü e c rra T O V , ö n  e v  p e v  t o Ts 
iö io i9  [o i] ä ö iK O Ü p e v o i ö a K p ü o u o i  K a i eA eivo i 
e ia iv , e v  ö e  t o Ts  ö q p o a i o i9  o i p e v  d ö iK O Ü v ie s  
eA eivoi, ü p e?9  ö ’ o i  ä ö iK O Ü p e v o i eA eeT ie. K a i v ü v  
Tocos n o i n o o u o i v  ä n e p  K a i n p o i e p o v  q a a v  
e iB io p e v o i K a i ö n p ö T a i  K a i 4>iAoi, K Ä a io v ie s  
e ^ a u e T o B a i  a u T o ü s  n a p ’ ü p tb v . ey w  ö* oütcü9 
cx^ia) y e v e o B a i-  e i p e v  cxöiKeTv t o u t o u s  p q ö e v  
v o p iü p u a iv ,  ä n o ö e i ^ a v T a ?  ci)9 ly e iiö q  T ä  
K a T riY O p n p e v a , o ü tco s  n e iB e iv  ü p ä 9  
ä n o ip q c J ) ia a a 0 a i -  e i ö e  v o p io a v T e ?  äö iK eT v  
a iT n a o v T a i ,  ö q A o v  ö n  t o ?9 d ö iK O Ü aiv  
e ü v o ü a r e p o i  e ia iv  q  u p T v io T ?  ä ö iK o ü p e v o i? ,  
WOT’ o ü  x d p iT O S  a ^ io i  TüxeTv äA A ä n p c u p i a ? ,  
ö n Ö T a v  üpeTe ö ü v q a B e
12 L ysias x x v ii i . l  1-14 Public
prosecutor
•  äA A ä n a p ä ö e i y p a  n ä a i v  ä v 0 p c ü n o i9  n o i f i a a i  
K a i p iy re  K e p ö o s  p n i e  eA eo v  p f |T ’ äA A o p n ö f jv  
n e p i  n A e io v o s  n o i q a a a B a i  T n? toütcüv  n p c ü p i a e
13 L ysias x x ix .8 Public
prosecutor
•  eYW ö ’ ü p ä e  ä ^ iw  üpTv aÜTO?9 ß o q B q a a i ,  K a i 
n o A ü  p äA A o v  t o Ü9 ä ö iK O Ü v T a s  n p c o p e T a B a i q  
TOÜ9 T ä  T n? n ö A e w e  e x o v T a s  eA e iv o u s  n v e T a B a i





•  o ip a i  ö ’ aÜ T Ö v ö ö u p e T a B a i  T qv  n a p o ü a a v  
n e v i a v  K a i T q v  Y e y e v q p e v q v  aÜTCp o u p c j io p ä v ,  
K a i A e^eiv  cü9 ö e i v ä  K a i a x e T A ia  n e i a e T a i ,  ei 
Tw v x p q p äT C ü v , u)v e n i  Tq9 ö A iY a p x ia e  
ä ^ n p e B n ,  toü tcü v  e v  ö q p o K p a n t ?  T qv  
e n c ü ß e A ia v  64>A qaei, K a i e i t ö t c  p e v  ö i ä  T q v  
o ü o i a v  T q v  aÜTOÜ ^ u y e iv  q v a Y K ä a ö q ,  v u v i  ö ’ 
e v  u) x p ö v tü  n p o a q K e v  aÜ T Ö v ö iK q v  A aßeT v, 
ä n p o 9  Y e v q o e T a i.
•  n p ö 9  p e v  o ü v  t o ü 9 ö ö u p p o ü e ,  ö ti n p o o f jK e i  
ßoqB eTv ü p ä 9 ,  o ü x  o ln v e e  ä v  ö u c r ru x e c rrä T O u e  
ö4>ä9 aÜTOÜ9 ä n o ö e i^ c ü o iv ,  äA A ’ o m v e 9  ä v  n e p i  
u)v ä v T C ü p ö aa v T O  ö iK a iÖ T e p a  AeYOVTee 
(J)aiv(üVTai.
•  KaiTOi nu)9  o ü k  äA oY Ö v ec rriv  e v  toütcü  tcü 
kivöüvcü ^qTeTv aÜ T Ö v e A e o u  n a p ’ ü p co v  
TUYXÖveiv, o ü  K Ü pioe aÜ TÖ 9 e a n ,  K a i ei9  ö v  
aÜTÖ9 aÜ T Ö v K a S ic r rq a i ,  K a i ö v  e n  K a i v ü v  
e i^ecm v aÜ T Ö  p q  K iv ö u v e ü e iv
•  p q ö ’ (ü 9 aÜ TÖ 9 ö e i v ä  n e n o v B e v  ä n o c j) a iv e iv ,  
äA A ’ (ü 9 eY(i) n e n o i q K a  e^ eA ey x e iv , n a p ’ o ü n e p  
ä^ io T T än o A cü A Ö T a K o p iC e a B a i
15 Isaeus v .3 4 -3 5 Private
prosecutor
•  A iK aiO Y ev q v  Y ä p ,  d) ä v ö p e e ,  o ü t ’ eAeeTv e c r re  
ö iK a io i [d)9] K aK W 9 n p äT T O V T a K ai n e v ö p e v o v ,  
o u t ’ e ü  no ieT v  d)9 äY ocB öv  n  e ip Y a a p e v o v  T q v  
n ö A iv  o ü ö e T e p a  Y ä p  aÜ T to  toütcüv  ü n ä p x e i ,  
cü9 eY(ü äno cJ)av (jü , w  ä v ö p e 9
16 Isaeus x .2 2 D iadikasia •  n e p i  ö e  t o ü  T e B v e u rro e  A e ^ o u a iv , eA e o ü v T ee  cü9 
ä v q p  (ü v  ä Y a 0 Ö 9  e v  t u ) n o A e p w  T eB vqK e, K a i 
ö ti o ü  ö iK a iö v  e a n  T ä 9  e K e iv o u  ö ia B q K a e  
ä K Ü p o u 9  K a B ic r r ä v a i
262
Table 7.3 (Cont.).
17 Isaeu s x i.3 8 Public
defendant
•  ßoüX opai öf) Kal n e p i toütwv eineTv eXni^ei 
y a p  ö iä  twv Xoywv epo i pev  n v a  4)0ovov 
y ev n aeaG ai n a p ’ ü pw v  nep i twv 
n p o sy ey ev n p ev w v  xPHüäTW v, toTs ö e  n a io iv  
eXeov, ä v  a n o p o i  n a p ’ üpTv e lva i ööEiwaiv
18 D em osth en es
x ix .2 8 1
Public
prosecutor
•  toütous pev  n a v T a s  tqv sk  twv vöpw v  öiKpv 
ü n eax n K ev a i, Kai pf|Te au yyvw pnv  pf)T’ eXeov 
piyre n a iö ia  KXaiovTa ö p w v u p a  twv 
eüepyeTw v pf|T’ äXXo p n ö e v  aÜTOÜs 
w4)eXriKevai' töv ö e  ’ A Tpopiyrou tou 
YpappaTiO TO ü Kal l"XauKO0eas tqs toüs 
Bia o o u s  a p v a y o ü a r is ,  oTs ö r e p a  Te0vr|Kev
ie p e ia , toutov üpeTs X aßövTes, töv twv 
toioütwv, töv o ü ö e  K a 0 ’ ev x p n o ip o v  Tfj noXei, 
o Cjk auTÖv, ou  n a T e p a ,  oük  äXXov o ü ö e v a  twv 
TOÜTOU, äcfcnoeTe;
19 D em o sth en es
x ix .2 8 3
Public
prosecutor
•  oük ä v a p v n o 0 n o e o 0 e  wv K aTnyopw v eXeyev 
T ip a p x o u , ws o ü ö e v  e a r ’ ö<J)eXos noX ew s ryns 
pf) v e u p a  eni toüs äöiKOÜvTas exsi, o ü ö e  
noXiTeias ev n au y y v w p n  Kai n a p a y y e X ia  twv 
vöpw v peTüpv io x ü o o u o iv , o ü ö ’ eXeeTv ü p ä s  
oÜTe Tf)v p riT epa  ö p ä v ,  öti, ei n p o f |o e o 0 e  Tä 
twv vöpw v Kai Trjs noX iTeias, o ü x  eü p q o eT e  
toüs ü p ä s  a u T o ü s  eX enaovT as
2 0 D em o sth en es
x ix .3 1 0
Public
prosecutor
•  äXX’ ü n e p  aÜTOü KXainoei tou  tö  T o iau T a  
nenpeoßeuKÖTOs, Kai Tä n a iö ia  Tows n a p ä ^ e i  
Kai ä v a ß iß ä T a i .  ÜpeTs ö ’ ev0upe?o0e, w ä v ö p e s  
ö iK acn a i, n p ö s  pev  T ä toütou  n a iö i a ,  öti 
noXXwv o u p p ä x w v  üpeTepw v Kai (})iXwv naTöes 
äXwvTai Kai rrrw xoi n ep iep x o v T a i ö e iv ä  
nenovBÖTes ö iä  toütov , oüs eXeeTv noXXw 
päXXov OpTv ä ^ io v  n toüs tou TOiaÜTa 
qöiKriKÖTOs Kai npoöÖTOu n a T p ö s , Kai öti toüs 
üpeT epous n a T ö a s  oütoi, “ Kai toüs eK yövois” 
n p o o y p a ip a v T e s  [eis] Tf)v eipnvrjv, Kai twv 
eXniöwv ä n e o T e p f iK a a r  n p ö s  ö e T ä  aÜTOü 
toütou ö ä K p u a , öti vüv  exsTe ävG pw nov , ös 
r *  ’ A''w a ö ia v  eKeXeuev eni toüs ü n e p  
(biXinnou n p ä m ro v T a s  n e p n e iv  toüs 
KaT n y o p n o o v T a s
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21 D em osth en es
x x i.9 9 -1 0 1
Public
prosecutor
•  Ti o u v  ü n ö A o in o v ; eX eq o a i v q  A ia - n a i ö i a  y a p  
n a p a c n q o e T a i  K ai K X aiqaei K ai t o ü t o i s  aÜTÖv 
e ^ a r rq o c T a i-  t o ü t o  A oinöv. aAA’ i'crre ö q n o u  
t o ü 0 \  ö t i  t o ü s  d ö iK w s t i  n a o x o w a s ,  ö  p q  
ö p u v q o o v T a i  (fcepeiv, eXeeTv n p o o q K e i, o ü  t o ü s  
tov n e n o iq K a a i  öe iv tov  öiK qv ö iö ö v r a s .  K ai t is  
d v  TaÜT’ eX eq o e iev  ö iK aiw s, ö p to v  T ä  t o ü ö c  
o ü k  eX eq0evT a  ü n ö  t o ü t o u
•  Tis o ü v  üßpi^oav n a ü a e T a i  K ai ö i’ ä  T aÜ T a noieT 
X p q p a T a  d 4 > a ip e 0 q o e T a i, ei t o ü t o v  rn a n e p  
ö e iv a  n ä a x o v T a  eXeqoeTC, ei ö e  t i s  n e v q s  
p q ö e v  qöiK qK w s T a ls  e a x d T a is  a u p n o p a T s  
ä ö iK w s ü n ö  t o ü t o u  nepinenT W K ev, t o ü t c o  ö ’ 
o ü ö e  a u v o p y ia 0 q a e a 0 e ;  p q ö a p & s -  o ü ö e is  y d p  
eoTiv ö iK a io s  T u y x d v e iv  eX eou tcov  p n ö e v a  
eXeoüvTcov, o ü ö e  o uyyvcbpqs t w v  
ä o u Y Y v w aö v w v . eya) y d p  o lp a i  n d v n ra s  
d v 0 p u m o u s  (frepeiv ä ^ io ü v  n a p ’ aÜTcbv e is t ö v  
ß io v  aÜToTs e p a v o v  n a p ä  n d v 0 .’ ö a a  
n p b n r o u o i v  o lo v  eycn t is  oÜToai p d rp io s  n p ö s  
ä n a v T d s  eip i, eXeqpoov, eü  n o iw v  noXXoüs- 
ä n a a i  n p o o q K e i t u  t o io ü t c o  T aÜ T a e io ^ e p e iv , 
e d v  n o u  K a ip ö s  q XP^ioc n a p a o T q .  eT ep o s  
oÜTooi t is  ß ia io s ,  o ü ö e v a  o u t ’ eXewv o ü 0 ’ öXws 
d 4 )0 p w n o v  q y o ü p e v o s -  t o ü t c o  t o s  ö p o ia s  
4> opds n a p ’ c k ö c j t o u  ö iK a io v  ü n d p x e iv .  o ü  ö q , 
nXqpW Tqs t o i o ü t o u  yeyovcbs e p d v o u  oeauTU ), 
t o ü t o v  Ö iK aios e! ouX X eE,aaQ at
22 D em osth en es  
x x i. 1 86-88
Public
prosecutor
•  o l ö a  T oivuv  ö t i  K ai T d n a i ö i a  excov ö ö u p e r r a i ,  
K ai noX X oüs X ö y o u s K ai T a n e iv o ü s  epeT, 
ö a K p ü w v  K ai (bs eXeeivÖTaTOV n o iw v  eauT Ö v. 
e a n  ö ’ ö o tp  n e p  d v  aÜTÖv v ü v  T an e ivÖ T epov  
n o iq , t o o o ü t o ) pöA A ov d ^ io v  piaeTv aÜTÖv, <o 
ä v ö p e s  ’A 0qvaT oi
•  evo i n a i ö i a  o ü k  c o t i v , o ü ö ’ d v  ex o ip i T aÜ T a 
n a p a o T q o d p e v o s  KXaieiv K ai ö a K p ü e iv  e<J)’ oTs 
ü ß p io 0 q v -  ö id  t o u t ’ d p a  t o ü  nenoiqK Ö TO s ö  
n e n o v 0 d )s  e X a i r o v  eE;io n a p  upTv; p q  ö ry ra- 
äXA’ ÖTav o Üt o s  excov T d n a i ö i a  t o ü t o i s  d^ioT 
ö o ü v a i  Tqv ipq4)ov ü p d s ,  t ö t c  üpeTs t o ü s  
v ö p o u s  e x o v T d  p e  nX qoiov  qyeTa0e 
n a p e o T d v a i  [K ai t ö v  öpKOv ö v  dpcopÖKOTe] 
t o ü t o i s  d ^ io ü v T a  K ai d v n ß o X o ü v T a  e K a c n o v  
üpcbv iy q ( l) io a a 0 a i
23 D em osth en es  
x x i. 195-96
Public
prosecutor
•  o ü  T d oauT O Ü  n a i ö i a  d^icboeis eXeeTv q a e  
T o ü a ö e , q a n o u ö d ^ e iv  e is  Td o d ,  t o ü s  ü n ö  a o ü  
ö q p o o ip  n p o n e n q X a K io p e v o u s
•  o ü k  e a n v  o ü ö a p ö 0 e v  oo i npoaqKCOv eX eos 
o ü ö e  K a 0 ’ ev , dXXd TOÜvavTiov pToos K ai 
(J)0övos K ai ö p y q -  t o ü t c o v  Y d p  d ^ ia  noieTs
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2 4 D em o sth en es  
x x iv . 19 6 -9 7
Public
prosecutor
•  OÜÖ’ eK siv ’ ä v  e x o i s  eineTv, u s  e A e q a a s  ö e iv ä  
n a a x o v T a s  ä E ;0 p u n o u s  ei'Xou ö i ä  T a u T a  
ßoqBeTv aÜToTs. o u t s  y a p  T ä  t o ü t u v  noX X ooT u  
Xpovco pöA is äK O V T as, e v  T p io lv  eE jeA eyxB evT as  
ö iK a c n q p io is , K o rro m B ev a i, t o ü B’ q y q o u  t o  
ö e iv ä  n ä a x s i v  e l v a r  noeTv y a p  e o n  t o u t o  y e  
ö e iv ä ,  K ai n a p o ^ ü v e ie  päA A ov  ä v  n v a  p ia e iv  q 
n p o T p etp e ie v  eA eeT v o u t ’ ä A A u s n p ä o s  K ai 
<J)iA äv0punos o ü  t is  t u v  ä X A u v  ö ia ^ ö p c a s  u v  
eAeeTs aÜTOÜs
25 D em o sth en es
x x v .8 1 -8 4
Public
prosecutor
•  Ti o u v  X o in ö v , 0 ) ä v ö p e s  ’ A B qvaT oi; ä  KOivä v q  
A ia  n ä o iv  ü n ä p x e i  toTs  ä y u v i^ o p e v o is  n a p ä  
Tqs t u v  ä X A u v  ü p u v  (J )ü o eu s, K ai o ü ö e i s  aÜTÖs 
e a u T u  T a ü T a  <J)epei tcüv K p iv o p e v u v , äXX’ 
ü p u v  eK a crro s e x u v  o k o B e v  e p x e T a i,  eX eo v , 
o u y y v u p q v ,  4 ) iA a v 0 p u n ia v . ä X X ä toutgüv y ’ 
o ü B ’ ö a io v  oÜ Te B e p is  t u  p i a p u  t o ü t u  
p e T a ö o ü v a i
•  t ivo s  ö e  o u y y v u p q s  q n o icov  e A e u v  o i 
o e o u K o 4 )a v T q p e v o i T eT u x eK a o iv  n a p ä  t o l it o u , 
o is  o ü t o s  B a v ä T O u  n ä o iv  ö n p ä T ’ e v  t o u t o io i 
t o is  ö iK a c n q p io is
•  äXX’ q y e  t o ü t o u  n iK p ia  K ai p ia i(J )o v ia  K ai 
üpÖ T qs n a p r jv  K ai e^qTä^eTO. o ü x i n a i ö l a ,  
o ü x i p q T e p a s  tcüv K p iv o p e v u v  e v iu v  y p a ü s  
n a p e a r u a a s  ö p u v  o ü t o s  qA eei. elY a o o i  
o u y y v u p q ;  n ö B e v  q n a p ä  t o ü ; q t o is  o o Ts 
n a iö io i s  eA e o s; noX X oü  y e  K ai öeT. a ü  t ö v  e is  
t o u t ’ eX eo v  n p o ö e ö u K a s ,  ’ A p io r o y e iT o v ,  
IjäXXov ö ’ ä v q p q K a s  ö A u s
2 6 D em osth en es
x x v iii.1 6
Private
prosecutor
•  T ä  x p q p o r r ä  [je n ä v T ’ ä n e c n e p q K u s  p eT ä  t u v  
o u v en iT p ö n cü v , e X e e io B a i v ü v  ücp’ ü p u v  
ä ^ iw o e i, p v u v  o ü ö ’ eßöopqK O V T ’ ä ^ ia  T p n o s  
o ü t o s  ä n o ö e ö u K u s ,  e lT a  K ai t o ü t o is  o ü t o Ts 
n ä X iv  e n iß e ß o u X e u K u s
2 7 D em o sth en es x x ix .2 Private
defendant
•  q y o ü p e v o s  ö i ä  t ö  p e y e B o s  t o ü  n p q p a T O s  Tqs 
ö k q s ,  q v  u)(J)Xev, e p o i  p e v  ä v  y e v e o B a i  T ivä  
tfrBövov, a Ü T u  ö ’ eX eo v
28 D em osth en es




•  i'va T o ivuv  e iö q T ’, u  ä v ö p e s  ’ A B qvaT oi, ö o a  
X p q p a T ’ excüv eK tcüv p ia B u o e u v  K ai eK tcüv 
Xpecüv cbs ä n o p u v  K ai n ä v T ’ ä n o X o X e K u s  
ö ö u p e r r a i ,  ß p a x s ’ q p u v  ä K o ü o a T e
29 D em osth en es




•  KaiTOi t ö v  e K e iv o u s  e^ qnaT qK Ö T a t o ü s  
ö iK a c n ä s ,  ä p ’ Ö K vq oeiv  ü p ä s  e ^ a n a T ä v  
o le a B e ; q n em crreuK Ö T a e ia ie v a i  to Ts 
n p ä y p a o iv ,  äX X ’ o ü  t o is  X ö y o is  K ai t o Ts 
o u v e o T u o i p e B ’ a Ü T o ü  p ä p T u a i,  t u  t ’ 
ä K a ß ä p T U  K ai p i a p u  ripoKXeT, t u  p e y ä A u  
t o ü t u , K ai iT paT O K X e? t u  n iB a v u T ä T U  n ä v T u v  
ä v B p u n u v  K ai n o v q p o T ä T U , K ai t u  p q ö e v  
ü n o c n e X X ö p e v o v  p q ö ’ a io x u v ö p e v o v  K Ä a q o e iv  
K ai ö ö u p e T o B a i;  K a n o i t o o o ü t o u  öeTs eA eou  
T ivös ä f y o s  e lv a i ,  ü o T e  p io q B e iq s  ä v  ö iK aiÖ T aT ’ 
ä v B p u n u v  e £  u v  n e n p a y p ä T e u o a i
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30 D em o sth en es  




•  Kal Tf|v öp(J)av iav  ööupeToGai
•  Kai y« P  öp<J)avoi Kai veoi Kai onoToi Tives eioiv 
äYVWTes f j o a v  TaÜTa ö e  n a v ie s  4>aaiv 
peyäX w v öiK aiw v iaxueiv  nXeov n a p ’ üpTv
31 D em o sth en es




• oü  Toivuv G a u p ä o a ip ’ ä v , ei Kai ö a K p ü e iv  Kai 
eXeivoüs e a u T o ü s  neipw vTo noieTv. eyw ö ’ äE;iw 
n p ö s  T aüG ’ ü n o X a p ß ä v e iv  ä n a v i a s  ü p ä s ,  ö t i  
t w v  a io x p w v  ecm , päXXov ö ’ o ü ö e  öiK aiw v, Tä 
pev  övTa K aieaG iovT as Kai n a p o iv o ü v T a s  peT’ 
’ ApICTTOKpdTOUS Kai AlOYVflTOU Kai t o i o ü t w v  
ärep w v  a io x p w s  Kai k o k w s  ävqX w K evai, Tä ö ’ 
äXXÖTpi’ w o t c  Xaßeiv, Ö aK pueiv vuvi Kai 
KXäeiv. e n ’ eKeivois eKXäeT’ ä v , ols en o ie rre , 
ö i k o i w s . vGv ö ’ oü  öeT öaK pueiv , äXX’ ws o ü k  
ä(j>nKaTe öeiK vüvai, q ws eioiv wv ä ^ q K a T ’ 
aüG is üpTv öiK ai, q ws eiKOOTW X ayxaveiv  e ie i 
ö iK aiöv e o n , t o ü  v ö p o u  nevT’ ä rq  Tqv 
n p o G e o p ia v  öeöwKÖTOS
32 D em o sth en es
x x x ix .3 5
D iadikasia • ä v  ö e  4>n ö e iv ä  n ä o x e iv  Kai KXäq Kai
ö ö ü p q ia i  Kai K aiqYOpq p o u , ä  pev ä v  Xeyn, 
P H  nioTeüeTe (o ü  y ä p  ö i k o i o v  pq n ep i t o ü t w v  
Ö V T O S  TOÜ Xöyou vuvi)
33 D em o sth en es x l.53 Private
prosecutor
•  äXX’ üpeTs, w ä v ö p e s  ö iK aoT ai, n p ö s  A iös Kai 
Gewv pn K aTanX aynT e ü n ö  Tqs K pauY qs Tqs
TOÜTOU
34 D em o sth en es xl.61 Private
prosecutor
•  e ä v  ö e  pf) exw v nep i wv 4)eüyei n iv  öiKqv pf|Te 
p ä p T u p a s  ä ^ iö x p e o is  n a p a o x e o G a i  pfpr’ äXXo 
niOTÖv p q ö ev , e re p o u s  napepßäX X n Xöyous 
KaKOUpYÄv, Kai ß o p  Kai oxeiX iä^q  p q ö e v  
n p ö s  to n p ä y p a ,  n p ö s  Aiös Kai Gewv pf) 
en iT p en e ie  aÜTW, äXXä ßoqGeiTe poi T ä ö iK aia
35 D em o sth en es x lv .8 8 Private
prosecutor
• e ä v  ö ’ ö öüpw vT ai, t ö v  nenovGÖT’ eXeivÖTepov 
t w v  ö w o ö v t w v  öiKqv nveioGe
36 D em o sth en es liii .2 9 P ublic
prosecutor
• e ä v  oüv  evGupqGryre, ö t i  o ü ö en o T ’ e a i a i  
ä n o p ia  t w v  äp4>ioßqTqaövTwv üpTv n e p i t w v  
ü p e ie p w v  - q y ä p  öp<j)avoüs q eniKXqpous 
K a T ao K eu o äo av T es  ä ^ iw o o u o iv  eXeeToGai Ü4>’ 
üpw v, q Y n p a s  Kai ä n o p ia s  Kai Tpo(J)äs pqTpi 
XeyovTes, Kai ö ö u p ö p e v o i ö i’ wv päXioT’ 
eXni^ouoiv e ^ a n a iq o e iv  ü p ä s ,  n e ip ä o o v ia i  
ä n o c r re p q o a i  Tqv nöXiv t o ü  ö(J)XqpaTOS - e ä v  
oü v  TaÜTa n a p iö ö v T e s  n ä v T a  K aTa4jq(j)iaqo6e, 
öpGws ßouX eüoeoG e
37 D em o sth en es liv .4 3 Private
prosecutor
• äXXä ö e q o e ia i  Kövwv Kai KXaiqoei. O K onene 
öq  nÖTepos e a r iv  eXeivÖTepos, ö  nenovG w s oT’ 
eyw nenovG ’ ü n ö  t o ü t o u , ei n p o o u ß p iaG e is  
ä n e ip i Kai öiKqs pq t u x w v , q Kövwv, ei öw aei 
ÖiKqv;
38 H yperides ii.7 Public
prosecutor
•  ei ö ’ o[Tei] KopöaK i^w v Kai YeX[wT]onoiwv, 
ö n e p  noi[eTv] ei'wGas eni t w v  öiK aoTq[pi]w v, 
äno4>eü^eoG ai, e[üqG ]qs ei, q n a p ä  t o ü t [ o ] i s  
ouYYVwpqv q e[Xeöv] Tiva n a p ä  t ö  öiK ai[ov 
ü n lä p fx le iv
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39 H yp erid es ii.9 P ub lic
prosecutor
•  Kai t c x  n a iö ia  qKeis e x « v  eis t ö  öiK aaT qpiov , 
Kai ä v a ß i ß ä o a s  aÜTiKa öq  ä^ iw o e is  ü n ö  
t o ü t g o v  eXeeioBai; äXX’ oü  ö[i]K aiov. ö t e  y ä p  q 
nöXis ü n ö  t u )v  äXXwv d)K[T]ipeTO ö iä  t c x  
a u p ß ä v [T a ] , t ö 0 ’ Ü4>’ üpcav e^u ß p i^ e io . Karroi 
o Ü t o i  pev Tqv ' EA A äöa ato^eiv npoeX öpevoi 
a v a ^ ia  t c o v  <J)povqpäTU)v e n a o x o v , a ü  ö e  Tqv 
nöAiv eis T äs e o x d i a s  a ia x ü v a s  äöiK tos 
K aO iaT äs vuvi ö iK aiw s n p w p ia s  Teü£n
4 0 H yp erid es v .4 0 P ublic
prosecutor
•  p q ö [e  t o Ts ] ö a K p ü o is  t o Ts  '  A y [ v (ü ] v i ö o u
n p o aex eT e  [ t ö v ]  v o ü v ,  c k c Tv o  Xo[yi^ö]pevoi, ö t i
dTU X [qoav]n p e v  o ....... (desu n t v. V III)
[ecpoöi...........] oütos ö ’ d v  [KXaiwv] oü  ö k a i a
noiqo[eiev], w o n e p  Kai oi X[niOTai] oi eni t o ü  
Tpox[oü KXai]o\rres, e^öv  aü[TOis] pq  
e p ß a iv e ß v  eis] t ö  nXoTov. o u t g o  Kai 
A q[po ]o0evqs t i  npoa[qK O v] KXaiqaei, e ß ö v  
aÜTÜl pq X apfßaveiv ]....
41 L ycurgus i.33 Public
prosecutor
•  T ivas öe  öuvaTÖ v e lv a i ö o k c T t o Ts  Xöyous 
ijju x ay w y q aa i, Kai Tqv üypÖTqTa aÜTCov t o ü  
q 0 o u s  t o Ts  ö a K p ü o is  eis eXeov n p o a y a y e a 0 a i ;  
TOÜS ÖlKaOTdS
4 2 L ycurgus i. 141-45 P ublic
prosecutor
•  expqv  pev oüv , u) ä v ö p e s ,  ei Kai nep i o ü ö ev ö s  
äXXou v ö p ipöv  ecm  n a T ö a s  Kai y u v a ik a s  
n a p a K a ü ia a p e v o u s  eau T o is  t o ü s  ö iK acrräs  
öiKd^eiv, äXX’ o ü v  ye n ep i n p o ö o a ia s  
KpivovTas oÜTtüs ö o io v  e lva i t o ü t o  n p ö n re iv , 
önw s ö n ö a o \ t o O  k w ö ü v o u  p e T £ t x ° v  üv 
ö(J)0aXpoTs övTes, Kai öpcopevoi Kai 
avapipvqoK O V Tes ö t i  t o ü  k o i v o ü  n a p ä  n d o iv  
eXeou o ü k  q^ id )0 q o av , niK pO Tepas T äs  yvcuoeis 
K aT ä t o ü  äöiKoüvTOS n a p e a K e ü a ^ o v . en e iö q  
ö ’ oü  vöp ip o v  o ü ö ’ e i0 iopevov  ecrriv, äXX’ 
ävayK aT ov ü p ä s  ü n e p  eKeivcov öiKä^eiv, 
T ip w p q o äp ev o i y o ü v  A ew K päTq Kai 
änoK TeivavTes aÜTÖv än ay y e iX aT e  t o Ts  
üpeT epois aÜTW v n a ia i  Kai yuvdi^iv  ö t i  
ü n o y c b io v  XaßövTes t ö v  npoöÖ Tqv aÜTtov 
e T ip w p q o ao 0 e
• Kai öeqoeT ai Kai iKeTeüaei eX eqoai aÜTÖv 
t i v g o v ; o ü x  oTs t ö v  aÜTÖv e p a v o v  eis Tqv 
aay rq p iav  eioeveyKeTv o ü k  eTÖXpqoe; r P o ö io u s 
iKeTeueTW Tqv y ä p  äa<})äAeiav ev Tq eKeivcov 
nöXei päXXov q ev Tq eauTOÜ naT piö i evöp ioev  
e lvai. n o ia  ö ’ qXiKia öiKaicos ävTOÜTOv 
eXeqoeie
43 L ycurgus i. 148 P ublic
prosecutor
•  eneiT a t o ü t o u  t i s  änoipqcJ)ieTTai, Kai 
auyyvcupqv e^ei t g o v  K a T ä  n p o a ip e a iv  
äöiK qpäT w v; Kai t i s  o ü t g o s  ecrriv ävöqTO s oocrre 
t o ü t o v  oto^üjv Tqv eauTOÜ ocoTqpiav n p o e o 0 a i 
t o Ts  eyKaTaXinelv ßouA opevois, Kai t o ü t o v  
eX eqoas aÜTÖs ävqXeqTOS ü n ö  t g o v  noAepicov 
än o X e o 0 a i n p o a ip q a e T a i ,  Kai t w  npoöÖ Tq Tqs 
n a T p iö o s  x ä p iv  0 e p e v o s  ü n e ü 0 u v o s  e lv a i Tq 
n a p ä  t g o v  0eu)v n p c o p ia
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4 4 Lycurgus i. 150 Public
prosecutor
•  vopi^ovTes ouv , w ’ A0r|vaToi, iKCTeüeiv upujv 
Tqv x ^ p a v  Kai tcx ö e v ö p a , öeTo0ai toüs 
Aip e v a s  [Kai] töc vecupia Kai T ä Teixn Tfjs 
nöAews, ä ^ io u v  ö e  Kai Tä ie p ä  ßoqBeTv aÜToTs, 
n a p ä ö e iy p a  n o iq a a T e  AewKpäTq, 
äv apv r|O 0evT es tgov K aT ayopnpevcuv, öti o ü  
nAeov ioxuei n a p ’ üp iv  eAeos o ü ö e  ö ä K p u a  Tqs 
ü n e p  tu)v vöpoav Kai toü ö q p o u  o u rrn p ia s
45 A esch in es iii.2 0 7 Public
prosecutor
•  outos KXäei pev  p<?ov q oi äAAoi yeAwaiv, 
eniopKeT ö e  nävTcav n p o x e ip Ö T a ia
4 6
I




•  nep i ö e  tcov ö a K p ü w v  Kai toü tovou Tqs 
(t>03vfi9, ÖTav ü p ä s  enepWTgc “noT K aT a^üyo), 
ä v ö p e s  ’ A0qvaToi; n e p ie y p ä ip a T e  pe- oük 
ecrriv ö no i ä v a n T q o o p a i ,” äv0unoßäX X eT e 
auTW- “ö  ö e  ö q p o s  ö  ’ A0qvaicov noT 
K aT a^ü y q , A qpöoO eves; n p ö s  n o ia v  
o u p p ä x w v  n a p a o K e u q v ;  n p ö s  noTa x p q p o rra ; 
n  npoßaX A öpevos ü n e p  toü ö q p o u  
n en o A rreu aa i
• öAcos öe  n  Tä ö ä K p u a ;  n s  q K p au y q ; n s  ö 
tövos Tqs (})ü)vqs; o ü x  ö  pev Trjv ypa4>qv e a r i 
KTqaicJjtov, ö  ö ’ äy tb v  oük ä n p ry ro s , o ü  ö ’ oÜTe 
n ep i toü o w p aT o s oÜTe nep i Tqs e n m p ia s  oÜTe 
n ep i Tqs o ü a ia s  äytoviCn
47 D inarchus i.2 2 -2 4 Public
prosecutor
•  q npoaqK eiv  aÜTÖv üc|)’ üpw v eXeou tivös 
Tuy x äv e iv T o iaÜ T a ö ia n e n p a y p e v o v , äXX’ oü  
Tqs e a x äT n s n p to p ia s  Kai ü n e p  tu>v vüv Kai 
ünepTobv npÖ Tepov yeyevqpevu)v äö iK qpäT iov
• ö iä  öe toütov töv npoöÖTriv n a iö e s  Kai
yuvaiK es a i  G q ß a iw v  eni T äs OKriväs twv 
ß a p ß ä p c o v  ö iev ep q O q aav , nöXis äaTuyerrcov 
Kai a ü p p a x o s  eK p e o q s  Tfjs r EXXäöos 
ä v q p n a c r ra i ,  äp o Ü T ai Kai on e ip eT a i tö 
G q ß a iw v  äcjTu tcov KOiu)vr|oävTü)v üpTv toü 
n p ö s  OiAinnov noX epou. äpoÜ T ai, (])qpi, Kai 
oneipeT ai- Kai oük qA eqae, ö  p ia p ö s
oütos nöXiv oiKTpws oütcos änoA A upevqv, eis 
qv  e n p e o ß w u a e v  ucj)’ üpw v a irc T ra X e is , qs 
ö p ö o n o v ö o s  Kai ö p o T p ä n e ü p s  noXXäKis 
yeyovev, qv aÜTÖs cßncyi a ü p p a x o v  qpTv n o iq a a i
48 D inarchus i.92 Public
prosecutor
• ei öe  Ti K qööpeO a Tqs n a T p iö o s  Kai toüs 
n o v n p o ü s  Kai öwpoöÖKOus p io o ü p e v  Kai 
peT O iü)vioaa0ai Tqv TÜxqv Kai p eT aX X ä^ao 0 a i 
ßouX ö p e0 a , o ü  np o eT eo v  e a n v  ü p ä s  aÜTOÜs, w 
' A0r|vaToi, TaTs toü  p ia p o ü  Kai yöqTOS toütou  
ö e q a e a iv , o ü ö e  npoöeK T eov toüs o’iktous Kai 
toüs 4>evaKiopoüs [to ü s] to ü to u - k a v q v  y ä p  
eiX qäaTe neTpav aÜTOÜ Kai twv epytuv Kai tcov 
Aöywv Kai Tqs TÜxqs
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4 9 D in a rc h u s  i. 103 P u b lic
p ro s e c u to r
•  K ai o u , navT cuv e v a v r io v  tw v  ' EXXqvwv 
ö ieX eypevos N iK äv o p i K ai K cxpqpaTiK W S [ev 
’ OXupniQc] n e p i  u)v eß o u X q B q s, eX eeivöv v ü v  
aeau T Ö v  K a T a o K c u ä ^ e is  n p o ö Ö T q s gov K ai 
öcopoöÖKOs, cos e n iX q a o p e v o u s  t o ü t o u s  Tqs 
a q s  n o v r ip ia s ,  K ai o ü  öcbacov öiK qv ü n e p  tov 
eTXqiyai nenoiqKcios
5 0 D in a rc h u s  i. 108-11 P u b lic
p ro s e c u to r
•  p q  o u v  ä x ö e ö 0 ’ aÜTOÖ K X aiovTos K ai 
ö ö u p o p e v o u -  noX ü y a p  ä v  ö iK aiÖ T epov  
e X e q o a r re  Tqv XGÖpav, rty o u t o s  K aB icrrqaiv  eis 
TOÜ9 KIVÖÜVOU9 T o iaÜ T a n p ä r r c o v ,  q t o ü s  eE; 
aÜ T qs yeY evriM evous ü p ä s  iKOTeüei, 
n a p a o T q a a p e v q  tcx ü p e T e p a  T eK va K ai 
y u v a k a s ,  T ip c o p q o a a B a i tö v  n p o ö Ö T q v  K ai 
a t i^ e iv  e a u T q v
•  K ai ÖTav A q p o a B e v q s  e ^ a n a i q a a i  ß o u X ö p ev o s  
K ai n a p a K p o u ö p e v o s  ü p ä s  oiKTi^qTai K ai 
ö a K p ü q , üpeTs eis t ö  Tqs nöXeoos ocop’ 
ä n o ß X e ip av T e s  K ai Tqv n p Ö T ep o v  ö ö ^ a v  
ü n ä p x o u a a v  aÜ Tq ä v n B e T e , nÖ T epov q nöXis 
eX eeivoT epa 5 i ä  t o ü t o v  ysYOvev q ö i ä  Tqv 
nöXiv A q p o a B e v q s
•  a4)evT£s o u v  t o ü s  eX eous K ai to ü s  
(f ie v a K io p o ü s  t o ü s  t o ü t o u  Tqv ö a i a v  K ai 
ö iK a ia v  4)epeTe ipq4)ov, K ai O K onerre  t ö  T f j  
n a T p iö i a u p 4 )e p o v , p q  tö  A q p o o B ev ei-  t o ü t o  
Ya p  e o n  KaX Ä v K ayaB cov  ö iK aoT tov  e p y o v
51 D in a rc h u s  ii. 11 P u b lic
p ro s e c u to r
•  eneiT ’ e ip w v e ü e o B e  n p ö s  ü p ä s  aÜTOÜs, K ai 
n e p i ’ ApicrroYEiTOvos peXXovTes 4>epeivT qv 
tpn4)ov eX eerre , ö s  tö v  a u T o ü  n a T e p a  KaKCüS 
ö ia n B e p e v o v  ü n ö  t o u  X ipoü oü k  q X eq aev
52 D in a rc h u s  iii. 13 P u b lic
p ro se c u to r
•  ene iB ’ ü n o a T e iX a o B a i ti öeT n p ö s  töv  t o io u to v  
ü p ä s ,  K ai a ia x u v B q v a i  t o ü s  q ö iK q p e v o u s , ö s  
oük  q o x ü v B q  T o iaÜ T a n p ö n rc o v  K a 0 ’ üpcov Kai 
tgov aXXwv; o ü x  oi to io ü t o i tw v  av B pconw v  
eXeoTvT’ ä v  eiKÖTGOS n a p ’ üpTv, w ’ A BqvaToi
53 D in a rc h u s  iii.2 0 P u b lic
p ro s e c u to r
•  p q ö e p ia v  o ü v  ö e q a iv , U) 'A B qvaT oi, p q ö ’ eXeov 
eis ü p ä s  X a p ß ä v o v T e s  aÜTOÜs, p q ö e  T qv eE, 
aÜTWv t g o v  epYü)v K ai Tqs ä X q B e ia s  
ä n o ö e ö e iy p e v q v  üpTv k o t ö  t w v  KpivopevGOV
ä ö iK ia v ...... ä K u p o v  n o iq a a v T e s ,  ß o q B q a a T e




The following abbreviations are used in addition to those listed in the Oxford Classical 
Dictionary:
AP The Athenaion Politeia attributed to Aristotle.
Ath. Pol. The Athenaion Politeia attributed to the Old Oligarch.
IG Inscriptiones Graecae, various volumes published since 1873, Berlin,
George Reimer.
LSJ Liddell and Scott Greek-English Lexicon (ninth edition, revised by Stuart
Jones and McKenzie, Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1940).
PCG R. Kassel and C. Austin (eds.), Poetae Comici Graecae, 8 Vols, 1983-
2001. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 
POxy Papyrus Oxyrhynchus.
SEG Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum, various volumes published since
1923.
Vit. Dec. Or at. The Vitae Decern Oratorem attributed to Plutarch.
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